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Turkish governments and their actions regarding both Israel and the Palestinians have appeared to tilt in favour of one or the other depending on Turkey's security concerns (both political and economic) and a changing international environment nevertheless they have been consistent in two matters: 1) A preference for a two-state solution to the conflict between the two parties; and 2) Insistence that the old city of Jerusalem should not be under Israeli control. Since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey has been perhaps the most outspoken advocate for the Palestinians, especially for those living in the Gaza Strip under the rule of Hamas, even more so than many Arab states, losing its earlier reputation as a mediator. It is a policy that plays well with Erdoğan's base as since the 1970s many Turks have developed sympathy with the situation of the Palestinians and had an increasing interest in matters regarding Jerusalem. In recent years, given Turkey's economic troubles it has shown some determination to repair relations with Israel, but the Israel-Hamas War of 2023 has damaged those ties politically once again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces a Special Issue dedicated to applying international relations theories to Turkish foreign policy. More specifically, it contrasts structural or neo-realist approaches with ideational or constructivist ones, suggests general strengths and shortcomings in each, and briefly suggests how both might apply to TFP. It also introduces the eight substantive articles in the Special Issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional literature on the role of middle powers emphasises the importance of soft power, niche diplomacy and coalition building. This article explores a case of unusual middle power activism with a focus on recent Turkish foreign policy behaviour. It demonstrates how the interaction of domestic politics and external dynamics produced an unusual degree of foreign policy activism, going well beyond conventional middle power behaviour, with the government increasingly employing coercive diplomacy and militaristic methods. We demonstrate that unusual middle power activism in a shifting international order yielded 'populist dividends' to the ruling elite in the short run but led to a 'triple governance crisis' in the economy, politics and foreign policy, with each element feeding into the others in a path-dependent fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 44-day Karabakh War seriously affected the international balances in the Caucasus in terms of security, politics, and economic dimensions. The attitude of international actors during the war was important to define the fate and consequences of the war. Among these international actors, Russia's attitude was of special importance. The policy followed by Russia during and after the 44-day Karabakh War had four main and parallel pillars: The first pillar of Russia's policy was maintaining the status of its traditional ally Armenia. The second pillar was maintaining its mediator role for the resolution of the conflict. The third pillar of the policy pursued by the Kremlin was not harming the strategic partnership relationship with Azerbaijan, which had been specially developed during Vladimir Putin's tenure. The fourth pillar of the policies pursued by Russia was not disrupting the multidimensional profound relationships with Turkey, which had advanced in recent years. The first two dimensions of this policy followed by the Putin Administration during the 2nd Karabakh War represent Russia's conventional Caucasus policy and the last two dimensions embody a policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article scrutinizes relations between economic diplomacy and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) by focusing on the Turkey-UK free trade agreements which came into force in 2021. Accordingly, the article first introduces the concept of economic diplomacy, an important issue as it has been shown that bilateral trade agreements, nowadays preferred by many countries, can be used as a tool of economic diplomacy. The article then discusses the history and development of free trade agreements signed by Turkey, including its long-running experience of economic integration with the European Union. Although Turkey began establishing free trade agreements in the 1990s, it has been concentrating on and accelerating its use since 2000. Based on economic and political reasons underlying the free economic agreements, the reasons why Turkey and the UK have reached such an agreement are summarized. Economic relations between the two countries are then analyzed and the details of the agreement are investigated in the context of the changes that it provides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on Turkey as a rising drone power in the international arena in recent years. In this context, the article will scrutinize the case of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which broke out on September 27, 2020. