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This Article is the first to examine the behavior of judges and their law clerks (officially entitled référendaires) at the Court of Justice of the European Union. It identifies a number of serious issues affecting Court performance. First, the Article finds that the Court's high judicial salaries and lack of procedural safe-guards for EU judicial appointments attract political appointees. As a consequence, some judges who are selected are not compe-tent to perform their duties and are dominated by their référen-daires. Moreover, the high turnover rate of EU judges hampers their productivity and increases their dependence on the référen-daires. Using a sample of data hand-collected from LinkedIn, the Article demonstrates that référendaires are drawn from a rela-tively closed social network. There is no open platform for re-cruiting référendaires, and the requirement of French as the working language significantly limits the pool of eligible candi-dates. The inefficiency of the référendaire labor market results in less competition, leading many référendaires to stay longer at the Court. The revolving door between the Court and the European Commission raises serious conflict issues, as the Commission is able to exert influence on the Court from the inside and gain a comparative advantage in litigation. In addition, the Court’s practice of issuing a single, collegial decision encourages free-riding, increases pressures for judges and référendaires to con-form, and suppresses dissent, as illustrated in the Microsoft case. Last but not least, the division of labor between the General Court and the Court of Justice could lead to divergent incentives for judges working at different levels of the Court.

The Supreme Court decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos rejected the two-stage test for dishonesty set out in R v Ghosh and replaced it with a single, objective test which transcends both criminal and civil law. This article asks whether it was correct to create a single test for dishonesty and in doing so, what role will subjectivity now play in the criminal law’s application of what is considered dishonest behaviour. Historically, the civil courts have beset with confusion as to the role of subjectivity in the test for dishonesty in the light of Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan. The author will consider whether lessons can be learned from the civil courts and whether similar problems will trouble criminal law, particularly in the light of criticism of the Ivey test and a preference, by some, for subjectivity to play a greater role in criminal liability for theft and other dishonesty offences.

The South African adversarial system of civil procedure in the High Court owes its origin to that of England. As with all civil procedural systems, the South African system is not stagnant. Its primary sources, namely Acts of Parliament and rules of court, are constantly amended in an attempt to meet the changing needs of society. Court delay and costinefficient procedural mechanisms, however, contribute to public dismay. The High Court, in the exercise of its inherent power to regulate its process, do so with the purpose of enhancing access to justice. The advantage of the system lies in the fact that it is not cast in stone but could, subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, be developed to make it more accessible to the public whilst protecting the public’s fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution and, in this regard, particularly the right to afair trial embedded in sec. 34 of the Constitution. This contribution gives an overview of the system with reference to the court structure, the judiciary, the process in the High Court and its underlying principles, appeals, class actions and alternative civil dispute resolution mechanisms.

The Constitutional Court does not only interpreting the Constitution in judicial review cases. The Courtalso applies legal construction which include constitutional construction and statutory construction. Thisarticle aims to identify this approach in the Court rulings. It also seeks to find conditions that trigger theCourt to venture on discovering the law by applying legal construction.

The UN Security Council's practice of targeted sanctions has resulted in serious limitations on the enjoyment of targeted individuals' human rights. The European Court of Human Rights pronounced on this issue in two instances. In the cases of Nada (Grand Chamber judgment) and al-Dulimi (Chamber judgment) the Court was asked to evaluate the lawfulness of the domestic implementation of sanction measures against the ECHR. Surprisingly, each Chamber opted for a different solution. The present article will discuss these solutions and evaluate them within the broader framework of international law, the Court's jurisprudence, and the conflicting interests involved.

This paper analyses the jurisprudence on the relevance of the commercial context to principles of the law of equity and trusts. We criticise recent UK Supreme Court decisions in the area (chiefly Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners and AIB Group v Mark Redler & Co) and identify a trend of the ‘commercialisation’ of the issues. The cases are placed in comparative context and it is argued that there is an unsatisfactory pattern of judicial reasoning, exhibiting a preference for some degree of unarticulated flexibility in commercial adjudication. But the price of that flexibility is a lack of doctrinal coherence and the development of equitable principles that will apply in, and beyond, the commercial context. We also argue that this trend has important implications for the coming rounds of Supreme Court appointments.

