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La Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española (SEKLE) invita a participar en el Congreso Internacional que tendrá lugar en Santiago de Compostela del 15 al 19 de julio del 2024. El VI Congreso Internacional de la SEKLE celebra no solo el encuentro bienal de esta Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos sino también el tricentenario del nacimiento de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). El lema Caminos del pensar, evoca metafóricamente tanto el Camino de Santiago y la bella ciudad anfitriona, como los múltiples caminos abiertos por el pensar kantiano a tres siglos de su nacimiento. Consideramos la historia evolutiva de su pensamiento, que, desde nuestro punto de vista, no recorre uno, sino varios caminos, lo que también vale para su historia efectual. Etimológicamente la palabra 'camino' o 'caminos' sugiere el problema del método o de los métodos del pensamiento de Kant y existe en nuestro pensador incluso “un camino que todavía no ha sido nunca hollado” (KrV, A 98), a saber, el de la Deducción trascendental de las categorías. Muchos son los caminos, tanto nacionales como internacionales, que pueden traer a las investigadoras y a los investigadores kantianos a Santiago de Compostela, con ocasión del tricentenario de su nacimiento. Además de los temas mencionados, son bienvenidas las contribuciones sobre cualquier otro aspecto del pensamiento de Kant. Los idiomas del congreso son: español, alemán, portugués, inglés, italiano, francés y gallego. La modalidad será híbrida.

La Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española (SEKLE) invita a participar en el Congreso Internacional que tendrá lugar en Santiago de Compostela del 15 al 19 de julio del 2024. El VI Congreso Internacional de la SEKLE celebra no solo el encuentro bienal de esta Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos sino también el tricentenario del nacimiento de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). El lema Caminos del pensar, evoca metafóricamente tanto el Camino de Santiago y la bella ciudad anfitriona, como los múltiples caminos abiertos por el pensar kantiano a tres siglos de su nacimiento. Consideramos la historia evolutiva de su pensamiento, que, desde nuestro punto de vista, no recorre uno, sino varios caminos, lo que también vale para su historia efectual. Etimológicamente la palabra 'camino' o 'caminos' sugiere el problema del método o de los métodos del pensamiento de Kant y existe en nuestro pensador incluso “un camino que todavía no ha sido nunca hollado” (KrV, A 98), a saber, el de la Deducción trascendental de las categorías. Muchos son los caminos, tanto nacionales como internacionales, que pueden traer a las investigadoras y a los investigadores kantianos a Santiago de Compostela, en ocasión del tricentenario de su nacimiento. Además de los temas mencionados, son bienvenidas las contribuciones sobre cualquier otro aspecto del pensamiento de Kant. Los idiomas del congreso son: español, alemán, portugués, inglés, italiano, francés y gallego.

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Este artículo presenta los resultados obtenidos a través del uso de herramientas informáticas (Provalis Research), también conocidas como CAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software), para el análisis de los escritos de Peirce, las bases estadísticas de una cronología para su último periodo intelectual y la justificación de una posible periodización del Pragmaticismo, además de la descripción de ciertos descubrimientos realizados en nuestro trabajo de archivo sobre los documentos y manuscritos originales de Peirce. Este trabajo es una parte de nuestra investigación en la Universidad de Quebec en Montreal (UQAM) y la Biblioteca Houghton de la Universidad de Harvard.

Kazimierz Twardowski’s article „On clear and unclear philosophical style” (O jasnym niejasnym stylu filozoficznym) is considered as one of his manifests of the Lvov-Warsaw School: clarity of expressing thoughts was one of methodological determinants of this school. Because of some passages in this article, Twardowski is often considered as a philosopher who believed that we may only think in words. In the article, Twardowski’s views on the relation between language and speech are analyzed through the prism of the less known Twardowski’s writings with application of some theoretical distinctions.

En primer término, se aborda la relación asimétrica de humanidades y ciencias en las instituciones contemporáneas de conocimiento sugiriendo la inconveniencia de acentuar la diferencia entre unas y otras, en la medida en que ambos órdenes epistémicos están sometidos hoy a los mismos condicionamientos estructurales. El efecto que estos tienen sobre las humanidades es analizado a través de dos aspectos críticos. En segundo término, se discute la significación epistémica de la ocurrencia como principio común de ciencias y humanidades apelando a la obra de Georg Christoph Lichtenberg a manera de caso ejemplar. En esta, experimentalismo y ensayo, singularidades, ficción y variación dan cuenta de un mismo brote epistémico en humanidades (y literatura) y ciencias.