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, one of the frozen problems in the Caucasus region, was ended in favor of Azerbaijan less than two months later. Turkey took on a game-changing role in the region by supplying its ally Azerbaijan with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for use in the conflict, and significantly contributed to Azerbaijan's victory. Turkey's political, diplomatic, and military contributions to Azerbaijan will likely be discussed on the global agenda for years to come; this study will contribute to the literature on the role and impact of Turkey's military support, especially its drones, on Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh victory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluating Turkey-Russia relations is a dilemma, as the two countries fluctuate between perceptions of mutual historical hostility and strategic partnership. An alternative perspective is needed to get beyond the impasse of this dilemma. The main purpose of this study is to explain the common aspects of the grand strategies of Turkey and Russia within the framework of the pattern and to evaluate the policies of both countries in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus where the interests of both intersect and occasional conflict. We propose that Turkey-Russia relations can best be defined around the concepts of 'smart alignment' and 'flexible competition.' Their bilateral relations cannot be considered black or white in the abstract, but rather take place in the 'gray zone.' Alternative scenarios for the future of bilateral relations are presented in the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how Turkey should adjust its grand strategy under the changing international order. It claims that the international order has undergone a significant transformation that is pushing Turkey to relocate its international position. First, the article examines the characteristic features of the changing dynamics of the international system; it then sheds light on the new aspects of Turkey's changing strategic landscape. By taking into consideration the transformation in Turkish foreign and security policy since the Arab Uprising, the article argues that Turkey needs a basis for determining what is important and what is not, what the primary threats to the nation's interests are, and how best to serve those interests in a way that is attentive to the costs and risks it is willing to bear. Our aim in this article is to describe how Turkey can deal with the new reality of the international system and pursue and protect its important interests by developing a comprehensive grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How compatible is Turkey's grand strategy with the grand strategies of global great powers? This article briefly summarizes principles of Turkish grand strategy, both from a descriptive and normative point of view, and then proceeds to outline and compare the grand strategies of five great powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While there are some observable conflicts between Turkey and the French, Russian, and American proxies in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus, there are no outstanding militarized conflicts between Turkey and the British proxies. China is also positioned against Turkey in several international conflicts including Syria, and the intense persecution of Turkic Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang adds another dimension of latent Chinese-Turkish conflicts. The article provisionally concludes that the Turkish grand strategy seems to be most compatible, or least incompatible, with the British grand strategy, followed by the U.S. grand strategy, among the five permanent members of the UNSC, whereas Turkish and French and especially Russian grand strategies seem particularly incompatible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international system is experiencing profound changes and has taken on an uncertain character as a result. The concept of strategy and its study has closely followed this trend, and new concepts have emerged both to adapt to and theoretically describe the practical changes and challenges it has engendered. This article explores the ill-suited features of mainstream debates and theorizing from a Turkish perspective and suggests that a critical realist analysis of agential strategizing is most useful to addressing the emerging context. It argues that Turkey has a long pursued grand strategy, but new concepts --resilience, protean power, and connectography-- can enhance Turkey's ability to strategize and can enrich the lately emerged vibrant debates exploring Turkey's grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Macron did decide to withdraw French troops from the Sahel last summer, leaving only special forces based in north Mali, he stated that Operation Barkhane will end early in 2022. Nonetheless, Algiers' decision to not allow French military planes to use Algeria's airspace will create a direct impact on the military mission and France's entire 'war on terror in the Sahel. In Algeria, however, bold decisions toward a strategic rapprochement with Turkey were in the making. Even though the new authorities in Algiers were hesitant for such a foreign policy shift, because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the internal political struggle, constitutional and institutional amendments in the aftermath of the peaceful Algerian 2019 Hirak needed to be put in place. However, the tenacious resistance of the Francophile and Arabophone-nationalists anti-Ottoman legacy, the well-off social class, and elite pro-France lobbies in Algiers and Paris held back President Abdelmadjid Tebboune's Administration from improving the relations between Algiers and Ankara. Meanwhile, the ambassadors from both countries have been pushing tirelessly for the success of the strategic rapprochement between these two states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish-African relations have consistently exhibited strong growth since Ankara declared 2005 as 'the year of Africa.' Turkey's growing economic, political, and