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Previous research has demonstrated an inverse relation between subjective social class (SSC) and performance on emotion recognition tasks. Study 1 ( N = 418) involved a preregistered replication of this effect using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task and the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery. The inverse relation replicated; however, exploratory analyses revealed a significant interaction between sex and SSC in predicting emotion recognition, indicating that the effect was driven by males. In Study 2 ( N = 745), we preregistered and tested the interaction on a separate archival dataset. The interaction replicated; the association between SSC and emotion recognition again occurred only in males. Exploratory analyses (Study 3; N = 381) examined the generalizability of the interaction to incidental face memory. Our results underscore the need to reevaluate previous research establishing the main effects of social class and sex on emotion recognition abilities, as these effects apparently moderate each other.

Contains fulltext : 220707.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Although early-life adversity can undermine healthy development, children growing up in harsh environments may develop intact, or even enhanced, skills for solving problems in high-adversity contexts (i.e., "hidden talents"). Here we situate the hidden talents model within a larger interdisciplinary framework. Summarizing theory and research on hidden talents, we propose that stress-adapted skills represent a form of adaptive intelligence that enables individuals to function within the constraints of harsh, unpredictable environments. We discuss the alignment of the hidden talents model with current knowledge about human brain development following early adversity; examine potential applications of this perspective to multiple sectors concerned with youth from harsh environments, including education, social services, and juvenile justice; and compare the hidden talents model with contemporary developmental resilience models. We conclude that the hidden talents approach offers exciting new directions for research on developmental adaptations to childhood adversity, with translational implications for leveraging stress-adapted skills to more effectively tailor education, jobs, and interventions to fit the needs and potentials of individuals from a diverse range of life circumstances. This approach affords a well-rounded view of people who live with adversity that avoids stigma and communicates a novel, distinctive, and strength-based message. 19 p.

Contains fulltext : 240004.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Sensitive periods are widespread in nature, but their evolution is not well understood. Recent mathematical modeling has illuminated the conditions favoring the evolution of sensitive periods early in ontogeny. However, sensitive periods also exist at later stages of ontogeny, such as adolescence. Here, we present a mathematical model that explores the conditions that favor sensitive periods at later developmental stages. In our model, organisms use environmental cues to incrementally construct a phenotype that matches their environment. Unlike in previous models, the reliability of cues varies across ontogeny. We use stochastic dynamic programming to compute optimal policies for a range of evolutionary ecologies and then simulate developmental trajectories to obtain mature phenotypes. We measure changes in plasticity across ontogeny using study paradigms inspired by empirical research: adoption and cross-fostering. Our results show that sensitive periods only evolve later in ontogeny if the reliability of cues increases across ontogeny. The onset, duration, and offset of sensitive periods - and the magnitude of plasticity - depend on the specific parameter settings. If the reliability of cues decreases across ontogeny, sensitive periods are favored only early in ontogeny. These results are robust across different paradigms suggesting that empirical findings might be comparable despite different experimental designs. 14 p.

Contains fulltext : 214941.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) We present a consensus-based checklist to improve and document the transparency of research reports in social and behavioural research. An accompanying online application allows users to complete the form and generate a report that they can submit with their manuscript or post to a public repository. 3 p.

Author(s): Aczel, Balazs; Szaszi, Barnabas; Sarafoglou, Alexandra; Kekecs, Zoltan; Kucharský, Simon; Benjamin, Daniel; Chambers, Christopher D; Fisher, Agneta; Gelman, Andrew; Gernsbacher, Morton A; Ioannidis, John P; Johnson, Eric; Jonas, Kai; Kousta, Stavroula; Lilienfeld, Scott O; Lindsay, D Stephen; Morey, Candice C; Munafo, Marcus; Newell, Benjamin R; Pashler, Harold; Shanks, David R; Simons, Daniel J; Wicherts, Jelte M; Albarracin, Dolores; Anderson, Nicole D; Antonakis, John; Arkes, Hal R; Back, Mitja D; Banks, George C; Beevers, Christopher; Bennett, Andrew A; Bleidorn, Wiebke; Boyer, Ty W; Cacciari, Cristina; Carter, Alice S; Cesario, Joseph; Clifton, Charles; Conroy, Ronan M; Cortese, Mike; Cosci, Fiammetta; Cowan, Nelson; Crawford, Jarret; Crone, Eveline A; Curtin, John; Engle, Randall; Farrell, Simon; Fearon, Pasco; Fichman, Mark; Frankenhuis, Willem; Freund, Alexandra M; Gaskell, M Gareth; Giner-Sorolla, Roger; Green, Don P; Greene, Robert L; Harlow, Lisa L; de la Guardia, Fernando Hoces; Isaacowitz, Derek; Kolodner, Janet; Lieberman, Debra; Logan, Gordon D; Mendes, Wendy B; Moersdorf, Lea; Nyhan, Brendan; Pollack, Jeffrey; Sullivan, Christopher; Vazire, Simine; Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan | Abstract: An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper.

