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As the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded, "Despite ongoing political frictions and concerns about discriminatory treatment, many U.S. companies remain committed to the Chinese market."[296] Indeed, one estimate concludes that the level of U.S. investment in China likely exceeds $1 trillion.[297] Consequently, alternative approaches must be developed to satisfy U.S. importers and manufacturers so that the impact on U.S. industries from the prospective loss of China's market can be minimized to the greatest extent possible. Neither variations in the repeated U.S. affirmations of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan - including more or less ambiguity - nor new labels for U.S. deterrence strategies can address the structural challenge to U.S. deterrence goals posed by the shifting correlation of forces and the political background of the Taiwan Question. This deterrence threat must be credible or, as Herman Kahn said, at least "not incredible", i.e. it must not entail likely costs to the United States that are so great that the U.S. deterrence position itself lacks sufficient credibility.[133] The political aims of U.S. Strategy What then are the U.S. political goals relative to the Taiwan Question? The fundamental deterrence questions that must be addressed by the United States are: is there space for deterrence to operate in principle and, if so, what deterrence posture might the United States preserve, or more likely regain, to support the credible deterrence strategy needed to uphold the U.S. position expressed in the 1979 TRA? At a time of considerable U.S. strategic nuclear advantage, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev raised the fundamental question about U.S. will and deterrence credibility when the potential U.S. suffering for carrying out its deterrent threat could easily have been intolerable for the United States. [Extracted from the article]

The need for an effective deterrence strategy in view of the new terrorist threats, weapons of mass destruction and missile technology is stressed. Deterrence now is primarily one of intelligence and newer methods of deterrence need to be adopted while the earlier ones based on nuclear forces and a mutual balance of terror must be reconsidered.

A new world order seemed to have come up with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the international coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicates that nuclear weapons are essential to deter aggressions willing to take extraordinary risks and include great costs but they are not suited to many of the contingencies for which one has to be prepared in the 21st century.

Resurgent expressions of an "action-reaction" arms race narrative and its corollary "inaction-inaction" narrative are the basis for frequent assertions that if the United States would only stop its nuclear programs, opponents would also stop building their nuclear force—and a "peace race" would ensue. In other words, U.S. efforts to maintain its deterrence capabilities are seen as sparking or accelerating the "arms race." This argument has its roots in the 1960s; it has not changed since then. This same claim is now leveled at the contemporary and much-delayed U.S. nuclear modernization program. As in the past, the claim now commonly expressed is that current U.S. efforts to preserve its strategic deterrence forces are the cause of a new action-reaction arms race cycle and should, therefore, be stopped. However, history disproves the action-reaction/inaction-inaction narrative. An examination of numerous documents regarding the development of U.S. strategic policy—including now-declassified governmental and unclassified non-governmental studies and books that that have closely examined this issue—and interviews with a bipartisan group of former officials and knowledgeable academics demonstrates the flaws in this narrative and sets the record straight regarding U.S. policy developments and the factors that drove those developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several prominent features of the post-cold war international system are emerging to cast a pall over the optimistic pronouncements of the early 1990s about a manageable New World Order. Two [...]

In January 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin completely rewrote the terms of debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by proposing a 'Global Protection System' to defend against limited missile [...]

Several letters to the editor are presented in response to articles in previous issues including an article on the decision to move the "Doomsday Clock," the review of the report "Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century," and the article "Batteries Included" by Gerald Marsh and George Stanford in the November/December 2006 issue.

The rise of hostile rogue states supporting terrorism and armed with weapons of mass destruction ended most of the hopeful 1990's talk of a new world order, which necessitates the need for the capability to deter attacks. The Bush AdministrationEs 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) integrates a much broader range of deterrent threat options than we inherited from the Cold War.

The limitations of the United States deterrence policy for the post-Cold War era are discussed. A methodology for tailoring deterrence policies to specific antagonists and contexts is developed to 'get inside' the decision-making process of the challenger and to ascertain as far as possible the basis for its decision-making with regard to a specific context and flashpoint.