This paper examines the constructivist turn in political representation from the perspective of Nadia Urbinati’s diarchic model of democracy. To properly assess the significance of Urbinati’s work, it is necessary to situate diarchy within constructivism. While constructivism aims to create new representation spaces for the excluded and marginalized, this endeavour faces challenges in allegations of elitism and manipulation. This paper compares democracy as diarchy with two prominent constructivist approaches, Saward’s claim-making, and Laclau’s hegemonic representation, and it suggests that both fail to address these allegations because they see procedures as external to democratic will formation. This paper concludes that Urbinati’s understanding of how procedures are inherent to democracy provides a valuable synthesis of proceduralism and constructivism, thus providing a novel way of thinking about democratic legitimacy within the constructivist turn.

This paper discusses the 17th-century Latin translation of Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, preserved in Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, MS 9871, produced by the Spaniard Vicente Mariner. The author examines the historical context, sources, and motivations behind Mariner’s translation, his intellectual profile, and the potential reasons for translating a mathematical text given his background in literature. Via a comparison of Mariner’s text with the original Greek, this paper delves into Mariner’s translation choices and linguistic nuances to highlight the challenges he faced while translating it. Transcriptions of the collated passage both from Grynaeus’ 1533 editio princeps of Proclus’ text and Mariner’s manuscript are provided in the Appendix. Overall, this paper attempts to shed light on Mariner’s contribution to the Latin reception of Proclus’ work in the early modern period.

The epistemological problem of scientific confirmation is about determining or comparing the degree of confirmation of scientific hypotheses (i.e., the level of epistemical value we can give them) with respect to empirical evidence. This problem is mainly discussed from an inductivist and probabilistic point of view, particularly by the means of Bayesian theories of confirmation. In this paper we suggest that Popper’s theory of corroboration should be considered as an alternative theory of scientific confirmation, which would reject both induction and probabilities. More specifically, in opposition to some interpretations of Popper, this paper will support the idea that Popper’s concept of corroboration can be understood as a form of confirmation. We will try to establish what could be the rules of this kind of Popperian theory of confirmation. We hope to be able to compare Bayesian and Popperian approaches to the problem of scientific confirmation, and highlight their different methodological contributions to scientific research.

This paper explores the prosaic deductive style developed by Melissus and Zeno. It first emphasizes the authors’ use of a systematic and reduced vocabulary solely dedicated to a priori deduction. In a second time, the paper delves into the systematic role of reductio ad absurdum in their reasoning and distinguishes several kinds of reductio employed by the authors. Through this analysis, the study shows how Melissus and Zeno not only developed and systematized certain aspects of Parmenides’ style but also introduced original features that significantly influenced the philosophical writing style.

This paper delves into the evolution of materialism from its origins with Democritus to its development by Karl Marx. It begins with Democritus' atomism, which proposed that everything is made up of indivisible atoms, laying the groundwork for a materialist worldview. The study then explores how Epicurus expanded on these ideas, focusing on sensory experience and the pursuit of a tranquil life. Moving into the Enlightenment, the paper examines the mechanistic materialism of thinkers like Hobbes and La Mettrie, who viewed humans as complex machines governed by physical laws. Finally, it addresses Marx's dialectical and historical materialism, which combined materialist philosophy with Hegelian dialectics to explain the influence of material conditions and economic structures on society and history. This analysis highlights the enduring significance of materialist thought in understanding social and historical processes.

This article explores the intersection of 19th-century philosophy with historical events, spotlighting Nietzsche, Bentham, Kierkegaard, and Schopenhauer and their distinct perspectives on suffering as a positive element, reflective of the era's cultural and historical nuances. The first part of the paper is a summary of the 19th century and its noteworthy events. The second part argues that suffering is a constant element of human existence by highlighting conceptual similarities between all four philosophers when they describe the challenges that humans must face. The third part of the paper analyzes the relationship between suffering and self-knowledge. The fourth and last part of the paper explores the mechanism of suffering as an epiphenomenon.

This paper constitutes an encompassing account of the Madonna of Orsanmichele in all its historical instances. As source of the first miracle ever recorded in the city-state of Florence, in 1292, the Orsanmichele Madonna generated a cult that lasted centuries. Considering the extravagant artistic commissions on the site of the granary-turned-church, Orsanmichele became a place of religious worship, and, more importantly, grown into being equated with the political and spiritual identity of Florence. The panel by Bernando Daddi and the tabernacle designed by Andrea Orcagna have generated, I argue, a parallel cult – one revering the exquisite artistic draughtsman ship of the painting and that of its monumental shrine. In this paper I aim to present the dialogue between the Marian cult located at Orsanmichele, starting in the thirteenth century, and the artistic patronage prompted by the popularity of the miracle-making image of the Virgin. My study represents a critical re-visitation of the prominent book by Megan Holmes, The Miraculous Image in Renaissance Florence, published in 2013.

