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Humans, while not wholly altruistic, will often come together to selflessly support and provide aid to others in need. To date, little attention has been paid to how memory for such positive events in the aftermath of a traumatic event can influence subsequent behavior. The current study examined how the way in which people represent and remember helping events immediately following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing related to their tendency to support Boston-related charities in the following months. People who recalled helping-related events in greater detail reported engaging in more helping behaviors in the following months. The relation between memory narratives and reports of helping behavior six months later has important implications for future work investigating the role of memory-based mechanisms in citizens' decisions to provide aid in times of collective need.

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007), both remembered past and imagined future events rely heavily on episodic memory. An alternative hypothesis is that observed similarities between remembering and imagining reflect the influence of broader factors such as descriptive ability, narrative style, or inhibitory control. We attempted to distinguish between these 2 hypotheses by examining the impact of an episodic specificity induction on memory, imagination, and picture description in young and older adults. In Experiment 1, participants received the specificity induction or a control induction prior to the memory, imagination, and description tasks. Older adults provided fewer internal (i.e., episodic) and more external (i.e., semantic) details than young adults across the 3 tasks irrespective of induction. Critically, however, the specificity induction selectively increased internal but not external details for memory and imagination in both age groups compared with the control induction. By contrast, the induction did not affect internal (or external) details for picture description. Experiment 2 replicated these results in young adults using a different control induction. Our findings point to a dissociation between episodic processes involved in memory and imagination and nonepisodic processes involved in picture description.

Is altruism always morally good, or is the morality of altruism fundamentally shaped by the social opportunity costs that often accompany helping decisions? Across four studies, we reveal that in cases of realistic tradeoffs in social distance for gains in welfare where helping socially distant others necessitates not helping socially closer others with the same resources, helping is deemed as less morally acceptable. Making helping decisions at a cost to socially closer others also negatively affects judgments of relationship quality (Study 2) and in turn, decreases cooperative behavior with the helper (Study 3). Ruling out an alternative explanation of physical distance accounting for the effects in Studies 1 to 3, social distance continued to impact moral acceptability when physical distance across social targets was matched (Study 4). These findings reveal that attempts to decrease biases in helping may have previously unconsidered consequences for moral judgments, relationships, and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imaginative resistance refers to cases in which one's otherwise flexible imaginative capacity is constrained by an unwillingness or inability to imaginatively engage with a given claim. In three studies, we explored which specific imaginative demands engender resistance when imagining morally deviant worlds and whether individual differences in emotion predict the degree of this resistance. In Study 1 (N = 176), participants resisted the notion that harmful actions could be morally acceptable in the world of a narrative regardless of the author's claims about these actions but did not resist imagining that a perpetrator of harm could believe their actions to be morally acceptable. In Study 2 (N = 167) we replicated the findings of Study 1 and showed that imaginative resistance is greatest among participants who experience more negative affect in response to imagining harm and are lower in either trait anxiety or trait psychopathy. In Study 3 (N = 210) we show that this is the case even when the harms assessed include both low-severity (i.e., emotional harm) and high-severity (i.e., killing) cases. Thus, people's moral beliefs constrain their ability to imagine hypothetical moral alternatives, although this ability systematically varies on the basis of stable individual differences in emotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People frequently feel less empathy for and offer less aid to out-groups in need relative to their in-groups. Most attempts aimed at reducing intergroup bias in helping emphasize group-focused cognitions and emotions. However, little is known about how the sensory properties of intergroup episodes informs intergroup decisions. Here we investigate whether episodic simulation (i.e., the ability to imagine events in a specific time and place) (a) increases participants' general willingness to help, and (b) decreases the difference in prosocial intentions and behavior toward in-group versus out-group targets. Experiment 1 revealed that imagining a helping episode significantly increased self-reported intention to help in-group and out-group targets, and eliminated the gap between groups relative to a control manipulation. Path modeling analyses indicated that the effect of episodic simulation was mediated by the vividness of the imagined episode and heightened perspective-taking for the target. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and ruled out reduced encoding of group membership as an explanation for the effect. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the effect of episodic simulation on prosocial intentions was distinct from the effects of imagining people (or contact with them). Experiments 4 and 5 replicated previous experiments with helping behaviors (i.e., writing in a letter of support to the victim of a misfortune; monetary donation to the person in need). These results shed light on a previously unexplored channel of group debasing and conflict reduction. We close by considering implications for future research at the intersection of episodic and intergroup processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are we willing to help others? Recent behavioral work on episodic processes (i.e. the ability to represent an event that is specific in time and place) suggests that imagining and remembering scenes of helping a person in need increases intentions to help. Here, we provide insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms that enhance prosocial intentions via episodic simulation and memory. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants using functional neuroimaging as they imagined and remembered helping episodes, and completed non-episodic control conditions accounting for exposure to the story of need and conceptual priming of helping. Analyses revealed that activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, as well as the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) predicted the effect of conditions on the strength of prosocial intentions. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt activity in the RTPJ, and better isolate the contribution of MTL subsystem to prosocial intentions. The effect of conditions on willingness to help remained even when activity in the RTPJ was disrupted, suggesting that activity in the MTL subsystem may primarily support this prosocial effect. It seems our willingness to help may be guided, in part, by how easily we can construct imagined and remembered helping episodes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagining helping a person in need can facilitate prosocial intentions. Here we investigated how this effect can change with aging. We found that, similar to young adults, older adults were more willing to help a person in need when they imagined helping that person compared to a baseline condition that did not involve helping, but not compared to a conceptual helping control condition. Controlling for heightened emotional concern in older adults revealed an age-related difference in the effect of imagining on willingness to help. While we observed age-related condition effects, we also found that the subjective vividness of scene imagery predicted willingness to help for both age groups. Our findings provide insight into the relations among episodic simulation, healthy aging, emotion, and prosociality. Implications for effects of episodic memory and aging on social decision-making are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prospection and prosociality are hallmarks of our species. Little is known, however, about how our ability to imagine or simulate specific future events contributes to our capacity for prosociality. Here, we investigated this relationship, revealing how the affective response that arises from a simulated prosocial event motivates a willingness to help a person in need. Across two experiments, people reported being more willing to help in specific situations after simulating future helping events that elicited positive (versus negative or neutral) affect. Positive affect increased engagement of theory of mind for the person in need, which in turn informed prosocial responses. Moreover, the subjective experience of scene imagery and theory of mind systematically couple together depending on the affective valence of future simulations, providing new insight into how affective valence guides a prosocial function of episodic simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Episodic simulation, the ability to imagine the self in a specific time and place, can be used to imagine future prosocial events. Recent work on episodic simulation indicates that imagining scenes of helping a person in need increases one's own intent to help. This work, however, leaves open the question of underlying mechanisms. While research on imagination points to the sensory quality of the imagined event as critical to the effect, research on moral cognition suggests that self-referential processing-imagining oneself versus another person-may be a key feature. Across three experiments, we investigated the role of self-referential processing and sensory quality on enhancing prosocial intentions via episodic simulation. The findings suggest that we are willing to help others, in part, because we can vividly imagine ourselves-or someone else-doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has demonstrated commonalities between remembering past events and imagining future events. Behavioral studies have revealed that remembering the past and imagining the future depend on shared cognitive processes, whereas neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have shown that many of the same brain regions are involved in both remembering the past and imagining the future. Here, we review recent cognitive and neuroimaging studies that examine remembering the past and imagining the future in elderly adults. These studies document significant changes in elderly adults' capacities to imagine future events that are correlated with their memory deficits; most strikingly, older adults tend to remember the past and imagine the future with less episodic detail than younger adults. These findings are in line with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis [Schacter and Addis: Phil Trans R Soc B 2007;362:773-786], which holds that past and future events draw on similar information and rely on similar underlying processes, and that episodic memory supports the construction of future events by extracting and recombining stored information into a simulation of a novel event. At the same time, however, recent data indicate that non-episodic factors also contribute to age-related changes in remembering the past and imagining the future. We conclude by considering a number of questions and challenges concerning the interpretation of age-related changes in remembering and imagining, as well as functional implications of this research for everyday concerns of older adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on memory, imagination, and empathy have largely progressed in isolation. Consequently, humans’ empathic tendencies to care about and help other people are considered independent of our ability to remember and imagine events. Despite this theoretical autonomy, work from across psychology, and neuroscience suggests that these cognitive abilities may be linked. In the present paper, I tentatively propose that humans’ ability to vividly imagine specific events (as supported by constructive memory) may facilitate prosocial intentions and behavior. Evidence of a relationship between memory, imagination, and empathy comes from research that shows imagination influences the perceived and actual likelihood an event occurs, improves intergroup relations, and shares a neural basis with memory and empathy. Although many questions remain, this paper outlines a new direction for research that investigates the role of imagination in promoting empathy and prosocial behavior., Psychology