security involvement in Africa re- flects Ankara's need to establish new markets for its manufactured goods and its defense and armaments industry and present itself as a relevant regional and global actor different from traditional western players on the continent. African countries have been astute in their engagement with Ankara in terms of exercising leverage in the evolving Turkish-African partnership. They seek to attract Turkish foreign direct investment, diversify economic and political partners to reduce dependency and fuel their state-building projects. Ankara's domestic economic woes notwithstanding, Turkey's growing footprint in Africa will likely continue to produce positive results for both sides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, soft power plays an important role in advancing states' foreign policy goals. As one of the world's emerging economic powers, Turkey pays special attention to the development and maintenance of its soft power. This commentary uses a descriptive-analysis approach to address the components of Turkey's soft power in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region in the years 2011- 2020, the second decade of AK Party governance. Turkey's soft power during this time period has mainly targeted and become influential in the Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East and Asia. Although certain events, such as the 2016 failed coup, the Gezi Park protests, the Syrian crisis, fluctuations in the value of the Turkish lira, etc., have somewhat tarnished the country's image, various indicators of Turkey's soft power demonstrate that it has remained strong in the MENA region during the time span of the present research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last five years, Turkish foreign policy in the regional and international arenas has followed a neorealist approach, mostly defensive, by establishing either cooperation or conflict with its allies, based on the dynamics of its domestic politics and the structure of the international system. Due especially to the coup attempt in 2016 and rising tension in Syria sparked by the activities of illegal groups, Turkey has usually followed a security‐oriented foreign policy to ensure national security and strengthen its strategic position within the framework of agreements in the military operations at its southern borders and its uncompromising principles regarding migration. The objective of this study is to analyze why Turkish foreign policy has followed a neorealist policy, by evaluating the bilateral relations with Turkey's core allies, the United States, Russia, and the European Union—ties that have survived at the highest level, even after the coup attempt and the Syrian conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 outbreak has had a huge impact on the global economy and politics. Closures and lockdowns stopped international trade resulting in an economic slowdown. It has changed the daily lives of people and the way business takes place. Politics has also been affected by the pandemic. Discussions about the changing world order have gained a new dimension and momentum. In this article, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in international relations is analyzed. Has COVID-19 triggered a change in the world order? If it has, what are the nature, scope, and content of this change? As a rising regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean region, how has Turkey been affected by this, and how did it respond to the changing situation? Signs of deteriorating world order, declining U.S. leadership, escalating geopolitical competition amongst global powers were in the air before the pandemic. Turkey's adaptation to this new world order pre-dates the pandemic, when it changed its political system, and invested in its security and cohesion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While recent research has started to pay more attention to the role of contact strategies on promoting intergroup harmony between Turkish and Kurdish communities, the effectiveness of a novel form of indirect contact strategy, E‐contact—where participants engage in a cooperative and structured online interaction with an individual from the outgroup—has not yet been tested. Across two studies (NStudy 1 = 110, NStudy 2 = 176), we investigated the effects of E‐contact among Turks on promoting positive attitudes and behavioral tendencies toward Kurds, testing outgroup trust and intergroup anxiety as mediators and incorporating a distinction between lower and higher self‐disclosure conditions. As expected, E‐contact led to more positive outgroup attitudes, as well as greater approach tendencies and decreased avoidance tendencies through increased outgroup trust (Studies 1 and 2) and reduced intergroup anxiety (Study 2). Study 2 also found that E‐contact produced lower perceived interethnic conflict through increased outgroup trust. While both lower and higher personal disclosure conditions provided similar effects in the two studies, E‐contact with heightened self‐disclosure was especially effective at promoting more positive outgroup attitudes and reducing avoidance tendencies. Findings highlight potential benefits of using E‐contact as a prejudice‐reduction strategy in conflict settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Iranian nuclear programme is a controversial issue that has had domestic, regional and international effects. Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology has divided the Middle East region and international community. Turkey has been at the centre of the Iranian nuclear debate and has sought to play a 'mediating role' in this issue. This article will apply a Historical Sociological (HS) framework to analyse Turkey-Iran relations considering the Iranian Nuclear Issue. It will explore the period from 2002 until the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 and will provide an analysis of the historical, domestic and regional/international developments in the nuclear issue and how this has affected Turkish-Iranian relations. By highlighting the continuities and constraints each actor has faced, this article will demonstrate how the interaction of structure versus agency, geographical determinants and historical analysis all help provide a comprehensive understanding of the constraining and enabling factors in Turkish-Iranian relations. By applying Historical Sociology and 'Cuspness' to Turkish-Iranian relations in the Iranian Nuclear Issue, this article provides the reasons of 'how' and 'why' the relationship is complex, and how Turkey and Iran can maintain pragmatic relations yet be constrained by these factors at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exodus of around 5 million people from Syria has evolved into a transnational 'social question', requiring a transnational response. The latest Syrian assault on Idlib in February 2020, creating one of the worst humanitarian crises of this brutal civil war, brought this to the world's attention again. Highlighting the scale of this 'social question' on the eve of a Covid-19 pandemic, it shows that displaced Syrians of Idlib had been trapped between the advancing Syrian regime and Russian troops. In response, Turkey, already hosting almost 3.5 million Syrians and closing its border in 2015 to prevent a further influx, let refugees – Syrians and migrants from other countries – head for the EU. Aiming to cajole the EU into heeding its demands, Turkey linked this to its Syria cause. Once again, the latest crisis showed that Turkey had reached the limit of its capacity to absorb more Syrians. This paper deals with Turkey's response and alternatives for the most relevant stakeholder, the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Turkish faith-based NGOs have been involved in delivering humanitarian aid for two decades, the relations of these organizations with the state have not received adequate scholarly attention. The main purpose of this article is to address this gap by asking what roles NGOs play in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice. Despite the relative isolation of Turkey's administrative structure as a result of a strong state tradition, this paper shows that NGOs attempt to play political roles in Turkish foreign policy. The study relies on an analytical framework derived from constructivism to examine the agenda-setting and information-providing activities of Turkish NGOs between 2004 and 2016. Based on findings from a series of semi-structured interviews with 25 respondents from nine different NGOs and three state institutions, this artilce expands the research agenda on Turkey's foreign aid and shows that NGOs function as knowledge-providers, powerful catalysts for humanitarian aid activities, and influential voices in bringing humanitarian issues to light. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the rigid boundaries in relations between China and Turkey by applying social identity theory to international relations. It evaluates different networks of political alliance and external cultural-ethnic ties as rigid boundaries between the two countries. Turkey-China relations have been shaped by both inter-systemic and inter-state dynamics. Therefore, to show how social context and the permeability of social structure have affected the nature of bilateral relations, this article divides relations into two historical contexts of Cold War and post-Cold War periods. It concludes that it will be hard to go beyond rigid boundaries as long as each side has its own solutions to problems between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than a decade, the states bordering the Eastern Mediterranean Sea have been in disagreement over the delineation of their maritime boundaries. The disagreements concern various parts of the region and create enormous political tension over energy-related activities. Ever since Egypt and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) signed the very first delimitation agreement of the region, without securing Turkey's involvement, Turkey has issued many official statements and carried out energy-related activities in the region. Based on the principle that maritime delimitation should be carried out to reach an equitable solution by taking all the relevant circumstances into account, Turkey has developed a comprehensive legal approach as to the maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and even submitted a map to the UN to demonstrate Turkey's claimed continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) areas. The details of this comprehensive approach should be examined, to identify both the claims of Turkey over the maritime borders and the related legal arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) is one of the largest regional development projects ever implemented in the Middle East. Launched officially in the 1970s to develop the water and land resources of southeastern Turkey, GAP has over time evolved from a predominantly technical, largely state-led and mainly infrastructural and economic development-oriented project into a primarily social, largely market-friendly and chiefly sustainable and human development-oriented project. Parallel