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This article analyzes the role of UN sanctions in the context of peace negotiations in South Sudan from the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013 until the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015. Drawing on the literature regarding third-party intervention in civil wars, it explores whether the UN sanctions regime--established in March 2015--was conceived as an instrument of leverage to get the parties to agree to a settlement. The article asks two questions: Have sanctions and mediation been coordinated? Has the interlink between sanctions and mediation been successful? First, there has been little coordination between sanctions and mediation. Second, UN sanctions did not appear to play a crucial role in the mediation process. This analysis is based on desk research and nineteen interviews with officials from the UN, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and other regional actors conducted between 2017 and 2018. Keywords sanctions - mediation - South Sudan - conflict - crisis management - United Nations - Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 1 Introduction International conflicts and crises are often mitigated, and sometimes resolved, through mediation processes. Indeed, sanctions can be adopted to change the cost-benefit analyses of parties/actors, thus supporting mediation [...]

The fragmentation of the European defence market hampers the establishment of a unified European defence. The European Union (EU) has implemented initiatives like the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Defence Fund (EDF) to address this issue. However, a comprehensive understanding of the European defence market and its consolidation, which is essential for evaluating these programs, remains insufficient. This article aims to observe the configuration of the European defence market and its evolution over time, exploring potential trends towards consolidation. The authors contend that despite the fragmented nature of the European defence market, a few larger companies from four countries hold significant positions. They also identify a positive trend towards consolidation, although institutional incentives perpetuate market fragmentation. To delve deeper, the authors analyze the funding allocation for defence companies through the preparatory programs of the European Defence Fund. Their analysis encompasses 65 projects awarded to 430 companies between 2016 and 2020, supplemented by insights from three focus groups and an expert survey conducted in the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden. This article suggests avenues for future research on the EDF, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive understanding of market consolidation and the efficacy of current initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the changing landscape of the European defense industry in response to various global crises and security concerns. It highlights the need for increased integration and expansion of the defense industry at the European level, including the establishment of the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The article also addresses key issues such as the status of the defense market, technological innovation, military-civilian connections, and the role of outer space, cyber, and critical infrastructure in the European defense architecture. The special issue provides a comprehensive exploration of the European defense landscape, offering unique perspectives on data collection, market fragmentation, industrial structure, innovation incentives, demand-supply dynamics, regulatory frameworks, and technology securitization. [Extracted from the article]

State defence and security policies rely mostly on their military capabilities. The latter are ensured through research and development (R&D) as well as procurement, which are subject to defence industry dynamics. Furthermore the defence sector is heavily dependent on public funds; the latter can be more easily allocated if related R&D has a spill-over effect on the civilian sector, creating the potential for a bigger and more globally (or regionally) integrated market. This article investigates, then, how technology moves, and whether defence sector innovations create spin-offs in the civilian sector in the Netherlands. We aim to provide an industry-centred perspective on defence sector dynamics and potentials. For this, the article attempts to answer the following questions: Are defence technologies transferred to the civilian sector? What lessons can be derived from the Dutch case? To address these research puzzles the article's theoretical framework builds on the technology-transfer literature in analysing the case study of the Netherlands. The basis for this is 23 interviews with representatives of Dutch defence companies that were carried out both in a workshop and in one-to-one settings in May and June 2020. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing debate over whether applications of blockchain and other financial technologies ('fintechs') reinforce forms of neo-colonial extraction that perpetuate North–South inequities or help enact decolonial ambitions across the Global South. This paper expands such discussions and contributes to this special issue on 'fintech in Africa' by situating emerging African blockchain techno-experimentation within wider international infrastructural relations. We argue that blockchain-based activities in and across the African continent must be understood within those also unfolding in countries that have been subjected to financial sanctions of varying types (China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela) by the European Union, United States, and United Nations. Our analysis traces how blockchain-based applications by sanctioned countries are extending exclusions in novel and existing socio-technical relations. We conclude that blockchain-based experiments are facilitating rather than displacing a colonial finance/security infrastructure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The implementation of European Union (EU) policies has been investigated for several policy areas, but Decisions made under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have rarely been considered. While many CFSP measures are applicable throughout the EU without the need for further action on the domestic level, some Decisions must be implemented by Council Regulations. These Council Regulations adopted with the intent to implement CFSP Decisions have qualities of Directives, which delegate implementing tasks to member states and require transposition. The aim of this article is to investigate whether restrictive measures imposed by the EU are uniformly implemented across the member states, and, if not, to what extent implementation performance varies. We observe significant differences in implementation performance across member states. The findings of this article are twofold. First, we claim that implementation and compliance studies should involve CFSP decisions more systematically. Second, empirical confirmation is provided of how uneven transposition and application occurs also in CFSP matters. This study is based on empirical work that consisted of desk research and semi-structured interviews with national competent authorities of 21 EU member states taking place between March 2020 and January 2021. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decisions to impose sanctions on Russia and to lift them on Iran, in opposition to the wishes of the United States, contributed to the elevation of the profile of the European Union among the main global actors in international politics. However, the EU imposes sanctions since the spring of 1994, shortly after the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht. Even though the EU consequently has 26 years of experience herewith, EU sanctions have been mostly studied only on a case-by-case basis. The aim of this article is to provide an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of the experience of the EU with sanctions. Specifically, it presents the results of a newly constructed database of EU autonomous sanctions constituted by 48 cases of these restrictive measures, which have been subdivided in 85 episodes. The analysis revolves around four questions that we asked in each case: when sanctions were in force, what type(s) were used, where the targets were located and why restrictive measures were imposed. The analysis of the empirical database leads to observations about the EU as an international actor and, more generally, on the trends vis-à-vis the utilisation of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interaction between individuals and states is considered a distinctive character of domestic politics, while international politics is the 'realm of states'. However, it is becoming more common to encounter loci where both states and individuals interact at the international level, such as in the cases of the Special Tribunals for Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Former Yugoslavia as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC). Within the International Relations (IR) theory panorama, one would expect the English School of International Relations (ES) to have the theoretical and analytical tools to conceptualize synergies between states and individuals, but this is not evident. This article asks, how does the interaction between individuals and states take place in the ES? We argue that this interaction takes place via 'contact points', defined as those international bodies that bring together states and non-state actors, be they individuals or groups, interacting on equal grounds in terms of rights and responsibilities towards each other. The notion of 'contact point' is developed inductively by focusing on the Office of the Ombudsperson to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. This research has theoretical implications. We aim to refine, sharpen and advance both the ES's theoretical and analytical architecture. The contribution we seek to make is one that will better equip ES scholars to conceptualize and analyse those secondary institutions that allow states and individuals to enjoy rights and duties equally. By so doing, we will make possible for the ES to provide a more fine-grained account for these synergies than other IR theories. The notion of 'contact point' does set a new agenda for the ES, since interactions between individuals and states are likely to become a constitutive essence of world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas a number of studies have been conducted to investigate causal relations between individual conditions (e.g. trade relations and labour standards), there is a lack of consensus among practitioners and scholars about the conditions that favour or cause labour standards improvements and, specifically, it is still unclear whether the increasing pervasiveness of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is conducive to enhancing labour conditions. The aim of this study is to shed light on whether labour clauses in FTAs are conducive to better labour standard practices, whether the content of a clause makes a difference, and whether changes have anything to do with other (external) pressures that play a role in changing labour standards. The main argument of the article is that FTAs do not play a determinant role in improving labour standards in signatory states. The analysis is done by looking at 13 FTAs signed by the United States with 19 countries. The United States is chosen because of its relatively extensive collection of FTAs including different conditions on labour standards. The empirical dataset is analysed with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method, which permits to trace the combined effect of independent variables rather than to focus on the direct and individual causality with each of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the authors discuss various reports within the issue on topics including intergovernmentalism in the European Union (EU), the security governance of the missions of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and organized crime and security governance in EU.

