Search

An editorial is presented which explores the occurrence of wrong site peripheral regional blocks around once for every 56 years of clinical practice. It outlines four varieties of human work to look at the work, in anaesthesia or anywhere else, that include work-as-imagined, work-as-prescribed and work-as-done. Also tackled is the application of the said human work to wrong site blocks, and to safe and effective practice in healthcare more widely.

As the UK's Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF) celebrates its 75th anniversary, it is worth reflecting on our discipline's contribution, current state, and critical future endeavours. We present the perspectives of 18 EHF professionals who were asked to respond to five questions regarding the impact of EHF, contemporary challenges, and future directions. Co-authors were in agreement that EHF's impact has been only limited to date and that critical issues require resolution, such as increasing the number of suitably qualified practitioners, resolving the research-practice gap, and increasing awareness of EHF and its benefits. Frequently discussed future directions include advanced emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, the development of new EHF methods, and enhancing the quality and reach of education and training. The majority felt there will be a need for EHF in 75 years; however, many noted that our methods will need to adapt to meet new needs. Practitioner statement: This article provides the perspectives of 18 Ergonomics and Human Factors (EHF) professionals on the impact of EHF, contemporary challenges and critical future directions, and changes that are necessary to ensure EHF remains relevant in future. As such, it provides important guidance on future EHF research and practice.

This study examined the emergence and implementation of community touchpoints established in the UK during the COVID-19 pandemic for victims/survivors of domestic abuse (DA). Community touchpoints are designated places, both online and in accessible settings such as pharmacies and banks, where victims/survivors can seek confidential advice and be directed to expert DA services. The research adopted a case study approach and explored a range of perspectives through expert interviews, document analysis, consultation with survivors and stakeholders and a survey of DA co-ordinators. Four national community touchpoint schemes were identified and, of these, three were implemented rapidly and were available in 2020-2021 when the UK experienced lockdowns. Partnerships between Government/voluntary organisations and commercial businesses-assisted design and implementation. Some stakeholders considered that the schemes lacked responsivity to the local context and noted challenges in providing a confidential service in rural areas. Whilst pharmacies, banks and online spaces were identified as non-stigmatised and trusted places to seek advice, community touchpoints were judged less accessible for some groups including those experiencing digital poverty and victims whose movements were heavily scrutinised. Most of the touchpoint schemes targeted adults only. There were also concerns about whether frontline staff in commercial businesses received sufficient training. Whilst robust evidence of outcomes was limited, there were indications that the schemes had achieved good reach with some early evidence of take-up. Testimonials indicated that victims/survivors were using the touchpoints in flexible ways which met their needs. Moreover, the wide reach and visibility of these initiatives delivered in non-stigmatised settings may have served to raise public awareness of DA, reducing the silence that has traditionally surrounded it. Further research into the use and impact of these initiatives is required and there may be future potential to extend community touchpoints to include children and young people experiencing DA., (© 2022 The Authors. Health and Social Care in the Community published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

This paper reviews the key perspectives on human error and analyses the core theories and methods developed and applied over the last 60 years. These theories and methods have sought to improve our understanding of what human error is, and how and why it occurs, to facilitate the prediction of errors and use these insights to support safer work and societal systems. Yet, while this area of Ergonomics and Human Factors (EHF) has been influential and long-standing, the benefits of the 'human error approach' to understanding accidents and optimising system performance have been questioned. This state of science review analyses the construct of human error within EHF. It then discusses the key conceptual difficulties the construct faces in an era of systems EHF. Finally, a way forward is proposed to prompt further discussion within the EHF community. Practitioner statement This state-of-science review discusses the evolution of perspectives on human error as well as trends in the theories and methods applied to understand, prevent and mitigate error. It concludes that, although a useful contribution has been made, we must move beyond a focus on an individual error to systems failure to understand and optimise whole systems.

