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Expert Level Round Table; International audience

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International audience; Security of supply and the mastering of defense innovation are the grounds for strategic autonomy that is at the heart of true sovereignty. This is the reason why many European countries have chosen to develop and maintain a domestic defense industrial base. While such policy was relevant for decades, the rising costs of defense capabilities and budgetary constraints should push these countries to gather resources. This is notably the case for defense innovation, which requires a certain level of investment to be effective due to threshold effects. The need to Europeanize defense innovation also results from the reliance of defense industry on non-defense innovations and from the impacts of the fourth industrial revolution on arms manufacturing. In this context, the Europe Defence Fund could provide the right incentives to achieve both transformations through a true Europeanization of defense innovation.

Sous la direction de Yann Basire; International audience

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Chair; International audience

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Anthony M. Endres in his 2005 book, has stressed the part player by some economists in the design of the international monetary system during the Bretton Woods era. He proposed a classification of their doctrines and proposals in a table where fifteen economists are mentioned for ten proposals (Hansen, Williams, Graham, Triffin, Simons, Friedman/Johnson, Mises/Rueff/Heilperin/Hayek/Röpke, Harrod, Mundell). Among them only one French economist, Jacques Rueff, is to be found but he did not stand alone but merged with those of other “paleo-liberals”. At the opposite, in his 2007 book, Rawi Abdelal pointed the predominant part played by French statesmen in the evolution of the international monetary system during the last decades, especially during the building up of the euro area and the liberalization of the capital movements. The article outlines the key stages in the evolution of the international monetary system and the part played by French actors in the forefront of the scene (Jacques Delors – European commission, Pascal Lamy, WTO, or in the wings (Chavranski, OECD). Among the six persons who are singled out by Rawi Abedal or made it in the book of Ivo Maas, it is striking that four have been trained in the National School of Administration. For his part, Jacques Delors graduated in law at Faculté de Droit of Paris where Charles Rist was an authority for monetary matters. Thereafter he began his carreer at Banque de France. Paradoxically most of them had a background leaning towards a significant role of the State in the nation economy whereas Maurice Allais (1911 –2010), the major figure of the French liberalism during the second half of the 20th century was a tireless opponent to “laissez-fairism” and liberal globalization.

