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In this thesis I examine the Riksbank’s monetary policy for five periods from 1995-2023 to see if the Riksbank follows the Taylor rule. I do so by conducting a diagram of the actual policy rate and the suggested policy rate from the Taylor rule. I also conduct reaction functions using the inflation gap and the output gap and the dynamic Taylor rule’s reaction function. The results gives that the reaction function based on Taylors original rule gave positive and overall statistically significant outcomes for the first periods, while the last two periods had negative and statistically insignificant outcome. The dynamic Taylor rule gave no significant results and evidence for interest smoothing cannot really be concluded. The graphical interpretation shows a similar result as the reaction function. The conclusion is that the Riksbank can be said to have followed the Taylor rule for the first two periods (1995-2005 and 2005-2010), but not for the last three periods (2010-2015, 2015-2020 and 2020-2023).

The Riksbank is currently investigating the possibility of producing a Central Bank Digital Currency in Sweden, called “e-krona”, implemented through an “e-krona network” on a platform based on Distributed Ledger Technology. By applying the methodology of legal dogmatics, legal informatics, and a legal policy perspective, this thesis examines and analyses some of the fundamental differences in Sweden’s current payment system for transactions at the point of sale, comparing debit card-based transactions with payments using the model of the Riksbank’s e-krona pilot. This contribution will examine, in particular, technological, regulative and, democratic differences between the two payment systems. The thesis also aims to contribute and encourage a discussion on potential democracy-related impacts concerning traceability aspects of the end-users’ payment data in the e-krona pilot. The examination of the e-krona technology reveals that the transactions are recorded in a distributed ledger and that the e-kronor in the network are represented by tokens, traceable to the Riksbank as issuer and delegated monitor of the system. Banks and other payment service providers act as participants in the e-krona network, responsible for providing the e-kronor to their customers through e-krona wallets. With respect to the payment system of card-based transactions, the paper concludes that individuals’ payment data is only traceable to a certain extent and that access to a transaction chain requires that information is collected among the multiple segmented private actors involved in the transaction. In the e-krona network, on the contrary, more information is shared between the participants, which enables traceability of the end-users payment data at a detailed level, providing access to full transaction chains by default. This thesis furthermore argues that the e-krona system does not comply with current legal frameworks protecting the payment data of individuals and that legislative changes may be required to ensure compliance. Lastly, given the means of current and future technology, the thesis also concludes that the traceability aspects, especially concerning the fact that all transactions will be traceable to the Riksbank, may enable the possibility of governmental misuse of the e-krona system, which could impact the privacy of the end-users and threaten democratic values. Given the limited scope of materials regarding the e-krona pilot project and the insufficient documentation available on public websites, the thesis required more profound research. Thus, to substantiate the conclusions of the complex technology, additional material was requested from the Riksbank, including an interview with a CBDC security expert.

This open access book presents case studies of twelve organisations which the public have come to view as institutions. From the BBC to Doctors Without Borders, from the Amsterdam Concertgebouw Orchestra to CERN, this volume examines how some organisations rise to prominence and remain in high public esteem through changing and challenging times. It builds upon the scholarly tradition of institutional scholarship pioneered by Philip Selznick, and highlights common themes in the stories of these highly diverse organizations; demonstrating how leadership, learning, and luck all play a role in becoming and remaining an institution. This case study format makes this volume ideal for classroom use and practitioners alike. In an era where public institutions are increasingly under threat, this volume offers concrete lessons for contemporary organisation leaders.

This paper examines the Swedish experience of forward guidance 2007-2018. We focus on three interrelated issues: first, the effects of forward guidance on the discussion within the Board of Directors of the Riksbank, second, on the communication between the Riksbank and the public, and third, on the interest rate expectations held by various groups in Swedish society. We conclude that forward guidance has had negative effects on the dialogue within the Board as well on the communication between the Riksbank and the public. In addition, forward guidance has failed to affect expectations about interest rates in a systematic and significant way. We trace the roots of these consequences to the inability of the Riksbank to forecast its future policy rate three years ahead with any reasonable accuracy. The Riksbank has learned from this dismal performance and partially abandoned forward guidance, returning to a focus on the rate of inflation – as it did prior to the introduction of forward guidance.

In a historical perspective, the stabilization policy regime in Sweden is in a state of constant change, affected by economic crises, international impulses, domestic politics, and developments in macroeconomic theory. Economists have been deeply involved in this process. The current framework for monetary and fiscal policy, with an independent central bank focusing on inflation targeting, and a rule-based fiscal policy, is not the final stage of this process. Future crises will once again change the goals, the instruments, and the institutional framework. In a historical perspective, the rapid expansion of the financial system, with the accompanying accumulation of private debt and high rates of asset inflation, stands out as a likely cause behind the next crisis. The next crisis will be followed by yet another step in the perennial pursuit of a better stabilization policy.

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe and explain the relation of changes in capital requirements on the profitability of Swedish banks. Method: A mixed model approach is used. The quantitative approach is con-ducted through the collection and analysis of statistics from Swe-dish banks and financial institutions. The qualitative research ap-proach is used to obtain further insights into the Swedish banking system and how banks are managing capital requirements. This is conducted through interviews with respondents from a large bank, a niche bank, and the Riksbank. Analysis: The analysis is made on yearly data from 1999 to 2015. Return on equity and net interest margin are individually used as dependent variables. The independent variables are various capital ratios which are defined by the Basel framework. The results from the quantitative analysis are in line with the findings from the qualita-tive interviews. Conclusion: On one hand, capital requirement ratios seem to have a negative and statistically significant correlation with the Return on Equity for both large banks and niche banks. On the other hand, capital re-quirement ratios seem to have a positive and statistically significant correlation with the Net Interest Margin for niche banks.

Should an inflation-targeting central bank have an explicit tolerance band around its inflation target? This paper provides an answer derived from the Swedish experience. The Riksbank is exceptional in the sense that it first adopted and later abolished an explicit band and is currently considering bringing it back. We conclude that the band should be explicit for several reasons. Most important, an inflation-targeting central bank should be open and transparent to the public regarding its actual ability to control inflation. We discuss how a numerical measure of the proper width of the band can be constructed to foster communication and credibility.