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The relevance of the proposed research is determined by the reviving the interest of modern literary studies of the figure of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, determining the place of his creativity in the context of European modernism, the ambiguity of assessments of this phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian fine literature. The article examines Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s novels in the discourse of French Existentialism. Attention is focused on outlining the similarities and differences between J.-P. Sartre, A. Camus and V. Vynnychenko’s worldviews and aesthetic views. The origins of the existentialist method in the work of the Ukrainian émigré writer and its inclusion in the discourse of French atheistic of Existentialism are also analysed, and some conclusions of the “Mougins” cycle of Vynnychenko’s works are investigated using summarized prospects for its study in a broad and its European context is also outlined. The authors examine the forms and methods of aesthetic refraction of the basic concepts of existentialism (absurdity, rebellion, freedom, choice, and relationships at the level “I – the Other”). The purpose of the work and the tasks involve analyzing the philosophical and artistic texts of Vynychenko in the discourse of French existentialism, as well as revealing the main philosophical ideas and functions of the novels of the Ukrainian writer, consistent with the creative guidelines of J.-P. Sartre and A. Camus. The set of goals determines the need for the use of hermeneutic (analysis of artistic texts), historical-literary, comparative-typological (posing and solving a number of literary problems in the context of equal national literature, and biographical (using diary entries) research methods. The problem is determining the place of ideology in the context of French existentialism and the “Mougins’” cycle of Vynnychenko’s works, was raised in literary studies as early as the 70s of the last century, in particular by diaspora researchers S. Naumovych and L. Zaleska-Onyshkevych, who tried to show the priority of Vynnychenko’s writing compared to Sartre and Camus. The problem of existentialism as a philosophical direction was considered in the late 1940s among the members of the Artistic Ukrainian Movement, attempting to formulate the concept of “Ukrainian existentialism”. The Ukrainian researcher Ya. Kotets includes diaspora representatives 70 years later in the article “The Formula of Ukrainian Existentialism” (2021). There are several Ukrainian and Soviet writers who produce some existential ideas and elements of existential interpretation of human life, but they should not be called conscious writers-existentialists. Among modern Ukrainian works need to name “Existentialist philosophy. Traditions and perspectives” by S. Raida (2009), as well as the comparative study “Ukrainian version of artistic existentialism: B.I. Antonych, V. Svidzinsky, T. Osmachka in the European context” (2020) by H. Tokman, where is introduced the concept of “artistic existentialism”. The critical optics of the research make it possible to combine the historical and philosophical specificity of the interwar twenty years and the post-war period, on which are built the works of Vynnychenko, Sartre and Camus. It is an attempt to show the originality of the philosophical and aesthetic views of the emigrant Vynnychenko in the paradigm of French existentialism, to demonstrate the similarity of the Ukrainian type of philosophizing (from Skovoroda, Franko, Lesya Ukrainka to Vynnychenko), to analyze his characteristic orientation towards a person who faces the eternal problems of life, death, and evil. Such non-scientific philosophizing gave birth to special genre forms: essay, aphorism, portrait, dialogue, drama, and novel, which can be found in V.Vynnychenko’s literary work. Vynnychenko belongs to those thinkers who went beyond the boundaries of traditional philosophy in order to comprehend the broader meaning of the entire spiritual culture, developing the ideas of A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, A. Bergson, the theosophical theory of R. Steiner, in their writings. Vynnychenko set himself the goal of revealing prospects for further development to man, to give meaning to its existence, to point it to certain positive values, that is, to overcome the extremes of German and French existentialism and develop a positive philosophical platform.