This article examines several topics relating to the administration and governance of courts in democratic societies. It includes a summary of the development of court administration as a profession, highlighting Australia and the United States. The summary includes a discussion of how judges and court administrators must work together and coordinate their efforts in key areas of court administration and management. The article also reviews separation of powers issues, highlighting the problems that emerge in systems in which oversight and administration of the courts is vested in the executive branch or power of government, most commonly in a justice ministry. It reviews the practical advantages of having courts governed and managed through institutional mechanisms within the judicial power rather than the executive power.

Although nowadays most courts publish decisions on the internet, substantial differences exist between European countries regarding such publication. These differences not only pertain to the extent with which judgments are published and anonymised, but also to their metadata, searchability and reusability. This article, written by Marc van Opijnen, Ginevra Peruginelli, Eleni Kefali and Monica Palmirani, contains a synthesis of a comprehensive comparative study on the publication of court decisions within all Member States of the European Union. Specific attention is paid on the legal and policy frameworks governing case law publication, actual practices, data protection issues, Open Data policies as well as the state of play regarding the implementation of the European Case Law Identifier.

The jurisdictional relationship between African states and the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights and between the latter Court and the International Criminal Court is not entirely clear. While the Malabo Protocol (Annex) has borrowed the complementarity principle from the Rome Statute, the Protocol does not indicate that states’ investigations or prosecutions should be genuine, in order to render a case inadmissible. Moreover, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is completely silent on the African Court’s relationship to the International Criminal Court. This chapter first discusses whether the leaving out of the term “genuinely” bears any consequences on the assessment of the quality of the performance of states in respect of investigation and prosecution of international crimes. Next, it considers two alternative scenario’s—one in which the International Criminal Court is hierarchically superior to the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights and one in which both courts cooperate as equal partners. The author concludes that the latter model would be feasible if the International Criminal Court and the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights move towards a “division of labor”.

In 2012 the International Criminal Court (ICC) celebrates its ten-year anniversary since its establishment. It is fair to say that the current age of the Court reflects its present maturity. At the time of writing, the Court has finally rendered its first verdict, by condemning the Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga for the conscription of child soldiers after a rather wobbly trial that took 6 years. In May 2011, the Court faced another unprecedented challenge. Four witnesses transferred from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to testify in the Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui (hereinafter: Katanga) trials, applied for asylum in the Netherlands. This matter, which was not anticipated in the Statute or secondary sources of ICC law, raises issues concerning the cooperation between the ICC, the Netherlands as host state and the DRC, and raises intriguing questions about the interaction of international criminal law and international refugee law.

In the period July–December 2012 both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a number of important rulings that are worth reporting. The present overview discusses four CJEU judgments, two dealing with the rules determining the applicable legislation (Partena ASBL v Les Tartes de Chaumont-Gistoux SA and Format) and two involving benefits aimed at promoting access to employment (Caves Krier and Prete). In addition, the overview covers the notable ECtHR decision judgment in Ramaer and van Willigen v. the Netherlands, which seems to mark the end of a long legal battle that Dutch pensionado's have fought against the introduction of compulsory health insurance in 2006.

After the shift of authority in the dispute settlement of Regional Head Election from Supreme Court to Constitutional Court, and the authority to evaluate the regulations of law of Constitutional Court, there is high public expectation on the role and functions of the Constitutional Court in the dispute settlement in Regional Head Election. This research discusses the problems on, first, the role and functions of Constitutional Court in the establishment of regional government law politics in Indonesia. Second the legal implications of the decision of Constitutional Court on the regional government governance. This research is a normative legal research using case study method. The result of the research concludes that, first, the role and functions of Constitutional Court is very significant, especially through the authority to evaluate the regulations of law and on the dispute settlement governing the regional head election. Second, the decision of Constitutional Court has given legal implication to the regional head election governance, that is the follow-up action by the lawmakers (Government and Legislative) by revising several particular provisions which has been annulled.

