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Objectives The article explores combat related Private Military Companies (PMCs) that are authorised to engage in the forefront of the battlefield as dedicated force multipliers. Methods To supplement empirical data with qualitative observation, the methodology applies the case study and observation method. Considering assistance in conflict termination as a dependent variable, the methodology evaluates the case study of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and, to impose a framework for observation, deconstructs that case with seven independent variables: competence, effectiveness, flexibility, field cooperation with conventional forces, cost efficiency, impact on military and the state-to-PMC balance. Results The methodology indicates what factors were prevalent in effective conflict management and what indicators entailed chal- lenges. The results advocate for the competence, flexibility, effectiveness and cooperation with armed forces to be deemed conclusive in positive PMC engagement, whereas the cost efficiency, impact on conventional military and the state-to-PMC balance require improvement. Conclusions Since governments have continued to be hesitant (justified either by financial, geopolitical or social incen- tives) towards overseas military operations where asymmetric warfare is taking place, PMCs stepped in to fill the se- curity void. Therefore, this paper argues that PMCs are here to stay; however, the literature hasn’t rigorously ex- plored the subject matter to determine whether indicators of success and failure exist to evaluate the PMC outcome. This paper also precipitates natural outgrowth in the scholarship by composing the benchmark that synthesises relevant data.

This article analyses the 2015 intervention of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP International Ltd), a South African private military company (PMC), against Boko Haram, the Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria. The origins of PMCs are highlighted before an in-depth analysis of the mercenary intervention against Boko Haram is performed, with an eye on previous major PMC interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the paper emphasises the unprecedented use of PMCs against Islamic extremist groups but on the other reveals that PMC interventions have not changed much. Finally, the article assesses STTEP's intervention in light of the current debate on private security involving those who advocate its use and regulation and those who question the legitimacy of PMCs as a tool of conflict resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares two foreign interventions in Sierra Leone; the 1995 involvement of Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African private military company (PMC), against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF); and the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, 1997-2000). A context analysis is performed, along with a focus on PMCs and African regional and sub-regional security systems, before an assessment of both interventions is provided. The paper highlights the failures experienced by both EO and ECOMOG: on the one hand, it reveals that EO intervention can be hardly considered as effective, due to its controversial legitimacy, accountability, etc., but on the other it points out at the technical, financial and political constraints as the main deficiencies of ECOMOG. Finally, the paper briefly introduces the most relevant achievements and developments experienced by ECOWAS/ECOMOG in terms of sub-regional peacekeeping in West Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]