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Esiste continuità tra la “Legge” dell’Antico Testamento (la Tôrâ) e il Diritto canonico propriamente detto? Il tema riguarda espressamente – e mette alla prova – la “qualità” della Teologia del Diritto canonico (prima che la Morale) e può trovare un supporto e indirizzo non ambigui o ideologici nella riflessione intorno alla “purità rituale”, cardine dell’osservanza giudaica, apertamente contestata da Gesù stesso e dalla Chiesa apostolica (Luca e Paolo), e non recepita nei primi quattro secoli di vita della Chiesa, dopo la decisione di At 15 sulla non-circoncisione. D’altra parte: poiché il Diritto canonico regola soltanto la vita della Comunità dei discepoli di Cristo, le norme giudaiche (che regolano la vita del Popolo d’Israele) non hanno in esso alcun rilievo. L’analisi delle ricorrenze di “Legge” nei Vangeli, insieme ad alcuni concetti chiave del Nuovo Testamento ( nuovo, ombra-realtà, pienezza, compimento) non lasciano dubbi in merito. ¿Hay continuidad entre la “Ley” del Antiguo Testamento (la Tôrâ) y el Derecho canónico propiamente dicho? El tema concierne expresamente – y pone a prueba – la “calidad” de la Teología del Derecho canónico (antes que la Moral) y puede encontrar un soporte y dirección no ambiguos o ideológicos en la reflexión sobre la “pureza ritual”, bisagra de la observancia judaica, abiertamente cuestionada por el mismo Jesús y por la Iglesia apostólica, (Luca y Pablo), y no transpuesta en los primeros cuatro siglos de vida de la Iglesia, después de la decisión de Hch 15 sobre la no-circuncisión. Por otro lado: ya que el Derecho canónico regula solamente la vida de la Comunidad de los discípulos de Cristo, las normas judaicas (que regulan la vida del Pueblo de Israel) no tienen ningún relieve en el mismo. El análisis de las repeticiones de “Ley” en los Evangelios, junto con unos conceptos claves del Nuevo Testamento ( nuevo, sombra-realidad, plenitud, cumplimiento) no dejan lugar a duda al respecto.

Montesquieu used the concept of “law” to indicate, in a broad sense, the multifarious concatenations of causes that are intertwined in the historical determination of human societies. The French thinker distinguished the “laws” in plurime typologies, that he related to the cultural, political, moral, legal, religious and climatic variables, whose incidence is stratified into the systemic composition of each civilization, through the commixture of reciprocal interdependencies that forge the “general spirit” of nations. Furthermore, Montesquieu combined his peculiar methodological approach with the principles of “jusnaturalism”, in fact took for granted the existence of “natural laws”, among which he included the instinct for “sociability”, that laid as the primary foundation of all community aggregates. In this regard, Montesquieu directed harsh criticisms at Hobbes, whereas revealed evident affinities with Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke, although without adhering to the “social contract theory”.

The plot of the Viceroys is massively interwoven by an extraordinary discourse concerning law which, combined with the historical, political, economic, religious and the emotional codes, involves the juridical code, in the strict sense of the word. The latter, in turn, still remains inscribed in a feudal structure. Although the historical-familiar events told take place around the mid-nineteenth century Bourbon Sicily, the age is yet marked by the abolition of some meaningful institutions of the old law such as, among others, the fideicommissum. In order to settle their hereditary, testamentary, matrimonial and estate caste issues, the noble Uzedas continue to rely on that old feudal law, at least formally. Actually, they do nothing but circumvent or even break it. Once the new Savoy regulations have become effective, they do not despise however to exploit a noble of the robe, and acquired by marriage, lawyer Benedetto Giulente’s advice in order to legally cope with their suspicious transactions. Next to the laical regulations of the law, the novel also describes, in an irreverent and outrageous way, what remains of the Benedictine Rule in an age of «plenty» about to the end, in consequence of the new Piedmont law which states the abolition of religious orders. Anyway, what sort of law, ethically speaking, does the novel actually convey, despite the positive juridical orders stemming from it? As a matter of fact, it is an archaic and dreadful maternal law, a ‘law-lawless’, incessantly brought up, as this analysis tries to point out accurately together with the positive law procedures coming out from the narrative.