The functioning of the European Union (EU) has been explored extensively in recent years. The dominant prism through which to look at the EU is still one of locus: i.e. whether decisions are made in the capitals of its member states or in Brussels. This debate is contained in the dualism between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, but drawing the boundaries between the two concepts is still undone. This article attempts to contribute to solving this problem by investigating the restrictive measures policy of the EU in order to identify three conditions under which intergovernmentalism should be used. First, when EU institutions are dependent on EU member states for information and expertise; second, when decision-making powers rest mainly in EU capitals; and three, when there are no exclusive fora for decision-making in Brussels. The study of the restrictive measures of the European Union does not meet any of these three conditions; therefore the article argues that the concept of supranational intergovernmentalism offers useful insights to understand the EU security governance of CFSP sanctions. The article is divided into four parts. The first introduces the debate on security governance and justifies the selection of this specific approach to the study of sanctions. The second part presents the restrictive measures policy of the European Union and justifies its pertinence to the field of security. The third part of the article investigates the emerging patterns in security governance by testing the three conditions on the decision-making process for EU restrictive measures. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main argument and indicates ways forward in the study of EU sanctions from a governance perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2002 and this article aims at evaluating the success of that decision. Applying a broader definition of success, this article assumes that sanctions can coerce, constrain and signal. Contrary to most of the literature holding that sanctions are imposed to change the behaviour of targets, this article argues that the sanctions on Zimbabwe appear to have been motivated by a constraining logic and, thus, what to expect from them and how to assess their success should be measured accordingly. The article holds that the restrictive measures of the EU fulfilled their expectations in making life harder for the members of Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and contributed to creating the conditions for the positive evolution of the situation in Zimbabwe with the power sharing agreement reached in 2009. The constraint on ZANU-PF benefits the MDC-T and MDC-M. The assessment of EU restrictive measures should take place under this light. The recent reduction of the individuals and entities targeted by EU sanctions is an interesting development that confirms how Brussels is interested in the stabilisation of the institutional framework wherein ZANU-PF would respect the newly formed institutional framework. The coercive aspect, allowing ZANU-PF to comply with the demands of the EU, is a further important improvement of the situation in the country that can be captured by the theoretical framework adopted in this article and that should help to lead the future analysis on sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the effectiveness of the travel ban of the European Union (EU) on the leaders of Transnistria. It notes that Brussels has used a strategy of divide et adduc, which means divide and influence, in limiting the capabilities of the targets undermine their claim from independence and of weakening their power position in the Transnistrian society. It talks about the contribution of the travel ban to the resolution of the conflict.

There is considerable debate on why are sanctions imposed, but little agreement so far. While the only consensus is that sanctions are aimed at changing the behaviour of a target, in fact, international sanctions can also be imposed to constrain actors or send signals. Since the creation of the Union in 1992, the EU has imposed 21 autonomous restrictive measures that are difficult to understand and compare without the proper analytical tools. The application of a tripartite taxonomy of the purpose of sanctions to the cases of the EU sanctions on Belarus, Zimbabwe and Uzbekistan is used to illustrate the differences and to set guidelines for a better understanding of international sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]