أكد "سارتر" في كتابه " الوجودية نزعة إنسانية" على أن المبدأ الرئيس للفكر الوجودي هو "الوجود يسبق الماهية"، قاصداً أن الإنسان ليست له "ماهية" سابقة محددة سلفاً، إنما هناك أفراد يأتون إلى العالم، وهم يشكلون ماهيتهم بأنفسهم من خلال أفعالهم واختياراتهم، ولكن هذا المبدأ لم يكن ينطبق على أصحاب البشرة السوداء، فكان لون بشرتهم يحدد ماهيتهم، و ساهم التراث الإنساني سواء الديني والفلسفي والاجتماعي والأدبي في رسم تلك الماهية المسبقة، وظهر الاقتران بين اللون الأسود والكثير من الصفات السلبية كالشر والعبودية، والانحراف الجنسي، والهمجية، مما نتج عنه حالة من الازدراء والدونية لأصحاب البشرة السوداء، وكرد فعل لهذه الحالة ظهر مصطلح "الوجودية السوداءBlack Existentialism "، كصورة جديدة للفكر الوجودي تتناول الأسئلة الفلسفية الخاصة بالوجود الإنساني ومشكلاته كالاغتراب والقلق والحرية والمعاناة والمسؤولية والتحرر في ضوء التجربة المعاشة للسود وسط المجتمع الأبيض. ومن خلال هذا البحث سنحاول التعرف على سمات هذا الاتجاه كما ظهر عند الفيلسوف الفرنسي صاحب البشرة السوداء "فرانز فانون"(1925-1961). In his book, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” Sartre emphasizes that the main principle of existential thought is “Existence Precedes Essence,” meaning that man does not have a predetermined prior “essence.” Rather, there are individuals who come into the world, and they form their essence themselves through their actions and choices. However, this principle dose not apply to people with black skin, as the color of their skin determines their essence. The human heritage in all its forms contributed to drawing that prior essence and many negative characteristics for black people such as evil, slavery, sexual deviance, and barbarism. As a response to this situation, the term “Black Existentialism” appeared, as a new form to existential thought that addressed philosophical questions related to human existence and its problems such as alienation, anxiety, freedom, suffering, responsibility. This is in the light of the experience of the black among white society. In this paper, we will try to identify the characteristics of this trend as it appeared among the black-skinned French philosopher Frantz Fanon (1925-1961).

O presente trabalho procura analisar os conceitos de “liberdade” e “consciência”, tal como aparecem definidos na obra de Jean-Paul Sartre, O Ser e o Nada, com o objetivo de destacar as linhas fundamentais do existencialismo sartriano. Analisa-se a articulação de diversos conceitos entre si, e seu encadeamento no sistema de pensamento sartriano, mostrando-se qual é a relação entre liberdade e consciência que dá coerência a todo o sistema. A liberdade não é uma propriedade do homem, é o ser mesmo do homem, engajado em uma situação. Para a consciência, também para a liberdade: esta é , não uma coisa, mas um ato, o modo mesmo da ação humana no mundo, do desvelamento, da significação, da humanização do mundo.

Dans cet article, nous montrerons comment la philosophie de Sartre propose une déconstruction du lien causal entre l’agent et ses actions dites méchantes selon une démonstration qui s’articule en trois temps. D’abord, nous interrogerons la liberté humaine pour comprendre comment elle peut exister pour faire le Mal. Ensuite, à partir du cas concret de Jean Genet, nous comprendrons le rôle des autres dans l’existence du méchant. Enfin, nous dégagerons des perspectives morales et politiques pour soutenir que la libération des méchants constitue une morale révolutionnaire.

La idea del cogito prerreflexivo se constituye en una de las ideas más importantes de la fenomenología ontológica sartreana. Por esta razón, el objetivo de este artículo es llevar a cabo una especie de estudio genético de la concepción de dicha idea a partir de la lectura que Sartre realiza de las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia interna del tiempo de Husserl, ya que, de dicha lectura, y esta es la tesis central de nuestro trabajo, Sartre llegará a proponer, frente a la concepción moderna de un cogito egológico y reflexivo, un nuevo cogito caracterizado, primordialmente, por ser no-egológico y consciente de sí mismo, pero no reflexivamente.

