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This essay attempts to establish that there are two very different notions of “foundation” at work in Husserl’s Logical Investigation. In the Third Investigation where the term is formally introduced, Husserl is using what I call an « ontological model » that investigates what kinds of contents can exist on their own (independently) and what kinds can exist only as a moment of something else (dependently). According to this model, the concrete has priority over the abstract that is founded upon it. In the Sixth Logical Investigation, by contrast, Husserl orients himself primarily on an « epistemological model » that see the complex as founded upon the relatively simple because they higher-order experiences, e.g. the perceptions of more complex kinds of objects are “founded in” although not reducible to the simpler experiences on which they are founded. The primary example here is that of categorical intuitions that are founded upon, but not reducible to sense intuitions. Distinguishing these two different senses of the term can help us understand better many controversial Husserlian claims, for instance about the way that the experience of the human being as a whole is founded upon the experience of a physical body, even though the entity we encounter includes both bodily and spiritual aspects that are both essentially viewed as moments of the human person who is the object of our experience