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Due to its strategic immensity and opportunities for covert action, the maritime domain has become the most prominent arena of modern-day great power rivalry. In the shadow of this confrontation and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Baltic Sea is now the focus of geopolitical interest and conflict. An expression of this is the increase in hybrid activities, from acts of sabotage to the use of unidentified drones. For the Western states of the Baltic Sea region in particular, all of this highlights their dependence on fossil resources, critical maritime infrastructure, and secure trade routes. In response to the war against Ukraine and Russian naval activity in the Baltic Sea, littoral states have placed their militaries on heightened readiness. In the midst of this crisis situation, NATO allies and future allies remain locked in an unnecessary dispute over force dispositions, new structures and leadership roles. As a result, there is little sign of the German "Zeitenwende" in the Baltic Sea region. (Autorenreferat)

Research on public opinion and international security has extensively examined attitudes toward nuclear weapons, but the diffusion of basic knowledge about nuclear weapons among the everyday citizens has nevertheless been mostly missed. This study proposes a working definition and advances a measurement model of knowledge on nuclear weapons in the general public. It analyzes data from two novel surveys conducted in 2018 (N = 6559) and 2019 (N = 6227) where respondents from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom answered a web survey on attitudes and factual knowledge on nuclear weapons. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic models are used to examine the dimensionality and to assess the measurement invariance of a scale of knowledge about nuclear weapons. A bifactor measurement model, where a strong general factor represents the construct of interest and specific factors account for the presence of testlets due to questionnaire design, is established and validated. Configural, metric, and scalar invariance are established across the eight samples. The findings indicate that knowledge about nuclear weapons in the general, non-expert public can be reliably measured cross-nationally.

Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. won the Philippines' presidential election by a land­slide on 9 May and was officially sworn in on 30 June. During the election cam­paign, Marcos Jr. - the son of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. who was ousted in 1986 - remained extremely vague when it came to describing his foreign and security policies. Some observers initially speculated that Marcos Jr. would con­tinue to pursue the foreign policy shift towards the People's Republic of China that had been estab­lished by his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. Several weeks into Marcos Jr.'s presidency, however, a much more nuanced picture has emerged. It appears that the newly elected president is likely seeking to balance the Philippines' relations with China and the US to a greater extent than his predecessor. He therefore seems to be follow­ing in his father’s foreign policy footsteps. This could open up new opportunities for coopera­tion between the Philippines and Germany and the EU - provided that such collabo­ration considers the high degree to which Manila's current foreign policy agenda seems to be driven by domestic concerns and objectives. (author's abstract)

When Israel signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 reactions were diverse. Experts were divided - some fearing a deepening of regional divisions, others hoping for a positive impact on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Two years later normalisation has intensified, but differs in degree and scope. Israel's normalisation process has strengthened her acceptance in the region and reaches beyond security issues. While Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates lead these dynamics, eager to benefit from exchange in science and technology, in Morocco the United States' recognition of the latter's sovereignty over the Western Sahara has hardened Rabat's position on that issue. With Sudan, the process has not developed beyond contact between the Israeli government and the internationally contested military leadership. Normalisation is not a decisive factor for Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. On the contrary, it was not an incentive in the past for Israel to make concessions; clashes with the Palestinians in Gaza or recently on the Temple Mount could not derail the process either. The real test, however, would be another Palestinian intifada or a return to the annexation plans of early 2020. Iran remains an important uniting factor which has led to a shared threat perception. Nevertheless, the Gulf monarchies and Israel differ in approach towards Iran. While Arab-Israeli joint military exercises mark a historical shift, talks about a military alliance in the Middle East with Israeli (and US) involvement are premature. The European Union and its member states should build on these positive dynamics and look at developments in the region not merely through the lens of the MEPP. Trilateral projects with Israel and Arab partners are a good starting point here. Also, Europe should become more involved in the broader Middle East through strategic dialogue with partners in the region as well as the US on the new order in the making.

