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Blindsight regroups the different manifestations of preserved discriminatory visual capacities following the damage to the primary visual cortex. Blindsight types differentially impact objective and subjective perception, patients can report having no visual awareness whilst their behaviour suggests visual processing still occurs at some cortical level. This phenomenon hence presents a unique opportunity to study consciousness and perceptual consciousness, and for this reason, it has had an historical importance for the development of this field of research. From these studies, two main opposing models of the underlying mechanisms have been established: (a) blindsight is perception without consciousness or (b) blindsight is in fact degraded vision, two views that mirror more general theoretical options about whether unconscious cognition truly exists or whether it is only a degraded form of conscious processing. In this article, we want to re-examine this debate in the light of recent advances in the characterization of blindsight and associated phenomena. We first provide an in-depth definition of blindsight and its subtypes, mainly blindsight type I, blindsight type II and the more recently described blindsense. We emphasize the necessity of sensitive and robust methodology to uncover the dissociations between perception and awareness that can be observed in brain-damaged patients with visual field defects at different cognitive levels. We discuss these different profiles of dissociation in the light of both contending models. We propose that the different types of dissociations reveal a pattern of relationship between perception, awareness and metacognition that is actually richer than what is proposed by either of the existing models. Finally, we consider this in the framework of current theories of consciousness and touch on the implications the findings of blindsight have on these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scientific study of consciousness emerged as an organized field of research only a few decades ago. As empirical results have begun to enhance our understanding of consciousness, it is important to find out whether other factors, such as funding for consciousness research and status of consciousness scientists, provide a suitable environment for the field to grow and develop sustainably. We conducted an online survey on people's views regarding various aspects of the scientific study of consciousness as a field of research. 249 participants completed the survey, among which 80% were in academia, and around 40% were experts in consciousness research. Topics covered include the progress made by the field, funding for consciousness research, job opportunities for consciousness researchers, and the scientific rigor of the work done by researchers in the field. The majority of respondents (78%) indicated that scientific research on consciousness has been making progress. However, most participants perceived obtaining funding and getting a job in the field of consciousness research as more difficult than in other subfields of neuroscience. Overall, work done in consciousness research was perceived to be less rigorous than other neuroscience subfields, but this perceived lack of rigor was not related to the perceived difficulty in finding jobs and obtaining funding. Lastly, we found that, overall, the global workspace theory was perceived to be the most promising (around 28%), while most non-expert researchers (around 22% of non-experts) found the integrated information theory (IIT) most promising. We believe the survey results provide an interesting picture of current opinions from scientists and researchers about the progresses made and the challenges faced by consciousness research as an independent field. They will inspire collective reflection on the future directions regarding funding and job opportunities for the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

doi: 10.1017/S0140525X07003044 Block proposes that phenomenal experience overflows conscious access. In contrast, we propose that conscious access overflows overt report. We argue that a theory of phenomenal experience cannot discard subjective report and that Block's examples of phenomenal 'overflow' relate to two different types of perception. We propose that conscious access is more than simply readout of a preexisting phenomenal experience.

Cueing attention after the disappearance of visual stimuli biases which items will be remembered best. This observation has historically been attributed to the influence of attention on memory as opposed to subjective visual experience. We recently challenged this view by showing that cueing attention after the stimulus can improve the perception of a single Gabor patch at threshold levels of contrast. Here, we test whether this retro-perception actually increases the frequency of consciously perceiving the stimulus, or simply allows for a more precise recall of its features. We used retro-cues in an orientation-matching task and performed mixture-model analysis to independently estimate the proportion of guesses and the precision of non-guess responses. We find that the improvements in performance conferred by retrospective attention are overwhelmingly determined by a reduction in the proportion of guesses, providing strong evidence that attracting attention to the target’s location after its disappearance increases the likelihood of perceiving it consciously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we become aware of auditory stimuli retrospectively, even if they initially failed to reach awareness? Here, we tested whether spatial cueing of attention after a word had been played could trigger retrospective conscious access. Two sound streams were presented dichotically. One stream was attended for a primary task of speeded semantic categorization. The other stream included occasional target words, which had to be identified as a secondary task after the trial. We observed that cueing attention to the secondary stream improved identification accuracy, even when cueing occurred more than 500 ms after the target offset. In addition, such "retro-cueing" boosted the detection sensitivity and subjective audibility of the target. The effect was a perceptual one and not one based on enhancing or protecting conscious representations already available in working memory, as shown by quantitative models of the experimental data. In particular, the retro-cue did not gradually shift audibility but rather sharply changed the balance between fully audible and not audible trials. Together with remarkably similar results in vision, these results point to a previously unsuspected temporal flexibility of conscious access as a core feature of perception, across modalities. Public Significance Statement: This study demonstrates that a cue presented after a sound has ended can still retrospectively trigger its conscious perception. As similar observations had been made in vision, we suggest that temporal flexibility of conscious access is a general and useful feature of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modulations of sensory processing in early visual areas are thought to play an important role in conscious perception. To date, most empirical studies focused on effects occurring before or during visual presentation. By contrast, several emerging theories postulate that sensory processing and conscious visual perception may also crucially depend on late top–down influences, potentially arising after a visual display. To provide a direct test of this, we performed an fMRI study using a postcued report procedure. The ability to report a target at a specific spatial location in a visual display can be enhanced behaviorally by symbolic auditory postcues presented shortly after that display. Here we showed that such auditory postcues can enhance target-specific signals in early human visual cortex (V1 and V2). For postcues presented 200 msec after stimulus termination, this target-specific enhancement in visual cortex was specifically associated with correct conscious report. The strength of this modulation predicted individual levels of performance in behavior. By contrast, although later postcues presented 1000 msec after stimulus termination had some impact on activity in early visual cortex, this modulation no longer related to conscious report. These results demonstrate that within a critical time window of a few hundred milliseconds after a visual stimulus has disappeared, successful conscious report of that stimulus still relates to the strength of top–down modulation in early visual cortex. We suggest that, within this critical time window, sensory representation of a visual stimulus is still under construction and so can still be flexibly influenced by top–down modulatory processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the phenomenon of attentional blink, identical visual stimuli are sometimes fully perceived and sometimes not detected at all. This phenomenon thus provides an optimal situation to study the fate of stimuli not consciously perceived and the differences between conscious and nonconscious processing. We correlated behavioral visibility ratings and recordings of event-related potentials to study the temporal dynamics of access to consciousness. Intact early potentials (P1 and N1) were evoked by unseen words, suggesting that these brain events are not the primary correlates of conscious perception. However, we observed a rapid divergence around 270 ms, after which several brain events were evoked solely by seen words. Thus, we suggest that the transition toward access to consciousness relates to the optional triggering of a late wave of activation that spreads through a distributed network of cortical association areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the study on the temporal structure of conscious reception using electroencephalogram (EEG) oscillations. It notes that several psychologists were challenged in unlocking the perceptual fluctuation issue. Moreover, the efforts of the neurophysiologists in developing the conscious perception research are also noted.