Freud occupe une place centrale dans l’œuvre de Sartre, non seulement parce que les textes sartriens sont parsemés de références à Freud depuis 1936 jusqu’aux textes les plus tardifs, mais en plus parce que Sartre théorisa et mis en pratique une psychanalyse existentielle. Toutefois, plus qu’un débat sur l’inconscient, la lecture sartrienne de Freud pose le problème de l’origine de la conscience. Là où Freud fait de la vie psychique l’accumulation de traces d’un passé qui ne passe pas et qui pèse constamment sur le présent, Sartre la pense au contraire comme une archive, c’est-à-dire, comme des traces qui ne prennent sens qu’à partir d’une intentionnalité future. Ainsi, la différence entre la psychanalyse freudienne et la psychanalyse existentielle repose pour l’essentiel sur l’opposition entre un surgissement pulsionnel de la conscience et un surgissement ontologique de celle-ci, ce qui impose deux ichnologies divergentes.

En una carta del 12 de septiembre de 1939, Sartre declara a Beauvoir: “Mi querido Castor... jamás sentí tan intensamente que usted es yo mismo… aquí hay más que amor”. ¿A qué se refería Sartre con eso de "más que amor"? Este artículo es un intento de responder a este interrogante por medio de la reconstrucción de las distintas formas del amor según el pensamiento de la pareja existencialista. Este objetivo se alcanza por medio del análisis de la crítica al amor romántico inauténtico en El ser y la nada y El segundo sexo, seguido por el examen del amor auténtico en Cahiers pour une morale.

Este artículo parte de una revisión de los conceptos de nada y libertad en Heidegger, para compararlos posteriormente con sus versiones sartreanas en El ser y la Nada. Haciendo esto, se defenderá que las discrepancias entre ambos autores se deben a que Sartre, al menos en su obra seminal, no se percata del giro lingüístico dado por Heidegger. Finalmente, se señala un problema central de la concepción sartreana de la libertad que se evidencia en su concepto de mala fe, y se sugiere cómo una consideración de las consecuencias del giro lingüístico puede ayudar a remediar dicho problema.

Se analizan los alcances de la noción de libertad desarrollada por Sartre en El ser y la nada. Se propone mostrar que la libertad sartreana no es absoluta, sino que tiene límites para su ejercicio. Con este fin nos preguntaremos, ¿cuál es el fin último de la libertad?, en otras palabras, ¿para qué la acción? Se examinará el problema en dos niveles: los proyectos y acciones concretas del para-sí y el proyecto fundamental de ser en-sí-para-sí. Se incorporan también breves referencias a la literatura sartreana, La náusea, y a ensayos de Simone de Beauvoir (1944) y Albert Camus (1942) del mismo período.

Copyright of RumeliDE Journal of Language & Literature Research / RumeliDE Dil ve Edebiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of RumeliDE Uluslararasi Hakemli Dil & Edebiyat Arastirmalari Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Baudelaire en accusation : au premier abord, cette formule semble porter sur la manière dont Baudelaire a été censuré ainsi que sur les conséquences d'une telle censure sur son activité d'écrivain. Baudelaire en accusation voudrait dire ici : Baudelaire mis en accusation par la censure pour atteinte aux bonnes mœurs. Dans ce contexte, et au regard de l'histoire littéraire du dix-neuvième siècle, Baudelaire comme d'autres, Flaubert ou les Frères Goncourt par exemple, serait un écrivain à scandale méritant, pour les gardiens de cet ordre moral, une mise en accusation. Cette lecture reste toutefois naïve car elle sous-estime l'ambiguïté de la formule. En effet, « Baudelaire en accusation » cela ne veut pas dire « Baudelaire mis en accusation ». En disant « Baudelaire en accusation », en reste-t-on à l'idée d'un Baudelaire accusé de porter atteinte aux bonnes mœurs, ou d'un Baudelaire en situation de porter une accusation contre la pesanteur de l'ordre social et le conformisme intellectuel des critiques littéraires qui jugent son œuvre ? On peut aussi se demander si ce n'est pas l'œuvre de Baudelaire qui accuse métaphoriquement l'écrivain d'un échec, le fameux échec baudelairien commenté par Sartre et Blanchot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Une esquisse de biographie existentielle ; une esquisse de psychanalyse existentielle ; une esquisse d'éthique existentielle – voilà le Baudelaire de Sartre1. Ce n'est pas le moins du monde une charge contre Les Fleurs du Mal ou Le Spleen de Paris ni une étude des ces œuvres. Mais une thèse s'y trouve posée dès la fin du premier paragraphe : les hommes n'ont jamais que la vie qu'ils méritent, et Baudelaire n'échappe pas à la règle. Sartre n'aurait guère aimé notre époque où tout un chacun se proclame victime. Et il allait à contre-courant du grand mouvement de réhabilitation dont Baudelaire bénéficia depuis la fin du XIXe siècle. Peut-être Sartre fut-il le dernier accusateur de Baudelaire ? Mais en quel sens, au juste ? N'est-ce pas aussi avec lui-même qu'il cherche à régler ses comptes ? Tout en faisant de Baudelaire l'occasion d'une réflexion sur l'histoire littéraire de la poésie aux XIXe et XXe siècles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