Despite the fact that there has only been limited harmonisation of the rules on groups of companies in the EU, the Court of Justice of the European Union has often had to rule on cases involving groups of companies. The Court must make such rulings when considering how to treat groups of companies under Union law, including whether to treat a group as a single enterprise or as several companies. This article analyses the Court’s approach to groups in various areas of Union law with a view to establishing when and under what circumstances a group will be treated as a single enterprise. The Court has also had to consider whether national rules on groups of companies comply with the fundamental Treaty rules on freedom of movement. The latter part of this article analyses how the Court can be expected to examine whether national rules on groups discriminate against or impose restrictions on cross-border groups of companies.

Recently, the existence of Tax Court has increased discussion comparing with the existing State Administrator Court. The independence of Tax Court can be explained that it is the only Court that has particular duty to handle the tax dispute. It has the place to do its juridical function, although at first, as stated in Tax Directorate General eq. Letter of Tax Assessment, the Tax Court was doing the Executive Function only. In term of doing its function, the Tax Court has the independence to make a verdict without decision of any other official office, as clarified in ps. 86 UU No. 14 th. 2002.

On 6 October 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued the final ruling in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (Case C-362/14). In its ruling the Court invalidated the Safe Harbour arrangement, which governs data transfers between the EU and the US. While the decision does not automatically put an end to data transfers from Europe to the United States, it allows each country's national regulators to suspend transfers if the company in the United States does not adequately protect user data. The paper analyses the most important aspects of the judgment: the Court’s definition of the competences of national data protection authorities, the Court’s interpretation of the criteria for ‘adequacy’ under Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC and the reasoning of the Court for the invalidation of the Safe Harbour Agreement. Further, and in line with the findings of the Court, the paper analyses the relationship between state surveillance and data protection and examines the consequences of the Court’s ruling.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a very powerful court compared to other international courts and even national courts of last resort. Observers almost unanimously agree that it is the preliminary references procedure that made the ECJ the powerful court it is today. In this paper, we analyze the determinants that lead national courts to use the procedure. We add to previous studies by constructing a comprehensive panel dataset (1982–2008), including more potentially relevant explanatory variables and by testing for the robustness of previous results. In addition to confirming the relevance of variables previously found significant, we identify a number of additional determinants, including the relevance of agriculture to a country, corporate tax rate, familiarity with EU law, and tenure of democracy.

The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the first-stage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.

Starting from the analysis of the European Court judgment in El-Masri , with an eye to legal reasoning related to the right to the truth, this chapter addresses the innovative reverse path followed by this right, from the well-established case law of Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jose, to the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In July 2009, assisted by the Open Society Justice Initiative, El-Masri lodged a complaint against the Republic of Macedonia with the European Court of Human Rights, seeking compensation for the torture and other cruel. The European Court in El-Masri undoubtedly paid a high tribute to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The innovative and reverse path followed by the right to the truth could mark a new era of positive dialogue and mutual influence between courts, "competing" with each other to afford human rights the highest standards of protection. Keywords: El-Masri ; European court; human rights; innovative reverse path; Inter-American court

This chapter reviews some recent developments in Belgium which have some relevance for the issue of the independence of the judiciary. It discusses recent attempts of recusal in cases in which judges of the highest courts of the land were involved: the Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation. The chapter explains a few words about a recent very high profile case (the Fortis case) which raised doubts about the respect of the government in Belgium for independence of the judiciary. The Constitutional Court had to deal with a request of recusal of one or more of its judges for the first time with its judgment. Very recently, the Court of Cassation also has been confronted with a request of recusal of all, or at least some, of the magistrates of that Court and subsidiary of Mr E.G., the highest magistrate of that Court. Keywords: Belgium; Constitutional Court; Court of Cassation; judiciary

This paper investigates whether the ‘Euro crisis’ has altered the Court of Justice’s legal reasoning in the area of the four freedoms and direct taxation. In view of the tremendous budgetary implications of the Court’s judgments in the area of direct taxation, this paper departs from the hypothesis that the financial crisis could result in the adoption of a more ‘lenient’ approach by the Court towards the Member States’ national budgets (in particular those under financial assistance). By deploying three different indicators, the interpretation and use of the general principles of EU law, the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment, and the number of references for preliminary rulings, this paper concludes that the Court has not been as affected by the financial crisis as initially suspected.