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Blindsight regroups the different manifestations of preserved discriminatory visual capacities following the damage to the primary visual cortex. Blindsight types differentially impact objective and subjective perception, patients can report having no visual awareness whilst their behaviour suggests visual processing still occurs at some cortical level. This phenomenon hence presents a unique opportunity to study consciousness and perceptual consciousness, and for this reason, it has had an historical importance for the development of this field of research. From these studies, two main opposing models of the underlying mechanisms have been established: (a) blindsight is perception without consciousness or (b) blindsight is in fact degraded vision, two views that mirror more general theoretical options about whether unconscious cognition truly exists or whether it is only a degraded form of conscious processing. In this article, we want to re-examine this debate in the light of recent advances in the characterization of blindsight and associated phenomena. We first provide an in-depth definition of blindsight and its subtypes, mainly blindsight type I, blindsight type II and the more recently described blindsense. We emphasize the necessity of sensitive and robust methodology to uncover the dissociations between perception and awareness that can be observed in brain-damaged patients with visual field defects at different cognitive levels. We discuss these different profiles of dissociation in the light of both contending models. We propose that the different types of dissociations reveal a pattern of relationship between perception, awareness and metacognition that is actually richer than what is proposed by either of the existing models. Finally, we consider this in the framework of current theories of consciousness and touch on the implications the findings of blindsight have on these., (© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press.)

When do we become conscious of a stimulus after its presentation? We would all agree that this necessarily takes time and that it is not instantaneous. Here, I would like to propose not only that conscious access is delayed relative to the external stimulation, but also that it can flexibly desynchronize from external stimulation; it can process some information 'offline', if and when it becomes relevant. Thus, in contrast with initial sensory processing, conscious experience might not strictly follow the sequence of events in the environment. In this article, I will review gathering evidence in favour of this proposition. I will argue that it offers a coherent framework for explaining a great variety of observations in the domain of perception, sensory memory and working memory: the psychological refractory period, the attentional blink, post-dictive phenomena, iconic memory, latent working memory and the newly described retro-perception phenomenon. I will integrate this proposition to the global neuronal workspace model and consider possible underlying brain mechanisms. Finally, I will argue that this capacity to process information 'offline' might have made conscious processing evolutionarily advantageous in spite of its sluggishness and capacity limitations.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'., (© 2018 The Author(s).)

The use of cognitive evoked potentials in EEG is now part of the routine evaluation of non-communicating patients with disorders of consciousness in several specialized medical centers around the world. They typically focus on one or two cognitive markers, such as the mismatch negativity or the P3 to global auditory regularity. However it has become clear that none of these markers in isolation is at the same time sufficiently specific and sufficiently sensitive to be taken as the unique gold standard for diagnosing consciousness. A good way forward would be to combine several cognitive markers within the same test to improve evaluation. Furthermore, given the diversity of lesions leading to disorders of consciousness, it is important not only to probe whether a patient is conscious or not, but also to establish a more general and nuanced profile of the residual cognitive capacities of each patient using a combination of markers. In the present study we built a unique EEG protocol that probed 8 dimensions of cognitive processing in a single 1.5 h session. This protocol probed variants of classical markers together with new markers of spatial attention, which has not yet been studied in these patients. The eight dimensions were: (1) own name recognition, (2) temporal attention, (3) spatial attention, (4) detection of spatial incongruence (5) motor planning, and (6,7,8) modulations of these effects by the global context, reflecting higher-level functions. This protocol was tested in 15 healthy control subjects and in 17 patients with various etiologies, among which 13 could be included in the analysis. The results in the control group allowed a validation and a specific description of the cognitive levels probed by each marker. At the single-subject level, this combined protocol allowed assessing the presence of both classical and newly introduced markers for each patient and control, and revealed that the combination of several markers increased diagnostic sensitivity. The presence of a high-level effect in any of the three tested domains distinguished between minimally conscious and vegetative patients, while the presence of low-level effects was similar in both groups. In summary, this study constitutes a validated proof of concept in favor of probing multiple cognitive dimensions to improve the evaluation of non-communicating patients. At a more conceptual level, this EEG tool can help achieve a better understanding of disorders of consciousness by exploring consciousness in its multiple cognitive facets.