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Despite the growing demand for long‐term care (LTC), the uptake of private LTC insurance (LTCI) is low and even declining in the United States. One reason is the complexity of LTCI decisions. Researchers have therefore suggested to support decision‐making abilities. This paper shows, however, that such support would not unambiguously enhance functioning of the LTCI market. We analyze whether selection arises from two correlated but different decision‐making abilities at old age, education and numeracy, and interactions thereof with private information. Using historical data from the Health and Retirement Survey we find that education generates adverse selection, which is only partially offset by advantageous selection due to numeracy. In addition, individuals with greater decision‐making abilities make better LTCI choices, amplifying selection by education and numeracy. This points at a trade‐off between decision simplicity and selection in insurance markets and suggests other steps are needed to enhance the performance of private LTCI markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: While the benefits of integrated care are widely acknowledged, its implementation has proven difficult. Together with other factors, financial factors are known to influence progress towards care integration, but in-depth insight in their influence on the envisioned outcomes of integrated care projects is limited. Methods: We conducted a multiple case study of four integrated care projects in the Netherlands. The projects were purposely sampled to be representative of integrated care in its different forms. A total of 29 semi-structured interviews were held with project members, both medical and non-medical staff. In addition, 141 documents were analyzed, including scientific publications and minutes of meetings. Based on elaborate project descriptions we deduced the synergistic influences of financial and other factors on the outcomes of the projects. Results: Financial factors have an important influence on integrated care projects, though this influence is neither deterministic nor isolated. This is because the likelihood of realizing a positive outcome is affected by the degree to which four key conditions are fulfilled: 1) willingness to change, 2) alignment of interests and uniformity goal, 3) availability of resources to change, and 4) effectiveness of management of external actors. Conclusion: Financial factors have an impact on the outcomes of integrated care projects and must be viewed in synergy with interrelated other factors. Crucial for realizing success in integrated care, a balance must be struck between the level of ambition set in a project and the reality of the prevailing key conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bismarckian health systems are mainly governed by social health insurers, but their role, status, and power vary across countries and over time. We compare the role of health insurers in three distinct social health insurance systems in improving health systems' efficiency. In France, insurers work together as a single payer within a highly regulated context. Although this gives insurers substantial bargaining power, collective negotiations with providers are highly political and do not provide appropriate incentives for efficiency. Both Germany and the Netherlands have introduced competition among insurers to foster efficiency. However, the rationale of insurer competition in Germany is unclear because contracts are mostly concluded at a collective level and individual insurers have little power to influence health system efficiency. In the Netherlands, insurer competition is substantially more effective, but primarily focused on price and cost containment. In all three countries, the role of insurers has been transforming slowly to respond to common challenges of assuring care quality and continuity for an ageing population. To assure sustainability, they need to ensure that care providers cooperate with the same quality and efficiency objectives, but their capacity to do so has been limited by insufficient support to enforce public information on provider quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of managed competition in Dutch social health insurance has resulted in price completion among insurance funds. The estimated premium elasticites of market share were 0.3 for compulsory coverage and 0.8 for supplementary coverage over the period of 1996-1998 in accordance with aggregate data from all insurance funds.

In health care systems based upon managed competition, insurers are expected to negotiate with providers about price and quality of care. The Dutch experience, however, shows that quality plays a limited role in insurer-provider negotiations. It has been suggested that this is partly due to a lack of cooperation among insurers. This raises the question whether cooperation amongst insurers is a precondition or a substitute for quality-based competition. To answer this question, we mapped insurers' cooperating activities to enhance quality of care using a six-stage continuum. The first three stages (defining, designing and measuring quality indicators) may enhance competition, whereas the next three stages (setting benchmarks, steering patients and selective contracting) may reduce it. We investigated which types of insurer cooperation currently take place in the Netherlands. Additionally, we organized focus groups among insurers, providers and other stakeholders to examine their perceptions on insurer cooperation. We find that all stakeholders see advantages of cooperation amongst insurers in the first stages of the continuum and sometimes cooperate in this domain. Cooperation in the next stages is almost absent and more controversial because without adequate quality information, it is difficult to assess whether the benefits outweigh the cost associated with reduced competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Worldwide, policymakers and purchasers are exploring innovative provider payment strategies promoting value in health care, known as value-based payments (VBP). What is meant by 'value', however, is often unclear and the relationship between value and the payment design is not explicated. This paper aims at: (1) identifying value dimensions that are ideally stimulated by VBP and (2) constructing a framework of a theoretically preferred VBP design. Based on a synthesis of both theoretical and empirical studies on payment incentives, we conclude that VBP should consist of two components: a relatively large base payment that implicitly stimulates value and a relatively small payment that explicitly rewards measurable aspects of value (pay-for-performance). Being the largest component, the base payment design is essential, but often neglected when it comes to VBP reform. We explain that this base payment ideally (1) is paid to a multidisciplinary provider group (2) for a cohesive set of care activities for a predefined population, (3) is fixed, (4) is adjusted for the population's risk