Contains fulltext : 219115.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) This special issue focuses on the relationship between life history and learning, especially during human evolution. 'Life history' refers to the developmental programme of an organism, including its period of immaturity, reproductive rate and timing, caregiving investment and longevity. Across many species an extended childhood and high caregiving investment appear to be correlated with particular kinds of plasticity and learning. Human life history is particularly distinctive; humans evolved an exceptionally long childhood and old age, and an unusually high level of caregiving investment, at the same time that they evolved distinctive capacities for cognition and culture. The contributors explore the relations between life history, plasticity and learning across a wide range of methods and populations, including theoretical and empirical work in biology, anthropology and developmental psychology. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'. 6 p.

Contains fulltext : 201953.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) The term 'life-history theory' is a familiar label in several disciplines. Life-history theory has its roots in evolutionary models of the fitness consequences of allocating energy to reproduction, growth and self-maintenance across the life course. Increasingly, the term is also used in the conceptual framing of psychological and social-science studies. As a scientific paradigm expands its range, its parts can become conceptually isolated from one another, even to the point that it is no longer held together by a common core of shared ideas. Here, we investigate the literature invoking the term 'life-history theory' using quantitative bibliometric methods based on patterns of shared citation. Results show that the literature up to and including 2010 was relatively coherent: it drew on a shared body of core references and had only weak cluster divisions running along taxonomic lines. The post-2010 literature is more fragmented: it has more marked cluster boundaries, both between the human and non-human literatures, and within the human literature. In particular, two clusters of human research based on the idea of a fast-slow continuum of individual differences are bibliometrically isolated from the rest. We also find some evidence suggesting a decline over time in the incidence of formal modelling. We point out that the human fast-slow continuum literature is conceptually closer to the non-human 'pace-of-life' literature than it is to the formal life-history framework in ecology and evolution. 9 p.

There is enduring debate over the question of which early-life effects are adaptive and which ones are not. Mathematical modelling shows that early-life effects can be adaptive in environments that have particular statistical properties, such as reliable cues to current conditions and high autocorrelation of environmental states. However, few empirical studies have measured these properties, leading to an impasse. Progress, therefore, depends on research that quantifies cue reliability and autocorrelation of environmental parameters in real environments. These statistics may be different for social and non-social aspects of the environment. In this paper, we summarize evolutionary models of early-life effects. Then, we discuss empirical data on environmental statistics from a range of disciplines. We highlight cases where data on environmental statistics have been used to test competing explanations of early-life effects. We conclude by providing guidelines for new data collection and reflections on future directions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Developing differences: early-life effects and evolutionary medicine'.

Contains fulltext : 204928.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) It is undesirable when students attend institutions that are less selective than their academic credentials would permit (i.e., undermatching) because of the long-term consequences for their job opportunities and wages, in particular for students from low-socioeconomic (SES) backgrounds. Undermatching may also affect students’ satisfaction during college. Research from a life course perspective shows that subjective experiences during college may have long-term impact on adolescents’ development. However, little is known about the relation between undermatching and students’ subjective experiences during their years in college, and about whether this relation is moderated by SES. From an academic misalignment perspective, undermatching may lead to less satisfaction because undermatched students are not maximizing their potential. However, from a social misalignment perspective, experiences of social mismatch when low-SES students enter the most selective institutions are well documented, and such mismatch may be less pronounced in less selective institutions. Consequently, there may be a positive relation between undermatching and satisfaction with the social environment for low-SES students. The current study tested these relations by using propensity score matching (PSM) to analyse the association between undermatching, SES, and satisfaction among 21,452 respondents (67% female) among 1st, 2nd, 3th, and 4th year college students from a cohort study among students in the Netherlands (Dutch Student Monitor), all of whom were eligible for the most selective institutions. The results indicated a negative relation between undermatching and satisfaction with the social and academic environment, both for low- and high-SES students. The negative relation between undermatching and both forms of satisfaction increases toward the last year in college, especially for low-SES students. This lowered satisfaction in the final stage in higher education implies that the negative consequences of undermatching become more pronounced after students have become more integrated in their colleges. These findings have important implications for the understanding about undermatching in relation to students’ development and for the formulation of policies and programs for promoting social mobility. 15 p.

