Search

This article investigates the early emergence of reason-giving. Toddlers are sensitive to disagreements, and they can track several kinds of informational access, such as visual perception. We investigated whether young children use these skills (a) when assessing whether providing reasons is needed and (b) when selecting appropriate behaviors to support their claims. An experimenter disagreed with 2- to 4-year-old children (N = 71) about the location of a toy placed in 1 of 4 boxes. In the fully transparent condition, the boxes were transparent, and the toy was visible to the experimenter and to the participant. In the window condition, the boxes were partially opaque, and the toy was initially hidden from the experimenter but visible to the participant through a transparent window. In this condition, toddlers could make the toy visible to the experimenter by rotating the baited box. Participants in the window condition were more likely to rotate the baited box than those in the transparent condition. Thus, children were more likely to rotate the box when this action was an efficient way of supporting their claims by revealing new and relevant information to the experimenter. These results demonstrate the presence of precursors of crucial skills required for reason-giving and reveal that from 2 years of age, children do not use fixed persuasion strategies. Instead, they select relevant evidence when attempting to influence others.

We summarize the argumentative theory of reasoning, which claims that the main function of reasoning is to argue. In this theory, argumentation is seen as being essentially cooperative (people have to listen to others' arguments and be ready to change their mind) but with an adversarial dimension (their goal as argument producers is to convince). Consistent with this theory, the experimental literature shows that solitary reasoning is biased and lazy, whereas reasoning in group discussion produces good results, provided some conditions are met. We formulate recommendations for improving reasoning performance, mainly, to make people argue more and better by creating felicitous conditions for group discussion. We also make some suggestions for improving solitary reasoning, in particular to maximize students' exposure to arguments challenging their positions. Teaching people about the value of argumentation is likely to improve not only immediate reasoning performance but also long-term solitary reasoning skills.

The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think AloneBy Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach. New York, NY: Riverhead Books, 2017. 296 pp. Hardcover, $28.In The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think [...]

The public is largely innumerate, making systematic mistakes in estimating some politically relevant facts, such as the share of foreign-born citizens. In two-step or multistep flow models, such mistakes could be corrected if better-informed citizens were able to convince their peers, in particular by using good arguments citing reliable sources. In six experiments, we find two issues that dampen the potential power of this two-step flow process. First, even though participants were more convinced by good than by poor arguments, many did not change their minds, even when confronted with good arguments. Second, participants are not inclined to spontaneously generate arguments that cite reliable sources, even when they have just been influenced by such arguments. Both issues should put a significant brake in the spread of political numeracy through the two-step flow process, in particular in non-dialogic contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-enhancing statements can provide useful information. Why do we resent those who make them? We suggest that the resentment comes from a broader claim of superiority that self-enhancing statements can imply. In three experiments, we compared one condition, designed such that the self-enhancing claim would be perceived as a claim of superiority, to three conditions providing different contextual reasons for why the self-enhancing claim might not be a claim of superiority. In those conditions the self-enhancing claim is either called for, addressed to someone who performs better than the self-enhancer, or addressed to someone who doesn't compete in the domain mentioned of the self-enhancing claim. The results show that participants disliked the self-enhancer more and were more likely to deem the self-enhancing claim to be a brag when the self-enhancing claim was manipulated to be a claim of superiority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two experiments with preschoolers (36 to 78 months) and 8-year-old children (Experiment 1, N = 173; Experiment 2, N = 132) investigated the development of children's resource distribution in dominance contexts. On the basis of the distributive justice literature, 2 opposite predictions were tested. Children could match resource allocation with the unequal social setting they observe and thus favor a dominant individual over a subordinate 1. Alternatively, children could choose to compensate the subordinate if they consider that the dominance asymmetry should be counteracted. Two experiments using a giving task (Experiment 1) and a taking task (Experiment 2) led to the same results. In both experiments, children took dominance into account when allocating resources. Moreover, their distributive decisions were similarly affected by age: Although 3- and 4-year-old children favored the dominant individual, 5-year-old children showed no preference and 8-year-old children strongly favored the subordinate. Several mechanisms accounting for this developmental pattern are discussed.