In the West, Russia's nuclear deterrence strategy is often described as one of 'escalate to deescalate'. The thinking goes that Moscow is prepared to use nuclear weapons at an early stage in a conflict in order to 'deescalate' and terminate the confrontation quickly in its favour. However, Russia's official military doctrine, nuclear exercises of the Russian military, and debates among political and military elites have so far pointed in a different direction. With the concept of 'strategic deterrence', Russia has developed a holistic deterrence strategy in which nuclear weapons remain an important element. Yet, to gain more flexibility below the nuclear threshold in order to manage escalation, the strategy also conceptualises a broad range of non-military and conventional means. Given Russia's dwindling arsenal of conventional precision weapons due to its war against Ukraine as well as the strategic adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia's strategy is likely to change: In the coming years, Russia's reliance on its non-strategic nuclear weapons will probably increase. These developments could both undermine crisis stability in Europe and further impede the prospects for nuclear arms control in the future.

Any conflict with a nuclear power like Russia carries the risk that nuclear weapons could be used, and President Vladimir Putin is aggressively exploiting such concerns. With its nuclear threats, the Kremlin is moving away from Russia’s doctrine that ascribes a protective role to its nuclear arsenal. In this way, Moscow aims not only to deter Western governments from providing more substantial support to Ukraine, but also to intimidate the Western public. However, as long as NATO does not inter­vene directly in Ukraine and the Russian regime does not feel existentially threatened, both intentional and unintentional nuclear use remain extremely unlikely. Never­theless, Moscow’s nuclear threats still entail significant negative consequences. If Russia succeeds in using nuclear deterrence to shield an offensive conventional war, this could further destabilise Europe and the global security order. (author's abstract)

The Ukraine crisis poses two particularly uneasy questions for Turkey: How to uphold a power balance in the Black Sea? And how to manage its relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West? So far, Ankara’s policy towards Moscow consists of both deter­rence and dialogue. In regards deterrence, Turkey is closer to the non-EU members of NATO such as the US and the UK. Meanwhile, Turkey’s policy of dialogue is similar to that of EU members, most notably Germany. However, while there is a certain degree of similarity between the stances of Turkey and some Western countries in the current crisis, their convergence of interests has not yet resulted in any meaningful coopera­tion. In the short term, the parallel track of deterrence and dialogue still gives Turkey some leeway to continue its multi-vector manoeuvring. The Ukrainian imbroglio is, however, a manifestation of a crisis concerning the current European security order, or more precisely the lack thereof, thus making it necessary to define the role of not only Russia but also Turkey in any European design for a new security architecture. (author's abstract)

Security has on a continuous basis posed multiple challenges to so many countries around the world over the past few years. The attempt to maintain world order has been a prerequisite for quite many countries, headed by the USA, especially as challenges of terrorism accrue day by day. Therefore, the present paper is set on a venture to question whether such attempts are to be met and whether there might rise a world power that can turn over all conventional understandings of world security paradigms.

With the change of government in 2019 to a Social Democratic leadership, the future of Danish foreign and security strategy is uncertain - not only its substance but also whether dedicated strategizing will be continued. This question is only becoming more urgent with the global reach of the corona crisis. The report finds that for a small state operating in a volatile geopolitical environment and addressing complex crises, a dedicated foreign and security strategy can play an important role. Four fundamental benefits are discussed: To the extent that a foreign and security strategy communicates position and priorities, it can sharpen Denmark's international identity and be a one stop shop to partner states and adversaries alike. As a government-sanctioned document, it can allow a small state to be pro-active and agenda-setting internationally, rather than following its larger allies. A strategy can support domestic political debate on foreign and security policy, because the actual drafting process is fundamentally inter-minsterial. The publication of a strategy can provide a much-needed occasion to cultivate democratic and political scrutiny through regular public debate.

Turkey-NATO relations are still sufficiently strong to keep the relationship from the brink, a new DIIS-report finds. But more dynamics are also gaining strength to render further troubles increasingly likely. The future of Turkey's NATO membership has been the subject of heated debate of late, from both outside and within Turkey. What ramifications will Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air anti-missile system have for Turkey's NATO future? Has the Syrian conflict exposed deep strategic differences between Turkey and other key NATO members? In response to such questions, a number of foreign policy practitioners as well as researchers and long-standing Turkey watchers have cautioned that a number of centripetal forces − dynamics that keep member states together - remain sufficiently strong at a structural level to keep Turkey-NATO relations on track. There seems to be widespread agreement on both sides that the alternative is simply worse. At the same time, the report also argues that these centripetal forces are losing their strength, and that centrifugal forces pulling the alliance apart are gaining strength and salience. Barring wild card developments, the net result is that this will increase the likelihood of further troubles ahead for Turkey-NATO relations The report is based on an analysis of the published policy commentary, scholarly literature, as well as a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with practitioners and academic experts during the course of 2019.