In a considerable number of areas, the European Union has developed its own state-like foreign policy. One important dimension is participation in international legal regimes. This is membership of international organisations and the signing of multilateral conventions. Because of the EU’s internal complexity participation in international legal regimes raises many issues of a constitutional nature. The Court of Justice has repeatedly been asked to scrutinise whether a particular case of participation is in compliance with EU law. In this regard, it is fair to say that the Court of Justice’s greatest concern has been the preservation of the autonomy of the EU legal order and more specifically the autonomous interpretation of EU law by the Court itself. Indeed, the Court has not so far accepted that it must be submitted to the authority of any external (quasi-)judicial structure. The two most prominent examples of international (quasi-)judicial bodies that have had and will continue to have a normative impact on the EU are the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization and the European Court of Human Rights. As is well known the EU is a member of the WTO, while negotiations for accession to the European Convention on Human Rights are ongoing. The underlying questions are: How does, will and should the Court of Justice deal with the decisions of these two (quasi-)judicial bodies? What could be the reasons for the Court of Justice’s concern about the autonomy of the EU legal order?

At an international level, and in particular in the Anglo-American region, there is a long tradition of scientific study of court management. Thus in Australia there has for quite some time been the Australasian Institution of Judicial Administration (AIJA), which concerns itself with every aspect of court administration. In the USA too, research and education in the field of court management has been institutionalized for a long time, in particular by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the related Institute for Court Management (ICM). In Europe, a working group known as the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) deals with issues of court management as part of the activities of the Council of Europe. The fact that court management is also increasingly becoming an important topic in the European area was demonstrated by the establishment, in 2008, of a new professional journal that focuses on court management, the International Journal for Court Administration (IJCA). In Switzerland, the issue of court management was discussed for the first time in the course of the New Public Management (NPM) projects in the cantons, but was often limited to the question of whether to include the courts in the relevant cantonal NPM model. Generally speaking, court management was a matter that was only sporadically raised, such as at a symposium of the Swiss Society of Administrative Sciences (SSAS) in 2003 or more recently in an article in which theses on good court management are formulated. In Switzerland even today there is a general dearth of empirical and other theoretical findings on the mode of operation of the justice system and its interaction with society, or with specific social target groups. For example, it was only in 2009 that the first indications were obtained of how cases in various categories were handled by the highest administrative and social insurance courts in Switzerland. In the fields of criminal and civil justice, no such information is available at all. There is also a lack of empirical principles related to the "self-image of judges", i.e. how judges in Switzerland see themselves. Empirical research into the activities of lay judges also remains in its infancy in Switzerland, whereas in other countries, the relevant principles are available. It has, however, been possible to obtain initial findings on the functioning of the federal courts while evaluating the effectiveness of the new federal justice system.

Article 3 ECHR and expulsion, extradition – Indirect and potential violations – Interim measures – Lowering of threshold – Transformation from civil to social right – Asylum seekers special vulnerable group

This article assesses the structure and operation of the International Criminal Court by setting out a case for the defence of the Court, a case for its prosecution and a verdict. Defenders of the Court suggest it has had a positive impact because: it has accelerated moves away from politics and towards ethics in international relations; it goes a long way towards ending impunity; it is a significant improvement on the previous system of ad hoc tribunals; it has positive spill-over effects onto domestic criminal systems; and because the courage of the prosecutor and trial judges has helped to establish the Court as a force to be reckoned with. Opponents of the Court see it as mired in power politics, too reliant on the United Nations Security Council and on state power to be truly independent; failing to bring peace and perhaps even encouraging conflict; and starting to resemble a neo-colonial project rather than an impartial organ of justice. The verdict on the Court is mixed. It has gone some way to ending impunity and it is certainly an improvement on the ad hoc tribunals. However it is inevitably a political body rather than a purely legal institution, its use as a deterrent is as yet unproven and the expectation that it can bring peace as well as justice is unrealistic.