I argue that emotion research needs formal (mathematical) theory to address two central questions. How does evolution shape mechanisms of emotion development across generations, depending on environmental conditions? How do these mechanisms generate emotions, based on lifetime experience and current context? Formal modeling enables researchers to state ideas clearly and precisely, deduce predictions, and evaluate the fit between theory and data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Contains fulltext : 216280.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) On average, psychological variables are often statistically different in people living in poverty compared with people living in affluence. The default academic response to this pattern is often the deficit model: Poverty damages or impairs brain function, which leads to poor performance that only exacerbates the poverty. Deficits and damage are real phenomena. However, there are also other processes: People living in poverty may have made reasonable psychological responses to their circumstances or may have developed strengths that enhance their ability to cope with challenges in their lives. We illustrate these points by discussing the linked examples of time preference, early reproduction, and hidden talents. We argue for a balanced approach to the psychology of poverty that integrates deficit and strengths-based models. Future research could focus on the ways in which impairment and adaptation interact. 6 p.

Item does not contain fulltext Variation in life history (LH) traits along the fast-slow continuum (referred to as pace of life, POL) is thought to result from a trade-off between investments in current versus future reproduction. Originally developed for understanding variation in LH strategies at the among-population level, the POL theory has more recently been applied towards understanding variation in LH traits at the within-population level, and further extended to address the covariance of LH traits with additional behavioural and/or physiological traits, referred to as pace-of-life syndromes (POLS). The article by Réale et al. (Philos T Roy Soc B 365:4051-4063, 2010), which synthesized several earlier reviews and opinions on among-individual covariation between LH, behavioural, and physiological traits, and subsequent research testing POLS in a variety of species, have collectively been cited several hundreds of times - a trend that continues. These works have interdisciplinary impact, informing research in life history biology, behavioural and developmental biology, and the social sciences. In this paper, we review the existing theoretical POLS models that provide adaptive explanations for covariances between LH traits and additional behavioural and/or physiological traits while assuming a trade-off between current and future reproduction. We find that the set of relevant models is small. Moreover, models show that covariances between life history traits and behavioural or physiological traits can arise even in the absence of a current-future reproduction trade-off, implying that observing such covariances does not provide a strong indication regarding the process generating POLS. We discuss lessons learned from existing models of POLS, highlight key gaps in the modelling literature, and provide guidelines for better integration between theory and data. 12 p.

Contains fulltext : 191999.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) We used a Face-in-the-Crowd task to examine whether hostile environments predict enhanced detection of anger, and whether such enhanced cognition occurs for a di erent negative emotion, sadness, as well. We conducted a well-powered, preregistered study in 100 college students and 100 individuals from a community sample with greater exposure to hostile environments. At the group level, the community sample was less accurate at detecting both angry and sad faces than students; and, only students discriminated anger more accurately than sadness. At the individual level, having experienced more violence did not predict enhanced anger detection accuracy. In general, participants had a lower threshold (i.e., a more liberal criterion) for detecting emotion in response to anger than sadness. And, students had a higher threshold (i.e., a more conservative criterion) for detecting emotion than the community sample in response to both anger and sadness. Overall, these ndings contradict our hypothesis that exposure to hostile environments predicts enhanced danger detection. Rather, our community sample was more prone to over-perceiving emotions, consistent with previous studies showing bias in threat-exposed populations. Future work is needed to tease apart the conditions in which people exposed to social danger show enhanced accuracy or bias in their perception of emotions. 8 p.

Sensitive periods in development are widespread in nature. Many psychologists and biologists regard sensitive periods as byproducts of developmental processes. Although this view may be correct in some cases, it is unlikely to be the whole story. There is large variation in sensitive periods (a) between species in the same trait ( Beecher & Brenowitz, 2005 ), (b) between individuals of the same species ( Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Belsky, 2016 ), and (c) between different traits within a single individual ( Zeanah, Gunnar, McCall, Kreppner, & Fox, 2011 ). In this article, we discuss recent insights provided by formal models of the evolution of sensitive periods. These models help to identify the conditions in which sensitive periods are likely to evolve, and make predictions about the factors that affect their development. We conclude by discussing future directions for empirical research.