On 19 January 2020 a high-level conference was held in Berlin to find solutions to the conflict in Libya between the unity government under Fayez al-Sarraj and the troops led by General Khalifa Haftar. A central agreement in the final declaration aims to stop the unimpeded influx of weapons that external actors are making available to the warring parties. The conference participants committed themselves to "unequivocally and fully respect and implement the arms embargo established by United Nations Secu­rity Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and the Council's subsequent resolutions, including the proliferation of arms from Libya, and call on all international actors to do the same". The declaration thus reaffirms the existing resolutions, revealing its basic problem: So far, the United Nations (UN) has not been able to effectively enforce the current embargo for a variety of reasons. (author's abstract)

The Sino-American conflict syndrome contains several elements. It is based on a regional status competition, which is increasingly becoming global. This competition for influence has become combined with an ideological antagonism that has recently become more focused on the US side. Since the United States and China perceive each other as potential military adversaries and plan their operations accordingly, the security dilemma also shapes their relationship. The strategic rivalry is particularly pronounced on China’s maritime periphery, dominated by military threat perceptions and the US expectation that China intends to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in East Asia. Global competition for influence is closely interwoven with the techno-logical dimension of American-Chinese rivalry. It is about dominance in the digital age. The risk for international politics is that the intensifying strategic rivalry between the two states condenses into a structural world conflict. This could trigger de-globalization and the emergence of two orders, one under the predominant influence of the United States and the other under China’s influence. (author's abstract)

The Arctic’s melting ice not only acts as an early warning system for the world’s climate, but also makes this region an indicator of change for international security policy. The Trump administration sees the Arctic primarily as an arena of competi­tion between great powers. This could both benefit and harm the region. A greater engagement on the part of the USA would be welcome, but if it comes with an at­tempt to exclude other states, this would damage the high level of cooperation that has held sway in the Arctic thus far. US Arctic policy has become a variable that is dependent on great-power rivalry. The resulting polarisation of relations makes it difficult to find the necessary common solutions for coping with the changes caused by global warming. (author's abstract)

NATO faces a problematic threat landscape in the Mediterranean. The Alliance has to deal with hot topics that range from Russia’s robust military posture and involvement in the Syrian Civil War to ISIS terrorism and the migrant crisis. To address all of these challenges, NATO should boost its engagement with partner nations, produce a new maritime security approach, and counterbalance Moscow’s strategic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. (Autorenreferat)

The report analyses the EU's maritime security operations so far undertaken under the CSDP, the counter-piracy operation ATALANTA in the Indian Ocean and the counter-smuggling operation SOPHIA in the Mediterranean Sea.

Why do similarly sized peacekeeping missions vary in their effectiveness to protect civilians in conflicts? We argue that peace operations with a large share of troops from countries with high-quality militaries are better able to deter violence from state and non-state actors and create buffer zones within conflict areas, can better reach remote locations, and have superior capabilities - including diplomatic pressure by troop contributing countries - to monitor the implementation of peace agreements. These operational advantages enable them to better protect civilians. Combining data from military expenditures of troop contributing countries together with monthly data on the composition of peace operations, we create a proxy indicator for the average troop quality of UN PKOs. Statistical evidence from an extended sample of conflicts in Africa and Asia between 1991 and 2010 supports our argument.

Originally, international security was conceived of in a restrictive sense as national, state, or military security. Different circumstances, events, and the theorizing about them, however, have led us to broaden and to deepen the conception of it., Die Problematik der Sicherheit wurde ursprünglich als die politische und militärische Sicherheit von nationalen Staaten aufgefasst. Unterschiedliche Ereignisse und Entwicklungen sowie die Reflexion darüber haben wesentlich zu einer Erweiterung des Begriffs der Sicherheit beigetragen und die ökonomische, soziale und humane Dimension der Sicherheitsfragen erscheinen lassen.

