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The study by International Labour Organization (ILO) aims to find alternative ways through which global consensus on the regulation of labour standards can be developed. It is concluded that the focus on core labour standards provides a platform for progress in labour protection and an influential outcome in placing the ILO at the centre of attempts to integrate social policy into global economic governance.

This article focuses on the vast number of people who make global governance happen. It probes the role of the unknown people in the "middle" who are largely absent from scholarly gaze: professionals, service teams, and others who act behind the scenes. They are not at the top of public and private organizations ("global governors" in the literature), but they keep the lights on. They accomplish the policy, operational, and support work to move the needle of global governance institutions of all varieties from the local to global. These largely invisible and unheard populations—at least in the scholarly and policy literatures—make global governance work. The "missing middle" is not confined to the everyday contributions of professionals in intergovernmental secretariats because contemporary global governance is not synonymous with international organization, but concerns networked forms of public authority that may or may not include secretariats or states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we explore what a programme of 'reglobalization' could look like for the governance of global trade. Our focus is on the centrepiece of the current commercial order, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our aim is to illustrate the potential value of a reformulated WTO not just for commercial relations globally but also for other areas of social concern. We seek to be both practical and challenging. We seek to be practical by establishing what a programme of WTO reform might look like in the near-to-medium term, including changes to the negotiating process and opening up the WTO to non-state actors. We seek to be challenging by setting the transformation of global trade governance within the context of a thorough process of reglobalization wherein the primary public mechanisms of global governance are reoriented towards the delivery of progressive social and environmental outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conclusion of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Buenos Aires ministerial conference (10–13 December 2017) was immediately celebrated and derided in equal measure. For its supporters, Buenos Aires opened the way toward negotiations in e‐commerce, investment facilitation for development, and measures designed to help micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs). For its detractors, the meeting underscored the gridlock that continues to blight the WTO's negotiating function and underlined the organisation's declining credibility as a mechanism for governing global trade. In this paper we provide one of the first full length critical evaluations of the Buenos Aires conference and its outcome. In so doing, we offer answers to three questions. What accounts for such dramatically different assessments of the meeting's outcome? How should the outcome be interpreted? What is its significance for the future of the WTO and the multilateral trading system? We argue that the meeting's outcome was indeed significant. It has consolidated the process of reconfiguring the WTO's negotiating function; and it enables members to tackle more effectively a range of pressing economic and social issues as well as to navigate blockers and blockages in the negotiations. However, it also poses challenges for the WTO's poorest constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the WTO's creation its relationship with civil society has changed significantly. In this article, we use an original dataset to: (1) plot the changes that have taken place in civil society group representation at the WTO Public Forum; and (2) assess the significance of these changes for understandings of public interactions with the WTO. We test four hypotheses drawn from prevalent claims made in the academic and policy-facing literatures: (1) that the volume of participation in the Public Forum is determined by the ebb and flow of WTO-centred trade politics, with participation levels peaking during moments of crisis and falling away during times of stasis; (2) that the stalling of the multilateral trade agenda has led to business interests turning away from the WTO; (3) that the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Public Forum is also sensitive to the rhythms of trade politics; and (4) that governments - particularly those from the global North - have begun to lose interest in the WTO and shifted attention to other arenas. We find support for hypotheses one and three but not for two and four. We subsequently analyse whose voices are heard at the Public Forum and find that there has been a narrowing of the arena of trade debate over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil society organizations are often seen as playing a crucial role in helping to mitigate the exclusion of weaker states, giving voice to marginalized communities, and raising environmental and developmental concerns within the trade system. The politicization and demystification of the global trade agenda by civil society also opens up space for a more diverse set of actors to influence trade negotiations. This article examines the evolution of the WTO secretariat's engagement with civil society within this context and argues that the dominant mode of engagement, as manifest in WTO Public Forums and civil society participation in ministerial conferences, is no longer fit for purpose. Rather it reflects an outmoded strategy that once served to underscore the existence and value of the WTO as an international organization and works to neutralize political contestation and publicly promote the benefits of free trade. It is now in need of reform. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This concluding article argues that while the actions of emerging powers have left an indelible mark on the way multilateral trade is governed, they have not been able to disrupt to any significant degree the deeper structures of power that underpin the World Trade Organization (WTO). While emerging powers have proven to be important players in the Doha negotiations, particularly in the closing stages, they have ultimately come up against a glass ceiling that prevents their further rise. This ceiling is the product of a series of institutional factors that combine to facilitate alterations in the general arrangement of members one-to-another but which prevent deeper configurations of power from being disturbed. The result is that while we may have witnessed some changes in the multilateral trading system, these have been more akin to a rearrangement of the multilateral furniture than to a fundamental transformation of the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a full-length evaluation of the World Trade Organization's ( WTO) decisive December 2015 Nairobi ministerial conference. It examines the dynamics of the meeting, the emergence of a new negotiating mode, and the contestations between key developing and developed members; it explores the substance of the deal negotiated; and it reflects on the future capacity of the WTO to serve as a means of securing trade gains for developing and least developed countries. Three arguments are advanced. First, the use of a new mode of negotiating brought participation and consensus into the core of the Nairobi talks, but it also resulted in an agreement that moves away from the pursuit of universal agreements to one wherein more narrowly focused piecemeal deals can be brokered. Second, the package of trade measures agreed continues an established pattern of asymmetrical trade deals that favour developed members over their developing and least developed counterparts. Third, Nairobi alters fundamentally the likely shape of future WTO deals with significant consequences for developing country trade gains. The likely result is that while Nairobi will energise the multilateral system it will do so in a way that is of questionable value to developing and least developed countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The zombie genre is quickly becoming a feature of International Relations (IR) classrooms and pedagogical toolkits as scholars enthusiastically embrace the undead as a vehicle for teaching the discipline. This article offers a cautionary note on a generally positive move to embrace the use of zombieism in IR. It shows how an uncritical use of a zombie apocalypse as a vehicle for teaching IR can reinforce existing divisions in the field, essentialise country positions, crowd out heterodox approaches, reinforce gender stereotypes and dehumanise people. To guard against these problems, the article shows how Zombie IR can be better used to think critically and normatively about world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the author discusses topics within the issue including global governance and power politics, solutions for preventing degradation of global environment, and the Chinese development financing.