Item does not contain fulltext Sensitive periods, in which experience shapes phenotypic development to a larger extent than other periods, are widespread in nature. Despite a recent focus on neural–physiological explanation, few formal models have examined the evolutionary selection pressures that result in developmental mechanisms that produce sensitive periods. Here, we present such a model. We model development as a specialization process during which individuals incrementally adapt to local environmental conditions, while receiving a constant stream of cost-free, imperfect cues to the environmental state. We compute optimal developmental programmes across a range of ecological conditions and use these programmes to simulate developmental trajectories and obtain distributions of mature phenotypes. We highlight four main results. First, matching the empirical record, sensitive periods often result from experience or from a combination of age and experience, but rarely from age alone. Second, individual differences in sensitive periods emerge as a result of stochasticity in cues: individuals who obtain more consistent cue sets lose their plasticity at faster rates. Third, in some cases, experience shapes phenotypes only at a later life stage (lagged effects). Fourth, individuals might perseverate along developmental trajectories despite accumulating evidence suggesting the alternate trajectory is more likely to match the ecology. 8 p.

Contains fulltext : 151892.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Children vary in the extent to which their development is shaped by particular experiences (e.g. maltreatment, social support). This variation raises a question: Is there no single level of plasticity that maximizes biological fitness? One influential hypothesis states that when different levels of plasticity are optimal in different environmental states and the environment fluctuates unpredictably, natural selection may favor parents producing offspring with varying levels of plasticity. The current article presents a mathematical model assessing the logic of this hypothesis – specifically, it examines what conditions are required for natural selection to favor parents to bet-hedge by varying their offspring's plasticity. Consistent with existing theory from biology, results show that between-individual variation in plasticity cannot evolve when the environment only varies across space. If, however, the environment varies across time, selection can favor differential plasticity, provided fitness effects are large (i.e. variation in individuals’ plasticity is correlated with substantial variation in fitness). Our model also generates a novel restriction: Differential plasticity only evolves when the cost of being mismatched to the environment exceeds the benefits of being well matched. Based on mechanistic considerations, we argue that bet-hedging by varying offspring plasticity, if it were to evolve, would be more likely instantiated via epigenetic mechanisms (e.g. pre- or postnatal developmental programming) than genetic ones (e.g. mating with genetically diverse partners). Our model suggests novel avenues for testing the bet-hedging hypothesis of differential plasticity, including empirical predictions and relevant measures. We also discuss several ways in which future work might extend our model. 24 p.

Contains fulltext : 149507.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Development in many organisms appears to show evidence of sensitive windows—periods or stages in ontogeny in which individual experience has a particularly strong influence on the phenotype (compared to other periods or stages). Despite great interest in sensitive windows from both fundamental and applied perspectives, the functional (adaptive) reasons why they have evolved are unclear. Here we outline a conceptual framework for understanding when natural selection should favour changes in plasticity across development. Our approach builds on previous theory on the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, which relates individual and population differences in plasticity to two factors: the degree of uncertainty about the environmental conditions and the extent to which experiences during development (‘cues’) provide information about those conditions. We argue that systematic variation in these two factors often occurs within the lifetime of a single individual, which will select for developmental changes in plasticity. Of central importance is how informational properties of the environment interact with the life history of the organism. Phenotypes may be more or less sensitive to environmental cues at different points in development because of systematic changes in (i) the frequency of cues, (ii) the informativeness of cues, (iii) the fitness benefits of information and/or (iv) the constraints on plasticity. In relatively stable environments, a sensible null expectation is that plasticity will gradually decline with age as the developing individual gathers information. We review recent models on the evolution of developmental changes in plasticity and explain how they fit into our conceptual framework. Our aim is to encourage an adaptive perspective on sensitive windows in development. 14 p.

Many recent evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology studies have tested hypotheses by examining correlations between variables measured at a group level (e.g., state, country, continent). In such analyses, variables collected for each aggregation are often taken to be representative of the individuals present within them, and relationships between such variables are presumed to reflect individual-level processes. There are multiple reasons to exercise caution when doing so, including: (1) the ecological fallacy, whereby relationships observed at the aggregate level do not accurately represent individual-level processes; (2) non-independence of data points, which violates assumptions of the inferential techniques used in null hypothesis testing; and (3) cross-cultural non-equivalence of measurement (differences in construct validity between groups). We provide examples of how each of these gives rise to problems in the context of testing evolutionary hypotheses about human behavior, and we offer some suggestions for future research. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York.

Development is typically a constructive process, in which phenotypes incrementally adapt to local ecologies. Here, we present a novel model in which natural selection shapes developmental systems based on the evolutionary ecology, and these systems adaptively guide phenotypic development. We assume that phenotypic construction is incremental and trades off with sampling cues to the environmental state. We computed the optimal developmental programmes across a range of evolutionary ecological conditions. Using these programmes, we simulated distributions of mature phenotypes. Our results show that organisms sample the environment most extensively when cues are moderately, not highly, informative. When the developmental programme relies heavily on sampling, individuals transition from sampling to specialization at different times in ontogeny, depending on the consistency of their sampled cue set; this finding suggests that stochastic sampling may result in individual differences in plasticity itself. In addition, we find that different selection pressures may favour similar developmental mechanisms, and that organisms may incorrectly calibrate development despite stable ontogenetic environments. We hope our model will stimulate adaptationist research on the constructive processes guiding development. © 2011 The Royal Society.

