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First-order theory of mind (ToM) development has shown to conform to a Guttman scale, with desire reasoning developing before belief reasoning. There have been attempts to test for internal consistency and scalability in advanced ToM, but not over a broad age range and only with a limited set of tasks. This 2-year longitudinal study (N = 155; M[subscript age] = 4.2; SD = 0.85 months; 68 girls, 87 boys) tests for the scalability of a broader range of ToM tasks, and we model the developmental "transition" from first-order to advanced ToM in 4- to 6-year-olds. Rasch analyses showed that psychometrically sound and developmentally sequenced scales emerge when measures of morally relevant and second-order false belief, as well as mental verb understanding, metacognition, and recognition of nonliteral speech are included. Individual differences were moderately stable over time, and there were systematic transitions from failure to success in children's performance, suggesting that conceptual continuity exists between first-order and advanced ToM.

Both theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning have been related to children's academic abilities. In a longitudinal study with 112 children, we investigated the influence of these two abilities on children's math and reading performance at 7 years of age. We found that math performance was predicted by concurrent working memory as well as by preschool numerical abilities and ToM. Reading performance was predicted by concurrent working memory and verbal IQ at 6 years. This corroborates earlier research demonstrating the importance of executive functioning (working memory) and ToM for later academic abilities. We argue that ToM may be an important developmental precursor of math performance because both require an understanding of representations.

Perspective taking and cognitive flexibility are important abilities for navigating our everyday lives. In this longitudinal study with 108 children (61 girls, mostly White), we investigated the developmental relation between Level 1 perspective taking at 27 months of age and Level 2 perspective taking at 52 months of age as well as relations to cognitive flexibility at 52 months of age. We found that early perspective taking was significantly related to later, more complex perspective taking abilities as well as to cognitive flexibility. This highlights the importance of early perspective taking abilities for later perspective understanding and flexible cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a longitudinal study (N = 54), we investigated the developmental relation between children's implicit and explicit theory of mind and executive functions. We found that implicit false belief understanding at 18 months was correlated with explicit false belief understanding at 4 to 5 years of age, with the latter being closely related to second-order false belief understanding at 5 years of age. Also, replicating a number of studies, explicit first- and second-order false belief understanding, in contrast to implicit false belief understanding, were related to executive functioning. This indicates that executive functions play a role in standard explicit false belief tasks, but not in implicit false belief understanding. We argue that spontaneous, implicit false belief understanding does not require conscious control, whereas explicit false belief understanding is based on conscious, reflective processing. In sum, we suggest a developmental enrichment account of theory of mind development, with belief processing becoming increasingly reflective and controlled with advancing age.

Previous research yielded conflicting results about when children can accurately assess their epistemic states in different hiding tasks. In Experiment 1, ninety-two 3- to 7-year-olds were either shown which object was hidden inside a box, were totally ignorant about what it could be, or were presented with two objects one of which was being put inside (partial exposure). Even 3-year-olds could assess their epistemic states in the total ignorance and the complete knowledge task. However, only children older than 5 could assess their ignorance in the partial exposure task. In Experiment 2 with one hundred and one 3- to 7-year-olds, similar results were found for children under 5 years even when more objects were shown in partial exposure tasks. Implications for children's developing theory of knowledge are discussed. (Contains 2 tables and 1 figure.)

In a study with 79 3-year-olds, we confirm earlier findings that separating the sorting dimensions improve children's performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. We also demonstrate that the central reason for this facilitation is that the two sorting dimensions are not integral features of a single object. Spatial separation of the sorting dimensions has no additional significant influence. This finding highlights the important role of objects with respect to children's attentional flexibility. Implications for current theories on the DCCS task and for the development of perspective taking and cognitive flexibility are discussed. (Contains 2 figures and 1 table.)

In the preschool years, there are marked improvements in theory of mind (ToM) and executive functions. And, children's competence in these two core cognitive domains is associated with their academic achievement. Therefore, training ToM and executive control could be a valuable tool for improving children's success in school. This article reviews several successful training studies in preschool children showing that these two school-related competencies can be trained. We also discuss methodological factors that may be important for the effectiveness of training programs. Finally, the review outlines implications of brain research for such training interventions.

The Dimensional Change Card Sorting task frequently is used to measure extradimensional shifting abilities in preschool children. In two studies, we investigated what makes this extradimensional shifting task difficult. In Study 1 with 61 2- to 4-year-olds, we showed that extradimensional shifts from one dimension to another are more difficult than reversal shifts within a dimension (even with irrelevant variation on a second dimension). Study 2 with 77 3- and 4-year-olds further confirmed this finding using a computerized paradigm and showed that sorting instructions are critical for 3-year-olds' difficulties with extradimensional shifts. This finding is taken to suggest that 3-year-olds have particular problems with spontaneously classifying one object in two different ways.