A series of four experiments investigated preschoolers' abilities to make sense of dominance relations. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that as early as 3 years old, preschoolers are able to infer dominance not only from physical supremacy but also from decision power, age, and resources. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that preschoolers have expectations regarding the ways in which a dominant and a subordinate individual are likely to differ. In particular, they expect that an individual who imposes his choice on another will exhibit higher competence in games and will have more resources.

The negativity bias favours the cultural diffusion of negative beliefs, yet many common (mis)beliefs—naturopathy works, there's a heaven—are positive. Why? People might share 'happy thoughts'—beliefs that might make others happy—to display their kindness. Five experiments conducted among Japanese and English‐speaking participants (N = 2412) show that: (i) people higher on communion are more likely to believe and share happier beliefs, by contrast with people higher in competence and dominance; (ii) when they want to appear nice and kind, rather than competent and dominant, people avoid sharing sad beliefs, and instead prefer sharing happy beliefs; (iii) sharing happier beliefs instead of sad beliefs leads to being perceived as nicer and kinder; and (iv) sharing happy beliefs instead of sad beliefs fleads to being perceived as less dominant. Happy beliefs could spread, despite a general negativity bias, because they allow their senders to signal kindness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Connectives, such as "because," are routinely used by parents when addressing their children, yet we do not know to what extent children are sensitive to their use. Given children's early developing abilities to evaluate testimony and produce arguments containing connectives, it was hypothesized that young children would show an appropriate reaction to the presence of connectives. Three experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis. In each, two informants gave contradicting statements regarding the location of an object and justified their positions by using a similar argument. Only one of the informants used the connective "because" to link his argument to the statement. In each experiment, the 3-year-olds performed at chance in selecting choices containing the connective "because," but the 4- and 5-year-olds performed above chance. Moreover, in Experiments 2 and 3, the 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults performed significantly better than the 3-year-olds. These findings show that 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults are sensitive to the presence of connectives. An interpretation of the difference in performance between the 3-year-olds and the 4- and 5-year-olds in terms of metarepresentational skills is suggested. (Contains 2 figures.)

The argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, in press) claims that reasoning evolved for argumentation: to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic contexts. The theory has drawn most of its supportive evidence from work with adults, leaving open the possibility that argumentive features of reasoning are in fact entirely learned. Evidence is reviewed here suggesting that the special relation between reasoning and argumentation holds at all ages. More specifically, it is argued that (a) children possess at least rudimentary argument skills, (b) they are able to reap the benefits of social reasoning from very early on, (c) confirmation bias is present as soon as they start to argue, and (d) children can be victims of the same biases that affect adults when they use reasoning in the wrong contexts. These claims strengthen the argumentative theory of reasoning and support a call for more research on the interactive features of reasoning in both adults and children.

A prominent and publicly influential literature challenges the quality of democratic decision making, drawing on political science findings with specific claims about the ubiquity of cognitive bias to lament citizens' incompetence. A competing literature in democratic theory defends the wisdom of crowds, drawing on a cluster of models in support of the capacity of ordinary citizens to produce correct outcomes. In this Letter, we draw on recent findings in psychology to demonstrate that the former literature is based on outdated and erroneous claims and that the latter is overly sanguine about the circumstances that yield reliable collective decision making. By contrast, "interactionist" scholarship shows how individual-level biases are not devastating for group problem solving, given appropriate conditions. This provides possible microfoundations for a broader research agenda similar to that implemented by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues on common-good provision, investigating how different group structures are associated with both success and failure in democratic decision making. This agenda would have implications for both democratic theory and democratic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Delusions are distressing and disabling symptoms of various clinical disorders. Delusions are associated with an aberrant and apparently contradictory treatment of evidence, characterized by both excessive credulity (adopting unusual beliefs on minimal evidence) and excessive rigidity (holding steadfast to these beliefs in the face of strong counterevidence). Here we attempt to make sense of this contradiction by considering the literature on epistemic vigilance. Although there is little evolutionary advantage to scrutinizing the evidence our senses provide, it pays to be vigilant toward ostensive evidence—information communicated by others. This asymmetry is generally adaptive, but in deluded individuals the scales tip too far in the direction of the sensory and perceptual, producing an apparently paradoxical combination of credulity (with respect to one's own perception) and skepticism (with respect to the testimony of others). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]