In my paper, I contend that it is necessary to rely on a categorial reading of Hegel’s notions of identity and difference in order to properly understand their non-hierarchical relationship in Hegelian dialectics. Many commentators reduce their speculative nature to a merely instrumental use of the terms in analyzing Hegel’s work. In this way, identity and difference are only formally employed and thus ontologically obscured, leaving room for subsequent shortcomings and hierarchizations. I maintain throughout the paper that the best way to elucidate the hierarchical question and prevent dialectical thought from such errors is by inquiring into Hegel’s speculative configuration of onto-logical categories. If anything, Hegel replaces the primacy of identity over difference with an internal linkage that determines the structure of these notions, thus granting their immanent relatedness. For him, the relationship between categories is necessarily a movement. The constitution of identity and difference, as determinations of reflexion of essence in Hegel’s Science of Logic, proves that they are equiprimordial and co-structural, hence preventing any possible hierarchy.

This paper introduces and addresses fresh perspectives in the engagement between Hegel and his postmodern critics and detractors. The first part of the paper examines some of the central discussions on postmodernity, specifically in the works of Lyotard and Habermas, and how they, in different ways, reengage Hegel. The second part focuses on Vattimo’s deployment of the concept of the postmodern credo as a way of returning to Hegel’s own interrogation of modern belief. The paper shows that the common thread linking the modernity of Hegel with the “postmodern moment” remains belief, and in particular, belief in belief itself. The final part provides a brief introduction to all the contributions in this issue.

This paper analyses Gilles Deleuze’s political philosophy in relation to the Hegelian concept of the State. To do this, we identify three interpretations of the term “State” in Deleuze’s work: 1) as the reference point defining the three forms of socius presented in Anti-Oedipus (primitive territorial, barbarian despotic, and civilized capitalist); 2) as a defining trait of the despotic socius form; and 3) as the internalization of this form (Urstaat). Deleuze emerges as a harsh critic of the State in each of these interpretations. However, the subsequent part of the paper reveals that this critique does not advocate for societal fragmentation. By comparing Deleuze’s political philosophy with Hegel’s, we demonstrate that the forms of socius in Deleuze’s system occupy the conceptual place of the State in Hegel’s framework. Through an exploration of the role of differential calculus in the ontology of both philosophers, we establish the groundwork for a philosophical examination of the dominant social relation in the modern world (which is capitalism and not the State) and the prerequisites for a novel political socius.

The 14th-century Dominican theologian and philosopher Durand of Saint-Pourçain was among the intellectuals who took part in the medieval debate on virginity, especially on the relationship between virginity and marriage. This paper discusses a question of his Sentences Commentary (Super Sent., II, d. 20, q. 2), in which Durand poses the question of “whether or not there would have been a loss of virginity in marriage” (utrum in actu matrimoniali fuisset amissio virginitatis) both in statu innocentiae and in statu post peccatum. This paper shows how Durand’s solution to the problem is in opposition to Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’s views, based on formal and material aspects of virginity.

By examining debates on the Anthropocene era ignited by new materialist and posthumanist scholarship, this paper aims to discern how these perspectives can reframe the human-nature nexus. It also considers how various “developmentalist” approaches might assume the role traditionally held by the concept of human nature. The first section highlights concerns raised by posthumanist and neomaterialist scholars about the marginalized status of “nature”, life, and biology within dominant constructivist viewpoints. A central argument posits that notions like “denaturalization” and biopolitics amplify societal dominance over nature, pushing social theory towards an anthropocentric and potentially biologically indeterminate stance. Contrasting this, the second section delves into modern interpretations of the planet in social theory, inspired by the emergence of the Anthropocene. This lens reveals a dynamic, co-constitutive relationship, tilting less towards the unilateral commands of “nature” and more towards understanding the evolution of human life and societal structures within Earth’s expansive temporal and spatial realms. The third section further unpacks these developmental ideas by juxtaposing the theories of Bruno Latour and Tim Ingold. The paper contends that both approaches endeavor to illuminate the complex processes underpinning the evolution of life forms, underscoring the significance of culture. In conclusion, the intricate postnatural landscape of the Anthropocene necessitates a more integrated human-nature relationship. This calls for not only discarding dehumanizing facets of human nature, but also fostering a renewed sensibility - a deeper form of humanizing that acknowledges and celebrates our shared existence with other species and entities.

In this paper, I analyze and compare Maria Kronfeldner’s and Tim Ingold’s views on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture. I show that despite the differences, their views remain close, particularly in terms of their integrative potential. The ultimate purpose of this examination is to lay the groundwork for further research on the problem of conceptual integration between sociocultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology. The paper comprises four main sections. First, I briefly explore the history of Darwinism to show how nature and culture were conceptualized within this framework. Second, I deal with Kronfeldner’s separationist stance and Ingold’s holistic perspective on the nature/ culture conceptual relationship. Third, I discuss the implications of their views on the choice of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. While I interpret Ingold as supporting methodological integration, Kronfelder argues for a version of integrative pluralism. Lastly, I provide an outlook for further discussions on conceptual integration and integrative pluralism.