Two experiments with 3 1/2- to 6 1/2-year-old children showed that theory-of-mind development is associated with the growth of episodic memory. Episodic memory was assessed by manipulating informational conditions such that they permit or prevent the formation of episodic memories in terms of re-experiencing the recalled event. Only experienced events, e.g. seeing how one puts a picture of a frog into a box, can be remembered by re-experience. Events known through indirect information cannot be re-experienced, e.g. putting pictures into the box when blindfolded and being later shown on video what was on these cards. Children were also tested on a battery of theory-of-mind tasks assessing their understanding of the origins of knowledge. There was a significant interaction in both experiments showing that recall of directly experienced items improved in relation to indirectly presented items the higher children's theory-of-mind scores. The discussion suggests that episodic memory development is specifically linked to the growing ability to introspect an ongoing experience and interpret it as representing an actual past event. (Contains 1 table and 2 figures.)

The dimensional change card-sorting task (DCCS task) is frequently used to assess young children's executive abilities. However, the source of children's difficulty with this task is still under debate. In the standard DCCS task, children have to sort, for example, test cards with a red cherry or a blue banana into two boxes marked with target cards showing a blue cherry and a red banana. Typically, 3-year-olds have severe problems switching from sorting by one dimension (e.g. color) to sorting by the other dimension (e.g. shape). Three experiments with 3- to 4-year-olds showed that separating the two dimensions as properties of a single object, and having them characterize two different objects (e.g. by displaying an outline of a cherry next to a red filled circle on the card) improves performance considerably. Results are discussed in relation to a number of alternative explanations for 3-year-olds' difficulty with the DCCS task.