This article is dedicated to the problems of deployment of the US anti-missile defence system in Eastern Europe. The European system of US missile defence is just one of the components of global US missile defence. This work aims to analyze possible Russia’s responses within military and political spheres. The measures proposed are divided into three subgroups: soft, medium and hard depending on the implementation of the adopted missile defence concept by the USA. This research employs the structure-system method and the method of actualization. The authors outline both positive and negative consequences of such actions for the Russian Federation, the USA, eastern European countries and the neighbouring countries, including the Baltic Sea states. The practical significance of this study consists in the proposed and justified responses of the Russian Federation that may serve as a basis for the scenarios of development of international situation and help to forecast the level of tension in Russia-US relations.

This paper examines the political and security challenges and prospects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the coming two decades. To simplify what is a hugely complex and wide-ranging set of issues, I divide the security challenges facing ASEAN into six broad categories. These include (1) the shifting balance of power in the Asia Pacific region, triggered mainly, if not exclusively, by the dramatic rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC); (2) the persistence of intra-ASEAN territorial conflicts; (3) the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, which is a critical factor in PRC-ASEAN relations; (4) the programs of military modernizations undertaken by ASEAN states and the resulting prospects for an intra-ASEAN arms race; (5) uncertainty and strife caused by demands for domestic political change; (6) and the dangers posed by transnational (non-traditional) security threats. I argue that ASEAN faces major hurdles in realizing a mature political-security community, where intra-ASEAN tensions are significantly managed and reduced to the point where war becomes 'unthinkable' and a deep and genuine sense of regional community emerges. While recent steps undertaken by ASEAN are bold and far-reaching, realizing them would depend on several factors, especially the maintenance of its unity and cohesion in the face of a rising PRC, the ability to resolve regional disputes, complying with the provisions and instruments of the ASEAN Charter and the Political-Security Community Blueprint, and ensuring an agenda-setting and managerial role in the wider East Asian and Asia-Pacific multilateralism.

The Claim that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) led to the invasion of frag in 2003 by the US army. For the George W. Bush administration, the likely presence of WMD in Iraq was the major justification for boing to war. However, Bush' opponents suspected he used the WMD-dispositive as a legitimation for an invasion that was already set in motion for different reasons. The Iraq invasion and the underlying ideas about the presence of WMD thus provide a tangible case for the analysis of theories of conspiracy and security. The development of the WMD-dispositive will be contextualized using the toolkit of securitization theory. The article explores the notions of security and conspiracy that were used to build the dispositive and shows how it ultimately failed and turned into a counter-narrative in which the Bush administration itself became the Great Conspirator., Historical Social Research Vol. 38, No. 1 (2013): Special Issue: Security and Conspiracy in History, 16th to 21st Century. Starting Point and Frequency: Year: 1979, Issues per volume: 4, Volumes per year: 1

This article provides a conceptual lens for and a thick interpretation of the emergent regional constellation in the Middle East in the first decade of the 21st century. It starts out by challenging two prevalent claims about regional politics in the context of the 2006 Lebanon and 2008–09 Gaza Wars: Firstly, that regional politics is marked by a fundamental break from the ‘old Middle East’ and secondly, that it has become ‘post-Arab’ in the sense that Arab politics has ceased being distinctly Arab. Against this background, the article develops the understanding of a New Arab Cold War which accentuates the still important, but widely neglected Arab dimension in regional politics. By rediscovering the Arab Cold War of the 1950–60s and by drawing attention to the transformation of Arab nationalism and the importance of new trans-Arab media, the New Arab Cold War perspective aims at supplementing rather that supplanting the prominent moderate-radical, sectarian and Realist-Westphalian narratives. By highlighting dimensions of both continuity and change it does moreover provide some critical nuances to the frequent claims about the ‘newness’ of the ‘New Middle East’. In addition to this more Middle East-specific contribution, the article carries lessons for a number of more general debates in International Relations theory concerning the importance of (Arab-Islamist) non-state actors and competing identities in regional politics as well as the interplay between different forms of sovereignty.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks - election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.

