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Attention is a limited resource that must be carefully controlled to prevent distraction. Much research has demonstrated that distraction can be prevented by proactively suppressing salient stimuli to prevent them from capturing attention. It has been suggested, however, that prior studies showing evidence of suppression may have used stimuli that were not truly salient. This claim has been difficult to test because there are currently no agreed-upon methods to demonstrate that an object is salient. The current study aims to help resolve this by introducing a new technique to test the role of salience in attentional capture. Low- and high-salience singletons were generated via a manipulation of color contrast. An initial experiment then verified the manipulation of salience using a search task where the color singleton was the target and could only be found via its bottom–up popout. High-salience singletons were found much more easily than low-salience singletons, suggesting that salience powerfully influenced attention when task relevant. A following experiment then used the same stimulus displays but adapted the task so that the singletons were task-irrelevant distractors. Both low- and high-salience singletons were suppressed, suggesting neither was able to capture attention. These results challenge purely stimulus-driven accounts by showing that improving salience only enhances attentional allocation in situations where the object is also task relevant. The results are instead consistent with the signal suppression hypothesis, which predicts that task-irrelevant singletons can be suppressed. Public Significance Statement: Salient stimuli, such as brightly colored objects, are often used to attract attention in everyday life. The current study aimed to understand how salience influences attentional allocation. We found that improving the salience of a stimulus can improve its ability to attract attention, but only when the object is made relevant to the task being performed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although mindfulness, or the self-regulation of attention, has been found beneficial in reducing teacher stress and burnout and in increasing students' cognitive and emotional regulatory skills, no study has explored students' attitudes toward meditation practices in depth. This mixed-methods study reports results from a randomized, controlled trial of a 10-week mindfulness intervention in a public school setting with 28 4th-grade students from lower income and ethnic minority backgrounds. Over the course of the intervention, students were asked to respond to writing and drawing prompts about their feelings and attitudes toward mindfulness. At the end of the intervention, the experimental teacher rated students on how often they had practiced mindfulness breathing during class. Qualitative analysis of journal entries yielded personality traits of students who were receptive or resistant to mindfulness training. Practical strategies for identifying and remediating resistant students and for implementing mindfulness interventions in a school setting are discussed.

There has been a long-lasting debate about whether salient stimuli, such as uniquely colored objects, have the ability to automatically distract us. To resolve this debate, it has been suggested that salient stimuli do attract attention but that they can be suppressed to prevent distraction. Some research supporting this viewpoint has focused on a newly discovered ERP component called the distractor positivity (PD), which is thought to measure an inhibitory attentional process. This collaborative review summarizes previous research relying on this component with a specific emphasis on how the PD has been used to understand the ability to ignore distracting stimuli. In particular, we outline how the PD component has been used to gain theoretical insights about how search strategy and learning can influence distraction. We also review alternative accounts of the cognitive processes indexed by the PD component. Ultimately, we conclude that the PD component is a useful tool for understanding inhibitory processes related to distraction and may prove to be useful in other areas of study related to cognitive control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a lengthy debate about whether salient stimuli have the power to automatically capture attention, even when entirely task irrelevant. Theeuwes (2022) has suggested that an attentional window account could explain why capture is observed in some studies, but not others. According to this account, when search is difficult, participants narrow their attentional window, and this prevents the salient distractor from generating a saliency signal. In turn, this causes the salient distractor to fail to capture attention. In the present commentary, we describe two major problems with this account. First, the attentional window account proposes that attention must be focused so narrowly that featural information from the salient distractor will be filtered prior to saliency computations. However, many previous studies observing no capture provided evidence that featural processing was sufficiently detailed to guide attention toward the target shape. This indicates that the attentional window was sufficiently broad to allow featural processing. Second, the attentional window account proposes that capture should occur more readily in easy search tasks than difficult search tasks. We review previous studies that violate this basic prediction of the attentional window account. A more parsimonious account of the data is that control over feature processing can be exerted proactively to prevent capture, at least under certain conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a longstanding debate as to whether salient stimuli have the power to involuntarily capture attention. As a potential resolution to this debate, the signal suppression hypothesis proposes that salient items generate a bottom–up signal that