Abstract: The question of time in psychoses has been studied more often as lived time (perceived) than as discursive time (abstract). The specificity of lived time in psychosis can disturb the modes of “intrigue setting” (‘mise en intrigue’ according to Ricœur seems to translate lived time into a narrative process), particularly as concerns lack of dating or excess of dating. In this paper, the authors study the phenomenon they have named “hyperdating” and its defensive function in psychosis. “Hyperdating” would be a function of overdating, illustrating the distance between the patient who “hyperdates” and the affective charge he feels. “Hyperdating” would then consist in a radical lack of the dating function. The purpose of dating would not be to tag events temporally in order to organize the narrative chronologically, but to proceed to evacuate the meaning out of the event by designating only its date. In fact, we suppose that the affect would be shifted onto this date, and thus disconnected with the representation of the event for which there are representational deficiencies and probably a very intensive original affective load. Dating is a vehicle of chronology, and is the manifestation of a faculty for the narrative of self to become an autobiography as temporal experience. We suppose that in psychosis, this process is inefficient. In fact, there is either a lack of dating of narrative events, or a “hyperdating” which overloads narrative with temporal pseudo-indicators, in particular through quasi-sacred dates. “Hyperdating” would therefore be a defensive psychic process against the traumatic load connected to the remembrance of the event, transferring the central characteristics to the date itself, which would then be exterior to any meaningful chronology. The authors propose to define this “hyperdating” phenomenon, and to investigate its psychic function. The methodology is qualitative, and based on two clinical cases, one of schizophrenia, the other of mania. A single case of schizophrenia: We think that in schizophrenia the “hyperdating” phenomenon could be underlain by a schism between affect and representation. This is an isolating process which fits into a psychotic dissociation, recalling the break characterising schizophrenic temporality. The speech is centred on a time-based accuracy to the detriment of experience narration and its affective expression. It then seems that “hyperdating” enables the person to avoid the huge traumatic load related to the factual content in order to shift the affective load on the dating itself. A single case of mania: Here “hyderdating” would be the expression of a game with dates in an omnipotent process. This game appears as a mosaic, a disjointed and blurred control attempt lacking a linear temporal trajectory. In mania, a cumulated series of dates does not ensure either temporal links or any necessary “temporalisation” for “intrigue setting”. Time is one of the forms of “discontinuity and hopping” frozen in instantaneity. “Hyperdating” reveals a need to control the temporal flux which can only fail and it is, under a chronological appearance, an expression of a temporality frozen on the return of the same. The lack of temporal succession and of alternatives to “temporalisation” of events by means of a date which freezes them and removes their affective dimension can only render the reflexive capture of an identity through a biographic narrative problematic. Conclusion: Thus, other than the discrepancies related to the specificity of the “hyperdating” process in the psychic economy of psychotic patients, there would be some similarities concerning “hyperdatation” in psychoses such as abortive attempts of intrigue restoration, deadlock of the chronological function of dating, but also freezing of temporalisation on a number. These illustrate the schism or the instantaneity, devoid of any temporal flux and therefore of any link with “withholding” (apprehension of what has just occurred) and with “protention” (intuition of the immediate future), which characterise time experience according to Husserl. The limits of our study are rooted in the difficulty of identifying this phenomenon as it seems to occur less often than those concerning forgetting or lack of dating. Furthermore the links between “hyperdating” and the affect management process as well as the differences of those links within the different types of psychosis will need to be investigated more thoroughly. That is why the prospects of this study could be the following ones: interrogating the links between “hyperdating” and memory in psychoses. (Is the “hyperdating” phenomenon a failed attempt to recover memories, and/or an attempt to shape raw mnesic traces?); further investigations of the psychotic temporality issue; therapeutic contributions in the management of time and affects could be based on these previous points as far as it seems that it is only through the flexibility of such a defence that the patient will reach the affects and integrate them in an intersubjective relationship with the therapist. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]