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The institution of group ownership has rarely been studied in political philosophy. Instead, most property theories in this discipline focus on arguments for and against individual ownership. When group ownership is discussed at all, moreover, this is often in the specific context of workplace governance. What is lacking is a general normative justification of group ownership that explains when and why it is valuable that individuals share a resource. This dissertation provides such a justification. The particular conception of group ownership that it defends is the institutional realisation of a sharing practice, called sharing in common. In this practice, members of a private group determine collectively and democratically how their shared object may be used. This conception of group ownership is irreducible to individual property rights, because under this institu-ion, individual rights to use and/or derive income from an object are authorised and subject to change by the group’s collective decisions. Group ownership so understood is valuable when and because it secures basic non-domination, and that it is also justified for that reason. People enjoy basic non-domination when they have the capabilities that are reasonably required to resist arbitrary power, and are equally in control of the decisions that affect these basic capabilities. This ideal constitutes the basis for a society of equals, where the normative status that belongs to beings capable of practical reason is affirmed for everyone. This dissertation develops two criteria for judging whether property institutions realise basic non-domination. First, they must promote people's ability to use resources to gain their basic capabilities. Secondly, the institutions must place the people who rely on a resource for their basic capabilities, in control of how that resource may be used. Using common property regimes (CPRs) in natural and agricultural resources as the central case study, the dissertation shows how existing institutions that approach the ideal of sharing in common can succeed on both counts. When democratically organised, CPRs al-low resource users to efficiently share and manage their resource themselves, and thus obtain their own livelihoods on their own terms. Other institutions that approach the ideal of sharing in common, such as insurance mutuals, energy cooperatives, worker cooperatives, and knowledge commons, are also briefly discussed for their potential to secure basic non-domination. The dissertation furthermore clarifies when and why alternative strategies for realising basic non-domination – such as through equal individual property rights, strong exit opportunities, and public ownership – fail to achieve that goal. The resulting theory not only defends a particular conception of ownership, but also provides tools that can facilitate research on ownership institutions and on basic non-domination more generally.

The institution of group ownership has rarely been studied in political philosophy. Instead, most property theories in this discipline focus on arguments for and against individual ownership. When group ownership is discussed at all, moreover, this is often in the specific context of workplace governance. What is lacking is a general normative justification of group ownership that explains when and why it is valuable that individuals share a resource. This dissertation provides such a justification. The particular conception of group ownership that it defends is the institutional realisation of a sharing practice, called sharing in common. In this practice, members of a private group determine collectively and democratically how their shared object may be used. This conception of group ownership is irreducible to individual property rights, because under this institu-ion, individual rights to use and/or derive income from an object are authorised and subject to change by the group’s collective decisions. Group ownership so understood is valuable when and because it secures basic non-domination, and that it is also justified for that reason. People enjoy basic non-domination when they have the capabilities that are reasonably required to resist arbitrary power, and are equally in control of the decisions that affect these basic capabilities. This ideal constitutes the basis for a society of equals, where the normative status that belongs to beings capable of practical reason is affirmed for everyone. This dissertation develops two criteria for judging whether property institutions realise basic non-domination. First, they must promote people's ability to use resources to gain their basic capabilities. Secondly, the institutions must place the people who rely on a resource for their basic capabilities, in control of how that resource may be used. Using common property regimes (CPRs) in natural and agricultural resources as the central case study, the dissertation shows how existing institutions that approach the ideal of sharing in common can succeed on both counts. When democratically organised, CPRs al-low resource users to efficiently share and manage their resource themselves, and thus obtain their own livelihoods on their own terms. Other institutions that approach the ideal of sharing in common, such as insurance mutuals, energy cooperatives, worker cooperatives, and knowledge commons, are also briefly discussed for their potential to secure basic non-domination. The dissertation furthermore clarifies when and why alternative strategies for realising basic non-domination – such as through equal individual property rights, strong exit opportunities, and public ownership – fail to achieve that goal. The resulting theory not only defends a particular conception of ownership, but also provides tools that can facilitate research on ownership institutions and on basic non-domination more generally.

This article attempts to explore the controversy surrounding eigendom land (land owned under colonial state management rights) in Surabaya and its relations with the enforcement of the Basic Principles of Agrarian Law (BAL), in an effort to realize the ideals of the Republic of Indonesia-justice and prosperity for all people. The enactment of the BAL, which independently regulated land tenure and ownership, was a milestone in the autonomy of postcolonial Indonesia. One of the effects of the law was agrarian reform, which led to most eigendom land becoming tanah negara, or state-controlled land. This eigendom land has been used for public housing, though some consider such usage to deviate from the BAL. In recent years, the issue has led to conflict between settlers of eigendom land and the municipal government of Surabaya. This article concludes that the existence of eigendom land in the postcolonial era is a reality and its impact can be seen in the form of residents being driven to oppose the government. If the law were consistent with the BAL, there would be no land with eigendom status in Indonesia. The best hope for achieving justice and welfare for the people of Indonesia, in accordance with the goals of agrarian reform, is to convert the status of all eigendom land to the types of land rights determined by BAL., Part of this paper was originally included in the author’s dissertation, “Konflik Pertanahan di Surabaya: Kasus Tanah Bersurat Hijau 1966-2012” (Land disputes in Surabaya: The case of Green Certificate land 1966-2012).