The present book aims to conceptualize and present, in a concise manner, the main questions raised in the field of international law regarding the role of the States and private actors in the prevention and the reaction to cyber-attacks. It has been prepared within the framework of the French Cybersecurity Initiative launched in 2017 by the Secretary General for National Defense and Security and the French National Cyber-Security Agency (ANSSI) and it will be presented for the International Conference to be held at UNESCO on 6 and 7 April 2017 on the theme: "Building International Peace and Security in a Digital Society – Public Actors, Private Actors: Duties and Responsibilities". This study strictly expresses the personal opinions of its authors in the framework of their academic research.The point of departure for this book is that the dramatic rise of cyber-attacks involving States and non-State actors could constitute a real threat to international peace and security. In 2013, the members of the UN GGE recognized the application of International Law in the cyberspace. The cyberspace is not a "No Law’s Land"; rather, it can be regulated by International Law, as are virtually all international activities. But the task in this field is infinitely more complex, not only because of the very nature of the cyberspace but also because the great diversity of the actors involved. These actors include potential perpetrators of cyber-attacks (States, "proxies", private actors supported or tolerated by States, terrorists, cybercriminals, companies conducting espionage or wanting to gain a competitive advantage, individual hackers, patriotic hacker groups, etc.); potential victims of attacks (States, administrations and communities, companies, media, individuals, etc.); those involved in these attacks (eg. the States through which cyber-attacks transit, companies and individuals whose systems are used by the attackers without the knowledge of the owners); and, finally, those to be potentially involved in a response to a cyber-attack (States, private companies acting for their own benefits, private companies undertaking a response on behalf of another company, etc.). This situation creates an impressive number of combinations, which in their respective turns affect the type and appropriateness of a response.The first part of this book focuses on the issue of prevention and argues that the concept of "cyber-diligence", which we have forged on the basis of existing international law and the obligation of any State not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States, provides a satisfactory answer to the question of vigilance that States should exercise with regard to cyber-operations developed from their territory by private actors.The second part of this book, examines those responses to cyber-attacks which can be developed in accordance with international law. It proceeds to a classification of the possible reactions to cyber-attacks, by proposing a kind of "user's manual" for victim States that wish to react within the limits of international legality. It distinguishes between reactions always permitted and other reactions that are permissible only if it can be established that a State has committed an "internationally wrongful act" by action or omission. It stresses the need for international cooperation in this area, and warns against any "trivialization" of responses that are in principle violations of international law but are "excused" as circumstances precluding wrongfulness or responsibility.In the third part of this book, we focus on the very important role that the private sector plays in this field, from preventing cyber-attacks and securing digital infrastructures to "active cyber defense" measures, passing through activities such as the attribution of cyber-attacks. Private sector activities in the area of cyber-security raise several issues and controversies, of political, ethical, technical and legal nature. We carry out a detailed study of the problems of "active cyber defense" and "hack-back" from the point of view of both international and comparative law. After analyzing the advantages, disadvantages and risks of hack-back, we answer to the question of whether private actors can unilaterally undertake cyber-offensive measures in accordance with the law, and examine to what extent States can authorize a hack-back operation and/or rely on private actors to conduct counter-attacks. Our conclusion is that private actors would be better off investing in cyber hygiene and the implementation of good safety practices, rather than trying to acquire offensive tools. If, nevertheless, they are victims of a cyber-attack, instead of launching a - technically and legally - hazardous hack-back, it would be better if they notified the State authorities of the attack and asked them to act, and also exercised their legal rights against the perpetrator of the cyber-attack, assuming that the perpetrator can be identified. States should act within the framework of international law (and especially human rights law) to enhance their proactive and reactive capabilities in order to avoid giving the impression that proper legal forms of reaction are either nonexistent or insufficient. Indeed, the impression of inadequate and inefficient government gatekeeping in the field of cyber-security serves the interests of those who call for cyber-vigilantism. States could, if needed, rely on private actors to conduct counter-attacks under certain circumstances, but this should be done under States' close control, with the risk of triggering their international responsibility., Le présent livre se propose de conceptualiser et de présenter de façon concise les principales questions que posent, du point de vue du droit international, le rôle des Etats et des acteurs privés dans la prévention et la réaction aux cyberattaques. Il a été préparé dans le cadre de l’initiative française en matière de cyber-sécurité lancée en 2017 par le Secrétaire Général pour la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale (SGDSN) et l’AgenceNationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI) et a été présenté comme étude préparatoire pour la conférence internationale organisée par le gouvernement français à l’UNESCO les 6 et 7 avril 2017 sur le thème : « Construire la paix et la sécurité internationales de la société numérique – Acteurs publics, acteurs privés : rôles et responsabilités ».Cet ouvrage représente le résultat de recherches conduites par ses auteurs sur les questions relatives à la sécurité de l’espace numérique, la protection des données et de la vie privée. Elle vise à contribuer à la réflexion d’un lecteur averti (expert en droit ou en cybersécurité) tout en souhaitant rester accessible à des non-spécialistes et au grand public afin de dissiper certaines confusions ou erreurs de perception qui pourraient exister à propos du rôle central que le droit international doit avoir dans ce domaine. La sécurité de l’espace numérique, la lutte contre la cyber-criminalité, la gouvernance et la protection des données, sont des enjeux majeurs pour la sécurité internationale et nationale. Alors que les organisations internationales, les Etats et le secteur privé se mobilisent pour adopter de nouvelles normes et codes de conduite dans ce domaine, le droit international existant apporte déjà un grand nombre de réponses pour assurer la coexistence pacifique et la coopération des nations à l’heure du numérique.La première partie de cette étude met l’accent sur les enjeux de la prévention. Elle examine, entre autres, la question de la protection des infrastructures critiques numériques et le devoir de diligence due (ou de "cyber-diligence") que les Etats doivent exercer à l’égard des acteurs non-étatiques qui opèrent depuis leur territoire (qu’il s’agisse de groupes terroristes, de cybercriminels, d’entreprises ou d’autres acteurs privés). Ce devoir découle directement de l’obligation, pour tout Etat, « de ne pas laisser utiliser son territoire aux fins d'actes contraires aux droits d'autres Etats ».La deuxième partie de cette étude se penche sur les réponses aux cyberattaques qui peuvent être développées dans le respect du droit international. Elle procède à une classification des réactions possibles aux cyberattaques et propose une sorte de « mode d’emploi » pour des Etats victimes d’attaques qui souhaitent réagir dans le cadre de la légalité internationale. Elle met l’accent sur la nécessité de la coopération internationale dans ce domaine et met en garde contre toute « banalisation » de ripostes qui constitueraient des violations du droit international mais qui seraient exceptionnellement « excusées » comme circonstances excluant l’illicéité ou la responsabilité.La troisième partie de l’étude présente une analyse détaillée des questions relatives au « hack-back » et à la « cyberdéfense active ». Après avoir montré les avantages, les inconvénients et les risques du hack-back, elle examine dans quelle mesure les acteurs privés peuvent déclencher unilatéralement des mesures cyber-offensives en conformité avec le droit et dans quelle mesure les Etats peuvent autoriser le hack-back et/ou s’appuyer sur des acteurs privés pour conduire des contre-attaques. Elle en conclut que les acteurs privés auraient intérêt à investir dans de bonnes pratiques d’hygiène et de sécurité informatiques – plutôt que chercher à acquérir des outils offensifs. Si, malgré tout, ils sont victimes d’une cyberattaque, plutôt que de se lancer dans un hack-back hasardeux et risqué tant sur le plan technique que sur le plan juridique, il serait préférable qu’ils puissent notifier cette attaque à leurs autorités en leur demandant d’agir et qu’ils puissent aussi exercer leurs droits légaux contre l’auteur de la cyberattaque (à supposer que ce dernier puisse être identifié). Les Etats devraient renforcer leurs capacités de réaction afin d’éviter de donner l’impression que l’action gouvernementale est lente, semée d’embuches et n’offre in fine que peu de garanties aux victimes – impression qui ne peut que servir les intérêts de ceux qui prônent le recours à la « justice privée » dans l’espace numérique. Les Etats pourraient, enfin, s’appuyer sur des acteurs privés pour conduire des contre-attaques dans certaines circonstances, mais ceci devrait se faire sous leur contrôle étroit et pourrait engager leur responsabilité internationale.Cette étude exprime les opinions strictement personnelles de ses auteurs dans le cadre de leurs recherches académiques et n’engage qu’eux.