RESUMO Neste ensaio, discutiremos o modo como a relação entre liberdade e temporalidade aparece em momentos determinados da reflexão de Hannah Arendt, Sartre e Merleau-Ponty, tomando como eixo de investigação a maneira pela qual cada um deles concebe a articulação entre permanência e mudança na descrição da dinâmica temporal. Com isso, pretende-se estabelecer um horizonte de convergência e, em seu interior, explicitar dois encaminhamentos distintos para uma questão similar, mostrando como é possível estabelecer um eixo fenomenológico comum e, ao mesmo tempo, explicitar a diversidade que o constitui.

Vassili Grossman, auteur soviétique des romans Vie et destin et Tout passe, se rend en Arménie en novembre et décembre 1961 pour y retravailler la traduction en russe du roman de l’un des dirigeants de l’Union des écrivains arméniens, Hratchia Kotchar. Moins de deux ans plus tard, en septembre 1963, les intellectuels français Simone de Beauvoir et Jean-Paul Sartre, constamment entourés par les autorités locales, dont Hratchia Kotchar, passent deux ou trois jours dans cette république soviétique, à la toute fin d’un séjour de six semaines en URSS. Grossman et Beauvoir – mais pas Sartre – écriront des textes à la première personne du singulier sur leur séjour en Arménie, et, si ces textes sont de longueurs très différentes, ils ont le mérite de figer deux regards en partie complémentaires sur l’Arménie, sa société et son monde littéraire à une époque précise : celle du Dégel et de la déstalinisation. En outre, Grossman développe dans le sien une comparaison explicite entre Arméniens et Juifs, deux peuples victimes de massacres de masse au XXe siècle, et il poursuit ainsi sa réflexion sur les totalitarismes du siècle. Ces deux textes sont donc aussi révélateurs des perceptions et des attentes de leurs auteurs : un Soviétique, désormais très critique du stalinisme et du léninisme, marqué par les meurtres collectifs du XXe siècle et séduit par les gens simples d’Arménie, et une Française qui demeure fascinée par le communisme et les révolutions, et ne parle ni russe ni arménien.

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Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world.

Mostro, neste artigo, como o problema da alteridade se apresenta na obra de Sartre e Camus e as reflexões que ambos desenvolvem sobre este tema. Acrescente-se que é perceptível o distanciamento entre o pensamento de Sartre e Camus.

Este artigo visa a compreensão de uma certa centralidade ética na contemporaneidade como expressão de uma relação problemática entre liberdade e história. Especificamente, situando aqui duas reflexões fundamentais para se pensar os dilemas éticos contemporâneos. Primeiramente, contraposta ao idealismo da nascente contemporaneidade, a ênfase estético-ética kierkegaardiana numa ética em perspectiva de um existir que problematizando radicalmente sua própria existência alienada faz, em consequência, a experiência crítica de um problemático instante ético no instantâneo da modernidade. E num segundo momento histórico, contraposta às limitações das idealizações realistas diante de um esvaziamento totalitário da liberdade, a recuperação sartreana dessa ética em perspectiva numa chave fenomenológica essencialmente crítica do fenômeno paradoxal de livre reificação de si; o que estabelece uma relação crítica, inclusive, com as próprias perspectivas fenomenológicas contemporâneas enquanto tendentes a niilizar com má-fé sua própria angústia histórica.