Why, despite well-established and well-publicized intergovernmental processes that date back to the early 1970s, have we been unable to put in place effective mechanisms to combat climate change? Why, despite the existence of extensive global human rights machinery, do we live in a world where mass kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder continue to blight the lives of so many? Why, despite a great deal of effort on the part of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nonstate actors, have we been unable to make much of a difference to the lives of the ultra-poor and attenuate the very worst aspects of growing global inequalities? Most fundamentally, why have the current international system and the outcomes that it has produced remained so inadequate in the postwar period? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conclusion of the World Trade Organization's (wto) ninth ministerial meeting – held in Bali 3–7 December 2013 – is at one and the same time momentous, marginal and business-as-usual. It is momentous because it marks the first multilateral agreement reached in the wto since the organisation began operations on 1 January 1995; it is marginal because the deal reached will have only a limited impact on the global trading system; and it is business as usual because the Bali package will be of disproportionally greater value to the industrial states than to their developing and least developed counterparts. We examine what happened in Bali, covering the principal issues at stake and the content of the outcome, what this means for the wto and for the Doha Development Agenda (dda), and why it all matters. We argue that, while the Bali ministerial is significant and the agreements reached important, the conclusion of the meeting and the package agreed represent only a limited movement forward in addressing the fundamental problems and inequities of the wto system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China has elicited a voluminous response from scholars, business groups, journalists and beyond. Within this literature, a 'China Threat Theory' has emerged which portrays China as a destabilizing force within global politics and economics. Though originating in Realist accounts, this China Threat Theory has spread across to other approaches, and it increasingly forms the backdrop against which scholarly work positions itself. Our article contributes to this debate by examining China's role within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It assesses the extent to which China has been the disruptive power that it is often claimed to be. In particular, the article examines the change identified in Chinese diplomacy around 2008, and argues that this is attributable to the process of learning and socialization that China had to undergo as a new member, coupled with its elevation to a position of decision-making power. Contrary to the China Threat Theory, we find little to suggest that China has adopted an aggressive system challenging mode of behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the forms of economic restructuring recently undertaken by Mauritius and Seychelles in response to recent changes in the global economy, which have a fundamental impact upon their socio-economic landscape. We argue that both Mauritius and Seychelles have recently embarked upon programmes that do not actually attenuate their exposure to the vagaries of international trade but continue a historic pattern of development that addresses ailing economic performance by refining and then replacing one small set of industries with another. The latest phase of restructuring is merely the most recent instalment in this pattern. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the Doha Development Agenda trade negotiation round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as of April 2012, arguing that rhetorical methods used in trade negotiations have the potential to undermine those negotiations. According to the author, metaphors in trade commentary can inhibit the development of solutions to economic problems. Topics include trade liberalisation, the potential detachment of the WTO from the Doha negotiations, and the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