Genetic variability is being discussed as a source of inter‐individual differences in Theory of Mind development. Previous studies documented an association between variations in DRD4 VNTR 48 bp, OXTR rs53576, COMT rs4680, and Theory of Mind task performance. As empirical evidence on these associations is sparse, we conducted a preregistered replication attempt of a study reporting a link between DRD4 VNTR 48 bp and false belief understanding in 50‐month‐old children [Lackner, C., Sabbagh, M. A., Hallinan, E., Liu, X., & Holden, J. J. (2012). Developmental Science, 15(2), 272–280.]. Additionally, we attempted a replication of studies on the role of OXTR rs53576 and COMT rs4680 in Theory of Mind. In both replication attempts, we did not find any evidence for associations between the sampled genetic markers and Theory of Mind ability in a series of analyses. Extending the replication attempt of Lackner et al., we employed longitudinal data from several tasks and measurement points, which allowed us to run follow‐up robustness checks with more reliable scores. These extensive analyses corroborated our null finding. This comprehensive non‐replication is important to balance current research on genetic markers of Theory of Mind. In a combined evaluation of our own and previous studies, we point to substantial methodological issues that research on the genetic basis of Theory of Mind development faces. We conclude that these limitations currently prevent firm conclusions on genetic influences on Theory of Mind development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent metacognitive research using a partial knowledge task indicates that a firm understanding of 'knowing about knowing' develops surprisingly late, at around 6 years of age. To reveal the mechanisms subserving this development, the partial knowledge task was used in a longitudinal study with 67 children (33 girls) as an outcome measure at 5;9 (years;months). In addition, first‐ and second‐order false belief was assessed at 4;2, 5;0, and 5;9. At 2;6, perspective taking and executive abilities were evaluated. Metacognition at 5;9 was correlated with earlier theory of mind and perspective taking – even when verbal intelligence and executive abilities were partialled out. This highlights the importance of perspective taking for the development of an understanding of one's own mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of Mind (ToM) and the structure of intelligence were investigated in 115 4‐year‐olds. Specifically, we asked whether children's intelligence involves both general and specific aspects and whether standard ToM measures of false belief can serve as indicators of social intelligence. Psychometric intelligence and children's domain‐specific understanding of number concepts and of mental states (false belief) were measured in the laboratory; communication and social skills were assessed through mothers' report. A confirmatory factor analysis revealed poor fit for a one‐factor model, but good fit for a model with three correlated factors, suggesting that children's intelligence involves both general and specific aspects. Numerate‐spatial and verbal intelligence were correlated (.70), and social intelligence correlated to a stronger degree with verbal (.66) than with numerate‐spatial intelligence (.37). Laboratory assessment of false belief and mothers' reports about children's social skills loaded on a single factor, pointing to real‐world consequences of ToM abilities. Statement of contributionWhat is already known on this subject?The structure of intelligence in 4‐year‐olds comprises domain‐general and domain‐specific dimensions.Some domain‐specific dimensions are numerate‐spatial, verbal, and social intelligence.What does this study add?Theory of Mind emerges as an aspect of children's social intelligence.Social intelligence (including Theory of Mind) is related to children's numerate‐spatial abilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does theory of mind become explicit? In this article, we provide a brief overview of theoretical accounts and then review longitudinal findings on the development of theory of mind from infancy to the preschool years. Long‐term predictive relations among conceptually related measures of implicit and explicit theory‐of‐mind reasoning support a conceptual continuity view of the transition from an implicit to an explicit understanding of the mind. We discuss alternative, minimalist accounts of infant psychological reasoning (e.g., two‐systems models, submentalizing theory) and their implications for the development of theory of mind in light of the evidence. Longitudinal findings further support a developmental enrichment view of joint attention as a foundation of theory of mind and early social interaction as a powerful mechanism in the development of this ability. Finally, we highlight the importance of longitudinal data for our understanding of conceptual development from infancy to the preschool years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge and use of self-presentational tactics is an important social skill. We examined understanding of the function of three different self-presentational tactics (self-promotion, ingratiation and blasting) in 11 8–12-year-old boys with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and 11 matched comparison children. Children were given six different self-presentation stories, two for each one of the three different tactics. After each story, they were asked to evaluate the effects of the self-presentational tactic used. Children with ADHD rated self-promotion and blasting as more positive and more effective—and ingratiation as less positive and less effective—than children in the control group. This implicates that children with ADHD prefer simple and direct self-presentational strategies (like self-promotion), and, therefore, may not as easily understand more subtle strategies (like ingratiation). They also seem to be more inclined to use negatively connoted strategies (like blasting). We suggest that this limited understanding of self-presentational strategies in children with ADHD may explain some of their problems in social interactions. Therefore, social skill interventions in children with ADHD should incorporate elements focusing on use and understanding of different self-presentational strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is robust evidence showing a link between executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) in 3- to 5-year-olds. However, it is unclear whether this relationship extends to middle childhood. In addition, there has been much discussion about the nature of this relationship. Whereas some authors claim that ToM is needed for EF, others argue that ToM requires EFTo date, however, studies examining the longitudinal relationship between distinct subcomponents of EF [i.e., attention shifting, working memory (WM) updating, inhibition] and ToM in middle childhood are rare. The present study examined (1) the relationship between three EF subcomponents (attention shifting, WM updating, inhibition) and ToM in middle childhood, and (2) the longitudinal reciprocal relationships between the EF subcomponents and ToM across a 1-year period. EF and ToM measures were assessed experimentally in a sample of 1,657 children (aged 6-11 years) at time point one (t1) and 1 year later at time point two (t2). Results showed that the concurrent relationships between all three EF subcomponents and ToM pertained in middle childhood at t1 and t2, respectively, even when age, gender, and fluid intelligence were partialled out. Moreover, cross-lagged structural equation modeling (again, controlling for age, gender, and fluid intelligence, as well as for the earlier levels of the target variables), revealed partial support for the view that early ToM predicts later EF but stronger evidence for the assumption that early EF predicts later ToM. The latter was found for attention shifting and WM updating, but not for inhibition. This reveals the importance of studying the exact interplay of ToM and EF across childhood development, especially with regard to different EF subcomponents. Most likely, understanding others' mental states at different levels of perspective-taking requires specific EF subcomponents, suggesting developmental change in the relations between EF and ToM across childhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• A significant longitudinal correlation between toddlers' performance on a Low Demands False Belief task and 4-year-olds' performance on a Standard False Belief task was observed. • The correlation was independent of language and executive function. • The correlation cannot be attributed to low-level similarities between the two tasks. • The finding supports a high-level conceptual continuity view of False Belief understanding. Conceptual continuity in children's false belief understanding from toddlerhood to childhood was investigated in a longitudinal study of 75 children. Performance in a low-demands false belief task at 33 months of age was significantly correlated with performance in a content false belief task at 52 months independent of language ability and executive function. In contrast, there was no correlation with performance in a location false belief task, which differed from the "Sally–Anne" format of the low-demands task and was high in executive demands. These findings support the view that explicit false belief understanding may be continuous from toddlerhood to childhood and that developmental change may be characterized in terms of enrichment and increasing stability of core conceptual understanding rather than in terms of fundamental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]