Le pacte légendaire de Simone de Beauvoir et Jean-Paul Sartre se fondait sur une connivence intellectuelle et affective entre eux deux. Étant donné que d’habitude Sartre était considéré comme le guide spirituel de ce duo, cela vaut la peine de relativiser le rôle du philosophe pour montrer que Beauvoir n’était aucunement au miroir de son maître. A contrario, ce sont les traces de son inspiration que l’on retrouve dans certains textes du fondateur de la revue Les Temps modernes. Cette influence se fait ressentir avant tout dans la pièce Les Mains sales, se référant au Deuxième Sexe, où l’auteur se rapporte à la notion de mythe, tout en manifestant son intérêt pour, et par, l’écriture au féminin. Ainsi, l’œuvre de Beauvoir et Sartre, deux personnalités fortes, d’un talent inédit, des consciences, à la fois, jumelles et différentes, prouve non seulement leur admiration réciproque pour leur travail respectif, mais aussi l’acceptation de l’autre. En témoignent leurs ouvrages, lus dans la perspective intertextuelle.

Este ensaio visa problematizar a definição da fenomenologia a partir da contribuição de três autores: Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre e Maurice Merleau-Ponty. A recepção do pensamento de Husserl é marcado, na França, pela corrente existencialista que exige, tanto de Merleau-Ponty quanto de Sartre, a reformulação da fenomenologia. A fim de acompanhar esse processo de assimilação e, ao mesmo tempo, modificação da fenomenologia, este ensaio apresenta três definições que, apesar de justapostas, relacionam-se entre si: 1) O que é a fenomenologia de Husserl?; 2) O que é a fenomenologia francesa?; 3) O que é a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty? Este trabalho de definição, apesar de topicalizado, apenas surge e é examinado a partir da relação de contraposição e renovação da escola da fenomenologia, que é vasta e plena de nuances, apontando ecos e vozes dissonantes entre si. Ao acompanhar a reformulação da fenomenologia em três momentos, fica mais claro, ao fim do ensaio, o processo de elaboração de Merleau-Ponty. [Cet essai avance la problématique de la définition de la phénoménologie à partir des contributions d’Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre et Maurice Merleau-Ponty. La pensée de Husserl, en France, est marquée par son caractère existentialiste et exige, de ce fait, tant pour Sartre comme pour Merleau-Ponty, une reformulation de la phénoménologie. Afin d’accompagner ce processus d’assimilation, mais aussi de modification de la phénoménologie, cette essai présente trois définitions qui, bien que juxtaposées, sont étroitement liées : 1) Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie de Husserl?; 2) Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie française?; 3) Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty? Cette tentative de définition n’est examinée qu’à partir de la relation d’opposition et de rénovation de l’école de phénoménologie, elle-même vaste et pleine de nuances, où nous tenterons de mettre en relief les échos et les voix dissonantes. C’est en accompagnant ce travail de reformulation de la phénoménologie en trois temps, que nous espérons éclaircir, à la fin de l’essai, le processus d’élaboration de Merleau-Ponty.]

