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Analyses of the impacts of the use of private finance by housing associations (HAs) across Europe regularly align with the hybridity in the social housing sector, linking private finance to a range of negative consequences related to the loss of social purposes by HAs. This article examines some of the implications of institutional investment for HAs in Britain to meet their economic and social goals. Using a combination of interviews with HAs and institutional investors and a round table discussion, the study shows how such investment has facilitated HAs as hybrid organisations which adopt a pragmatically ‘fit-for-purpose’ approach that combines social benefit with profitability. For institutional investors, investing in social housing is a profit-oriented business as well as a corporate social activity that creates public relations benefits. Importantly, the study shows how government regulations can affect the form of institutional investment (bond finance rather than equity investment) in social housing and help HAs balance the opportunities and risks in combining business and social orientations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper will argue that the meaning and definition of private renting varies from country to country, and this presents a series of challenges for comparative research. It will demonstrate a lack of equivalence between ‘private rented housing sectors’ in western Europe and show that this arises from variations in definitions, property rights, the role of the tenure in relation to other tenures, and differences in the characteristics of both landlords and tenants. It will show that an argument can be made that the private rental sector is a different phenomenon in different countries but that comparisons are still valuable. It will argue that between the extremes of universalism, that emphasise similarities, and particularism that emphasises differences, middle way approaches that consider contexts, apply commensurability and apply theory that is fit for purpose all have strong methodological advantages. The argument will be expanded by reference to the authors’ work on applying the concept of a competitive gap between market and social renting in six European countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper aims to make a contribution to the debate about the meaning of competition as applied to social housing and the usefulness of a competitive paradigm as a comparative analytical tool. Social housing providers have been asked to become more competitive and more market orientated in Europe. But what exactly do these terms mean and what are the defining features of competitiveness? And how can concepts of competition be applied to social housing, given that social housing is not allocated by price and market demand? Starting in mainstream economic analysis the meaning of competition and governments' roles in relation to competition are examined. The paper then applies key features of competition to social housing in order to explore the meaning of competition within social housing and between social housing and market housing. It then considers competition as a framework for examining the performance of social housing systems and the relationships between social and market rental housing. The possible implications of (more) competition within social housing and between social housing and market housing are discussed. Finally, the paper suggests that the competitive paradigm can be useful in comparative analysis because it can potentially supply a graded taxonomy that identifies and compares degrees of competitiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will set out the concept of a 'gap' between the social rented and market rented housing sector. This will be examined with respect to one aspect of competition between the two sectors in England, France, the Netherlands and Germany: substitutability. The analysis will involve an examination of the extent to which tenants can choose between the two sectors. The price-quality bundles of housing services as expressed by the characteristics of the accommodation, the property rights of the tenants, the allocation system and the housing allowances in the different countries will be compared. Competition measured in this way seems to be rather larger than smaller in the Netherlands and Germany and rather small in England. France's intermediate sector partly closes the gap between both rental tenures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an attempt to promote efficiency and consumer choice, many governments in Europe have in recent years required social housing organisations to be more market-orientated and competitive. Competition, however, is being discussed and implemented without any detailed examination of what is meant by the term 'competition' outside a conventional 'market', as is the case in social housing. It is not clear what exactly is meant by competition and this paper therefore focuses on the question of how competition can be operationalised and how it can be measured in practice. This paper concentrates on social housing in England and the Netherlands: two countries where competition in social housing is an issue. These two countries also have different social housing models. For both countries, we build on an evaluative framework based on the economic concepts of rivalry, risk and choice and then analyse the data to establish whether competition can be measured in a convincing way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper considers the proposal in England that a continuing requirement for residential developers to contribute directly to the supply of affordable housing in return for planning permission should operate alongside a new tax on land value increases due to planning permission. The paper asks whether it is right in principle for affordable housing to be supported by the implicit taxation of development. It is argued that in terms of transparency, clarity, and certainty explicit taxation is to be preferred to implicit taxation. It is thus suggested that once the new explicit tax is in place developers should no longer be routinely required to pay an additional implicit affordable housing tax. Affordable housing should, it is argued, be supported on the basis of need, not the resources available from the development process. The link between the provision of affordable housing and planning obligations should be broken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the application of the concept of competition to social housing in Europe. A distinction is made between competition amongst social housing suppliers and between social housing organisations and commercial suppliers of housing. The competitiveness of social housing is examined using evidence mainly from England and the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the proposal for a new tax on the ‘windfall gains’ arising from the granting of planning permission for residential development in the UK. The theoretical foundations in the theory of economic rent are discussed and the practical problems of applying such a tax, in the form of a ‘Planning-gain Supplement’, are explored. The relationship between any new explicit taxation and implicit taxation through planning agreements is examined. The reactions to this proposal, which come from the Barker Review of Housing Supply, are considered. It is shown that much of the criticism is about implementation difficulties rather than matters of principle. The problem of measuring the site-specific value of economic rent is discussed and the resolution is seen to be in viability appraisals that determine the changes in residual value that are a consequence of planning permission. The data requirements for such an approach are set out. It is argued that a detailed taxation proposal will need to include clear relationships between other demands on the development process, especially the provision of affordable housing through planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the meaning of the term 'housing subsidy' is reviewed and the theoretical and practical problems of measuring the value of housing subsidies and making comparisonsbetween countries is demonstrated.The definitions of both 'subsidy' and 'housing subsidy' are questioned. The paper shows that what is and is not a housing subsidy is often ill defined. More rigorous analysis, it is argued, requires the use of 'benchmarks' against which the changes initiated by subsidies can be judged. The use of alternative benchmarks with respect to home owners, tenants and landlords in several European countries is demonstrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines investment in social housing in France, Germany, Netherlands and United Kingdom. Comparative measure used; Overview of different policy approaches; Arguments on the objectives of social housing.

Discusses how planning policy and processes adapt to changes in The Netherlands and its implications for Great Britain. Difference in planning between the two countries; Main policy changes in The Netherlands and the reasons for its occurrence; Effect of changes in the implementation of Dutch physical planning; Extent to which objectives and implementation of planning differ in the two countries.

Profiles physically handicapped musicians in the United States. Includes Matthew Redka; Amy Parks; Ian McClure.

Land and Housing Policies In Europe and The USA. Graham Hallett (ed). London: Routledge, 1988. pp216. £27.50. Housing and Social Change in Europe and The USA. Michael Ball, Michael Harloe and Maartje Martens. London: Routledge, 1988. pp222. £30.00. Polarisation and Social Housing: The British and French Experience. Peter Willmott and Alan Murie. London: Policy Studies Institute, 1988. pp101. £5.95. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Discusses the application of social theory to housing research. Reflexive balance between structural and contextual elements; Theorized nature of comparative housing analysis.

The article presents the author's comments on the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was established to restore investors' confidence after many people in the U.S. suffered due to frauds committed by companies like Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. It informs that the Sarbanes-Oxley act requires that a company's top officials sign the financial statements, so that if the numbers turn out to be wrong or fraudulent, they can be held accountable.