In the main arms-producing countries, Ministries of Defence are looking for alternative ways to acquire defence capabilities. Over the past two decades, several reform projects have been experimented to go beyond the model inherited from the Cold War, but they did not succeed in delivering expected results. One may wonder whether such defence acquisition systems correspond to their core mission: supplying boots on the ground with adequate capacities. The research agenda and reforms programmes are biased since they focus mainly on “how” to procure. While reforming existing mechanisms seems to fail or to deliver well below expectations, one may wonder in fact whether the true question should concern “why” and “what” to buy with regard to military needs but also the place that technology takes in conceiving defence capabilities.

International audience

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The aim of this panel is to raise the question of the inequality in the political and democratic legitimization of the use of force among European countries. If European defense policies and the building of a Common Security and Defence Policy in the framework of the EU have been well documented for a few years, the question of how the European countries allow their military to use force inside and outside their territory and how they democratically control this use of force has been much less investigated until these days. Thus in a period where the armed forces are not only used for military multinational operations outside the national borders but also participate internally to the fight against terrorism, the question needs to be asked : how do the Europeans nationally control the use of force ? What is the role of their parliaments ? What room if left for the civilian society ? What happens at the EU level ? Why are there so many inequalities in the democratic control of the use of force in the European countries ? The idea here is to confront the institutionalist analysis (more precisely the historical institutionalist frame of analysis) to different national cases so as to understand what explains these differences among the EU member states.This panel will welcome both theoretical and empirical propositions of paper.