This paper spells out the ways in which we need to be pluralists about “human nature”. It discusses a conceptual pluralism about the concept of “human nature”, stemming from post-essentialist ontology and the semantic complexity of the term “nature”; a descriptive pluralism about the “descriptive nature” of human beings, which is a pluralism regarding our self-understanding as human beings that stems from the long list of typical features of, and relations between, human beings; a natural kind term pluralism, which is a pluralism that concerns the choices we have in deciding how to apply the kind term “human”; and an explanatory pluralism that results from the causal complexity of life. Because of the complexity of being human, which gives rise to these pluralisms, being human is, the paper claims, a kaleidoscopic affair, and one far from concerning the life sciences only.

In this paper, I attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about what the main mss. are for establishing the text of Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (henceforth EN). This hypothesis was recently advanced on the basis of evidence coming from EN I-II. In exploring this hypothesis, I confine myself to the text of EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and, as a result, I propose a new text for EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] based on a fresh collation of nine mss—four of which were not taken into account in previous editions of the EN—and based on readings that can be gathered from the Arabic translation of the EN that was preserved in the Fez ms. The text proposed in this paper is accompanied by textual notes that justify my decisions regarding some difficult passages.

The study interprets two novels by Kafka (Metamorphosis and Disciplinary Camp), and shows that one of the motives both novels share is the “ahypnotic experience”, i.e., the state in which the character of the story is frightened by sleep, since in sleep he loses control over himself, and is given up to the forces which rid him of of his human form (Metamorphosis). Based on the analysis of the apparatus of torture, interpreted here as “apparatus for producing justice”, the paper argues that for Kafka, the law means not freedom, but inhumanity (Disciplinary Camp). The following part of the paper explains that a similar process is uncovered in Donnarumma’s Amygdala art installation, and poses the question as to whether the increasing autonomy of modern technology intensifies Kafka’s fears of dehumanisation of the world. The final part of the paper offers an alternative conclusion to the problem building on Nietzsche’s understanding of the sense of the sublime.

This paper discusses the concept of information formulated by Michael (Michał) Heller. Heller—a philosopher, theoretical physicist, cosmologist, and theologian—provided a complex image of information and its role in nature, which is rarely found in studies of information. Heller posited that the laws of nature may be interpreted as information, or as providing information, presenting this as a complementary view to scientific structuralism (not discussed in this paper). According to Heller, the informational content of a structure in nature is inversely proportional to that structure’s degree of freedom. The more constrained or complex a structure is, and the less likely it is to exist, the more information it contains. In Heller’s view, the concept of information in Shannon’s Theory of Communication (ToC) is inadequate for expressing the notion of information beyond a numerical measure of a signal structure. Information in Heller’s research closely aligns with the concepts of Jacquette’s and Perzanowski’s combinatorial ontology (concepts not discussed in this paper) and the general theory of information (GTI) of Mark Burgin, although Heller did not explicitly make these connections.

Mathematics, as Eugene Wigner noted, is unreasonably effective in physics. The argument of this paper is that the disproportionate attention that philosophers have paid to discrete structures such as the natural numbers, for which a nominalist construction may be possible, has deprived us of the best argument for Platonism, which lies in continuous structures—in fields and their derived algebras, such as Clifford algebras. The argument that Wigner was making is best made with respect to such structures—in a loose sense, with respect to geometry rather than arithmetic. The purpose of the present paper is to make this connection between mathematical realism and geometrical entities. It thus constitutes an argument against formalism, for which mathematics is merely a game with humanly set rules; and nominalism, in which whatever mathematics is used is eliminable in the final analysis, by often insufficiently specified means. The hope is that light may be cast on the stubborn mysteries of the nature of quantum mechanics and its mathematical formulation, with particular reference to spinor representations—as they have been developed by Andrej Trautman. Thus, according to our argument, quantum mechanics (QM) may appear more natural, as we have better reasons to take spinor structures as irreducibly real, a view consonant with the work of Trautman and Penrose in particular.

This paper delves into AI development’s historical and philosophical dimensions while highlighting the symbiotic relationship between philosophy and AI from a technological perspective: philosophy furnishes foundational concepts, and AI supplies practical tools. The paper posits neurosymbolic AI as a solution to present challenges, sparking discussions encompassing both technical and philosophical considerations. Advocating a multidisciplinary approach calls for merging empirical AI insights with philosophy and cognition science to enrich our comprehension of intelligence and propel AI forward.

