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Background: Busulfan is widely used in conditioning regimens to prepare patients for hematopoietic stem cell transplantation. Therapeutic drug monitoring (TDM) is critical due to large inter- and intra-individual variability in busulfan pharmacokinetics, and the risk of adverse consequences of toxicity including hepatic veno-occlusive disease. Busulfan is most commonly measured by liquid chromatography–mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS), which is not as widely available in clinical laboratories as automated routine clinical chemistry analyzers. The objective was to perform analytical verification of a busulfan immunoassay on the Abbott Alinity c platform. Methods: The MyCare Oncology busulfan immunoassay was configured as a third-party reagent on the Abbott Alinity c. Imprecision, linearity, sample carryover, and onboard stability of reagent studies were evaluated. The performance of the busulfan immunoassay using the Abbott Alinity c was compared to the Beckman Coulter AU480 using sodium heparinized plasma, as well as to LC-MS/MS using lithium heparinized plasma. Results: The imprecision goal of 8% was met, and linearity within the analytical measurement range of 240 to 1700 ng/mL was verified. Sample carryover was negligible, and the reagents were stable onboard for at least 84 days. The busulfan immunoassay correlated well with LC-MS/MS (slope = 0.949, y-intercept = −7.8 ng/mL, r2 = 0.9935) and the Beckman Coulter AU480 (slope = 1.090, y-intercept = −34.5 ng/mL, r2 = 0.9988). Conclusions: This study demonstrated successful analytical verification of a busulfan third-party immunoassay on the Abbott Alinity c platform. The ability to perform TDM of busulfan on a routine clinical chemistry analyzer will positively impact turnaround times to improve patient outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guided by Honig and Hatch's conceptualization of bridging and buffering, we analyzed the first teacher collective bargaining agreements negotiated after the enactment of the Ohio Teacher Evaluation System to understand how state law has shaped provisions for teacher evaluation, compensation, reductions in force (RIF), transfers, and contract renewal. We found surprising variation in provisions across districts. Most notable was how districts defined comparable evaluations in making RIF decisions. Bridging districts provided the greatest protections for the most accomplished teachers, regardless of seniority. In contrast, buffering districts have RIF provisions based on seniority.

This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up this stance, I argue, depends on the choices that one faces (or is likely to face). I close the paper by arguing against the view that there are standing moral reasons against regarding others as epistemically hopeless. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a novel form of pragmatic encroachment: one that makes a difference to the status of emotion rather than the status of belief. I begin by isolating a distinctive standard in terms of which we can evaluate emotion – one sometimes called "subjective fittingness," "epistemic justification," or "warrant." I then show how this standard for emotion could face a kind of pragmatic encroachment importantly similar to the more familiar encroachment on epistemic standards for belief. Encroachment on warranted emotion is a striking proposal that deserves attention. In fact, there are good reasons to think that encroachment on warranted emotion deserves to be considered the default view for those who already accept pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic status of belief. I support this parity claim by arguing for a principle that establishes a limited coordination between the conditions that warrant emotion and the conditions that justify belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the design and ground-based testing of a multiplexed colorimetric solid-phase extraction (MCSPE) platform for the rapid determination of multiple water quality parameters in a simple set of operational steps. Colorimetric solid-phase extraction (C-SPE) is an analytical platform that combines impregnated colorimetric reagents on a solid-phase extraction membrane and diffuse reflectance spectroscopy to quantify trace analytes in water. In extending C-SPE to MC-SPE, a filter holder that incorporates discrete analysis channels and a jig that facilitates the concurrent operation of multiple syringes have been designed, enabling the simultaneous determination of three different measures of water quality. Separate, single-parameter membranes, placed in a readout cartridge create unique, parameter-specific addresses at the exit of each channel. Following sample exposure, the diffuse reflectance spectrum of each address is collected serially and the Kubelka-Munk function is used to quantify each water quality parameter via calibration curves. Performance evaluations of the MC-SPE platform were conducted using sample pH, silver(I), and nickel(II). Determinations of silver(I) (0.05-0.5 ppm) and nickel(II) (1.8-5.0 ppm) follow established C-SPE methods on reversed-phase extraction membranes using 5-(p-dimethylaminobenzylidene)rhodanine and dimethylglyoxime, respectively, as colorimetric reagents. Sample pH (2.5-5.0) is measured using an anion-exchange membrane impregnated with fluorescein. These determinations require ~120 s to complete using a total sample volume of 3.0 mL. The extension of MC-SPE to the determination of a greater number of analytes and its potential application to space and earth-bound monitoring needs are briefly discussed.

In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one's epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to be friendly to my view; it can help them explain why it can be unfitting to hold on to hope and worry in the face of overwhelming evidence, and it can also help them explain the sense in which knowledge that p and hope that –p are in tension with one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]