profile and (5) includes risk-mitigating measures. Finally, some important trade-offs in the practical operationalisation of VBP are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In most studies on hospital merger effects, the unit of observation is the merged hospital, whereas the observed price is the weighted average across hospital products and across payers. However, little is known about whether price effects vary between hospital locations, products, and payers. We expand existing bargaining models to allow for heterogeneous price effects and use a difference‐in‐differences model in which price changes at the merging hospitals are compared with price changes at comparison hospitals. We find evidence of heterogeneous price effects across health insurers, hospital products and hospital locations. These findings have implications for ex ante merger scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For almost a century, the Netherlands was marked by a large market for voluntary private health insurance alongside state-regulated social health insurance. Throughout this period, private health insurers tried to safeguard their position within an expanding welfare state. From an institutional logics perspective, we analyze how private health insurers tried to reconcile the tension between a competitive insurance market pressuring for selective underwriting and actuarially fair premiums (the insurance logic), and an upcoming welfare state pressuring for universal access and socially fair premiums (the welfare state logic). Based on primary sources and the extant historiography, we distinguish six periods in which the balance between both logics changed significantly. We identify various strategies employed by private insurers to reconcile the competing logics. Some of these were temporarily successful, but required measures that were incompatible with the idea of free entrepreneurship and consumer choice. We conclude that universal access can only be achieved in a competitive individual private health insurance market if this market is effectively regulated and mandatory cross-subsidies are effectively enforced. The Dutch case demonstrates that achieving universal access in a competitive private health insurance market is institutionally complex and requires broad political and societal support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In several OECD countries the percentage of elderly in long-term care institutions has been declining as a result of ageing-in-place. However, due to the rapid ageing of population in the next decades future demand for institutional care is likely to increase. In this paper we perform a scenario analysis to examine the potential impact of these two opposite trends on the demand for institutional elderly care in the Netherlands. We find that the demand for institutional care first declines as a result of the expected increase in the number of low-need elderly that age-in-place. This effect is strong at first but then peters out. After this first period the effect of the demographic trend takes over, resulting in an increase in demand for institutional care. We argue that the observed trends are likely to result in a growing mismatch between demand and supply of institutional care. Whereas the current stock of institutional care is primarily focussed on low-need (residential) care, future demand will increasingly consist of high-need (nursing home) care for people with cognitive as well as somatic disabilities. We discuss several policy options to reduce the expected mismatch between supply and demand for institutional care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2006, the Dutch health insurance system was radically reformed to strengthen competition among health insurers as purchasers of health services. This article considers whether purchaser competition has improved efficiency in health-care provision. Although supply and price regulation still dominates the allocation of health services, purchaser competition has already significantly affected the provision of hospital care, pharmaceuticals and primary care, as well as efforts to gather and disseminate information about quality of care. From this perspective, the glass is half full. However, based on the crude performance indicators available, the reforms have not yet demonstrated significant effects on the performance of the Dutch health system. From this perspective the glass is half empty. The article concludes that the effectiveness of purchaser competition depends crucially on the success of ongoing efforts to improve performance indicators, product classification and the risk equalisation scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Netherlands was the first country that introduced a universal mandatory social health insurance scheme for covering a broad range of long-term care (LTC) services provided in a variety of care settings. Compared with most other OECD countries, both total and public expenditure on LTC is high, particularly since the Dutch population is relatively young. On the other hand, coverage of LTC services is relatively comprehensive. In this article we examine the past experiences, current deficiencies and future prospects of LTC financing in the Netherlands. By rationing of supply and tight budgetary restrictions, the government managed to effectively control the growth of LTC expenditure, but at the expense of growing waiting lists and deteriorating quality of care. Reform plans aim to make the LTC system more efficient and consumer-directed. We discuss whether the proposed reforms offer a perspective on a sustainable system of comprehensive LTC insurance. This is especially important in view of the ageing of the population and the expected increase in demand for LTC services. We conclude that the success of the reforms heavily depends on the definition of entitlements, the accuracy of needs assessment and the feasibility of determining appropriate client-based budgets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2006, the Dutch health insurance system was radically reformed to strengthen competition among health insurers as purchasers of health services. This article considers whether purchaser competition has improved efficiency in health-care provision. Although supply and price regulation still dominates the allocation of health services, purchaser competition has already significantly affected the provision of hospital care, pharmaceuticals and primary care, as well as efforts to gather and disseminate information about quality of care. From this perspective, the glass is half full. However, based on the crude performance indicators available, the reforms have not yet demonstrated significant effects on the performance of the Dutch health system. From this perspective the glass is half empty. The article concludes that the effectiveness of purchaser competition depends crucially on the success of ongoing efforts to improve performance indicators, product classification and the risk equalisation scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]