automatically attracts attention, but that salient items can be suppressed by top–down mechanisms to prevent attentional capture. Despite much support, the signal suppression hypothesis has been challenged on the grounds that many prior studies may have used color singletons with relatively low salience that are too weak to capture attention. The current study addressed this by using previous methods to study suppression but increased the set size to improve the relative salience of the color singletons. To assess whether salient distractors captured attention, electrophysiological markers of attentional allocation (the N2pc component) and suppression (the PD component) were measured. The results provided no evidence of attentional capture, but instead indicated suppression of the highly salient singleton distractors, as indexed by the PD component. This suppression occurred even though a computational model of saliency confirmed that the color singleton was highly salient. Altogether, this supports the signal suppression hypothesis and is inconsistent with stimulus-driven models of attentional capture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A longstanding debate in visual attention research has been whether physically salient objects have an automatic power to capture attention. Recent evidence has supported a hybrid model. According to the signal suppression hypothesis, salient items automatically attract attention but can be proactively suppressed via top-down control to prevent attentional capture. Although much recent evidence has suggested that salient items can be suppressed, many of these studies used color singletons with relatively low salience. It is therefore unknown whether highly salient color singletons can also be suppressed. The current study adapted the probe technique to assess capture by color singletons at large set sizes (10 or 30 items). In four experiments, we observed no evidence that highly salient color singletons captured attention and instead observed evidence that they were suppressed below baseline levels of processing. We did, however, find strong evidence of floor effects in probe report at high set sizes, which can be mitigated by limiting the number of items that are simultaneously probed. Altogether, the results support the signal suppression hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luck et al. (2021) reviewed evidence that observers can learn to suppress attentional capture by salient distractors. Several commentaries were written in response to this review paper, many of which raised important and interesting issues. Here, we respond to these commentaries. Although there has been substantial progress in the attentional capture debate, there are still remaining issues that need to be addressed before the debate is completely resolved. Specifically, we summarize the need for an independent measure of bottom-up salience and better metrics of how attentional control unfolds over time. Ultimately, the field may need a more refined theoretical model of visual attention that distinguishes between attentional priority, attentional orienting, and attentional engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do salient distractors have the power to automatically capture attention? This question has led to a heated debate concerning the role of salience in attentional control. A potential resolution, called the signal suppression hypothesis, has proposed that salient items produce a bottom-up signal that vies for attention, but that salient stimuli can be suppressed via top-down control to prevent the capture of attention. This hypothesis, however, has been criticized on the grounds that the distractors used in initial studies of support were weakly salient. It has been difficult to know how seriously to take this low-salience criticism because assertions about high and low salience were made in the absence of a common (or any) measure of salience. The current study used a recently developed psychophysical technique to compare the salience of distractors from two previous studies at the center of this debate. Surprisingly, we found that the original stimuli criticized as having low salience were, if anything, more salient than stimuli from the later studies that purported to increase salience. Follow-up experiments determined exactly why the original stimuli were more salient and tested whether further improving salience could cause attentional capture as predicted by the low-salience account. Ultimately, these findings challenge purely stimulus-driven accounts of attentional control. Public Significance Statement: This study aimed to understand whether highly salient stimuli have the power to automatically attract attention. Using a new method to measure salience, we found evidence that is inconsistent with theoretical accounts claiming that stimuli of sufficient salience cannot be ignored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schizophrenia is widely thought to involve elevated distractibility, which may reflect a general impairment in top-down inhibitory processes. Schizophrenia also appears to involve increased priming of previously performed actions. Here, we used a highly refined eye-tracking paradigm that makes it possible to concurrently assess distractibility, inhibition, and priming. In both healthy control subjects (HCS, N = 41) and people with schizophrenia (PSZ, N = 46), we found that initial saccades were actually less likely to be directed toward a salient "singleton" distractor than toward less salient distractors, reflecting top-down suppression of the singleton. Remarkably, this oculomotor suppression effect was as strong or stronger in PSZ than in HCS, indicating intact inhibitory control. In addition, saccades were frequently directed to the location of the previous-trial target in both groups, but this priming effect was much stronger in PSZ than in HCS. Indeed, PSZ directed gaze toward the location of the previous-trial target as often as they directed gaze to the location of the current-trial