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In some schools of thought of radicalisation research there is a tacit assumption that individuals become gradually radicalised in their ideas, attitudes, political preferences and worldview, and then motivated by this subsequently radicalise their actions to commit an act of terrorism. This article supports those who question this linear model and I argue that these two processes, which are here labelled as ideological and behavioural radicalisation, must be differentiated. Drawing on ideas from radicalisation in genocide studies, this article contributes to the social movement theory approaches to terrorism. As such, the article differentiates between ideological and behavioural radicalisation processes and argues that these two types of radicalisation can be sequenced with either first. This article posits that it is possible for individuals to engage in radical actions without having extreme preferences, just as it is equally possible for other individuals to have radical ideologies without acting on them, supporting more social movement theory approaches to radicalisation. The article provides a plausibility probe for this sequencing, demonstrating its empirical utility for participation in genocidal violence.

The method of building simplified formal models of phenomena under study is widespread in contemporary natural and social science; much scientific progress consists in the provision of better models. A model-building methodology has also been used with success in analytic philosophy, for example by Carnap in his development of intensional semantics. Arguably, philosophers have overlooked how much progress their discipline has made through their failure to conceive it in model-building terms. By using the method more extensively, they can overcome the fragility to error inherent in the naïve falsificationist methodology on which many analytic philosophers rely.