On 21 October 2008, the Italian Court of Cassation affirmed that Italian courts have jurisdiction over claims for compensation against the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) brought by victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during Germany's occupation of Italy in the Second World War (WWII). A former member of the Hermann Goring Division, Max Josef Milde, has been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in the same proceedings. The Court took the view that when a conflict arises between the customary rule of state immunity from foreign courts and the principle of protection of fundamental human rights, the latter must prevail. According to the Court, this includes the victims’ judicially enforceable right to seek reparation. The author discusses the specificities of the Civitella case and the implications of the Court's reasoning for this, as for future cases. She argues that, notwithstanding the Italian Government's initial reaction and the institution by Germany of proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court's ruling represents a welcome development.

The quality of the administration of justice by courts is being discussed in many countries. The lengthy duration of court proceedings in particular is considered to be a problem in the Netherlands. This article presents the results of a large-scale research project into the opinions of litigant parties concerning the duration of administrative court proceedings in the Netherlands. Research was also carried out into the influence on the duration of court proceedings as a result of both the conduct of litigant parties and the characteristics of district courts. There are a number of factors, in particular the presence of significant backlogs of unfinished cases at the district court that have been proven to be responsible for delaying court proceedings. This provides a starting point for the formulation of several recommendations to speed up court proceedings. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

US organisations supporting women's right to have an abortion are gearing up for a battle over the nomination of a conservative, anti-abortion candidate for a vacancy on the nine member Supreme Court. A change of only one justice on the court could end legal abortions in the United States. President Bush will almost certainly be able to appoint one, two, three, or even four new justices to the court. He has often said that he opposes all forms …

If the High Court can, through judicial review, invalidate earlier decisions of itself and lower courts where they are found to have been made in a procedurally improper way, and if the House of Lords can do the same thing in respect of its decisions, who has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeal? If the answer is, as some might say, "no court can review the procedural work of the Court of Appeal" is that fair? This article gives a critical analysis and opinion on that question.

It is doubtful whether there is a more famous court in Europe than the European Court of Human Rights. The town in which it is located, Strasbourg, has become a rallying cry for disappointed litigants from Iceland to Istanbul. Through its application of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court is seen to have played an important role in the protection of individual freedom in western Europe, and its case-law has ballooned dramatically in recent years. So successful has it been that the Court's jurisdiction is coveted by the newly emerging democracies in eastern and central Europe as a badge of legitimacy and a bulwark against future tyranny. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria already have judges on the Court and representatives from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are expected in the not too distant future. There is even talk of Russian membership. Moves are afoot to rationalise the Court's procedures, and to incorporate its law within the European Community.1Some- time in the next few years it will have a fine new building, designed by Sir Richard Rogers. All the signs are that its jurisprudence will continue to grow at a hectic pace. It is not improbable that the Court will emerge over time as a supreme court of Europe, at least so far as human rights are concerned.

We use NOMINATE (Nominal Three Step Estimation) (Poole and Rosenthal, 1983, 1997) to estimate ideal points for all Supreme Court Justices in Brazil from 2002 to 2012. Based on these estimated preferences we identify the nature of the two main dimensions along which disagreements tend to occur in this Court. These estimates correctly predict over 95% of the votes on constitutional review cases in each of the compositions of the Court which we analyze. The main contribution of the paper is to identify that the main dimension along which preferences align in the Brazilian Supreme Court is for and against the economic interest of the Executive. This is significantly different than the conservative-liberal polarization of the US Supreme Court. Our estimates show that along this dimension the composition of the Court has been clearly favorable to the Executive's economic interests, providing the setting in which the dramatic transformation in institutions and policies that the country has undergone in last two decades could take place. Este trabalho usa o procedimento NOMINATE (Nominal Three-Step Estimation) (Poole and Rosenthal, 1983, 1997) para estimar pontos ideais que representem as preferências de todos os ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal no Brasil de 2002 a 2012. Estas preferências estimadas são usadas para identificar a natureza das duas principais dimensões ao longo das quais discordâncias tendem a se manifestar neste tribunal. Estas estimativas preveem corretamente mais de 95% dos votos em casos de revisão Constitucional (ADINs). O trabalho mostra que a principal dimensão na qual se alinham as preferências diz respeito a questões de interesse econômico do Executivo, refletindo a estrutura das instituições políticas no Brasil. Isto é significativamente diferente da polarização conservador-liberal que se observa na Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos. Os resultados mostram que ao longo desta dimensão a Corte tem sido claramente favorável aos interesses econômicos do Executivo, criando condições propícias para a dramática transformação em instituições e políticas pela qual o Brasil tem passado nas últimas duas décadas.