This paper presents and discusses Henri Poincaré’s view on the logical non-derivability of imperatives from indicatives. Firstly, his point of view is compared with David Hume’s. Then Poincaré’s thesis is shown to have been implicitly or explicitly essential to attempts to build a logic of imperatives (norms) as a special linguistic category as well as a deontic logic. The paper shows deontic logic enables us to formulate general principles concerning the logical separability of deonticals (sentences with deontic operators) and non-deontic sentences. Finally, the paper includes remarks on the reception of Poincaré’s discussed ideas in later logical and philosophical literature with the second issue illustrated by legal philosophy.

The purpose of the present paper is to analyse the problem of cost generated by the performance of a duty to rescue. The authors consider three distinct views of this problem by confronting a scenario in which one party decides to rescue another, where providing such assistance seems to involve an infringement upon the property rights of the third party. For example, A rescues drowning B but in the process of doing so A apparently trespasses upon C’s land. The question that the authors pose is: Assuming that there is a duty to rescue, who should be charged with the cost of what seems to be an infringement upon the third party’s property rights? The paper analyses the following possibilities: the cost should be borne by (a) the victim of the emer- gency, (b) the rescuer, (c) the third party whose rights seem to have been encroached upon. Even though the authors begin with a pronouncedly libertarian assumption about the third party’s absolute property rights, in the course of the discussion they come to the conclusion that it is exactly this assumption that should be further probed and ultimately relaxed in order to reach the most plausible solution to the present dilemma.

In his 2013 monograph on Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, Malcolm Wilson has shown both that Aristotle conceived of meteorological phenomena as analogous to the bodily processes of animals, and that for the Stagirite the sublunar world should not be seen as a single body, but rather as composed of many different individuals. However, Wilson did not articulate the relationship between these two theories—that is, he did not answer the following question: how is it possible for the Earth to behave like an animal if it is not a single body? This paper argues that the answer to this question lies in the Aristotelian statement about the different paschein of the Earth and animals. In fact, in the chapter of Meteorology dedicated to climatic changes (1.14), Aristotle, after comparing such changes to the maturing and ageing of living organisms, states that ‘only, in the case of the bodies of plants and animals being affected does not occur in each part separately, but it is necessary for the being to mature and decay all at once, whereas in the case of the Earth this occurs in each part separately, due to cooling and warming’ (351a.28-31). In his commentary, Alexander of Aphrodisias reiterates that the difference between the changes of the Earth and those of living organisms concern the way in which these different subjects undergo affections (pathê). The concept of paschein/pathos is thus fundamental to understanding how Aristotle conceives of biological analogies, which play a key role in his meteorology: as the affections of maturing and corruption show, parallels with organic processes can be found in meteorological phenomena, but always at the level of the individual parts of the Earth. Although the sublunary world can be understood in organic terms, this world is not a ‘cosmic animal’, but rather a multiplicity of ‘regional animals’. To corroborate this thesis, this paper addresses several related questions, including: the mechanics ofenvironmental changes according to Aristotle; the differences between the regions of the Earth; the lexicon used in Meteorology to refer to the transformations of the Earth; the personal notes that Alexander adds to Aristotle’s discussion. Finally, the first modern translation of the relevant section of Alexander’s commentary is also provided here.

The paper focuses on the intellectual aspects of Bohumil Hrabal’s work and also on the concept of worldview. The starting point is Josef Zumr’s article “The Intellectual Inspiration of Bohumil Hrabal” (1989); the approaches of Jan Patočka (1942) and Jan Mukařovský (1947) are also mentioned. In his article Zumr presents Hrabal’s worldview as a mosaic of constitutive and affirmative influences. He formulates a thesis on the post-war continuity of the avant-garde, of which Hrabal’s work is a part. In this paper, Zumr’s interpretation is subjected to partial revision: it is not only about ideological influences, but also about their individual creative transformation. Hrabal has lost the optimism of the avant-garde, his work testifies to the turn of an epoch and combines humour with melancholy and historical scepticism.

The paper explores the possibility of creating a positive vision of post-capitalist society and economy, a blue-print for future society with reminiscence to the existing valuable drafts such as Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto. Also, it focuses on shortcomings of that blue-print that became evident through the experiences of 20th-century real socialisms. Following Canadian Marxist Michael Lebowitz, the paper elaborates on how the vision of socialism for the 21st century should place central emphasis on the importance of changing the social relations of production. The central problem is located in the “vanguard relations of production”, the central power and hierarchical authority in the hand of the party vanguard. The paper stresses the importance of the communist party as central to the articulation of the interests of the proletarian class as a whole, a class whose central interest is the overthrow of capitalism. However, the project of overthrowing capitalism must include the recognition of the practical comprehension of the importance of the democratic protagonism. Workers cannot be subordinated as passive observers of the system change. A change in social circumstances should simultaneously mean a change in the actors themselves - the socialist protagonists.