Introduction: 'Systems thinking' is often recommended in healthcare to support quality and safety activities but a shared understanding of this concept and purposeful guidance on its application are limited. Healthcare systems have been described as complex where human adaptation to localised circumstances is often necessary to achieve success. Principles for managing and improving system safety developed by the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL; a European intergovernmental air navigation organisation) incorporate a 'Safety-II systems approach' to promote understanding of how safety may be achieved in complex work systems. We aimed to adapt and contextualise the core principles of this systems approach and demonstrate the application in a healthcare setting., Methods: The original EUROCONTROL principles were adapted using consensus-building methods with front-line staff and national safety leaders., Results: Six interrelated principles for healthcare were agreed. The foundation concept acknowledges that 'most healthcare problems and solutions belong to the system'. Principle 1 outlines the need to seek multiple perspectives to understand system safety. Principle 2 prompts us to consider the influence of prevailing work conditions-demand, capacity, resources and constraints. Principle 3 stresses the importance of analysing interactions and work flow within the system. Principle 4 encourages us to attempt to understand why professional decisions made sense at the time and principle 5 prompts us to explore everyday work including the adjustments made to achieve success in changing system conditions.A case study is used to demonstrate the application in an analysis of a system and in the subsequent improvement intervention design., Conclusions: Application of the adapted principles underpins, and is characteristic of, a holistic systems approach and may aid care team and organisational system understanding and improvement., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In this article, we examine the relationship between safety culture and national culture, and the implications of this relationship for international safety culture assessments. Focussing on Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance (UA) index, a survey study of 13,616 Air Traffic Management employees in 21 European countries found a negative association between safety culture and national norm data for UA. This is theorized to reflect the influence of national tendencies for UA upon attitudes and practices for managing safety (e.g., anxiety on risk; reliance on protocols; concerns over reporting incidents; openness to different perspectives). The relationship between UA and safety culture is likely to have implications for international safety culture assessments. Specifically, benchmarking exercises will consistently indicate safety management within organizations in high UA countries to be poorer than low UA countries due to the influence of national culture upon safety practices, which may limit opportunities for identifying and sharing best practice. We propose the use of safety culture against international group norms (SIGN) scores to statistically adjust for the influence of UA upon safety culture data, and to support the identification of safety practices effective and particular to low or high UA cultures., Practitioner Points: National cultural tendencies for uncertainty avoidance (UA) are negatively associated with safety culture.This indicates that employee safety-related attitudes and practices may be influenced by national culture, and thus factors outside the direct control of organizational management.International safety culture assessments should attempt to determine the influence of national culture upon safety culture in order that benchmarking exercises compare aspects of safety management and not national culture.Safety culture against international group norms (SIGN) scores provide a potential way to do this, and can facilitate the identification of best practice within countries operating in a low or high UA cultural cluster.

The management of safety culture in international and culturally diverse organizations is a concern for many high-risk industries. Yet, research has primarily developed models of safety culture within Western countries, and there is a need to extend investigations of safety culture to global environments. We examined (i) whether safety culture can be reliably measured within a single industry operating across different cultural environments, and (ii) if there is an association between safety culture and national culture. The psychometric properties of a safety culture model developed for the air traffic management (ATM) industry were examined in 17 European countries from four culturally distinct regions of Europe (North, East, South, West). Participants were ATM operational staff (n = 5,176) and management staff (n = 1,230). Through employing multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, good psychometric properties of the model were established. This demonstrates, for the first time, that when safety culture models are tailored to a specific industry, they can operate consistently across national boundaries and occupational groups. Additionally, safety culture scores at both regional and national levels were associated with country-level data on Hofstede's five national culture dimensions (collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term orientation). MANOVAs indicated safety culture to be most positive in Northern Europe, less so in Western and Eastern Europe, and least positive in Southern Europe. This indicates that national cultural traits may influence the development of organizational safety culture, with significant implications for safety culture theory and practice., (© 2015 Society for Risk Analysis.)

System disturbances are likely to be a key factor affecting the acceptance and safety of future automation. Since hardware and software are rarely totally reliable, humans are always required in socio-technical command and control environments such as air traffic management (ATM). Unfortunately, human-automation interaction is known to be problematic, particularly when the human assumes a monitoring or back-up role. Hence an understanding of how humans manage system disturbances is required, together with a method of looking at the problem for new systems. In this paper we outline a contextual framework of the process by which people recover from system disturbances, together with literature data and findings from 31 interviews with ATM personnel. The framework describes the context and causes of a problem, the problem itself, the effect and exposure, the recovery process, and the outcome. The framework, together with the research findings and operational experience, is also the basis for a performance prediction tool called the Recovery from Automation Failure Tool (RAFT).