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A new Other has arisen in our world. By emphasizing our vulnerability, he makes us more alone than ever, locks in our borders, our limits, our bodies. He makes sure that our slightest presence evokes a sense of shame, guilt, a sense of fault and generalized estrangement. We humbly consider ourselves harmful, potential transmitters, and unconscious supporters of this infernal Other. The appearance of the coronavirus is a critical health situation. It is, by its immensity and its great philosophical and cultural significance, a major event in natural history. An event that could potentially lead to a new phase in the relationship of man to the world. Animated, invisible, and terrifying, it is shaping and reforming our existence. However, the world has always been looked at by our anthropocentric vision as an object to explore, know, and use. This time this is the Other who looks at us and makes us objectified and exteriorized. In the present study, we apply the dialectical notion ‘Other-subject / Me-object’ to the Sartrean reading of the event to deal with this distortion of our existence and the possibility of rethinking and redefining our relationship to such new Others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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If truth hurts, this is no doubt because it is often enough forced on us. And the question as to whether the reception of “nice,” “easy” truths is similarly an outcome of coercion negates itself in its very formulation—we do not ask “why are things the way they are?” from a feeling of comfort; the plaintiff cry of “how, then, shall we live?” does not come to us out of a sense of security. Indeed, insofar as truth overtakes us and interrupts the conventions of our lives, it occurs to us quite apart from our ordinary desires and wants. We are thus faced with a paradox: what claim can truth make on a being that “doesn’t need it and doesn’t care about it—since it doesn’t at all concern his needs”? When one considers that the awareness of truth is indexed to lived experience, the paradox is only heightened.

In a statement too strong even to summarize his own views, Jean-Paul Sartre famously declares in “Existentialism is a Humanism” that “man is nothing other than what he makes of himself.” It is bad faith, according to him, to attribute what I am to my family, culture, condition, etc., because through awareness of what I am and have been, I can determine whether what I am will continue into the future. Human being, as a result, is nothing but what he or she has chosen or decided. In “On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew,” Jean Améry rejects that view.He explicitly rejects the idea that “I am what I am for myself and in myself, and nothing else.” In doing so, he is one of a group of Jewish thinkers, including Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, who reject Sartre’s ideas about Jewish identity and identity more generally, ideas expressed particularly in Reflections on the Jewish Question but amplified by views expressed in “Existentialism is a Humanism” and Being and Nothingness.Those in the group go out of their way to express their gratitude to Sartre for writing on “the Jewish question” after the war--Sartre who wrote because he saw no mention of the 77,000 Jews in France who were deported and murdered by the Nazis.

The aim of the analysis is to present selected non-biblical intertextual references appearing in the novel Franz et François by the Belgian writer François Weyergans. They create a polylogue of voices coming from various areas of culture, e.g. literature (Gide), philosophy (Sartre, Camus) or psychoanalysis (Freud, Karl Abraham), and often taking issue with the world of traditional biblical values. As such these references illustrate well the process of individuation of the hero of the novel who, full of guilt, moves away from the Bible and from his father [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Resumo A necessidade da transmissão se impõe a cada geração. Entretanto, o problema do narrar permanece e se renova a cada alvorecer: a fronteira entre os gêneros, os limites documentais, as escolhas narrativas, os narradores, os leitores. Tal temática poderia parecer estranha a Sartre, mas não só a situo no coração de seu pensamento, como reivindico seu potencial restaurador como instrumento atual de conhecimento. Este trabalho procura seguir os traços desse Sartre inventor de formas narrativas, mostrando que, desde La Nausée, não hesitou em colocar entre parênteses os gêneros para propor formas novas, mais coerentes com suas experiências e reflexões. Junto com os Carnets de la drôle de guerre, Les Mots e L'Idiot de la famille, o esforço empreendido em La Nausée mostra que do entrelaçamento fundamental entre vida e obra salta uma concepção restauradora da narrativa como mediadora do processo de transformação existencial.