In his theoretical efforts, Lenin made two excursions into philosophy - first in the book Materialism and Empirio-criticism and then in Philosophical Notebooks. There are obvious differences between these two works, which are reflected in the attitude towards Hegel (first rejection and then enthusiasm and acceptance of Hegel’s dialectical method), but also significant similarities. The paper points out that what links Lenin’s two books is the concept of theoretical formation. We derive the term theoretical formation from Lenin’s concept of socio-economic formation: in every society, a large number of modes of production coexist, which are overdetermined by one mode as dominant. Society is thus not a complete and rounded form, but a contradictory overdeterimned formation. The main thesis of the paper is that Lenin applies the concept of over determined formation to the reading of philosophy. Philosophical discourse is never whole but is split between two irreconcilable tendencies - materialism and idealism. Philosophical work is nothing but a struggle for the theoretical dominance of one tendency over another. This struggle between philosophical tendencies is, as Louis Althusser points out, an extension of the class struggle in theory and takes place both in the entire history of philosophy and within each individual philosophical text. The philosophical text is thus a contradictory formation of unequal and combined development.

The title question of the paper has its empirical origin in the form of an individual’s existential experience arising from the personal use of a computer, which we attempt to describe in the first section. The rest of the entire paper can be understood as a philosophical essay answering the question posed. First the connection between the main problem of the article and its “premonition” by mankind, which was expressed in the form of ancient myths and legends, is briefly suggested. After shortly discussing the problems that early considerations of AI focused on, i.e. whether machines can think at all, we move on to reformulate our title question, about the possibility of outsmarting AI. This outsmarting will be understood by us in a rather limited way as to prevent a machine from completing its implemented task. To achieve this objective, after softly clarifying the basic terms, an analogy is built between the “outsmarting” of a machine by a human (the target domain) and the playing of a mathematical game between two players (the base domain), where this outsmarting is assigned a “winning strategy” in the certain game. This mathematical model is formed by games similar to Banach-Mazur games. The strict theorems of such games are then proved and applied to the target of the analogy. We then draw conclusions and look for counter-examples to our findings. The answer to the title question posed is negative, and it is not clear how far it should be taken seriously.

In this paper, we focus on the analysis of Eliezer Yudkowsky’s concept of “coherent extrapolated volition” (CEV) as a response to the need for a post-conventional, persuasive morality that meets the criteria of active trust in the sense of Anthony Giddens, which could be used in the case of autonomous machines. Based on the analysis of the results of the Moral Machine project, we formulate some guidelines for transformation of the idea of a coherent extrapolated volition into the concept of a coherent, extrapolated and clustered volition. The argumentation used in the paper is intended to show that the idea of CEV transformed into its clustered version can be used to build a technically and socially efficient decision-making pattern database for autonomous machines.

This paper provides an account of the evolution of the notion of comparatio in the main dialectical works of Valla, Agricola, and Vives. It highlights the elements of continuity and discontinuity and sheds light on the original contributions of Vives’s treatment. In Valla, Agricola and Vives, the notion of comparatio characterizes: a) the locus of the relation to another in the inventio method; b) the cognitive act through which one can grasp the relationships of similarity and difference between concepts; c) the epistemic method for weighing the degree of plausibility of probable arguments. The paper also shows how Vives enhances the role of comparatio within dialectical art. Firstly, he attributes a pre-eminent position to the locus of the comparatio by virtue of the transversality of its application to all the other loci. Secondly, he identifies the explanation of the key concept of syllogism in the act of compering two sentences with a third. Finally, he finds the essence of the disputatio in the method of comparing equally probable contradictory arguments. This can rightly be considered an innovative element of the Vivesian dialectical treatment with respect to the most advanced European humanist movement of the first decades of the sixteenth century.

This paper analyzes Paul of Venice’s theory of measurement of natural properties and changes. The main sections of the paper correspond to Paul’s analysis of the three types of accidental changes (local motion: section II; augmentation: section III; alteration and qualities: section IV), for which the Augustinian philosopher sought to provide rules of measurement. It appears that Paul achieved an original synthesis borrowing from both Parisian (Albert of Saxony in particular) and Oxfordian sources (especially Richard Swineshead). It is also argued that, on top of this theoretical synthesis, Paul managed to elaborate a quite original theory of intensive properties that marks him out not only from the nominalist framework of his Parisian sources but also from the usual realist treatments of the problem. Finally, it is shown that, to a certain extent, Paul undertook to apply the mathematical and logical tools inherited from the Calculatores tradition to empirical problems of natural philosophy, leading to reevaluate his role in the evolution of scientific thought in early 15th-century Italy (section V).

