Search

In this paper, the author links the 1862 Kanlica Conference with the demographic changes in Northeast Bosnia that occurred during the 1860s. The author claims that there was a direct link between these two, or in other words, that the Kanlica Conference was a major factor that contributed to changing the demographics — more precisely, switching the majority between the Christians and Muslims in favor of the latter. It’s important to note it here that the Conference itself wasn’t the only reason for the changes, but the factor which, intentionally or not, caused them.

Italian aggression against Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 placed Czechoslovak diplomacy in a predicament. On the one hand, as a member state of the League of Nations, the First Czechoslovak Republic was obliged to preserve the integrity and independence of other League members, including Abyssinia, and to apply at least economic sanctions against any aggressor. On the other hand, as a product of the First World War, Czechoslovakia was highly interested in maintaining the post-war order in Central Europe against growing German revisionism. Here, apart from France and Great Britain, Czechoslovak diplomats put their hopes in Italy as well and were particularly anxious to gain Mussolini for the defence of Austria. In light of this dilemma, the article examines the attitude and behaviour of foreign minister Edvard Beneš, who was not only Czechoslovakia’s leading diplomat but also the country’s principal actor in the League of Nations, where the Abyssinian crisis had been on the agenda since the beginning of 1935. As far as Beneš’ role in the League is concerned, the study focuses on the sixteenth Assembly in autumn 1935, of which Beneš was elected president. While previous works on Czechoslovakia’s Abyssinian policy are mainly based on documents from the Archives of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, this article also uses sources from the League of Nations Archives in Geneva and the Archives of the Masaryk-Institute in Prague.

After Japan was forced to open its ports to the western powers, by the threat of western navies, it was further compelled to sign unequal treaties with the Great Powers. This triggered a sonnō jōi movement led by young samurai, who criticized the ruling Tokugawa regime for its concessions to the foreigners. They therefore sought to expel the Westerners and close the country to their trade. Their second task was to bring the downfall of the shogunate and the restoration of the Imperial rule. In order to achieve this, many radical samurai mounted murderous attacks against the foreigners. One of the most serious of these incidents occurred in September 1862, when British merchant Charles Lennox Richardson was murdered by samurai from the Satsuma domain. Apart from the previous attacks this time the culprits could be identified. British minister to Japan Colonel Neale therefore demanded the punishment of the assailants and an indemnity from the bakufu for its inability to secure lives and safety of British nationals. The Tokugawa government tried to resist and resorted to delaying tactics because of its fear of internal impact, if it yielded. It was only after the British representatives demonstrated, that they are willing to use the naval forces at their disposal, that bakufu submitted.

The events of the Slovak-Hungarian “Little War” are closely connected to the circumstances of Hungary’s re-annexation of Sub-Carpathia in March 1939, which took place under the motto of re-establishing a common Hungarian-Polish border. Corps belonging to the Carpathian section of the Hungarian army advanced into Sub-Carpathia and then proceeded to attack Slovak territories. Hungaryʼs official explanation for its occupation of Sub-Carpathia ran as follows: since Slovakia has become an independent state and thus Czechoslovakia no longer exists as a state, the Viennese arbitration is no longer valid. Hungary has won the right to exercise its claim to Sub-Carpathia. The military conflict between Slovakia and Hungary came to an end when Germany intervened and ordered the two parties to conduct bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement. At the negotiations on March 28, 1939, the parties agreed to end hostilities and to establish a neutral zone between the two armies. They also agreed that Hungarian troops might remain at their occupied positions. On March 28 the Slovak delegation announced claims on Hungarian territory by way of compensation, but the Hungarian government rejected these claims. Germany offered no support to the Slovaks on the border issue; indeed, on April 7 Slovak troops were even required to withdraw from various settlements on the Slovak side of the demarcation line. On April 3, 1939, the German Ambassador to Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, paid a visit to the Hungarian foreign minister, István Csáky; in the course of their discussions, the two men touched upon the issue of the border established with Slovakia. The Ambassador informed Csáky that the Slovak government had turned to Germany for support, but that it had been told that under the circumstances any attempt at the full restoration of the old border, which was Slovakia’s wish, would be futile. The German Ambassador then asked Csáky whether the Hungarian government would be willing to make certain territorial concessions. Csáky responded that this would be inconceivable — “where Hungarian soldiers have trodden, they will stay”. Hungary could keep the 60-kilometre long and 20-kilometre wide strip of land that it had taken from Slovakia. The Hungarian authorities attached the area of land Sub-Carpathia, of which it remained a part until 1944. In 1945 the newly re-established Czechoslovakia was obliged to surrender the railway line between Csap and Ungvár as well as the Ung line: the Czechoslovak-Soviet border — today’s frontier between Slovakia and Ukraine — was drawn ten to fifteen kilometres further west. During its engagements with the Slovak armed forces from March 23–28, 1939, the Hungarian army suffered 25 fatal and 56 non-fatal casualties; it captured 360 Slovak and 211 Czech/Moravian soldiers.

