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The 2013–2014 Revolution in Ukraine has spurred a boom in civic anti-corruption initiatives across Ukraine. There is as yet little consolidated understanding of how effective these initiatives are and what explains variation in effectiveness. Insights from academic and practitioner literature suggest that factors associated with success in anti-corruption activism fall under three broad categories: environmental factors, advocacy strategies of civil society organizations, and their organizational characteristics. Drawing on a comprehensive study of anti-corruption activism in the regions of Ukraine, this article asks how these insights relate to anti-corruption activism in the regions of Ukraine. We find that anti-corruption initiatives generally face two key dilemmas: insufficient capacity in terms and financial and human resources, and the absence of a credible base of support. Anti-Corruption organizations that are most effective tend to be those that convincingly solve either one of these two dilemmas. In addition, we find that political will among local authorities is an important conducive factor to the effectiveness of anti-corruption activism. The article also discusses the implications of our findings for practitioners of international assistance.

Following the recent deterioration of relations between Russia and the West over crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is growing stronger. In 2014, the two nations signed an unprecedented gas deal worth US$400 billion. In May 2015, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping agreed to coordinate the Moscow-led EEU with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). Following these developments, authors and journalists heralded a new era in Sino-Russian relations in which the two nations would consolidate their forces to counter a US-led unipolar world. However, the nature of the relationship between China and Russia, the prospects for closer cooperation between the two nations, and the feasibility of integrating the two grand Eurasian projects are topics of fierce debate. This article maintains that while a consensus between Moscow and Beijing with regard to post-Cold War US unilateralism and their convergent interests have pushed China and Russia to cooperate on a range of global and regional issues, relations between the two Eurasian neighbours are complex and multi-faceted and are far from forming an anti-US bloc. Furthermore, the abstract nature of China’s Silk Road initiative and a number of significant obstacles make the feasibility of integration between the two projects a complicated task. Issues explored by this article include the development of mechanisms and agreement on a format for cooperation between the nations involved; the solution of practical issues such as rail gauges and corruption in the region; the prospects for an “equal partnership” in Sino-Russian relations and Moscow’s predicament with regards to its position as “junior partner” in Eurasia; and last but not least, the ever-growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism and regional security.

The Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border remains one of the last undefined frontiers in the Commonwealth of Independent States, where the governments are reluctant to act against the wishes of their border communities and force delimitation solutions that may cause social protests. Uncertainty of territorial arrangements persists; however, the era of commonality and interdependence may be at its end due to the establishment of a border as a means of spatial control. Border drawing reflects the divergent development trajectories of the new states, seeking to break out of an interdependence pattern. Borderlands’ interactions become more conflictual. Generation change and a loss of common language work to widen the inter-communal gap. Ethnicity and identity factors grew in significance as association with the nation-states increased, and a border expresses a symbol of nationhood in this paradigm. Crucially, a border justifies a security regime, reinforced by international assistance policies, to project power over the territory. Actions of security structures cause grievances but also signify a protective arm of the state, a role that the border communities appreciate, themselves acting as a collective border guard and projecting their fears of encroachment onto the borders. The expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union became a new factor that could have served to alleviate the pressure to divide territory and assets, but this could work only if two countries joined it at the same period. With this option unavailable, a territorial impasse has been reached.

One of the biggest problem in OSCE election observation methodology concerns the selection of polling stations where the observation is conducted: in practice, polling stations that are visited by observers are disproportionally urban and located in or around the national capital and in regional centers. Because visited polling stations are not representative of all polling stations, the observation mission risks getting an unbalanced picture of the shortcomings in the election. In this article, we present findings from original research that shed light on the scope of the problem of distortion in the selection of polling stations, and discuss potential ways to overcome the problem.

The December 2011 legislative election was among the most fraudulent national elections in Russia since the communist period. The fraud, however, was not evenly spread across the country. Precinct-level election returns from the 83 regions of the Russian Federation suggest that the level of fraud ranged from minimal or small in some regions to extreme in some others, with moderate to high fraud levels in many regions in between. We argue that in an electoral authoritarian context like Russia, regional variation in fraud can be explained by differences in (a) the perceived need by regional authorities to signal loyalty to the center by “delivering” desired election results; (b) the capacity of regional authorities to organize fraud; and (c) the vulnerability of citizens to political pressure and manipulation. We test the effect of signaling, capacity, and vulnerability on electoral fraud in the 2011 legislative elections with data on the 83 regions of the Russian Federation. We find evidence for all three mechanisms, finding that the tenure of governors in office, United Russia's dominance in regional legislatures, and the ethnic composition of regions are most important for explaining regional variation in electoral fraud

While international election observations missions often aim to present generalizable claims about the quality and integrity of an election, their findings are rarely based on a representative sample of observations, undermining the credibility of the missions. Bias in the selection of polling stations, among other things, can inflate or deflate the percentage of polling stations where observers find significant flaws. This article uses original data from Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election observation missions to illustrate the nature of the problem of selection bias in international election observation, and show how the percentage of ‘bad’ polling stations (in the absence of selection bias) can be estimated through a weighting procedure. The article finds that, while there is a strong degree of selection bias, this does not significantly impact the overall percentage of ‘bad’ polling stations that is reported by OSCE observation missions.

It is widely taken for granted that international election observation deters and detects election fraud, but little evidence exists that supports this conventional wisdom. This article employs a unique dataset on the 2011 and 2012 election observation missions by the osce to the legislative and presidential elections in russia, to assess the claim that international election observation deters and detects fraud. The findings suggest that observers may have deterred fraud to some degree during the observation of counting procedures but less so, if at all, during the observation of voting procedures. , and that observers probably did not detect fraud to any significant degree during both voting and counting observations.