This paper provides a philosophical analysis and a new edition of an anonymous Epitome (Compendium) of John Dumbleton’s solution to the semantic paradoxes (insolubilia). The first part of this paper briefly presents Dumbleton’s cassationist solution to the semantic paradoxes, which the English philosopher proposes in his Summa Logicae, written in the 1330s–40s. The second part investigates the solution to various types of insolubles proposed by the anonymous author of the Epitome. The third part provides a new critical edition of the Latin text – a first edition was edited by Bottin in 1978 – and an English translation.

In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.

The present case study raises a series of historiographical and archival issues brought up by an investigation we devoted to the patrimonialization of the personal papers of Jean Leray (1906-1998). We first intend to reconstruct Jean Leray’s scientific persona as portrayed in biographical notes about him, especially those published after his death. These systematically put forward Leray’s own recollections of his captivity during World War II. We then establish that the way Leray’s papers were sorted is contemporary with these eulogies and that it was carried out under the close supervision of the mathematician and Academician Paul Malliavin. In doing so, we formulate some hypotheses on the principles that led him to deposit only a few fragments of Leray’s papers in three distinct mathematical libraries. Finally, we place Leray’s account of his captivity in the context of the relationships that certain members of the Académie des sciences, namely Gaston Julia and Henri Villat, had with the university while in captivity at Oflag XVII-A during the Occupation of France (1940-1944).

The present paper concerns the Wittgenstein ontology project: an attempt to create a Semantic Web representation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The project has been in development since 2006, and its current state enables users to search for information about Wittgenstein-related documents and the documents themselves. However, the developers have much more ambitious goals: they attempt to provide a philosophical subject matter knowledge base that would comprise the claims and concepts formulated by the philosopher. The current knowledge representation technology is not well-suited for this task, and a non-standard approach is required. The creators of the Wittgenstein ontology project are aware of this fact; recently, they have been discussing conceptual devices adjusting the technology to their needs. The main goal of this paper is to present examples of a representation of philosophical content that make use of both the devices already proposed and some new inventions. The represented content comes from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; more specifically, its theses concerning the problems in philosophy of mathematics.

The functions of new metaphors in early tantric Buddhism are analysed in the paper. Two models of religious practice are concerned. According to both of them, the goal of tantric practice is permanent modification of the practitioner’s cognitive activity. That modification can be understood as willingness to implement particular metaphors spontaneously into the process of perceptive data interpretation. Those metaphorical concepts are closely related to the conception of Buddha nature. Religious practice of Vajrayâna can be seen as striving for experiential substantiation for the main of those metaphors (mind is mandala). Special act of visualization in ritual context is expected to be such substantiation. Six types of metaphors important in the soteriology of the early Vajrayâna can be distinguished. All of them are discussed in the paper.

The present paper argues that libertarians (e.g. Murray Rothbard, Stephan Kinsella) who subscribe the proportionality principle while embracing the view that to have a right to property is to have a right to defend it run into what we call the Property Defense Dilemma. For if the only way to defend property is to defend it disproportionately, then a private property right – contrary to what these thinkers claim – is not accompanied by a right to defend it. The most plausible way out of the dilemma – the present paper argues – is to conceive of private property rights as only weakly absolute, to use Matthew H. Kramer’s illuminating distinction. On the other hand, libertarians who as Walter Block would like to escape the dilemma by replacing the proportionality standard with the gentleness principle run into other sorts of problems (moral implausibility, incoherence) which also shows that it is the libertarian view on rights as infinitely stringent side constraints that calls for revision and attenuation.

This paper argues that the account of friendship (philia) present in Plato's dialogue the Lysis is rife with the disruptive and maddening force of eros. By its end it is no longer clear whether the familiar sorts of personal relationships that we typically count as friendships, and which Aristotle discusses with great sensitivity and appreciation in the Nicomachean Ethics, can be meaningfully sustained. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes each of the seven, relatively self-contained arguments Socrates offers. In addition, it shows how the dramatic context in which these arguments are embedded foreshadows the dialogue's principal objective: to blur the distinction between philia and eros by allowing the latter to infect the former.

Many scholars consider that Socrates in the Lysis holds that friendship and love are egoistic and utility-based. In this paper, I will argue against those readings of Plato’s Lysis. I will analyze how Socrates treats utility and egoism in the many different kinds of friendship he discusses in the dialogue, from parental love, like-to-like, and unlike-to-unlike relationships, to the accounts of friendship rooted in the human relation to the good and the ways in which we can belong with some other human beings. The upshot of my paper is twofold. I endeavor to prove that some of these relationships, as Plato’s Socrates discusses them, are not egoistic and that Plato represents and valorizes a particular type of friendship having to do with philosophy and philosophical way of life, which is for the sake of another.