The Meiji Restauration in Japan prefigured a change of mutual relations with Korea. Through coerced Ganghwa Treaty by Japan was Korea opened to the world in 1876. Subsequent three decades Japan sought to consolidate its position on the Korean Peninsula, which became not only economically but also strategically important territory for Japanese government. These efforts led to disputes with China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05), of which Japan emerged as victor. The signing of the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 was a significant step forward for the strengthening of Japanese dominance over the Korean Peninsula. Five years later was Korea annexed.

Even though everyone defines diplomacy in some form, all recognize its special place that bears its political and legal mechanisms and structures, changes over the centuries in foreign policies enhancing its importance in the new context of globalization, thus acquiring new meanings and ways and embracing new features. As we will see later in the paper, diplomacy exists even in ancient times, though not necessarily under this name. Nowadays we can say that diplomats, through their efforts they reconcile conflicting situations and even avoid negative consequences for states, such as embargoes or even wars. It is therefore necessary for diplomats to master the art of negotiations and to be specialized and skilled people. The present study will make an incursion into history until present time to highlight the evolution and importance of diplomacy in international relations. The paper is addressed to those who wish to learn a brief history of diplomacy in a couple of minutes, from El-Amarna until today. The impact of diplomacy on how the state is seen in relationship with others is even more powerful considering the ability to reflect how conflicts are settled or resolved before they escalate. The aim of the paper is to provide a broader vision of what diplomacy means, through the chronology from appearance and its development to the final conclusion: is it a science or an art? The intention is that this work will be useful to all who wish to know more about this subject still considered relatively new. It is worth to mention that it has led to the emergence of a new job – the diplomat, an official, whose mission is to maintain relations with officials of other states or to deal on behalf of his country, who knows how to behave in a situation in order to achieve his goals. Briefly, a shift from art itself to a policy of the art of diplomacy.

Copyright of Studia Historica Brunensia is the property of Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Italian aggression against Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 placed Czechoslovak diplomacy in a predicament. On the one hand, as a member state of the League of Nations, the First Czechoslovak Republic was obliged to preserve the integrity and independence of other League members, including Abyssinia, and to apply at least economic sanctions against any aggressor. On the other hand, as a product of the First World War, Czechoslovakia was highly interested in maintaining the post-war order in Central Europe against growing German revisionism. Here, apart from France and Great Britain, Czechoslovak diplomats put their hopes in Italy as well and were particularly anxious to gain Mussolini for the defence of Austria. In light of this dilemma, the article examines the attitude and behaviour of foreign minister Edvard Beneš, who was not only Czechoslovakia's leading diplomat but also the country's principal actor in the League of Nations, where the Abyssinian crisis had been on the agenda since the beginning of 1935. As far as Beneš' role in the League is concerned, the study focuses on the sixteenth Assembly in autumn 1935, of which Beneš was elected president. While previous works on Czechoslovakia's Abyssinian policy are mainly based on documents from the Archives of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, this article also uses sources from the League of Nations Archives in Geneva and the Archives of the Masaryk-Institute in Prague. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]