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The method of cases, i.e. the informal elicitation of judgements in thought experiments for the purpose of philosophical theorising, has been much criticised in recent years. In this paper we point out that the method of cases is not peculiar to philosophy: it can also be found in physics, where it has made a more limited, but still valuable contribution to the probing and formulation of theories. The method of cases per se should therefore not be treated as intrinsically methodologically flawed. This paper has also a narrower goal: to show that when the analogy underlying the so-called 'expertise defence' is drawn between judgements in thought experiments in philosophy and in physics, several objections can be avoided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The so-called expertise defence against sceptical challenges from experimental philosophy has recently come under attack: there are several studies claiming to have found direct evidence that philosophers' judgments in thought experiments are susceptible to erroneous effects. In this paper, we distinguish between the customary 'immune experts' version of the expertise defence and an 'informed experts' version. On the informed expertise defence, we argue, philosophers' judgments in thought experiments could be preferable to those by the folk even if it were true that philosophers' judgments are no less immune to confounders than judgments by the folk are. We present results from an experimental study comparing philosophers and non-philosophers (n = 484), which support this version of the expertise defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought not to influence one's acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social sciences and compares their views to those held by philosophers. Some of the more surprising results are: (i) all three groups have a preference order regarding theoretical virtues, making theory choice a much more determinate matter than what has sometimes been suggested; (ii) the preference orders are very similar for the three groups; (iii) simplicity is viewed as an epistemic virtue particularly by social scientists (but not by philosophers); and (iv) syntactic parsimony is preferred to ontological parsimony by all three groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.009 Byline: Samuel Schindler Keywords: Data; Phenomena; Bottom-up; Theory-ladenness; Plate tectonic revolution Abstract: In this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward's (1988) data/phenomena distinction, which in a similar way to Cartwright's construal of the model of superconductivity (1995) -- although in a different domain -- argues for a 'bottom-up' construction of phenomena from data without the involvement of theory. I criticise Bogen and Woodward's account by analysing their melting point of lead example in depth, which is usually cited in the literature to illustrate the data/phenomenon distinction. Yet, the main focus of this paper lies on Matthias Kaiser's (1995) case study of the plate tectonic revolution, the most extensive case study that has been put forth to support the bottom-up construction of phenomena. On the basis of new historical evidence, which has been overlooked not only by Kaiser but also by the entire historical literature on the plate tectonic revolution, I demonstrate that phenomena are not constructed from the bottom-up but rather, admittedly counter-intuitively, from the top-down. Author Affiliation: Division of History and Philosophy of Science, School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK Article History: Received 21 March 2006; Revised 23 August 2006 Article Note: (dedication) This article is dedicated to Lawrence Morley

In the Kuhnian view of theory choice, theories, as a matter of empirical fact, often score differently with regard to the standard theoretical virtues. The case I discuss in this paper, however, is a case in which there was one theory which was more virtuous than all its competitors. In such cases practitioners' disparate weighting preferences, which Kuhn is so keen to emphasize, make no difference to theory choice: practitioners' choices will converge on one theory despite their different weighting preferences. The case I discuss in this paper concerns the Glashow-Weinberg-Salam (GWS) model of electroweak interactions in the early 1970s. After considering the contemporary experimental evidence in its favor in detail, I argue that the GWS model was chosen not because the evidence in its favor was compelling, but rather because its virtues exceeded those of its competitors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]