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(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(2), 627-639 | European Forum Insight of 17 October 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Background. - II.1. The European Commission Decision. - II.2. The 2014 General Court judgment in Intel. - II.3. The Intel judgment of the Court of Justice. - III. The 2022 General Court decision in Intel. - IV. Critical analysis and further discussion. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The latest judgment of the General Court in the Intel case annulled the EU Commission's decision from 2009 imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel for abusing its dominant position by offering fidelity rebate schemes (case T‑286/09 Intel v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2022:19). The judgment reaffirms the application of an "effects-based" approach which requires careful economic analysis in order to establish the abusive nature of fidelity rebates. The judgment demonstrates that the presumption that fidelity rebates are restrictions of competition by object can be rebutted by the dominant company. It also clarifies that the as efficient competitor (AEC) test is not an indispensable part of the assessment in examining the foreclosure capability of all rebate systems but can be a relevant factor where the Commission has carried it out as part of its assessment of the anticompetitive effects of the rebate schemes. This Insight seeks to examine how this clarification can be translated into concrete lessons not only for future cases but also for other cases dealing with similar issues (i.e. the Qualcomm and Google Shopping cases) and, in particular, the significance of the AEC test as a specific tool to evaluate the anticompetitive effects of fidelity rebates. The Insight concludes that the recent judgment leaves more questions than answers regarding the application of the AEC test, and that it can be seen as signalling the demise of the application of this test for future cases.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(3), 1325-1337 | European Forum Insight of 11 February 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The economic entity's liability for damages under EU competition law. - II.1 The very existence of the economic unit as a basis for (civil) liability. - II.2. Conditions for determining the responsible economic unit. - II.3. Extension of liability to further companies of the same economic unit. - III. The subsidiary as defendant in damage claims for EU competition law infringements. - III.1. Framework for the exercise of the subsidiary's rights of defence. - III.2. Civil procedural implications of the EC's findings in administrative proceedings. - IV. Joint and several liability of the legal entities of the economic unit. - IV.1. Financial risks of the joint and several liability for shareholders. - IV.2. The internal allocation of the debt for the payment of damages. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The judgment of the Court of Justice in the Sumal ECLI:EU:C:2021:800 case charts new territory in the application of the concept of the "economic unit" in EU competition law. In addition to the established principles regarding the liability of the economic unit for fines imposed by the European Commission, the Court has found that the concept may also serve as a basis for damage claims against a subsidiary of a parent company that has been found to infringe EU competition law. The application of these principles regarding the liability of a subsidiary for its parent's conduct warrants an adjustment of the criteria that determine the existence of the single economic unit. In the case of downward liability, the exercise of decisive influence of the parent company over the subsidiary is not enough. Additionally, to establish a uniform market conduct the subsidiary needs to be involved in the specific economic activity of the economic unit. Based on this new judgment, victims of infringements of EU competition law will no longer be limited to bringing actions for damages against those companies punished by the Commission. They may also hold liable any subsidiary of the parent company belonging to same economic unit - even though it is not named in the Commission's decision - and may benefit from the binding effect of this decision, joint and several liability, and additional fora.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(2), 987-1013 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The road to the ECN+. - II.1. Regulation 1/2003. - II.2. Success and shortcomings of Regulation 1/2003. - II.3. Actions taken to address the shortcomings. - III. The ECN+ Directive. - III.1. Institutional security of NCAs. - III.2. Harmonised power to investigate and sanction. - III.3. Dissuasive fines. - III.4. Leniency pro-grams. - III.5. Mutual assistance. - IV. Decentralised cooperation as a role-model leading to an ever closer un-ion? - IV.1. Is the decentralised enforcement of competition law after the ECN+ to be considered as a well-functioning system? - IV.2. Can a decentralised enforcement system contribute to an ever closer union? - IV.3. Does the system under the ECN+ serve as a role-model for other areas, too? - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Present Article deals with Directive 1/2019 which intends to harmonise public enforcement regimes of EU competition law in the Member States. The Directive does so by harmonising and complementing the existing decentralised system of competition law enforcement and empowering the competition authorities in the Member States to be more effective enforcers. In light of the overall topic "Shaping the Future of Europe", the Directive will be tested regarding its possibilities to contribute to more effectiveness, acceptance and ultimately deeper integration. It is concluded that the system complemented by Directive 1/2019 can overall be considered a success, multiplying enforcers and thus strengthening enforcement. With the preconditions of uniform - and uniformly interpreted - substantive law, well-equipped expert authorities as well as close cooperation within a network, it could, furthermore, even contribute to an ever closer union and serve as a role-model for other areas, too.

This study investigates deontic modality, the grammatical category through which legal texts express mainly obligation and permission, in an English-Greek bilingual corpus composed of legislative texts related to European Union (EU) Competition Law. More specifically, the study is based on Biel’s discussion on deontic modality, i.e. deontic obligation and deontic permission (Biel 2014: 158). The analysis of the data is mainly quantitative, while a small-scale qualitative analysis is also carried out when necessary. The results of the study are compared with the specific guidelines proposed by the EU Institutions for English and Greek, i.e. the Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of European Union legislation (2015), the English Style Guide: A handbook for authors and translators in the European Commission for English (2018) and the Greek Style Guide: A handbook for authors and translators in the European Commission for Greek (n.d.), as well as with those of earlier studies on legislative texts.