Abstract – This chapter is intended as a critical re-reading of Orphée noir by Jean-Paul Sartre, which is an introduction, written by the French philosopher, to the anthology of French-speaking poets of the Third World, edited by L. Sedar Senghor, entitled: Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache de langue française (1948). Analysing Sartre’s text again today has a dual theoretical importance regarding the alternative semantics needed to make sense of the diversity of the African culture, of ‘negritude’ which, in its ‘western’ meaning, has always stemmed from a vocabulary of white domination justifying the reduction of blacks to slaves, and which is also an inherent aesthetic energy of the poetic word, whose symbolic nature guarantees an understanding of the logical language of the ‘other’ who is defined as ‘wild’ by the restricted rationality of the functional western culture – and yet s/he is ‘deeply human’ insofar as s/he makes use of the imaginative and emotional language of the universal consciousness. The writings of Sartre seem to have no time limit when considering the topical relevance of his thought, which is open to the overcoming of every closed identity, including that of ‘negritude’ – which must be a liberating symbolic tradition to be abandoned, however, in the name of humanistic identity that is open to the recognition of the dignified condition of a human being from any culture, from any geo-historical area in the world. The objective of every culture, in fact, must be to liberalize the ‘human’ dimension of a human being tout-court, beyond every border and every tradition – History will decide which populations emancipate others in a particular period. Then, this task moves onto other nations, a pattern which repeats itself over time, which crosses the historical events of every human and humanistic process towards the goal of a conscious and democratically civil existence.

Finalizada la Segunda Guerra mundial, René Leibowitz, principal defensor y promotor del dodecafonismo en Francia, ocupa un sitial de privilegio en el medio intelectual, desempeñándose como crítico musical en prestigiosas revistas literarias de la época. En octubre de 1947, publica en Les Temps Modernes (revista fundada y dirigida por Jean-Paul Sartre) un artículo polémico titulado “Béla Bartók ou la possibilité du compromis dans la musique contemporaine”. Los postulados de dicho escrito tendrán una influencia insospechada sobre una parte importante de la juventud musical de aquel entonces. A través de un examen minucioso del texto, así como de otras fuentes de la época, este trabajo se propone un doble objetivo: analizar la recepción del artículo en los biógrafos franceses de Bartók y evaluar el impacto de las ideas leibowitzianas en sus alumnos, en particular en Pierre Boulez.

Usually associated with a view of freedom as absolute, Sartre’s philosophy seems particularly able to account for the indeterminacy that we experience today in most areas of human experience that have a normative dimension. Without denying that this is a plausible reading, it will be argued here that it is nevertheless a problematic interpretation. On this reading, existentialism seems unable to account for the fact that we are powerfully conditioned by a significant number of factors, which limit our freedom and, in certain situations, make emancipation a normative requirement. It is held here that this problem can be addressed and a less problematic interpretation of Sartre can be defended, once we start to acknowledge that in Sartre we have a variety of notions of freedom that can provide a robust account of our freedom, of authentic choice and of responsibility. Habitualmente asociada a una visión de la libertad como un concepto absoluto, la filosofía de Sartre parece especialmente capaz de representar la indeterminación que experimentamos hoy en día en la mayoría de las áreas de la experiencia humana que tienen una dimensión normativa. Sin negar que ésta es una lectura convincente, no obstante, se va a argumentar que es una interpretación problemática. Con esta lectura parece que el existencialismo es incapaz de representar el hecho de que estamos fuertemente condicionados por un número importante de factores que limitan nuestra libertad y, en algunas situaciones, hacen de la emancipación una necesidad normativa. En este artículo se defiende que se puede abordar este problema, y se puede defender una interpretación de Sartre menos problemática, una vez empecemos a reconocer que en Sartre se pueden encontrar una variedad de nociones de libertad que permiten ofrecer una explicación sólida de nuestra libertad, de elección auténtica y de responsabilidad. DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER FROM SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2622045

A noção de desejo é essencial na filosofia de Sartre, que a trata de forma ontológica em O ser e o nada, descrevendo o modo pelo qual o Para-si é desejo necessário e ao mesmo tempo frustrado de ser Em-si-Para-si. No entanto - e isso não costuma ser estudado pelos comentadores que se voltam para essa questão - a noção de desejo também aparece como essencial em O imaginário, no qual o filósofo descreve a forma pela qual esse desejo se mostra diferentemente diante de objetos percebidos e de objetos imaginados. Este artigo pretende mostrar como a noção ontológica de desejo está relacionada à descrição de desejo, particularizando as distintas formas de seu fracasso. Embora o fracasso seja constitutivo do desejo, mostraremos que há uma distinção nessa frustração, que se dá por meio do modo de existência de cada objeto (tendo o objeto real uma existência independente do sujeito que o visa, e o objeto irreal tendo existência apenas enquanto é visado).*