In 1973, at the age of 44 and the height of the Cold War, James Schlesinger was confirmed as the 12th U.S. Secretary of Defense. While serving as Defense Secretary, Dr. Schlesinger implemented important nuclear policy developments designed to strengthen the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies. His 1974 adjustments to U.S. nuclear policy, known as the Schlesinger Doctrine or the Schlesinger Shift. The Schlesinger Doctrine advanced the basic parameters of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy that contributed to the peaceful ending of the Cold War and have remained constant across Republican and Democratic administrations to the present. It is hard to conceive of a more significant defense-policy legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For over two decades since the end of the Cold War, US nuclear policy has been based on a general belief that nuclear deterrence, and thus also nuclear weapons, are of rapidly declining value because international relations had moved toward a much more benign and enduring stage of history. Nuclear weapons supposedly had little or no remaining role to play in US security; the only real questions were how, and how quickly could the United States lead the world to nuclear disarmament. The end of the Cold War, which left the United States as the only standing Superpower inspired this view of history, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear weapons. With the nuclear resurgence of Russia, the rise of China, the mounting nuclear threats from North Korea and potentially Iran, that foundational belief underlying US inattention to its nuclear arsenal is now a manifest fiction, and US nuclear policy must confront, and adjust to a very different reality. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Russian foreign military actions, defense initiatives, markedly expanded conventional and nuclear arms programs, internal repression, and egregious arms control non-compliance are elements of an increasingly assertive and threatening agenda. In this text, we call out and examine the apparent grand strategy underlying Russian policies, programs and behavior. This examination demonstrates that Russian grand strategy now includes a deeply-troubling mix of ingredients, including increasing hostility toward the West, expanding conventional and nuclear weapons programs, a military doctrine that place much greater emphasis on nuclear weapons and military campaigns against neighboring states. These developments have created the potential for escalating political military crises in Europe and may be more dangerous than were Soviet Cold War policies and behavior. In particular, contemporary Russian nuclear strategy is intended to coerce the West and enforce Moscow's expansionist moves with nuclear first-use threats and planning that go well beyond Soviet Cold War behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This monograph,Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence, is the second in a series examining the U.S. goals of deterrence, extended deterrence and the assurance of allies, and how to think about the corresponding U.S. standards of adequacy for measuring “how much is enough?” It begins by examining the manifest character of the contemporary threat environment in which the United States must pursue its strategic goals of deterring foes and assuring allies. Fortunately, there is considerable available evidence regarding the character of the contemporary threat environment and its general directions. Noted historians have compared this threat environment not to the bipolar Cold War, but to the highly dynamic threat environments leading to World War I and World War II. The uncertainties involved are daunting given the great diversity of hostile and potentially hostile states and non-state actors, leaderships, goals, perceptions, and forces that could be involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the claims of Minimum Deterrence proposals of the U.S. that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons is considered an adequate nuclear force for all pertinent deterrence missions of the U.S., including its nuclear deterrence coverage to its allies. Topics include the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama and his policy positions on the topic, General Kevin Chilton of the U.S. Strategic Command, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.

A commonly held view is that nonstate actors cannot be deterred. A historical review of deterrence vis-à-vis nonstate actors, however, shows that deterrence can be applied successfully to terrorist groups for some purposes and at some times. An examination of the sensitivities, vulnerabilities, and other characteristics of the core al-Qa'ida group suggests a combination of denial and punitive deterrent measures could be used to discourage this nonstate actor from attempting a mass-casualty attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyses of U.S. strategic force requirements frequently are based on assertions about the requirements for deterrence. A politically attractive position is that a relatively small number of nuclear weapons reliably meets U.S. strategic nuclear requirements. This position, however, is flawed for two reasons: first, the number/types of nuclear weapons required for deterrence cannot be identified with precision because requirements shift dramatically across time and circumstances. Second, strategic forces also are intended to assure allies and limit damage, and these goals entail separate requirements that must be included in any serious calculation of U.S. strategic force requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War, academic theorists and senior U.S. policy makers planned strategies of nuclear deterrence according to a particularly narrow application of the rational actor model. Their assumptions were that the Soviet leadership would make decisions pertinent to deterrence per an instrumental rationality, and that the parameters of that rational decision making would be bounded by a familiar and largely Western worldview with regard to perceptions, values, goals, and behavioral norms. The fundamental problem with this narrow application of the rational actor model is that it typically does not take into account a wide range of factors that can shape decision making decisively and vary widely across time, place, and opponent. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The bipartisan Congressional Strategy Posture Commission offered numerous recommendations to reduce what it labeled 'the nuclear danger.' The Obama Administration has pursued some of these recommendations via its policy documents, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, its budgets, and plans. There is reason, however, for several concerns in this regard. These involve the high priority placed on nuclear force reductions at the potential expense of other national goals, including deterrence and assurance; the maintenance of the flexibility and resilience of the U.S. force posture necessary to meet deterrence and assurance requirements now and in the future; continued support for U.S. strategic defensive capabilities given Russian opposition; and apparent interest among some in the Administration to move increasingly toward what has been termed a policy of Minimum Deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a speech by Doctor Keith B. Payne, professor and head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (MSU), Springfield, Missouri, delivered during the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing on July 27, 2010, in which he discussed the treaty concerning the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms with Russia.

The article presents a speech by Dr. Keith B. Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, delivered at the Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois, February 20, 2009, in which he discussed the ways to achieve peace and prevent war.

Focuses on the implementation of Anti-Ballistic Missile and mutually assured destruction as cold war strategic policy in the United States. Assessment of strategic arms control process; Consideration of deterrence stability and nuclear arms reductions in the policy; Limitations of strategic offensive forces.