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Different approaches analyze the strength of a natural language argument in different ways. This paper contrasts the dialectical, structural, probabilistic (or Bayesian), computational, and empirical approaches by exemplarily applying them to a single argumentative text (Epicureans on Squandering Life; Aikin & Talisse, 2019). Rather than pitching these approaches against one another, our main goal is to show the room for fruitful interaction. Our focus is on a dialectical analysis of the squandering argument as an argumentative response that voids an interlocutor’s right to assertion. This analysis addresses the pragmatic dimensions of arguing and implies an argument structure that is consistent with empirical evidence of perceived argument strength. Results show that the squandering argument can be evaluated as a (non-fallacious) ad hominem argument, which however is not necessarily stronger than possible arguments attacking it.

The identification of an empirically adequate theoretical construct requires determining whether a theoretically predicted effect is sufficiently similar to an observed effect. To this end, we propose a simple similarity measure, describe its application in different research designs, and use computer simulations to estimate the necessary sample size for a given observed effect. As our main example, we apply this measure to recent meta-analytical research on precognition. Results suggest that the evidential basis is too weak for a predicted precognition effect of d = 0.20 to be considered empirically adequate. As additional examples, we apply this measure to object-level experimental data from dissonance theory and a recent crowdsourcing hypothesis test, as well as to meta-analytical data on the correlation of personality traits and life outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When interpreting a natural language argument that generalizes over a contextually relevant category, audiences are likely to activate the category prototype and transfer its characteristics onto category instances. A generalized argument can thus appear more (respectively less) persuasive than one mentioning a specific category instance, provided the argument's claim is more (less) warranted for the prototype than for the instance (positive and negative prototype effect). To investigate this effect in legal contexts using mock-scenarios, professional and lay judges at Swedish courts evaluated the persuasiveness of arguments giving a generalized or a specific description of an eyewitness. The generalized version described the witness either as an alcohol-intoxicated person or as a child, while the specific version varied both the amount of alcohol consumed (two vs. five glasses of wine) and the child's age (four vs. 12 years). To investigate the effect of legal expertise on argument selection, moreover, law and social science students evaluate the persuasiveness of both argument versions. Though we observed statistically significant prototype effects as well as expertise effects, results were mixed and sometimes ran counter to normative expectation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a brief selective overview and discussion of recent research into natural language argumentation that may inform the study of human reasoning on the assumption that an episode of argumentation issues an invitation to accept a corresponding inference. As this research shows, arguers typically seek to establish new consequences based on prior information. And they typically do so vis-à-vis a real or an imagined opponent, or an opponent-position, in ways that remain sensitive to considerations of context, audiences, and goals. Deductively valid inferences remain a limiting case of such reasoning. In view of these insights, it may appear less surprising that allegedly "irrational" behavior can regularly be produced in experimental settings that expose subjects to standardized reasoning tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although legal contexts are subject to biased reasoning and decision making, to identify and test debiasing techniques has largely remained an open task. We report on experimentally deploying the technique ''giving reasons pro et contra'' with professional (N = 239) and lay judges (N = 372) at Swedish municipal courts. Using a mock legal scenario, participants assessed the relevance of an eyewitness's previous conviction for his credibility. On average, both groups displayed low degrees of bias. We observed a small positive debiasing effect only for professional judges. Strong evidence was obtained for a relation between profession and relevance-assessment: Lay judges seemed to assign a greater importance to the prior conviction than professional judges did. We discuss challenges for future research, calling other research groups to contribute additional samples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In psychology as elsewhere, the main statistical inference strategy to establish empirical effects is null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The recent failure to replicate allegedly well-established NHST-results, however, implies that such results lack sufficient statistical power, and thus feature unacceptably high error-rates. Using data-simulation to estimate the error-rates of NHST-results, we advocate the research program strategy (RPS) as a superior methodology. RPS integrates Frequentist with Bayesian inference elements, and leads from a preliminary discovery against a (random) H 0-hypothesis to a statistical H 1-verification. Not only do RPS-results feature significantly lower error-rates than NHST-results, RPS also addresses key-deficits of a "pure" Frequentist and a standard Bayesian approach. In particular, RPS aggregates underpowered results safely. RPS therefore provides a tool to regain the trust the discipline had lost during the ongoing replicability-crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reanalyze the recent multilab preregistered study on ego-depletion by Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2016)as iftheir data were obtained under the research program-strategy (Witte & Zenker, 2016a, 2016b). This strengthens Hagger and Chatzisarantis’s (2016) main conclusion, because our reanalysis more directly corroborates the absence of a medium-sized, or a small-sized, ego-depletion effect (d = .50 under α = β = .05;d = .20 under α = β = .01). We explain how a smaller ego-depletion effect ofd = .04 can be tested under similar conditions, having determined this value by maximum likelihood estimation, and compare the research program-strategy to a standard meta-analytic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on probabilistic reasoning has discovered several systematic errors, among which base rate neglect and the fallacy of the transposed conditional have featured prominently. This article introduces the term miss rate neglect to capture the systematic failure to properly account for false positives, i.e. the probability of evidence (E) given the hypothesis (H) is false, P(E|~H). Miss rate neglect occurs when decision makers (i) completely disregard the miss rate; (ii) underestimate the importance of differences in the miss rate, or (iii) overlook circumstances that affect the miss rate. We explain the relevance of miss rate neglect for legal decisionmaking, reviewextant literature, present new experimental work that empirically validates options (ii) and (iii), and propose experimental variations that future researchmay pursue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By understanding laws of nature as geometrical rather than linguistic entities, this paper addresses how to describe theory structures and how to evaluate their continuity. Relying on conceptual spaces as a modelling tool, we focus on the conceptual framework an empirical theory presupposes, thus obtain a geometrical representation of a theory’s structure. We stress the relevance of measurement procedures in separating conceptual from empirical structures. This lets our understanding of scientific laws come closer to scientific practice, and avoids a widely recognised deficit in current philosophy of science accounts, namely to risk a collapse of the physical into the mathematical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reconstruct recent work on macrosocial stress (Chou, Parmar, & Galinsky, 2016) as if it were an instance of a research strategy that tests point-alternative hypotheses within a full-fledged research program. Because this strategy is free of various deficits that beset dominant strategies (e.g., meta-analysis, Bayes factor analysis), our article demonstrates one way in which the confidence crisis may be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]