In a recent article in Perspectives on Psychological Science, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) propose that insecure attachment styles harm the biological fitness of individuals, yet may have been favored by natural selection because they provide benefits for the group. This novel hypothesis proclaims that groups containing a mixture of secure and insecure attachment styles deal more effectively with hazards, such as venomous snakes or fires, because of earlier detection and escape. While I support adaptationist approaches to development, including attachment, I have concerns about this specific proposal. In particular, I question: (1) that insecure attachment styles are detrimental to individual fitness, (2) that insecure attachment styles are well-designed for dealing with danger at the group-level, (3) the underlying assumption that human attachment styles evolved in social groups comprised mostly of genetic relatives, (4) whether the empirical evidence, provided by the authors, can arbitrate between hypotheses postulating benefits to individuals versus benefits to groups.

We agree with Henrich et al. that documenting cultural universality and variability provides an indispensable window into human nature. We want to stress the mediating role development plays between evolution and culture. Moving beyond the mere documentation of universality or variability, developmental approaches can provide mechanistic explanations, linking ecology to phenotype. Combining phylogeny and adaptationism, evolutionary approaches can explain the properties of developmental systems.

Contains fulltext : 90029.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Previous studies suggest that men in Western societies are attracted to low female waist-to-hip ratios (WHR). Several explanations of this preference rely on the importance of visual input for the development of the preference, including explanations stressing the role of visual media. We report evidence showing that congenitally blind men, without previous visual experience, exhibit a preference for low female WHRs when assessing female body shapes through touch, as do their sighted counterparts. This finding shows that a preference for low WHR can develop in the complete absence of visual input and, hence, that such input is not necessary for the preference to develop. However, the strength of the preference was greater for the sighted than the blind men, suggesting that visual input might play a role in reinforcing the preference. These results have implications for debates concerning the evolutionary and developmental origins of human mate preferences, in particular, regarding the role of visual media in shaping such preferences.

A casual look at the literature in social cognition reveals a vast collection of biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize utility. One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the human mind is woefully muddled. We present a three-category evolutionary taxonomy of evidence of biases: biases are (a) heuristics, (b) error management effects, or (c) experimental artifacts. We conclude that much of the research on cognitive biases can be profitably reframed and understood in evolutionary terms. An adaptationist perspective suggests that the mind is remarkably well designed for important problems of survival and reproduction, and not fundamentally irrational. Our analysis is not an apologia intended to place the rational mind on a pedestal for admiration. rather, it promises practical outcomes including a clearer view of the architecture of systems for judgment and decision making, and exposure of clashes between adaptations designed for the ancestral past and the demands of the present. By casually browsing journals in the social sciences one can discover a collection of human biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize utility. Papers published in Social Cognition are illustrative. In just 2007, the journal published a special issue dedicated to the hindsight bias, which is the tendency to believe that events that have occurred are more probable when assessing them after the fact than when estimating them prospectively (Blank, Musch, & Pohl, 2007). Other examples include misapprehensions of probability like the hot hand fallacy that leads people to erroneously believe that basketball players who have shot several successful baskets are more likely to succeed on the next try (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). There are also many effects of emotion purported to cloud good judgment (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1996), overuses of stereotypes (Ross & Nisbett, 1991), misapprehensions of the motives of members of the opposite sex (Abbey, 1982), common violations of monetary utility in behavioral eco

We agree that much of language evolution is likely to be adaptation of languages to properties of the brain. However, the attempt to rule out the existence of language-specific adaptations a priori is misguided. In particular, the claim that adaptation to “moving targets” cannot occur is false. Instead, the details of gene-culture coevolution in language are an empirical matter.

Evolutionary psychologists tend to view the mind as a large collection of evolved, functionally specialized mechanisms, or modules. Cosmides and Tooby (1994) have presented four arguments in favor of this model of the mind: the engineering argument, the error argument, the poverty of the stimulus argument, and combinatorial explosion. Fodor (2000) has discussed each of these four arguments and rejected them all. In the present paper, we present and discuss the arguments for and against the massive modularity hypothesis. We conclude that Cosmides and Tooby's arguments have considerable force and are too easily dismissed by Fodor.