This article offers an account and analysis of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 7th Ministerial Conference – a meeting that, although ‘successfully’ concluded, failed to address a series of key issues in the increasingly moribund Doha Round of trade negotiations. We begin with an account of the meeting that offers an insight into the ‘colour’ of these biennial gatherings. The article then identifies and explores the primary consequences of pursuing an agenda designed not to focus on the core issues in the Doha Round but instead to ensure that the meeting is a ‘success’. Here we draw attention to the increasingly problematic nature of the Round's ‘development’ content, the thorny issue of agricultural liberalization and the problems posed for developing countries when their industrial counterparts pursue trade objectives through regional and bilateral means. In the concluding section, we consider the way forward for both the Doha Round and the WTO as an institution.Cet essai invité offre un compte-rendu et une analyse de la 7ème conférence ministérielle de l′Organisation mondiale du commerce, une réunion qui, bien qu’ayant été formellement conclue de manière « satisfaisante », n′a pas abordé les questions clés associées aux négociations commerciales du Cycle – de plus en plus moribond – de Doha. Nous commençons avec une description de la réunion même, afin de donner une idée de la tonalité de ces rassemblements bisannuels. Nous identifions et explorons ensuite les conséquences du fait que la conférence ait poursuivi un ordre du jour qui n′avait pas pour but de se pencher sur les questions fondamentales du Cycle de Doha, mais plutôt d′assurer que la réunion serait un « succès ». Nous poursuivons notre analyse en attirant l′attention sur la nature de plus en plus problématique du contenu des négociations du Cycle de Doha, le problème épineux de la libéralisation agricole et les problèmes rencontrés par les pays en voie de développement quand leurs partenaires industriels poursuivent des objectifs commerciaux par des moyens régionaux et bilatéraux. En guise de conclusion, nous considérons le futur du Cycle de Doha ainsi que de l′OMC en tant qu′institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Warnings that a breakdown in multilateral trade liberalization would bring about an upsurge in protectionist sentiment, the possible collapse of the multilateral trading system and, in the most doomsday of scenarios, the fragmentation of the global economy have been an intrinsic part of trade negotiations since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was first negotiated. What is seldom acknowledged, however, is the role that this language of crisis and collapse--what might be called a 'crisis discourse' --has had on framing trade negotiations and in maintaining forward momentum in the liberalization process. This discourse has played a role in facilitating the kind of institutional development that the GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has undergone--helping to push through bargains among GATT contracting parties and WTO members that have been (and remain) deeply asymmetrical--and driving the trade agenda forward at moments when the institution appears deadlocked; and it has continued to play a role in the current round of negotiations. The aims of the paper are twofold. First, the paper explores the content of the crisis discourse. Second, it examines the way in which the discourse has been deployed as a means of reframing trade negotiations in such a way that the likelihood of their continuation and ultimate conclusion increases. The paper does this by focusing on the collapse and resumption of the negotiations in the wake of the WTO's 2005 Hong Kong ministerial meeting, though the crisis discourse and its intensification at moments of intransigence has been a key feature of trade negotiations since the Allies first sat down to develop a trade architecture in the wartime and early post-war years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the World Trade Organization's ministerial conference in Hong Kong in mid December 2005. The aim of the meeting was to inject energy into an increasingly delayed and periodically fractious round of trade negotiations, the so-called Doha Development Agenda. The Hong Kong meeting was the first time trade ministers had gathered for a full conference since the collapse of the meeting in Cancun, Mexico.

Drawing on perspectives from telecommunications policy and neo-Gramscian understandings of international political economy this paper offers an explanation and analysis of the shifting patterns of regulation which have been evident in the telecommunications sector in recent years. It aims to illustrate, explain and explore the implications of the movement of regulatory sovereignty away from the nation-state, through regional conduits, to global organisations in the crystallisation of a world system of telecommunications governance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Evaluates the World Trade Organization's (WTO) accomplishments after its emergence from the Uruguay Round in 1986-1994. Contributions to the growth in world trade; Coherence brought by the WTO in global economic policy making; Progress in the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements; Public image of the WTO; Obstacles facing the WTO.

Features the Global Compact initiative launched by the United Nations on July 26, 2000. Scope of the initiative; Factors affecting the ability of the initiative to promote corporate responsibility.

Provides a comprehensive overview of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) sponsored by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Proposed content of the Agreement; Tensions surrounding the negotiations; Environmental and social concerns raised by this issue.

As well as consolidating and enhancing the process of trade liberalisation, the completion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) formalised the expansion of multilateral trade regulation into areas of commercial activity previously deemed to be trade-related. This expansion, however, has been highly uneven, privileging the needs of capital, and to a much lesser degree land, over labour. Attempts to secure a degree of regulatory protection for labour in the legal framework of the WTO-by requiring that the Organisation's members adhere to a set of core labour standards when engaged in trade-producing activities-have so far failed. Both the Singapore (1996) and Geneva (1998) Ministerial Meetings of the WTO witnessed discussion of this issue, yet neither resulted in a comprehensive and satisfactory outcome for labour. That said, significant opportunity exists for the reconstruction of the trade-labour standards debate within the WTO. This article, seeks to demonstrate how this might be the case. In doing so, it first reviews the process of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO involvement in the regulation of trade-related areas. Second, it explores the current deadlock that characterises the issue of trade and labour standards within the WTO's legal framework as well as the more significant positions that have emerged among the Organisation's membership by focusing on British, US and EU involvement in this issue. Third, it identifies the reactions of certain key member states to the protests of civil society at the 1998 Geneva Ministerial Meeting of the WTO as the means by which the issue of trade and labour standards may once again be raised. And finally, it considers how the effective regulation of labour standards might be made within the confines of the WTO's legal framework by examining a range of options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines if and how a linkage could operate within the context of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) rules, and whether or not such a linkage is an appropriate foundation for future WTO-ILO (International Labor Organization) collaboration. Outcomes from the debate over trade and labour standards with particular reference to the December 1996 WTO Ministerial Declaration; Problems associated with WTO-regulated agreements.