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Two interdependent phenomena are questioned: what allows, ecologically, the subject-environment relation then, the dynamics of this relation. To do this, two scientific currents are mobilized: affordance in its current meaning and the sociology of translation. While each of these currents has its own semantics and epistemology, both initiate breaks in the way of understanding what occurs within human activity and contribute to an ecological approach based on a fundamental principle: all human activity is situated and dynamic, characterizing the processes implemented by the actors according to the properties, in part, perceived of their socio-cultural environment. All deterministic logic is then set aside to place, on the same plane, all the dynamic entities within an environment, whether or not they are perceived by the actors on the ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to discuss some cases of metaphorical linguistic expressions in some ancient Indo-European languages, in order to show how conceptual metaphors (in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson 1980) "materialize" in certain linguistic expressions through the use of concepts such as spatiality and embodiment. Furthermore, it will be observed that in some circumstances it is possible to imagine, for the reconstructed linguistic phase, a polysemy of certain Proto- Indo-European (PIE) roots - usually interpreted as homonymic - precisely by virtue of the metaphorical logic mentioned above. We shall also consider the idea of a one-to-one correspondence between form and function of a linguistic sign and that of an intrinsic "naturalness" and "transparency", in the light of more general processes of linguistic change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: "Francis Wolff a développé une ontologie qui repose sur une certaine conception, indissociablement sémantique et métaphysique, du principe de non-contradiction. Son ontologie part du principe que « le monde n’est pas contradictoire ». C’est là, écrit-il, «sa caractéristique la plus générale et la moins douteuse ». Le principe de non- contradiction est donc « le principe fondamental de notre monde ». Francis Wolff explicite sa thèse de manière « quasi-modale » : le principe de non-contradiction est nécessairement celui de tout monde, une loi ontologique."

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: "Que faut-il pour faire un monde ? À cette question classique, Francis Wolff répondait en 1997 ni de tout (car le monde n’est pas une collection de choses, une totalité entendue au sens purement quantitatif ou extensionnel d’un inventaire exhaustif), ni seulement du tout (car le monde ne répond pas non plus à la seule exigence d’universalité ou d’universalisation de l’expérience), mais « des noms, des verbes et des pronoms personnels ». Sa réponse avait de quoi surprendre le lecteur. Elle garde toute sa dimension provocatrice aujourd’hui. À suivre les linéaments de la démonstration de l’ouvrage, le langage « fait monde » en un double sens : la prédication donne accès au monde ; cet usage apophantique du logos est par définition intersubjectif. C’est donc le langage qui fait du réel un monde entendu à la fois comme tout ordonné et comme réel partagé. Il y aurait dès lors un cercle vertueux entre la relation d’objectivité et la relation d’interlocution, ainsi qu’une réversibilité de principe entre le langage défini comme objet-monde et la structure elle-même langagière du monde. On ne saurait distinguer le monde de ce que nous pouvons en dire. Par définition, le monde ne peut donc aller sans dire, ni même aller de soi."

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: "Dans Dire le monde, Francis Wolff avance de façon répétée la formule suivant laquelle le langage « fait monde ». Une telle expression peut être prise en plusieurs sens. On peut l’entendre d’abord au sens où le langage en lui-même constituerait un monde et, en effet, en un sens, lorsqu’il explicite et justifie cette formule, Francis nous montre que le langage partage quelque chose avec la notion de « monde » : sans doute en premier lieu son universalité (DM, p. 19), car comme le monde est tout ce qui existe, et peut-être plus généralement tout ce qui est, de la même façon, le langage fondamentalement se définit comme ce qui peut parler de tout."

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Copyright of Mélanges francophones is the property of Galati University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines the structure, source and content of analytical truths in order to show the legitimacy of this concept. Traditionally the concept of analytical truth is linked to notions of a priori knowledge, necessary proposition, and unrestricted validity. But such truths may be designed without such correlation. This way of conceiving the sentences whose truth is reached by the analysis will be here defended and exploited. The aim is to show that this notion is legitimate and operational, although not for the purposes which prompted it, because its content is the very significance structure of the language.

Abstract: The delirium of schizophrenia is marked in psychiatry as one of the most radically deviant forms of thought. It is also very often apprehended based on the analysis of verbal productions (scales, tests, experiments) and the speech of patients. Should we consider that insanity means a complete loss of logicality or rationality? Does assuming it help to understand schizophrenia? In this paper, we shall defend the reverse. From a discussion on the principle of charity, we address the question of rationality and logicality of schizophrenics and their understanding in a general philosophical perspective. We then present a work, based on this assumption of logicality, on the formalization of schizophrenic conversations. Some conversational “failures” are clearly typical of the pathology, and their theoretical account raises the question of their localization: shall one locate the breaks either at a logico-semantic, or at a pragmatic and interactional level? The analysis leads us to admit the two answers as reflecting two possible views on the conversation disease: the external or third person perspective, i.e., that of the “normal” subject, and the internal or first person perspective, specific to the schizophrenic. The formal analysis is conducted within the framework of Segmented Discourse Representation Theory of Asher & Lascarides, whose principles are briefly outlined in the article. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Ten years after the publication of Discourse Pragmatics (Moeschler & Reboul), a retrospect of its principles, contributions and results seems to be necessary. In this respect, the paper highlights the ideas of the research program proposed by Moeschler and Reboul: (i) the model that seeks to capture discourse interpretation must be a pragmatic one; (ii) pragmatics must be understood as inferential pragmatics; (iii) pragmatics must integrate notions such as: global intention and anticipatory hypothesis; (iv) the identification of discourse relations (for instance, temporal reference calculus) is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for discourse interpretation; (v) a pragmatic theory of discourse must be able to predict the conditions that underlie the speaker's coherence judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]