The Preparatory Action for Common Security and Defence Policy‐related research is currently under preparation, and it will serve as a test‐bed to prove the relevance of defence‐related research at the European Union‐level. The Preparatory Action could potentially see between €75 ‐ €100 million invested in defence‐specific research over a three‐year period beginning in 2017. The Preparatory Action follows on from a pilot project on CSDP research that was launched by the European Parliament with a budget line of €1.5 million over the 2015‐2016 period. The Preparatory Action aims to serve as a basis for an eventual, fully‐fledged, European Defence Research Programme. Indeed, should the work of the Preparatory Action prove successful, the next step would be to insert a specific thematic area on defence research within the next multi‐annual financial framework (2021‐2027) potentially worth some €3.5 billion.The idea to specifically invest EU funds in defence research is potentially a ‘gamechanger’. Traditionally, the EU has suffered from important constraints when using EU funds for defence‐related activities. Presently, projects and programmes funded under the European Structural and Investment Funds, COSME (Europe’s programme for SMEs) and Horizon 2020 are still largely geared towards civilian rather than military projects, even though defence‐related projects are not formally excluded. One of the chief objectives of the Preparatory Action and of any eventual European Defence Research Programme is to enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy by investing in key defence technologies.Yet using EU funds for defence‐relevant research is not without its challenges. This policy paper analyses the likely relationships or approaches that may emerge from an EU‐funded programme on defence research, and it draws out some of the challenges that could emerge during the rolling out phase of the Preparatory Action. On the basis of this analysis, this policy paper concludes that while the Preparatory Action will be a small‐scale financial contribution to Europe’s defence research efforts, it could – if correctly calibrated – lead to a step‐change in the way the EU funds fundamental research to support the needs of Europe’s armed forces. Notwithstanding this point, this policy paper recommends that the Preparatory Action should:-Resist any duplication of national defence R&T and R&D efforts.-Map and coordinate national‐ and European‐level defence R&T and R&D efforts.-Not be capability‐driven but rather make prospective, longer‐term, investments.-Help avoid any further reductions in national defence R&T and R&D.-Stay focused on defence R&T and R&D but converge with the civilian innovation base.-Ensure fair and effective distribution of IPRs between the defence and civilian bases.

International audience

From the ICRC to the Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyberwarfare, there seems to be a broad consensus that cyberwar, like any other method or means of warfare, is subject to the traditional rules of the law of armed conflict, including one of its ‘cardinal principles’, the principle of distinction. However, the transposition of the principle of distinction into cyberspace raises important legal questions. Indeed, the prohibition of direct attacks against civilians, which is the cornerstone of the principle of distinction, cannot be easily transposed to cyber-operations that are in part or completely dematerialized. It is thus necessary to review this principle carefully in order to assess whether it is strictly focused on the prohibition of ‘attacks’ against civilians or whether it could also be interpreted as prohibiting any kind of direct military cyber operations against them. The interconnectivity characterizing the cyberspace also challenges the protective status given by the principle of distinction. By blurring the distinction between civilians and the military, cyberwarfare makes the enforcement of the principle of distinction all the more challenging.

International audience

International audience; The choice between self-determination and territorial integrity is one of the oldest false dilemmas of International Law. It sets the problem of secession under two contradictory and mutually exclusive options, neither of which is true as such under positive International Law: either a specific group within a State constitutes a "people" and has a right to "external" self-determination; or the territorial integrity of the parent State must be respected and prohibits secession by such a group. This dilemma is very convenient from a political point of view. It provides States with the opportunity to "ride two horses at the same time". States could thus embrace 'self-determination' of some groups and encourage in one way or another separatist claims compatible with their interests, while proclaiming that the principle of territorial integrity prevails at home or in the territory of friends and allies.The case of Crimea highlighted these contradictions once again. Russia, which for years was a big champion of the principle of respect of territorial integrity of States (especially during the 90s when it was fighting the separatist attempts in Chechnya and Tatarstan), suddenly started claiming that the principle of self-determination of Russian speaking populations in Crimea prevails over the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Western States, which constantly backed in one way or another the Kosovo separatist movement since 1998 and which recognized Kosovo just a few hours after the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, suddenly rediscovered, because of the crisis in Ukraine, the merits of the principle of territorial integrity and other basic principles of International Law often violated by these same Western States during these last years.In this article we focus on the relevance of the principle of self-determination in the Crimean conflict. We try to explain why the "dilemma" between self-determination and territorial integrity is a false one. We explain that there is no "right" to external self-determination and unilateral secession for any "people" or ethnic group outside the colonial context. But while secession is not authorized by international law neither is it in principle prohibited by the principle of territorial integrity, save in the event of violation of a fundamental rule of international law, which raises the crucial issue of the unlawfulness of Russian military intervention in Crimea and the possible solutions to the fierce conflict between unlawful effectivités and the law.

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