According to Václav Havel’s famous essay The Power of powerless life within a lie is at the core of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Life within a lie is characteristic for the great majority of people and is contrasted with life within the truth which is characteristic of dissent movement. In this paper, I will try to shed some light on the concept of “living within a lie.” I will show that Havel develops not one but two concepts of a lie: on the one hand, lie is deliberate pretence; on the other hand, lie is seduction by consumerist values. The first meaning of a lie is derived from Havel’s analysis of the specifics of the Soviet sphere of influence, namely central role of ideology with omnipresent demands on public support of the regime. The second meaning of a lie is heavily influenced by a critical assessment of modern society from the leading figure of the Czech underground movement Ivan Jirous and leading Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. This double meaning of a lie enables Havel to capture both specific problems of living under the communist regime and general problems of living in modern society anywhere in the world. In the final chapters of this paper, I will show that Havel is not clear about how these two meanings of a lie are connected and that there are problems resulting from these unclarities both for Havel’s analysis of the communism and his proposed solution of the crisis.

Given our troubled history in the 20th century, how is it that nationalism and populism have come to raise their heads again in Europe over the past 20 years? What have we lost? What is it about our liberal, democratic political structures that creates the current atmosphere of mistrust, xenophobia and shortsightedness? How has this development come about, and what is driving it? How should we understand this desire for authoritarianism? In this paper, I will address these questions through a reading of two essays that can be considered to have been written as warning signs regarding a very common tendency within social psychology that entails a development of communities towards authoritarian structures. Simone Weil’s essay “Human Personality”, written in 1943 during her wartime exile in London, and Václav Havel’s “The Power of the Powerless”, written in 1978 during his house arrest in Czechoslovakia, both address the potential relapse of Europe into authoritarianism. Neither of these essays should be read as developed theories within political philosophy. They are notes from a dire predicament of crisis, on both a personal and a macro-political level, that investigate the relationship between the subject and society in order to understand the dynamics of totalitarianism. Their strength lies exactly in that they address a present unfolding situation that the authors perceive to have potentially unbearable consequences. This tone of urgency, their way of addressing us from a positionality void of any real power or privilege, and their bold demands for envisioning change beyond given political ideologies, make these essays into unique backdrops for thinking about our current political questions. Both Weil and Havel advocate an open society that permits the subject to cultivate a form of life beyond collective ideology. Both essays address the sensibilities of the subject that do not appeal to identity, common ideology or collectivity in order to thrive. The aim of this paper is to outline this redefinition of the relation between the individual and society in Weil and Havel, as a remedy for our desire for authoritarianism.

How to explain the persistence of technical or scientific objects that seem outdated in every way? This paper tackles this issue through a case study on models assessing the transfer of radioactivity in the environment. These models appeared in the 1950s and were based on a single coefficient. Many conceptual and practical issues concerning this parameter appeared and many studies were then carried out to develop alternatives to these models that seemed outdated. Despite this amount of work, these single coefficient-based models are still the most used. This paper explains this situation that seems paradoxical with practical reasons (technical costs, social structure of expertise) and with arguments based on the functions of the models and their uses.

Retrospection and transformation of the phenomena of criticism and crisis in social theory in recent decades have led to the weakening and even “illegitimate” renunciation of the said doublet. The paper presents an analysis of the renewal of discourse on criticism/crisis and its effects with special consideration of the possibilities of structural criticism. We included several authors of recent analyses as well as the viewpoints that have led to reconsideration of historical and analytical dynamics of two categories, structure and conjuncture, as a form of analysis of current structural processes in terms of structural analysis and criticism. The paper comprises three parts. The first part is a reflection on the reason criticism and crisis have been subjected to different processes of derogation despite their original connection. In the second part, we show the effects of different ways that crisis has manifested itself in capitalism and explain its dispersive and “non-punctual” modalities. The third part raises the question of chances of reuniting the crisis and “immanent criticism” based on structural criticism, and we further articulate its connections with immanent criticism. Structural criticism is viewed as a connection between immanent criticism and transcendent orientation that is focused on the reconnection between crisis and criticism, the elements related to capitalism.

Originating from the fields of philosophy and history, the term historicism is often used by architectural historians. Aiming to contribute to the theoretical framework for the analysis of architectural historicism, the paper first explores the meaning of the concept in its native field of philosophy of history. The paper is aligned with the recent scholarship which interprets historicism as a worldview and deduces three historicist principles - principles of holism, individuality, and development. This paper argues that an historicist outlook marked wider creative achievements of an epoch, and that architecture of the period approximately ranging from the 1750s to the 1950s did not evade its influence. Finally, the paper illustrates the three principles in the idea of building for the age which haunted architects of the Western civilisation for almost two centuries.