If an unbreakable law exists for the Subject, it is the limits that Reality sets for his expansion and for his creativity, unless he alienates himself from reality to enter the realm of folly. Literary creation realizes itself in the space between the direct experience of the world, the event in its pure happening, and the unity of sense as an object of desire. The subject with his understanding abilities, therefore, must react to the stimulus given by the event willingly or unwillingly experienced and he must venture out to the eventful journey of interpretation led by the intentionality of his desire. As Petrarch’s canzone 360 demonstrates, the trial-pattern can be used as a literary form and a cognitive model in order to show the inner reasoning and moral debate, to define the rules of the specific literary genre, to explicate a truth that finally depends on the literary genre. On this journey the desire of sense can suffer limits and frustrations imposed by the law of Reality: obstacles, obligations, censorship and self-censorship (as introjected censorship principles). This law both makes hard and leads the journey, obstructs it but also makes it shareable: facing a Reality similar for all the human beings (even if differently perceived), shareable reactions and interpretations are developed. My article intends to explore these issues in some revealing and foundational texts of modern lyric poetry (mostly from Petrarch’s Canzoniere), having in mind the idea that poetry, as a personal voice of a subject, utters this journey of research more than it reveals some acquired general truths. In European lyric tradition, woman and nature can be considered as functional objects that activate and set a limit to the subject; they embody the law to obey, to which to conform or to rebel. In order to exercise himself in the text-space, to construct himself as a subject, the lyric-I has to create the limits within which to act and the laws of this space.

La letteratura e le sue rappresentazioni del mondo della legge. Differenze profonde tra l’amministrazione della giustizia nei paesi eredi del diritto romano e quella nei paesi di tradizione anglosassone. I protagonisti della scena giudiziaria: l’imputato, il procuratore, gli avvocati, i testimoni, il perito di parte, il giudice, la giuria, il pubblico. La macchina della giustizia, i suoi funzionamenti, l’atmosfera delle udienze nelle metafore letterarie. La frequente incomprensione dei suoi meccanismi da parte di imputati e pubblico. Gli esempi di molti testi letterari e filmici, dal Libro di Giobbe ai romanzi di Grisham.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the ways in which law is represented in the celebrated TV series The Wire, broadcasted in United States between 2002 and 2008. The analysis focuses particularly on the thematization of the relationship between the concept of law and that of justice, that is between 'positive law' and 'natural law'. This theme is pursued in the context of American television series of great success such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS, 2000-) and Ally McBeal (Fox, 1997-2002) . The comparison highlights the way in which in The Wire the terms of the problem are completely eroded through the representation of a sort of 'disappearance of justice'. In this series the natural law becomes insignificant both because it is no more the point of reference of the actions activated by the institutions, and because an informed, in-depth and not prejudicial gaze on the social reality of the contemporary metropolis brings into question the very idea of a justice absolute and distanced from the contingent circumstances.

How could the story of an imaginary society based on sport laws be an allegory of the concentration camp? What made the drawings of this improbable utopia, sketched in some forgotten days of youth, the objets trouvés for the reworking of the trauma of an orphan and the history of the Shoah? Perhaps the best approach to W ou le souvenir d’enfance (1975) by Georges Perec is to consider it a parable of the law. The book faces the various meanings of this concept: law of society, contrainte of writing, rule of memory. The essay intends to outline how these meta-textual correlations provided Perec with a way to surround an absence with words. W focuses on the vain claim of writing personal experience, but also on the allusive relationship that nevertheless brings together the written and the unwritten world. While Perec’s search seems to clash with the irresolvable trauma of his childhood, a bizarre youthhood fantasy, like a mirror, reveals to the reader unexpected glimpses of the past.

In quello che Paolo Grossi chiama il medioevo sapienziale i giuristi si impegnano a definire una serie di regole tese alla composizione delle controversie di confine: non ci sono infatti testi normativi precostituiti che le definiscano. Il Corpus Iuris si occupa, quasi esclusivamente, della conflittualità confinaria tra privati. Quando il richiamo ai testi del diritto romano viene effettuato serve solo per conferire ‘autorevolezza’ a soluzioni che assai spesso si fondano su pratiche di composizione legate alla prassi. Le regole elaborate dai giuristi medievali trovano così la loro formalizzazione sul piano del diritto, ma rinviano a un modo di vivere i confini tra comunità legato agli spostamenti, alle abitudini, alle comuni necessità esistenziali. D’altra parte l’esistenza di demarcazioni nette (che pure esistono) rinvia non tanto a una pretesa politica esclusiva e totalizzante, quanto piuttosto all’esercizio di diritti e prerogative determinati.