This article explores the role played by prosecutors during the court stage of criminal proceedings. It complements Peter et al.’s chapter on negotiated case settlements in showing how the power to decide cases is divided between judges and prosecutors when cases are taken to court. Providing information as to, e.g. what influence prosecutors in the 11 study countries have on what evidence is brought to court in “normal” and accelerated court proceedings, this chapter explores the balance of responsibilities in court rooms across Europe.

Read Tuesday, 8th June, 1869, My desire this evening is to present in panorama a few pictures that have already passed before the spectator in the Court of Chancery; then to point out some innate vices in the principles on which the companies so seen were founded; to consider how far the law pretends, and how far it does not, to deal with those disorders; and finally, with considerable self-distrust, to suggest certain legislative remedies, drawn as far as possible from the stores of established principle, and therefore savouring rather of old custom than of innovation.

[Extract] Most lawyers — but I venture to suggest all judges — owe an incalculable intellectual debt to their law teachers. Memories of my days at the Sydney Law School come flooding back: of Dr Currey’s inscrutable mien as he told the marvellous story of English legal history. The disciplined Pat Lane, comfortable in the analytical jurisprudence then so dominant in the constitutional law of the High Court of Australia. The mercurial Frank Hutley, whose unpredictable examination questions on the law of succession were every law student’s nightmare. The busy and elegant Gordon Samuels, instructing us in the late afternoons in the niceties of common law pleading. Little did I think I would share the Bench for a time with Hutley and Samuels. The intrepid David Benjafield, ever cheerful. The painstaking Ross Parsons. Bill Morison, whose lectures on torts were models of clarity. The gentle Ilmar Tammelo who did not live to see his beloved Estonia freed from Russian rule. The incisive Tony Blackshield, still at work in his instruction, then a promising acolyte of Julius Stone. And above all “Big Julie” himself, whose profound influence on the Sydney legal scene cannot be overstated. One distinguished judge, hesitant over the recent burst of creativity in the High Court of Australia, asserted to me recently that he could understand it only by reference to the common approach of the Sydney Justices and the influence upon them — directly or indirectly — of the instruction of Julius Stone concerning the judicial function. I take this occasion to pay tribute to my own law teachers. Instruction in the law never ceases so long as one practises its stern discipline. Every day I continue to be instructed by the passages I read, or which are read to me, from judicial and academic writing. Academic texts are used today in courts as never before. Happily (as I am sure you will agree) scholars do not now need to die in order that their works might be acknowledged in court. That was always to require too large a sacrifice which even those passionate for the law might have felt reluctant to pay. Led by the High Court of Australia, the Australian courts are now much more ready to receive and use academic writing from at home and abroad. Ours is an enormous international legal treasure-house. Computers can retrieve a huge mass of data. They can do so in a matter of minutes and from the far side of the world. Judges usually have little time to reflect languidly upon the problems before them. Often they stumble, by instinct or feeling for the law, upon decisions which point them in the right direction. Scholars, typically, have more time to give thought to where the law is, where it is going and where it has gone wrong. Ceaselessly, I press my inquisitiveness upon the barristers who appear in my court. All too often they are captives to the instruction of their faraway days in law school. The only comparative law they know is English law. That is the law which they have in books on their shelves. Whilst this is truly a wonderful source of information and opinion, we should not be hostage to it. At least since Cook v Cook,1 Australian lawyers should have realised that no English decision binds them and that no English law has more precedential authority than the law of any other land.