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This paper begins by reviewing some of the theoretical issues to be canvassed in any consideration of trade and foreign policy. The empirical core of the paper is a description of the many recent proposals to enhance transatlantic relations, it then turns to consideration of a puzzle : why has this resurgence of Atlanticist fever in trade policy happened now ? Finally, in the conclusion, it discusses whether the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFIA) is meant to be an objective of policy in its own right, or an instrument used in pursuit of some other objective. The paper concludes that TAFTA is not significant for trade policy, but it is for foreign policy.

The purpose of this article is to shed new light on the issue of drug trafficking in the Americas. Specifically its objective is to demonstrate that the perception of drug trafficking as a national security threat is only one aspect of a much more complex socio-political phenomenon. First, this paper presents the multilateral mechanisms that serve as a frame work to facilitate regional cooperation on drug matters. It goes on to analyze the different approaches of regional drug trafficking. It concludes that a much more flexible approach is needed to gain an in-depth understanding of drug politics in the Americas.

The general character of Canada-U.S. relations would have been sharply different in the past 65-70 years had there not been established the International Joint Commission under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. That Treaty anticipated in a remarkably prophetic way the lively and sometimes dangerous disputes that arise over shared water resources, boundary and trans-boundary. By providing a mechanism for the settlement of disputes over boundary and trans-boundary water courses, lakes, rivers, etc. and by providing also an investigative mechanism for all other disputes that' may take place along the boundary, the framers of the Boundary Waters Treaty created perhaps better than they knew. For the International Joint Commission has proven to be an instrument of flexibility and high utility. For almost 70 years it has issued Orders of Approval in over 50 cases involving the construction of works affecting the levels and flows of boundary waters as well as causing trans-boundary waters to rise at the boundary and therefore, requiring the approval of the Commission. The whole question of water use/water allocation between neighbouring states sharing common river basins or having rivers and lakes as boundaries is involved in this exercise. It could not have been foreseen, however, that the pioneer language of the pollution provisions of the Boundary Waters Treaty should have moved the Commission with ease into the environmental era. While the Commission was investigating pollution of water questions as early as 1912, and while it recommended a Canada-U.S. Great Lakes Pollution Treaty as early as 1920, it was a great achievement of both countries in signing the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in 1972 and again in 1978, which created the massive environmental role as monitor, co-ordinator and advisor that the Commission now plays in relation to both governments in the Great Lakes basin, and also, in the other watersheds along the 5 500 mile frontier of both countries. With the rise in the knowledge of air pollution, and the interfacing between air, water and land use, there is now a whole complex that is ecologically at the basis of the concerns of Canada and the United States and is of prime interest to the Commission, and has become a fundamental aspect of its work. The future of the Commission is vital to the future of both countries as its successful past has been in maintaining reasonably friendly relations despite the tensions which disputes over water resources can cause. It is the thrust of this paper to describe and demonstrate the processes in dispute avoidance and dispute settlement, in shared resource-planning, for which the Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great Lakes Quality Agreement and the work of the Commission now stand.

Each of the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) has extended, through a common agreement, its own fishing grounds to 200 miles, thus leading to the creation, since 1977, of the Community waters whose exploitation would be subjected to the common fisheries policy of the EEC. The widespread extension of fishing grounds throughout Europe together with the state of overfishing in the North-East Atlantic have led the EEC to elaborate a policy in order to protect the interests of its member states, to make their fishing vessels competitive, and to ensure the stability of the fishing industry. This paper looks into the implementation of the fisheries policy of the EEC, internally — namely access s rights to Community waters, the coordination of markets and producers, aid to modernize the vessels - as well as regarding foreign countries with whom agreements are sought in order to maintain historic fishing rights - specially in the North Atlantic - or in order to develop new fishing grounds - specially along the West African coast and in the Indian Ocean - a quarter of the EEC catch is made outside Community waters. France is deeply committed to the orientations of the EEC fisheries policy due to the importance of its fleet of trawlers fishing outside French waters and to the potential catch in the exclusive economic zone of its departments and territories overseas. The compromise signed by member states in 1983 is an important step towards the establishment of a true « Europe Fisheries ».

This article seeks to illustrate how security considerations impact upon trade policy-making. In contrast to interpretations derived from hegemonic stability theory, this paper suggests that the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world in the 1980s caused growing relative gains concerns within the Western alliance. Comparative analysis of American trade decisions in regard to the machine-tool industry shows that the change of decision between 1982 and 1986 regarding protection of the industry resulted from a change in political coalitions surrounding the demand of protection, which was caused by a transformation in the perception of national security. It is suggested that this uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains from trade is linked to the turn to unilateralism in American trade policy during the same period.

In recent years there has been an important shift in the pattern of Canadian food aid distribution towards a greater concentration on Africa. Recent projections call for increased transfers of food aid to Africa in the foreseeable future. Given the growing concern about the long-term contribution that food aid might make to increasing food sufficiency in Africa, this paper examines the concept of « developmental » food aid and its implications for Canadian food aid policy. First, the article discusses some of the problems that arise out of the provision of increased volumes of non-emergency food aid to Africa. Then, it examines the recent evolution of Canadian food aid policy with particular attention to some of the difficulties involved in implementing a strategy of providing « developmental » food aid to Africa on a long-term basis. The issues of policy dialogue, recipient selection, donor co-ordination, and food aid dependence are discussed respectively.