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The 2008 banking failures in the UK and the United States reshaped global economic governance. The aftershocks of the financial crisis exposed the need for global agencies which could rapidly allocate resources to prevent countries collapsing. Equally highlighted was the need for more inclusive institutions, drawing in major emerging economies to provide resources and agree upon institutional reform. Five years after the global financial crisis, the promise of better capacity to manage a global crisis is slipping out of sight. Not emerging are well-resourced, globally-reaching, rapidly-acting international institutions. The IMF still waits the doubling of its capital, currently stalled for want of US approval, and its existing resources are heavily tied-up in Europe. The World Bank's increase in resources was more modest, and it has yet to build capacity to lend rapidly and globally and to expand lending and its exposure beyond existing borrowers and loan arrangements. Equally missing is a successful engagement of new emerging economies at the core of global economic management. The IMF still awaits implementation of the voice and vote reforms which would raise emerging economies' stakes in the core of the institution. The World Bank has not seen emerging economies rushing to increase their contributions to IDA, nor to double the Bank's resources, nor even to borrow from the Bank. The new global institution, the Financial Stability Board, is still woefully short of the legal mandate and inclusive processes which would draw each region of the world into its standard-setting process. This paper lays out recent transformations at the IMF, World Bank, and FSB, and examines how a number of core principles of global governance - legitimacy; representation; responsiveness; flexibility; transparency and accountability; and effectiveness - could be furthered in these institutions. In so doing, it lays out a new action plan for the reform of global economic governance.

This paper argues that recent global health cooperation has been marked by two trends. First, there has been a highly successful proliferation of vertical funds to fight specific diseases. These are characterised by narrower problem-based mandates; multistakeholder governance; voluntary and discretionary funding; no in-country presence for the delivery of assistance; and an output-based legitimacy (based on effectiveness, not process). The rise of new initiatives with these characteristics has dovetailed with an increase in the funding of international organizations. However, the latter has not necessarily strengthened multilateralism. Instead rapid increases in discretionary earmarked funding to the WHO and World Bank, which we call Trojan multilateralism, has replicated features of the vertical funds. With what consequences for international cooperation? Using principal-agent theory, we find a mixed picture. International organizations are being redirected by specific incentives. However, two constraints on bilateral control are not shifting. There is a persistent asymmetry of information between the WHO or the World Bank and individual member states which gives the former a degree of autonomy. Equally, there are persistent obstacles to tightening bilateral monitoring of multilateral action. We conclude that the positive lessons to be drawn from vertical initiatives need to be balanced by the risks posed from a convergence of vertical initiatives and Trojan multilateralism.

Should aid be better coordinated? And if so, how? The case for aid coordination is a powerful one. As aid poured into Haiti in the wake of a massive earthquake in January 2010, television coverage around the world broadcast two different realities. One story was about well-organized aid-givers collecting record donations and dispatching food and medical equipment by the tonne to Haiti. The other was a story about aid stymied by a lack of coordination. Television crews depicted Haitian families and children complaining that none of the food, medical assistance, or shelter was reaching them. The President of Haiti soon spoke out: "I am not in a position to criticize anybody, not in the least people who have come here to help me," Preval said. "What I am staying is, what everybody is saying is, that we need a better coordination."

This paper presents a short, analytical history of the G20 Leaders group. It examines the impact of the G20 on outcomes in international cooperation, and its impact on processes and institutions of global governance. The first part of the paper traces the trajectory of the G20 across its first four meetings, highlighting that after the initial "crisis committee" phase of the G20, the cooperation achieved by the grouping waned dramatically. The second part of the paper examines whether the global agenda has been broadened or influenced by the inclusion of emerging economies. The third and final part of the paper examines the prospects for the G20 looking forward, sketching out four major areas in which the G20 needs to act as an agenda-setter and orchestrator of global governance. To foreshadow the conclusions, the G20 is uniquely placed as an informal agenda-setting group, to push forward global cooperation in four key areas: financial regulation, development assistance, exchange rates, and international institutional reform.