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A relação da arte com a filosofia sempre passou por uma meditação muito especial sobre a relação entre poética e política. A expulsão dos poetas da república platônica, a fundação kantiana da comunidade sobre o juízo de gosto, e a educação estética do homem que Schiller propõe com fins reformistas, são exemplos emblemáticos desse gesto recursivo, que procura pensar filosoficamente uma tensão irredutível entre a poética da política (isto é, os estilos de articulação do comum) e a política da poética (isto é, as formas de intervenção da criação artística). A assimilação hegeliana da arte a «coisa do passado» representa simplesmente um episodio a mais nessa história de desentendimentos, de exclusões e de apropriações violentas, mas representa também, ao mesmo tempo, um momento fundamental para a reflexão estética contemporânea, na medida em que pretende resolver definitivamente essa tensão constitutiva. Evidentemente, para além do diagnóstico hegeliano, a arte continuaria proliferando, forçando a filosofia a confrontar-se novamente com essa tensão que define de forma trágica a reflexão estética. Longe das interpretações do pensamento hegeliano em registro de «obituário» da arte, as obras de Benjamin e Adorno, Heidegger e Sartre, Bataille e Blanchot, Deleuze e Rancière, propõem uma série de leituras incomensuráveis, que procuram restituir à arte seu (sem)sentido na práxis humana.

O objetivo deste estudo é analisar e discutir o papel que a música exerce no romance A náusea de Jean-Paul Sartre. Assim, em um primeiro momento se irá descrever o modo como a contingência se apresenta na obra, para em um segundo momento explicitar o efeito que a música exerce sobre o personagem Antoine Roquentin. O que será evidenciado, sobretudo, é a possibilidade de subjugar a contingência de maneira temporária em uma espécie de fuga salvacionista.

Given the lack of research on this subject produced in Romance Languages, the author Given the lack of research on this subject produced in Romance Languages, the author tries to find a possible meeting point between the philosophical systems of Fichte and Sartre in order to understand better their contributions to this theme. Disregarding a possible approach to these two authors through a receptive textual criticism of the former in the work of the latter, it is possible to identify points of convergence and coincidence between them. Subsequently, the paper focuses on the subject of freedom, firstly, from the Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness, and secondly, from the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge and Nova Method. In this way, freedom is perceived as the cornerstone for both systems of thought and the bridge that shortens the distance between the Fichtean self and nonself and the Sartrean being-in-itself and being-for-itself.

O artigo investiga o modo pelo qual Merleau-Ponty compreende a experiência do imaginário ao longo de sua obra. Buscamos analisar dois momentos decisivos. No primeiro, enfatizamos a proximidade com a filosofia de Sartre – a despeito das diferenças que os separam, por conta da centralidade do corpo próprio na Fenomenologia da Percepção –, a qual nos convida a pensar a imaginação enquanto exercício da liberdade da consciência. Num segundo momento, Merleau-Ponty se dá conta do idealismo inerente à proposta sartreana e abre campo a uma nova abordagem do imaginário: o filósofo analisa o caráter corpóreo e passivo das produções imaginárias, tendo por referência a psicanálise freudiana e a abordagem do simbólico empreendida por esta.

Albert Memmi’s first autobiographical novel, called La statue de sel, was published in 1953. Born in a Jewish family, Memmi grows up in Tunisia at a time where this Muslim majority country was still a French protectorate. Growing up in such an exceptional environment causes him a serious identity crisis. At 35, Memmi realizes that only literature can help him understand his place in the world. In this paper, we would like to analyze the feeling of strangeness Albert Memmi grew up with, paying special attention to his books: La statue de sel and the Portrait du colonisé, an essay published in 1957 as a theoretical complement to the novel.