target. These results demonstrate that-at least in the context of visual search-PSZ are no more distractable than HCS and are fully capable of inhibiting salient-but-irrelevant stimuli. However, PSZ do exhibit exaggerated priming, focusing on recently attended locations even when this is not beneficial for goal attainment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers typically distinguish between two mechanisms of attentional selection in vision: overt and covert attention. A commonplace assumption is that overt eye movements are automatically preceded by shifts of covert attention during visual search. Although the N2pc component is a putative index of covert attentional orienting, little is currently known about its relationship with overt eye movements. This is because most previous studies of the N2pc component prohibit overt eye movements. The current study assessed this relationship by concurrently measuring covert attention (via the N2pc) and overt eye movements (via eye tracking). Participants searched displays for a lateralized target stimulus and were allowed to generate overt eye movements during the search. We then assessed whether overt eye movements were preceded by the N2pc component. The results indicated that saccades were preceded by an N2pc component, but only when participants were required to carefully inspect the target stimulus before initiating the eye movement. When participants were allowed to make naturalistic eye movements in service of visual search, there was no evidence of an N2pc component before eye movements. These findings suggest that the N2pc component does not always precede overt eye movements during visual search. Implications for understanding the relationship between covert and overt attention are discussed. The current study assessed the relationship between eye movements and covert attention. We found that the N2pc component—a putative neural index of covert attention—only preceded eye movements under a limited set of conditions, suggesting that not every eye movement is preceded by a shift of covert attention. This finding has important implications regarding the nature of the N2pc component and the relationship between covert and overt attention more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has demonstrated that observers can learn to prevent attentional capture by physically salient stimuli. One critical question is how observers learn to avoid capture, particularly in situations where they receive no direct feedback about attentional performance. One possibility is that individuals have some level of introspective awareness of capture when it occurs. Once capture is detected, participants then adjust performance strategies to avoid subsequent attentional capture. It is currently unclear, however, if observers have any introspective awareness of attentional capture when it occurs. In the current study, participants attempted to locate a target shape and ignore a salient distractor. On half of trials, participants were then asked to classify whether their first eye movement was misdirected to the singleton distractor on that trial. The results demonstrated that participants clearly had some level of introspective awareness of attentional capture: Oculomotor capture effects were much larger on "capture" report trials than on "no capture" report trials. Interestingly, there was no evidence that awareness of oculomotor capture prevented subsequent capture by salient items. Future research is needed to definitively determine whether metacognitive awareness can be used as a training tool to prevent capture. Public Significance Statement: This study demonstrates that observers can introspectively detect eye movements that were misdirected to physically salient distractors, such as uniquely colored shapes. This ability may be important in understanding the mechanisms by which individuals learn to avoid visual distraction by salient items, especially in applied scenarios where observers receive no direct feedback regarding attentional performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For over 25 years, researchers have debated whether physically salient stimuli capture attention in an automatic manner, independent of the observer's goals, or whether the capture of attention depends on the match between a stimulus and the observer's task set. Recent evidence suggests an intermediate position in which salient stimuli automatically produce a priority signal, but the capture of attention can be prevented via an inhibitory mechanism that suppresses the salient stimulus. Here, proponents from multiple sides of the debate describe how their original views have changed in light of recent research, as well as remaining areas of disagreement. These perspectives highlight some emerging areas of consensus and provide new directions for future research on attentional capture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies have demonstrated that salient distractors can be proactively inhibited to prevent attentional capture. Traditional theories frame attentional guidance effects such as this in terms of explicit goals. However, several researchers have recently argued that that unconscious factors – such as the features of attended and ignored items on previous trials (called selection history) – play a stronger role in guiding attention and can overpower explicit goals. The current study assessed whether voluntary inhibition can overpower selection history. We directly compared both forms of top-down control by measuring overt eye movements, which offer an unambiguous measure of which location has won the competition for attention. We repeatedly found that selection history overpowered any effects of voluntary goals, such that observers were unable to avoid fixating a salient distractor of a known color if the target had been presented in that color on the previous trial. Moreover, a salient distractor of a particular color captured gaze even when the observer had voluntarily chosen this color to be the distractor color just moments before. Taken together, these experiments suggest that the ability to inhibit a salient color singleton is primarily a result of recent experience and not a result of explicit goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies have indicated that abrupt onsets have the power to capture attention against our will. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that abrupt onsets can be suppressed, but only when there is a strong incentive to do so. We presented a highly-salient flurry of distracting, irrelevant abrupt onsets immediately prior to each target display. This should incentivize participants to suppress the disruptive onsets (if that is an available strategy) and/or habituate to the abrupt onsets. In Experiment 1, the flurry of onsets was composed of dots. Experiment 2 greatly increased the size of the flashing onsets (10-fold increase in pixels) to make them even more salient and worthy of suppression. Experiment 3 used premasks, so that the search items would be offsets rather than onsets. Experiment 4 created more direct competition between the salient onsets and the search display. Surprisingly, despite the variety of approaches employed specifically to promote suppression of capture by abrupt onsets, we were unable to eliminate, or even noticeably reduce, capture effects. The present data support the hypothesis that the visual system is incapable of suppressing abrupt onsets in diffusely attended regions of visual space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers have long debated how salient-but-irrelevant features guide visual attention. Pure stimulus-driven theories claim that salient stimuli automatically capture attention irrespective of goals, whereas pure goal-driven theories propose that an individual's attentional control settings determine whether salient stimuli capture attention. However, recent studies have suggested a hybrid model in which salient stimuli attract visual attention but can be actively suppressed by top–down attentional mechanisms. Support for this hybrid model has primarily come from ERP studies demonstrating that salient stimuli, which fail to capture attention, also elicit a distractor positivity (PD) component, a putative neural index of suppression. Other support comes from a handful of behavioral studies showing that processing at the salient locations is inhibited compared with other locations. The current study was designed to link the behavioral and neural evidence by combining ERP recordings with an experimental paradigm that provides a behavioral measure of suppression. We found that, when a salient distractor item elicited the PD component, processing at the location of this distractor was suppressed below baseline levels. Furthermore, the magnitude of behavioral suppression and the magnitude of the PD component covaried across participants. These findings provide a crucial connection between the behavioral and neural measures of suppression, which opens the door to using the PD component to assess the timing and neural substrates of the behaviorally observed suppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has revealed that people can suppress salient stimuli that might otherwise capture visual attention. The present study tests between 3 possible mechanisms of visual suppression. According to first-order feature suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of simple feature values. According to second-order feature suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of local discontinuities within a given feature dimension. According to global-salience suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of their dimension-independent salience levels. The current study distinguished among these models by varying the predictability of the singleton color value. If items are suppressed by virtue of salience alone, then it should not matter whether the singleton color is predictable. However, evidence from probe processing and eye movements indicated that suppression is possible only when the color values are predictable. Moreover, the ability to suppress salient items developed gradually as participants gained experience with the feature that defined the salient distractor. These results are consistent with first-order feature suppression models, and are inconsistent with the other models of suppression. In other words, people primarily suppress salient distractors on the basis of their simple features and not on the basis of salience per se. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drivers face frequent distraction on the roadways, but little is known about situations placing them at risk of misallocating visual attention. To investigate this issue, we asked participants to search for a red target embedded within simulated driving scenes (photographs taken from inside a car) in three experiments. Distraction was induced by presenting, via a GPS unit, red or green distractors positioned in an irrelevant location at which the target never appeared. If the salient distractor captures attention, visual search should be slower on distractor-present trials than distractor-absent trials. In Experiment 1, salient distractors yielded no such capture effect. In Experiment 2, we decreased the frequency of the salient distractor from 50% of trials to only 10% or 20% of trials. Capture effects were almost five times larger for the 10% occurrence group than for the 20% occurrence group. In Experiment 3, the amount of available central resources was manipulated by asking participants to either simultaneously monitor or ignore a stream of spoken digits. Capture effects were much larger for the dual-task group than for the single-task group. In summary, these findings identify risk factors for attentional capture in real-world driving scenes: distractor rarity and diversion of attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers are sharply divided regarding whether irrelevant abrupt onsets capture spatial attention. Numerous studies report that they do and a roughly equal number report