to this evolution, GAP has grown more visible in political and public discourses. The implications of the project, for instance, on the ecology and cultural heritages, on the Kurdish Question, and on water issue among Turkey, Syria and Iraq have become clearer. However, despite growing academic and policy interest on GAP, there has been no attempt to provide a literature review on the project. Even more than 40 years after GAP was begun, a bird's eye view of researched and under-researched topics in the literature has not been introduced yet. This article seeks to present a qualitative review of GAP-related literature. In this way, it seeks to constitute an initial step to establish a base for more expansive reviews and to provide guidance to interested and involved researchers, practitioners and policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the rise of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Islam has come to play a more prominent role in public and political spheres in Turkey. This paper draws on ethnographic data gathered in Istanbul and Diyarbakir between 2013 and 2015 to highlight Kurdish attitudes to Islam. Following the electoral success of the AKP amongst Kurds in the general election of 2007, Kurdish actors have sought to incorporate Islamic sensibilities into their political offering in order to appeal to Kurdish constituents. Amid the AKP's recent authoritarian turn and instrumentalization of religion, and the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), many Kurds have sought to redefine their relationship with Islam to clearly demarcate distinctly Kurdish religious and political spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses several article published within issue to explain the changing dynamics of Turkey's military and defense strategy by taking into consideration foreign and security policy practices of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa region.

Turkey's attempted military coup on 15 July 2016 provided an opportunity for China and Turkey to improve cooperative relations. After the military coup, Turkey experienced a severe internal political crisis. Structural contradiction with traditional Western allies forced Turkey to reconsider its allegiances and political positions. Several high-level Chinese delegations to Turkey played an important role in improving Turkey's political stability, economic development and national security. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election as president of Turkey, the strategic coordination between Turkey and China's Belt and Road Initiative and Turkey's Middle Corridor project all accelerated and promoted China–Turkey relations. This is a golden opportunity for China and Turkey to build the strategic cooperation relations that began in 2010. If Turkey can accommodate the core interests of and establish political ties with China, further cooperation between the two countries will not only benefit both, but also have a great impact on regional stability and global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, Turkish policymakers have perceived the possible emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region or an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq as an existential threat to Turkey. However, from 2008 onwards, under the Justice and Development Party government, Turkish foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was gradually desecuritized. In light of Turkey's experience, this paper explores the role of context in desecuritizing foreign policy issues in general and Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG in particular. It argues that the changing civil–military relations in Turkey as well as the country's broader political and economic conjuncture allowed for the desecuritization of Turkey-KRG relations from 2008 onwards. The context also determined what kind of a desecuritization Turkey experienced towards the KRG. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main argument of this paper is that Turkey had close relations with Middle Eastern states during the Atatürk period, which is contrary to the literature that claims the opposite because of Turkey's Western-oriented ideology. The article asks why Turkey as a Western-oriented state sought to have close relations with Middle Eastern states. To answer this question, the article uses discourse analysis focusing on Middle Eastern leaders' visits as represented in Turkish public discourse. Accordingly, it proposes two main answers. Firstly, the paper argues that the new state's relations with Middle Eastern countries played an important role in legitimation of its Westernization projects in the eyes of its citizens. Secondly, the Turkish state marginalized rival political discourses, mainly Islamism, by proving that even Muslim majority countries wanted to imitate modern Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses Turkey’s relations with Libya, especially after the latest ground-breaking and rapid developments that took place in Libya such as Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to invade Tripoli, the signing of two memoranda of understanding between Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the dramatic change in the military situation of the country. It argues that Turkey’s military support changed the positions of many domestic and external actors in Libya by tilting the balance of power in favor of the GNA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper's main objective is to explain the concept of transactionalist foreign policy in detail and to demonstrate how it applies to