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“When a country legalizes active euthanasia, it puts itself on a slippery slope from where it may well go further downward.” If true, this is a forceful argument in the battle of those who try to prevent euthanasia from becoming legal. The force of any slippery-slope argument, however, is by definition limited by its reference to future developments which cannot empirically be sustained. Experience in the Netherlands—where a law regulating active euthanasia was accepted in April 2001—may shed light on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the slippery slope argument in the context of the euthanasia debate. This paper consists of three parts. First, it clarifies the Dutch legislation on euthanasia and explains the cultural context in which it originated. Second, it looks at the argument of the slippery slope. A logical and an empirical version are distinguished, and the latter, though philosophically less interesting, proves to be most relevant in the discussion on euthanasia. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether Dutch experiences in the process of legalizing euthanasia justify the fear for a slippery slope. The conclusion is: Dutch experiences justify some caution. Despite the fact that we live in a global village, and despite the fact that values and norms are widely exchanged within the Western culture, some differences have in the past decades become larger instead of smaller. The discussions on euthanasia and assisted suicide are an example. In this paper, I intend to contribute to the discussion from an inside perspective, i.e., as a participant in a political culture in which active euthanasia is considered more or less accepted, having worked in medical ethics in a clinical setting for most of my career, and being part of a family of practicing physicians and nurses. The paper will concentrate upon one of the arguments used in the current euthanasia debate worldwide: the contention that any form of legalization of voluntary euthanasia will inevitably go from bad to worse, from euthanasia in the case of terminal diseases to assisted suicide under much broader conditions,1 to more requests, to misuse, to nonvoluntary or even involuntary euthanasia and, eventually, to an erosion of the roots of our public morale. I will concentrate on developments in Holland.2 It should be noted from the onset, however, that other countries, which have not or not yet legalized euthanasia, may be worse off than the Netherlands.3 In this paper, I will first clarify the Dutch legislation on euthanasia and comment on the cultural context from which it stems. Second, I will look at the argument of the slippery slope: What does it mean to use the argument? What function does it have in ethics? Thirdly, I will combine the two and look whether Dutch experiences since the legalization process of euthanasia give ground to the fear for a slippery slope.

It is crucial for the quality of care of people with mental retardation that care providers experience their work as meaningful. A complexity, however, is the fact that this care is divided amongst a range of professions. This book addresses issues of meaning (meaning of care and meaning of life) from all the different professional perspectives involved. Such a multidisciplinary approach is unique and has never before been followed. The book contains the results of a series of interviews in which parents of people with mental retardation were asked what they conceive to be meaningful care. The results are placed in relation to experiences and conceptions of professional caregivers. Moreover, the study analyzes the cultural, philosophical, and theological significance of the concept, `meaningful care'. Finally, the book explores the relevance of this concept for practical professions such as medical care, social work, educational psychology, pedagogic counseling, and pastoral care. Scholarly depth is combined with experiential knowledge of professional practice. Hence, this book is an outstanding source of reflection for all those who work professionally with people with mental retardation.

The aim of the present investigation is to provide a comprehensive and critical analysis of the ethics of James M. Gustafson. Gustafson has developed a model of moral reasoning that has become known as “Theocentric Ethics.” It criticizes the anthropocentric character in many historical and contemporary ethics, both theological and philosophical. His normative ethics is based upon four sources: historical Christian beliefs, philosophical methods and principles, the results of modern natural sciences, and human experience broadly conceived. In regard to methodology, his theological ethics is essentially experience-based. But although it rejects revelational claims, a functional equivalent to revelation can be found in the form of religious piety. The result is a worldview that stresses God's sovereignty and the marginal place of mankind in the history of the universe. For normative ethics, theocentrism means that human beings should divert their attention from human well-being as the primary or only object of moral concern to the well-being of the whole of creation. This investigation is critical about a number of epistemological and methodological elements in Theocentric Ethics. Scientific theories about the origin and the end of the universe are shown to have a decisive impact on the content of Gustafson's theology. In his use of scientific theories, Gustafson overlooks the disagreements among scholars in the natural sciences, and on a number of occasions, there seems not to be a sufficient distinction between “facts” and “interpretations.” The use of the historic sources for Christianity—both Scripture and tradition—can be criticized for being highly eclectic. Furthermore, we argue that the concept of an impersonal God who nevertheless “commands” and has moral relevance, is problematic. On the basis of the analysis and critique of Gustafson's Theocentric Ethics, this study gives an outline of some elements of a Reformed theological ethics “after Gustafson.“ This is done on the basis of the Reformed tradition, taking into consideration Troeltsch's integration criterion which says that theological statements may not run counter to established scientific facts. The investigation especially highlights the relation between ethics and worldview. Although Theocentric Ethics is a theistic construal, its elaboration of the relation theology to ethics, of “is” to “ought,” is applicable to the relation between any worldview and ethics. This is based on the realist character of his theology. As theology “says something about how things really and ultimately are,” the relation of theology to ethics can serve as a model for any “is” to “ought” relationship. In agreement with Gustafson, this study argues that applied ethics and ultimate theoretical convictions can be separated only at our peril.