that they do not. This puzzle has inspired numerous attempts at reconciliation, none gaining general acceptance. The authors propose that abrupt onsets routinely capture attention, but the size of observed capture effects depends critically on how long attention dwells on distractor items which, in turn, depends critically on search difficulty. In a series of spatial cuing experiments, the authors show that irrelevant abrupt onsets produce robust capture effects when visual search is difficult, but not when search is easy. Critically, this effect occurs even when search difficulty varies randomly across trials, preventing any strategic adjustments of the attentional set that could modulate probability of capture by the onset cue. The authors argue that easy visual search provides an insensitive test for stimulus-driven capture by abrupt onsets: even though onsets truly capture attention, the effects of capture can be latent. This observation helps to explain previous failures to find capture by onsets, nearly all of which used an easy visual search. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights from the article: But more recent research suggests that observers learn to reject these salient distractors (e.g., Vatterott & Vecera, [12]) and selectively inhibit those salient items in order to prevent attention capture (called the I signal suppression hypothesis i ; for a review, see Gaspelin & Luck, 2018). Other articles focus on inhibition of nonsalient distractors during visual search (Carlisle & Nitka, 2019; Conci, Deichsel, Müller, & Tölner, 2019; Stilwell & Vecera, 2019; Van Moorselaar, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2019). This likely highlights an ongoing debate in the field about whether attention is guided by explicit goals (i.e., conscious foreknowledge of the upcoming visual scene) or whether attention is guided by implicit learning processes (e.g., automatic priming from the previous trial).

Distractor suppression refers to the ability to filter out distracting and task-irrelevant information. Distractor suppression is essential for survival and considered a key aspect of selective attention. Despite the recent and rapidly evolving literature on distractor suppression, we still know little about how the brain suppresses distracting information. What limits progress is that we lack mutually agreed upon principles of how to study the neural basis of distractor suppression and its manifestation in behavior. Here, we offer ten simple rules that we believe are fundamental when investigating distractor suppression. We provide guidelines on how to design conclusive experiments on distractor suppression (Rules 1–3), discuss different types of distractor suppression that need to be distinguished (Rules 4–6), and provide an overview of models of distractor suppression and considerations of how to evaluate distractor suppression statistically (Rules 7–10). Together, these rules provide a concise and comprehensive synopsis of promising advances in the field of distractor suppression. Following these rules will propel research on distractor suppression in important ways, not only by highlighting prominent issues to both new and more advanced researchers in the field, but also by facilitating communication between sub-disciplines. • Distractor suppression is the ability to filter out irrelevant information. • At present, we know little about how the brain suppresses distraction. • We offer ten rules that are fundamental when investigating distractor suppression. • Following the rules will propel research and foster interaction between disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attention researchers have long debated the roles of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in controlling attention. Theeuwes (2018) has argued that that top-down control is much less common than typically assumed and that a third mechanism-selection history-plays an underappreciated role in guiding visual attention. Although Theeuwes has made a strong case for the importance of selection history, his arguments for a limited role of top-down mechanisms involve conflating the terms "top-down" and "voluntary." Cognitive psychologists typically use the term "top-down" processing to refer to any perceptual phenomenon that is influenced by context, learning, or expectation, which would include selection history. This highlights a broad problem in attention capture research: The terms used to describe attentional control are often poorly defined, and much current debate seems to be related to the meaning of words. To move forward in understanding the actual mechanisms of attentional control, we must agree on what terms such as "top-down" and "bottom-up" actually mean.

ERP experiments generate massive datasets, often containing thousands of values for each participant, even after averaging. The richness of these datasets can be very useful in testing sophisticated hypotheses, but this richness also creates many opportunities to obtain effects that are statistically significant but do not reflect true differences among groups or conditions (bogus effects). The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how common and seemingly innocuous methods for quantifying and analyzing ERP effects can lead to very high rates of significant but bogus effects, with the likelihood of obtaining at least one such bogus effect exceeding 50% in many experiments. We focus on two specific problems: using the grand-averaged data to select the time windows and electrode sites for quantifying component amplitudes and latencies, and using one or more multifactor statistical analyses. Reanalyses of prior data and simulations of typical experimental designs are used to show how these problems can greatly increase the likelihood of significant but bogus results. Several strategies are described for avoiding these problems and for increasing the likelihood that significant effects actually reflect true differences among groups or conditions., (© 2016 Society for Psychophysiological Research.)