a real-world case in Turkish foreign policy towards the EU under the AKP rule. We define transactionalism as a foreign policy approach that favours bilateral to multilateral relations, focuses on short-term wins rather than longer-term strategic foresight, adheres to a zero-sum worldview where all gains are relative and reciprocity is absent, rejects value-based policymaking, and does not follow a grand strategy. This paper also provides a new layer to the existing periodisation of AKP's EU policy through framing the EU as 'a foreign policy actor' in Turkey-EU relations. Scholars divide Turkey's EU policy under the AKP government into three broad periods: Europeanisation, selective Europeanisation and De-Europeanisation. We complement this literature by adding another layer of analysis that focuses on Turkey's foreign relations in its broader region, including the EU, and argue that Turkey's relations with the EU were characterised by the zero-problems doctrine during the selective Europeanisation period, and by civilisational competition with the EU during the de-Europeanisation period, and by transactionalism since 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Turkey's venture into Syria to create a safe zone. It mentions about effort to silence and resettle the undesired and unwanted Syrian refugees in Turkey to Northern Syrian territories currently occupied by a confident Syrian Kurdish political movement that had recently helped defeat the Islamic State threat.

Since the coup attempt of 2016, bilateral ties between Ankara and Tehran have witnessed a significant boost. Using and refining Steven David's framework of omni-balancing, which argues that the conduct of foreign policy in Third World settings also takes stock of domestic threats to the regime, this paper explains this emerging rapprochement. The article argues that after 2016, the AKP's foreign policy became increasingly predicated on regime survival, which was also reflected in Ankara-Tehran ties. This rapprochement was strengthened by both countries' intersecting positions on the following issues (1) A mutual pro-Qatar stance in the recent Saudi Arabia-Qatar spat, (2) Mutual opposition to a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and (3) Increasingly troubled relations with the US. Through a careful analysis of Turkish and Persian sources along with official discourses, this paper will expand on these key aspects of these significantly improved bilateral relations between both countries and will conclude with discussion of its durability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With high interdependence, politicization, and unlikely enlargement, alternative options for EU–Turkey relations beg for consideration. This article argues that, first of all, conceptualization of a new model of EU–Turkey relations must thoroughly account for the evolution of the European project away from uniformity and towards more differentiation as a result of both integration and disintegration pressures. Secondly, an extended model of external differentiated integration has a potential to foster new, more dynamic EU–Turkey relations. However, its practical implementation is constrained by a number of challenges and scope conditions related to preferences and interests of key actors, namely EU institutions, member states and Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the evolving relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey following the 2015 refugee crisis. It argues that post-crisis relations have become predominantly functional, measured by strategic EU-Turkey partnership based on interdependence as well as the EU's relative retreat from political membership conditionality. This is particularly demonstrated by the March 2016 EU-Turkey 'refugee deal' whereby functional cooperation deepened amidst material and normative concessions that the EU granted Ankara. The article concludes that although functionalism is set to guide the relations beyond the question of Turkey's EU accession, a future EU-Turkey external differentiated integration arrangement remains uncertain due to pending challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been made of the once brotherly relationship between Syrian President Bashar al Assad and the Turkish President Recep Teyep Erdogan. Indeed, this relationship formed the bedrock of Turkey's much-vaunted move towards the Arab world and its re-engagement with regions on which Ataturk and his successive Kemalist Generals had shut a door. Yet, more than fifteen years after the historic first visits by the Turkish and Syrian leaders to each other's capitals, the Syria-Turkey relationship lies in ruins. Whilst much of the focus of the war in Syria has been on the exaggerated sectarian divide in the Middle East and the great power rivalry between the United States and Russia, a key aspect overlooked is the fundamental relationship between Turkey and Syria. The last two decades of this relationship have been defined by Assad and Erdogan. As Turkey slowly begins to re-engage with Syria one can trace the tumultuous relationship between the two neighbours in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab nationalists and Turkish nationalists have been at daggers drawn over the make up of the border. Syria has never forgotten the land-grab of the Turks in the aftermath of the French exit of the Levant. Furthermore, the diverse set of communities – the Greeks, the Armenians, the Kurds and the Syriacs – that make up the inhabitants of the region still suffer from the effects of the mismanagement of the French exit and what is seen by many of