Empathy has long been considered central to living a moral life. However, mounting evidence has shown that people's empathy is often biased toward (i.e., felt more strongly for) others that they are close or similar to, igniting a debate over whether empathy is inherently morally flawed and should be abandoned in efforts to strive toward greater equity. This debate has focused on whether empathy limits the scope of our morality, but little consideration has been given to whether our moral beliefs may be limiting our empathy. Across two studies conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (N = 604), we investigated moral judgments of biased and equitable feelings of empathy. We observed a moral preference for empathy toward socially close over distant others. However, feeling equal empathy for all people is seen as the most morally and socially valuable approach. These findings provide new theoretical insight into the relationship between empathy and morality, and they have implications for navigating toward a more egalitarian future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are we willing to help others? Recent behavioral work on episodic processes (i.e. the ability to represent an event that is specific in time and place) suggests that imagining and remembering scenes of helping a person in need increases intentions to help. Here, we provide insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms that enhance prosocial intentions via episodic simulation and memory. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants using functional neuroimaging as they imagined and remembered helping episodes, and completed non-episodic control conditions accounting for exposure to the story of need and conceptual priming of helping. Analyses revealed that activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, as well as the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) predicted the effect of conditions on the strength of prosocial intentions. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt activity in the RTPJ, and better isolate the contribution of MTL subsystem to prosocial intentions. The effect of conditions on willingness to help remained even when activity in the RTPJ was disrupted, suggesting that activity in the MTL subsystem may primarily support this prosocial effect. It seems our willingness to help may be guided, in part, by how easily we can construct imagined and remembered helping episodes., (© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press.)

Imagining future events and remembering past events rely on a common core network, but several regions within this network--including the hippocampus--show increased activity for imagining future events compared to remembering past events. It remains unclear whether this hippocampal activity reflects processes related to the demands of constructing details retrieved across disparate episodic memories into coherent imaginary events, encoding these events into memory, novelty detection, or some combination of these processes. We manipulated the degree of constructive processing by comparing activity associated with the initial construction of an imagined scenario with the re-construction of an imagined scenario (imagine vs. re-imagine). After accounting for effects of novelty and subsequent memory, we found that a region in the hippocampus was preferentially activated for newly constructed imagined events compared with re-imagined events. Our results suggest that the hippocampus may support several distinct but related processes that are critical for imagining future events, and they also indicate that a particular region within posterior hippocampus may uniquely contribute to the construction of imagined future events., (Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.)