At the heart of the existing climate change regime is a divide between developed and developing countries. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-FCCC) enshrines "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" and in so doing recognizes that historical responsibility for climate change rests with developed countries and that they have greater capacity to address the problem. That said, the Convention specifies no timetable for the introduction of binding commitments on developing countries, nor any agreed procedures for "graduating" countries from developing to developed status. As a result, progress in governing climate change rests heavily on finding a North-South agreement. That, in turn, rests on overcoming what Joanna Depledge and Farhana Yamin (2009) describe as "the persistence of dysfunctional North-South politics . . . negotiations between the groups tend to be dominated by kneejerk suspicion, defensiveness, and misunderstanding, which hinder the rational discussion of proposals". An "integrated multi-track approach" has been proposed by Bodansky and Diringer (2008) as a possible way forward. All major emitters (developed and developing) would commit to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but they would have the flexibility to devise their own approaches (whether economy-wide targets, efficiency standards, efforts towards renewable energy, curbing deforestation, and so forth).1 Many developing countries are concerned and sceptical about the prospect of new regulatory arrangements. They do not wish to become "rule-takers" in yet another sphere of global politics which leaves them vulnerable to rules, monitoring, and enforcement which they see as having asymmetric impact to their disadvantage. We focus on: the participation of developing countries in rule-making, and the monitoring, verification, and enforcement processes. As mentioned above, developing countries are concerned that a small group of powerful, industrialized countries will mostly "do" the regulating, leaving them highly constrained, but marginalized, with little influence or control over the rules and their application. Below we draw out why developing countries might be concerned and what kinds of arrangements might reduce the risk that they will be marginalized from arrangements.

Aid for good governance is much in the news. Wealthy countries promised dramatically to increase aid to the world's poorest countries at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles in 2005, agreeing to double aid for Africa by 2010 and noted that according to the OECD, aid for all developing countries would increase by around $50 billion per year by 2010 (Gleneagles G8 Communique, 8 July 2005 at www.g8.gov.uk). Promoting good governance is at the heart of these new commitments. To quote the G8 in 2007: "Good governance in Africa is vital to peace, stability, sustainable development, and growth. Without good governance, all other reforms will have limited impacts" (Heiligendamm G8 Communique, 8 June 2007 at www.g7.utoronto.ca). The promises being made by wealthy countries need to be set in a broader context. After 9/11 the global security agenda shifted. Suddenly the top priority was the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan - in fact, anywhere, where extremists might be contributing to international terrorist activities. Soon after, the invasion of Iraq signalled a new approach to containing and disarming states thought to have weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Inevitably demoted were efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts within poorer states, such as the one currently raging in the Darfur region of Sudan. These developments magnified three existing challenges to foreign aid. First, donors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security goals instead of helping the world's poor. Second, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader War on Terror have been extremely costly, diverting aid and reducing other aid budgets. Generous promises of increased aid have not translated into real new flows. "Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has stalled" concluded the OECD DAC in 2006 (OECD DAC 2006, Figure 2.2) while the World Bank report that net ODA disbursements in fact declined by US$3 billion in 2006 (World Bank 2007, p.55). The third challenge to aid is that major donors are failing to coordinate aid through existing multilateral institutions, choosing instead to create their own new mechanisms and pursue their own priorities. The result is competition and clashes among priorities, creating aid chaos in many of the poorest recipient countries with regard to how aid is being delivered. This chapter assesses the scope for more aid and good governance promotion in the context of the emerging aid policies of the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Self-regulation by multinational corporations of social/ environmental impacts has been advocated as a solution to the regulatory capacity problems faced by developing states. Market pressures can provide incentives for firms to implement codes and standards, but rely on widely available information about corporate behaviour. Voluntary schemes attempt to provide reliable, standardized reporting of information. But government action - in the North and South - remains vital to effective regulation, by setting social goals and upholding the freedom of civil society actors to organize and mobilize. International organizations and legal instruments may be able to assist developing country governments in fulfilling these roles.

The IMF is governed by a 24-member Executive Board, which represents 184 countries. Although often prized as a small and efficient decision-making body, the Board represents some countries more effectively than others. This is due to the institutional structure and incentives within which the Board operates. Prime among them is a system of constituencies, which have formed and evolved as countries have sought to improve their position in the organization. These groups vary in size, shared interests, and distribution of power. Their effectiveness is not only affected by these attributes. It is also determined by decision-making rules across the institution, by the lack of formal accountability of Board members, and by the strength of other coalitions of countries acting informally within the institution. The analysis implies that representation on the IMF Board could be improved without altering the size of the Board.

Calls for the IMF to increase participation in decision-making present a compelling case from numerous sources. Any organization working to meet and further its clients' needs requires feedback from those affected, to maintain quality and relevance. IMF lending typically takes place during a crisis with little time for broad democratic consultations. If the Fund's role is not to be coercive, broader society participation must precede the crisis, part of the normal politics of engagement. Despite the need for greater participation and legitimacy in the IMF, little rigorous thought has been applied to how this might practically be brought about. This paper argues that the involvement of national Parliaments is an obvious beginning. It evaluates the status of parliamentary involvement to date and analyses how Parliamentarians and the IMF can improve and expand parliamentary oversight.