these communities as an illegal annexation by Turks and Arabs. However, under the Syrian Arab Republic the Christians of all denominations including the Armenians and Greeks flourished whilst Turkey forced only one identity upon its once diverse people. This article will argue that the relationship between Syria and Turkey has ebbed and flowed – and this dynamic is rooted in history where successive Turkic dynasties have favoured Syria as their pivot to control the region. Similarly, when Syria became less important, the very foundation of the Turkic and later Turkish influence became weak in the region. The close relationship between Erdogan and Assad overturned more than six decades of animosity, but once Erdogan turned his back to Assad and supported the overthrow of the Syrian government the relationship fell apart. As the end of the war nears, a defining factor to end this war will be how Turkey and Syria reconcile or interact. The Syrian Kurds now seem to be back in Assad's corner as they prefer to be under Damascus' sovereignty then under attack from Ankara across the border. The Kurdish question is of significant value to both Syria and Turkey; it has been a major reason for both countries to be at peace and war. A closer look at the history of these two countries' relationship proves that the Assad-Erdogan relationship has mirrored the history of the two states since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Their future in more than one way is now inter-twined on how they interact with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes regional events in the twenty-first century and identifies Turkey's relations with Arab countries, pointing out the serious deterioration that has occurred in those relations with its bordering Arab neighbors as well as Egypt and Lebanon. The article argues that Turkey's "imperatives of state," as in the case of any other state actor, determine the foreign policy trajectory and consequently its regional and international relations. Turkey has chosen to ally itself with pro-Western regional states, namely Israel and Qatar, but not others, such as Egypt. Creating rivalry and animosity with bordering states is neither conducive to Turkey's long-term relations with those states nor to its ultimate political stability. Its NATO membership exacerbates animosity that would ultimately work against Turkey's regional influence. Consequently, Turkey's imperatives of state ironically stand in the way of achieving its regional ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the Europeanization of Turkey's foreign policy by examining Turkey's mediating role in the Israel–Palestine dispute. The paper assesses whether, to what extent and how the EU shaped Turkey's mediating role in the conflict. It is concluded that Turkish political actors used the EU to justify certain policies and their relations with certain actors, which would otherwise be considered unacceptable. Given its indirect impact on Turkey's mediation, the EU's role in Turkish foreign policy should not be exaggerated. There seems to be no evidence in this case that Turkish foreign policy-makers internalized EU foreign-policy norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) has been in power in Turkey since the November 2002 elections. This era brought about significant changes and transformations in many aspects of state‒society and state‒economy relations. However, as far as the state's management of labour power is considered, the era represented a direct continuity with the post-1980 authoritarian neoliberal restructuring. The party's policies aimed to make the labour market more competitive, flexible, low-waged, precarious and de-unionized. Economic policies in this term also increased the indebtedness of labourers as a result of the detrimental developments in the labour markets for workers. The AKP also did not hesitate to use state power whenever possible in order to suppress workers' discontent and strikes. However, the party also enjoyed a considerable amount of working class support as a result of the 'neoliberal social policy regime' which attempted to alleviate the detrimental effects in the labour market. Against this background, this article attempts to develop a critical appraisal of state‒labour relations and general trends thereof, and make sense of developments in the labour market during the AKP era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy has undergone a structural change since 2002. This shift in Turkey's identity is primarily linked to the ascendancy of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) and its proactive foreign policy towards Turkey's eastern neighbourhood. The change in Turkey's identity and foreign policy is mostly intertwined with the Islamist identity embraced by the AKP, which can be traced back to the National Vision Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi). This article aims to analyse what are said to be 'newly' established preferences in AKP identity and its reflections in Turkey's foreign policy, particularly since 2009/2010. The main argument is that the emergence of this new ideological discourse has had immediate reflections on Turkey's relationship with North Cyprus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's humanitarian and development intervention in Somalia is unusually illuminating as a case study to investigate the relations between emerging and conventional interveners in conflict zones since, in this case, Turkey's intervention carries adequate impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western counterparts. Our starting point is the observation