In recent years, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has emerged as a key component of international post-conflict reconstruction efforts. At the same time, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that the holistic approach to SSR that is outlined in policy papers is very difficult to translate into effective interventions in fragile states. This paper identifies two competing approaches for a 'contextualized' SSR-agenda: A monopoly model that focuses on restoring the state's monopoly on the means of violence and a hybrid model that seeks to strengthen local community-based security and justice solutions. The paper argues that as a strategy for intervention, the choice is not simply between a top-down 'imposition' of a universal state model and a bottom-up approach of 'working with what is there'. It is also a choice between direct and indirect forms of rule. This makes the dilemma real for liberal-minded practitioners and observers who for good reasons remain reluctant towards the colonial practice of ruling through middle-men. The paper does not offer a solution to the dilemma. When two imperatives pull in opposite directions, 'answers' are bound to be ad hoc: Specific and contextual, rather than principled and generic. The paper does, however, suggest that part of the way forward may be to move towards a more 'entry-oriented' mode of operation that recognizes that the role of external actors is to help establish a space for security and development solutions, rather than to fill that space.

As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.

The article traces the extension of the concept of security over roughly the last fifty years. It differentiates between four dimensions of conceptual change: the referent object, the issue dimension, the spatial dimension and the dimension of perceived danger. The process of conceptual extension is explained not only as securitization, i.e. the result of voluntary speech acts, but as a macro-social process of the dissociation of state and society and the prevalence of liberal values., Historical Social Research Vol. 35, No. 4 (2010): Special Issue: The Production of Human Security in Premodern and Contemporary History. Starting Point and Frequency: Year: 1979, Issues per volume: 4, Volumes per year: 1

In order for NATO to remain credible and efficient, its new Strategic Concept must address and find solutions to fundamental issues which are likely to define the Alliance's missions over the next decade, of which the most important ones concern member states' ability to ensure and reinforce their mutual defense and burden-sharing commitments. The challenge of NATO's new Strategic Concept is to strike a balance between the objectives of deterrence and defense, and stronger security guarantees for member states, on the one hand, as well as greater reassurance to Russia, on the other hand. The document expected to be adopted by NATO member states at the Lisbon Summit should aim at building greater internal commitment and mutual confidence, while identifying more venues of political cooperation with Russia, even outside the NATO-Russia Council. The paper looks closely at those factors which influence the options made by allies when dealing with topics like forward defense, nuclear deterrence and strategic reassurance. The Alliance's new strategic concept is likely to acknowledge the danger posed by unconventional security threats but there are little chances for article 5 of the Washington Treaty to suffer major alterations, although the scope of potential threats has broadened. NATO's nuclear posture will continue to remain strongly linked to that of the United States, while Allies take note of the rising profile of other major nuclear powers on the international scene, the most prominent one being China.

The paper discusses the salience of the Finno-Ugric links in substantiating intra-EU cooperation among Finland, Estonia and Hungary. The focus is on investigating evidence of such cooperation in the EU's human rights and minority rights related policies towards the Russian Federation and other eastern neighbourhood states. The paper gives an account of institutionalised forms of cultural and political co-operation among the three countries under study. It discusses whether small EU states can coalesce under constructive policy alliances or not. The paper presents the current foreign policy narratives in Finland, Hungary and Estonia and locates the Finno-Ugric narrative in this general framework.

This paper claims that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU, and in particular the elements related to justice and home affairs (JHA), is a complex, multilayered initiative that incorporates different logics and instruments. To unravel the various layers of the policy, the paper proceeds in three steps: firstly, it lays out some facts pertaining to the origins of the ENP, as its 'origins' arguably account for a number of the core tensions. It then presents the underlying logic and objectives attributed to JHA cooperation, which can be derived from the viewpoints voiced during policy formulation. The paper goes on to argue that despite the existence of different logics, there is a unifying objective, which is to 'extra-territorialise' the management of 'threats' to the neighbouring countries. The core of the paper presents the various policy measures that have been put in place to achieve external 'threat management'. In this context it is argued that the 'conditionality-inspired policy instruments', namely monitoring and benchmarking of progress, transfer of legal and institutional models to non-member states and inter-governmental negotiations, contain socialization elements that rely on the common values approach. This mix of conditionality and socialisation instruments is illustrated in two case studies, one on the fight against terrorism and one on irregular migration. Finally, the paper recommends that the EU draft an Action-Oriented Paper (AOP) on JHA cooperation with the ENP countries that indicates how the EU intends to balance the conflicting objectives and instruments that are currently present in the JHA provisions of the ENP.