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A laughter that will bury you: the morality of plant-based meat irony When plant-based meats enter the foodscape, they face the challenge of how to communicate their nature and function to consumers: one strategy for navigating the tension between portraying conventional meat as something to be replaced and affirming their unique meaty tastiness is through ironic claims and performances. This paper seeks to analyse the moral stance of irony in plant-based meat advertisements, specifically when this irony involves the death of animals. Firstly, it presents an argument showing that, from the standpoint of veganism, ironising about animals’ death can be a moral wrong. Secondly, by relying on an interpretation of irony that leverages its potential for subverting and criticising hegemonic viewpoints, it is shown that this kind of irony can serve as a form of resistance aimed at dismantling the pervasive indifference towards the killing of animals for producing meat.

Abstract (it) Facendo dialogare Sayad con altrɜ autorɜ, quest’articolo propone il concetto di presentificazione intendendolo come un uso politico del tempo da parte degli Stati-nazione, funzionale all’assoggettamento delle persone. Le politiche confinarie europee, infatti, pongono le soggettività migranti in regimi di incertezza legale e precarietà temporale, utilizzando il tempo come un’arma per astrarle dalla Storia, collocandole in un presente reiterato. La presentificazione produce assenza dal campo storico, mentre le persone tentano di farsi presenza. Questa condizione viene infatti sfidata dalle soggettività migranti, che provano a riappropriarsi del proprio tempo, attivando processi di soggettivazione, emergenti dalle pieghe dei regimi di assoggettamento. Il “provvisorio che dura” produce qualcosa laddove si fa presenza attraverso forme di attivazione politica che interrompono la ricorsività prodotta dai regimi di frontiera. Questo articolo muove quindi dalla dialettica tra campi di forza all’interno dei quali si gioca la partita del soggetto: da una parte, presentificazione e individuazione, dall’altra soggettivazione e storicizzazione.

This paper emphasises that there is a deep unity underlying Pierre-Yves Raccah’s theory of argumentation, ethics, moral epistemology, general epistemology, philosophy of science and cognitive psychology. First I show that – on the background of his argumentative conception of justifications – Raccah’s moral antifoundationalism is a consequence of the importance he assigns to responsibility in ethics, and in particular to the meta-ethical requirement that we are fully responsible of the moral positions we hold and of the actions we perform in observance to them. Then I explain why his anticonventionalism, as well as his account of how humans can form higher-order effective metapreferences, play a very important role in achieving the target of safeguarding our full responsibility in the prescriptive realm. Finally, I argue that also Raccah’s general epistemology is aimed at supporting the thesis that we are morally responsible of both the scientific theories and the empirical statements we do accept as true. I show how Raccah can assign such a key role to responsibility also in the descriptive realm without abandoning empiricism.