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The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between the expressions bon père de famille and bonne mère de famille. The expression bon père de famille refers to the reasonable person standard of the French law and has been recently replaced by the terms raisonnablement, raisonnable and personne raisonable. This paper discusses the historical background of the bon père de famille standard in the French law and presents the analysis of occurrences of both expressions in the corpus of legal texts.

The present study is a critical approach to the Canada Law Reform Commission document concerning homicide. This study deals with two particular aspects of the law of homicide. In the first chapter we suggest the creation of a special category of homicide, the « homicide passionnel », for the following reasons : first of all the substantive defences, like intoxication, self-defence, diminished responsibility and provocation are too narrow. Especially with provocation, the application of the objective test is detrimental to the more vulnerable population which lacks educational and financial resources. Secondly, we cannot compare the robber who kills by using his weapon with the person who kills in a state of excitement, jealousy or anger. Besides, many foreign laws have recognized this category of « hot-blood » homicide. So, we think that is time for Canada to abolish the defence of provocation (s. 215 Cr. C.) and create this specific offence. In the second chapter, we suggest criminalization of homicide by negligence. Actually, we can see the difficulty judges have in convicting someone for criminal negligence when the death of a person is due to trafic « accident ». Many foreign criminal codes have created this offence. We find it fair to impose the duty of the reasonable person on those who take certain risks by using motor vehicles or other machines for their benefit or spare time.

L’exercice de la discrétion par les fiduciaires de fiducies testamentaires est une notion qui suscite un nombre grandissant de litiges. Si quelques jugements ont tracé la route pour une réflexion plus riche, de nombreuses questions demeurent sans réponse. Le présent article a pour objectif d’établir de quelle façon le droit québécois enjoint aux fiduciaires de fiducies testamentaires d’exercer leurs pouvoirs. Plus particulièrement, il vise à déterminer si les fiduciaires doivent décider en fonction de leur perception de ce que le testateur aurait lui-même décidé ou s’ils doivent plutôt le faire en fonction de la décision que prendrait une personne raisonnable. Pour répondre à ce questionnement dans le contexte où très peu d’auteurs ont spécifiquement travaillé sur l’exercice du pouvoir par les fiduciaires de fiducies testamentaires, le présent article prend assise sur la convergence entre la théorie moderne du patrimoine et la théorie des pouvoirs juridiques privés. Il a également pour objet de concilier la vaste étendue de la liberté de tester du testateur (qui pourrait lui permettre d’être déraisonnable) et certains devoirs impératifs des fiduciaires qui les forcent à agir comme le ferait une personne raisonnable., The exercise of discretion by the trustees of a testamentary trust is increasingly a source of litigation. Although some judgments have paved the way for more thought, many questions remain unanswered. This text aims to establish how Quebec law regulates/controls trustees in the exercise of their powers. More precisely, it aims to determine whether trustees must decide considering their own perception of what the testator would have decided himself, or whether they must decide on the basis of how a reasonable person would decide. To answer the question in the context where very few authors have specifically addressed the discretionary powers of trustees up to now, this text builds upon the meeting point between the modern theory of the patrimony and the theory of private powers. This text also aims to reconcile the testator’s freedom of testation (which may even be exercised unreasonably) and the duty of the trustees to act as a reasonable person.