that Turkish and conventional humanitarian and development interveners have struggled to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia. This article investigates what this uncooperative and uncoordinated organisational behaviour means, and we root our investigation in 21 face-to-face interviews with officials working inside the Turkish and conventional intervention in Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire about how they understand and theorise this discordant behaviour. We use a parsimonious analytical framework of trustworthiness that questions the 'ability' and 'integrity' of counterpart organisations to explore the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Our analysis of interview narratives evidences challenges to conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and the protection of the same by North/Western organisations. Our concluding discussion interprets these findings in relation to consequences for the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, and for the utilisation of securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in conflict zones such as Somalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, one of the most popular concepts in Turkish foreign policy has been public diplomacy, which refers to government activities to increase the country's image among foreign societies. While the concept is important, the problem is that a similar emphasis and attention is not given to personal diplomacy, another state practice of modern diplomacy. This article illustrates that personal diplomacy is most effective in crisis periods, when there is dominant leadership, and when the political leader is confident about his/her ability to shape policies. As all these factors exist in Turkish foreign policy today, it is not surprising to see that Ankara increasingly relies on personal diplomacy in its relations with foreign countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on the contents of the Turkish Cypriot Museum of Barbarism and a Greek Cypriot elementary level schoolbook to show how the image of the home, both personal and collective, can be used as an evocative framework for commemorating the conflict on Cyprus. The inherent familiarity of this image, its deep connection to our identities and its ability to evoke feelings of nostalgia and grief, hope and pain, make it a powerful trope around which memories of the many lives lost in the conflict can be constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the first wave of migration from Turkey to North Cyprus (1975–1980), which is largely absent from existing migration literature. Through extensive oral history interviews with influential policy makers, policy implementers and opposition politicians of the period, as well as through in-depth interviews with immigrants, the complexly interwoven socio-economic and political-ideological parameters of this migratory movement is discussed. Thereby the paper endeavours to challenge the dichotomy between voluntary 'labour migrations' characterised by a predominant economic dimension, and 'ethnic migrations', which stand out due to their strong political-ideological dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2017, relations between Greece and Turkey were under severe strain when warships from both sides engaged in a brief standoff near a pair of uninhabited Greek 'islets' in the Aegean, whose sovereignty is disputed by Turkey. Theoretically informed by the literature of foreign policy analysis, we examine how the Greek diplomats, military officers and political analysts interpreted Turkey's behaviour at that particular time. The article considers the following research question: which factors, from a Greek point of view, explain Turkey's foreign policy in the Aegean in January 2017? Our theoretical expectation is that, in the aftermath of the coup attempt in Turkey, Greek diplomats, military officers and political analysts would ascribe domestic calculations into Turkey's activities. We employed Q- methodology to uncover socially shared perspectives on this topic. Based on our findings, we uncovered two viewpoints: (1) Turkey's diachronic strategy in the Aegean and (2) the strongman style. According to the former and most widely shared viewpoint, a consistent 'rationalist' strategy to change the status quo in the Aegean explains Turkey's behaviour. According to the second one, the belief system of Turkey's leadership legitimises the use of force in the conduct of foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the reasons why the U.S. was unable to persuade Turkey to host U.S. troops headed for Iraq. Negotiations over the U.S. use of Turkish territory in aid of the U.S. campaign; Creation of safe heavens that allowed the return of Iraqi Kurds who had fled their country and sought refuge in Turkey and Iran; Public rumors about secret U.S. plans for a Kurdish state.

There have been significant changes in Turkish foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in particular since the 2016 military coup attempt. The changes have resulted in a strong focus on national security, an assertive style in policy implementation, a preference for transaction-based relations, and a quest for more strategic autonomy. Two main arguments are made: First, these features of policy represent both change and continuity when compared with earlier periods in Turkish foreign policy. The novelty under Erdogan is primarily in how the features are combined. Second, the changes do not represent a shift in Turkey's overall international orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]