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En el período 1820-1835 el mundo legal Anglo-Americano estaba sumido en la discusión referida a si el common law debía ser abolido y reemplazado por el sistema de codificación de leyes del derecho continental. Durante este tiempo denominado «Controversia de la Codificación» se debatió por primera vez acerca de la cientificidad de ambos sistemas legales. Los que estaban a favor de la codificación, afirmaban que ésta era más científica porque reducía la complejidad de la ley y simplificaba, a la par que dividía, a los principios de las normas jurídicas, permitiendo así su fácil aplicación al comportamiento humano. Los defensores del common law, en cambio, sostenían que este último sistema era el más científico porque permitía a los jueces basarse en la realidad y la razón humana para construir un sistema reconocido no escrito compuesto de principios y normas jurídicas aplicados como vinculantes. Pero debe evitarse toda mirada simplista sobre esta discusión y no tomar tales argumentos como una doble postura doctrinal. En realidad, estos autores debatieron exclusivamente sobre la cientificidad de ambos sistemas jurídicos tanto desde la estrategia discursiva como desde la objetividad argumentativa. En un contexto de Inter discursividad y lucha contra sus oponentes, deben, a toda costa, replicar y convencer a la opinión pública.

Between April 1820 and April 1822, stimulated by the restoration of the Cádiz Constitution, Bentham devoted himself to writing a number of works on the constitutional reform and colonial rule of Spain, which have been sources of a scholarly debate over Bentham's views on colony. By examining those works, this essay aims to supplement the scholarly debate by drawing attention to a thesis that Bentham developed in his criticism and evaluation of the Cádiz Constitution: a thesis concerning the irreconcilable incompatibilities of liberal constitution and colonisation. I focus on Bentham's critical analyses of the Constitution, and indicate that Spain's colonial rule of Ultramaria not only intensified the weaknesses of the Constitution, but also rendered its merits useless, if not harmful, to the public in both hemispheres. Moreover, I explore the tension that Bentham detected between liberal constitutionalism and colonialism. I maintain that, in Bentham's observation, the civil rights granted by the Cádiz Constitution to the Ultramarians stood to facilitate the enlightenment of citizens and the formation of civil society. As a consequence, the delusion of the Spanish ruling few would be exposed, and the Ultramarians' discontent with exploitation by such foreign rulers would sow the seeds of disobedience and resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Bentham’s metaphysics has until recently been unfairly belittled, and that it in fact built on and surpassed that of David Hume, of whom Bentham was both an attentive student and a fierce critic. Bentham’s logic is metaphysically based, multi-levelled, and comprehensive. First, taking Hume’s empiricism as a starting point, Bentham developed the additional mechanism of “reflection” to facilitate a utilitarian pragmatic resolution to Hume’s skepticism. Second, unlike Hume, Bentham aspired to encyclopedic knowledge, especially of the human mind, which he believed allowed him to place his thought on a more solid and broader foundation. Third, whereas Hume focused on the passive understanding, Bentham captured the interaction between understanding and volition. Fourth, in relation to moral approbation, Hume adopted an approach which highlighted benevolence, whereas Bentham sought to reconcile self-preference with benevolence. Fifth, Hume’s common sense moral philosophy pushed him to associate justice with social convention, and helped to make him a conservative. Bentham developed the principle of utility to direct and push forward social reform for a better world.

The main thesis of this article is that Newman’s famous Idea of a University cannot be fully appreciated without the background of the educational programmes popularized in the first half of the 19th century, which have their matrix in the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. The comparison of these two thinkers shows that Newman built his system of education and arrived at its basic principles precisely by refuting the principles of utilitarianism and liberalism of his time. From this perspective, his work on education no longer remains a quiet prose, but can be seen as a moral and cultural struggle over fundamental values.

Can there be rule of law at sea? In extending the traditionally terrene ideal seaward, there are a range of conceptual difficulties. These difficulties are outlined, and a recurring thought pattern is set out that is found in the traditions of thought about the rule of law as protecting members of a community from the abuse of power. Drawing on Jeremy Bentham's scattered remarks about maritime governance, three assumptions underlying this thought pattern, regarding territoriality, community, and protective function, are identified as requiring modification in the maritime context. Achievement of the rule of law at sea is possible, but reflects a number of limitations as compared to its terrene counterpart, limitations related to these three traditional assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jeremy Bentham is usually seen as an anti-realist political thinker, or a proponent of what Bernard Williams has termed 'political moralism'. This article questions that prevalent view and suggests instead that there are good grounds for considering Bentham a political realist. Bentham's political thought has considerable commonalities with that of the sociologist and political realist Max Weber: both agree that politics is a unique domain of human activity defined by its association with power; that consequently, ethical conduct is unavoidably inflected by power in politics; that a commitment to truth in politics can only ever be contingent; and that politics has a set of basic conditions that it would be not only misguided but dangerous to attempt to transcend. Whilst it is often held that Bentham advanced a reductive framework for understanding politics, in fact, his utilitarianism was a far more realistic approach to political ends and means than has generally been acknowledged, and one that contemporary political theory realists would benefit from taking seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent works on political radicalism in the British Isles, the contribution of “philosophic radicalism” is only cursorily mentioned. Indeed, the focus of historiography has moved away from the Westminster circles in which Bentham, Mill and their friends were active and has paid increasing attention to popular movements. In the 1810s and 1820s however, contacts between Benthamites and radical reform groups were numerous. This article draws on Bentham’s collected correspondence for the year 1820. It first explains his position within radical circles in London, before looking at the events of that year under the lens of his letters. Two themes illustrate the close links between radical and utilitarian circles: the fight for the liberty of the press and a shared interest in the liberal revolutions in Spain and Portugal. Bentham’s testimony also highlights the divisions within radical movements.

In terms of the distinction between relationalist and substantialist philosophies of science opened up by American pragmatist thinkers like Dewey and Bentley, Bentham's social ontology is relationalist and anti-substantialist. When the ontology is combined with his emphasis on ordinary language as the basis of social reality, it is seen to have thematic connections to later developments in social science such as social constructionism, social phenomenology, ethnomethodology and, due to its intent to critically question-received fictions, to neo-Marxian and other concerns about objectivation and reification. Also, by re-reading Bentham's theory of fictions as a theory of vernacular language habits, it can be shown to have empirical relevance for the sociology of language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper is providing a comprehensive & comparative study of Utilitarianism & Sarvodaya. Both the ideologies establish as democratic ideologies but there is a big difference between democratic parameters and characteristics of utilitarianism. We found utilitarianism is not a core democratic ideology as this does not follow the very core principles of the common good and the equality of democracy. Comparatively, Sarvodaya is based on equality. Sarvodaya seems to have the welfare of all means as it is basically rooted in Sanskrit term Sarv and Udaya with ‘Gun Sandhi’, which stands for uplift or welfare for all. It shows its bonding with the pure democratic characteristics widely accepted. The founder of utilitarianism is Jeremy Bentham and his brilliant student John Stuart Mill amended and updated this theory. The beginning utilitarianism was initially not related to social morality, but later on, amendments established its relations with social morality. The basic concept of utilitarianism stands for a high level of happiness and pleasure as Bentham believes that human nature is derived only by pleasure and pain. But, here it does not force to distribute this happiness and pleasure equally to everyone. The basic idea here goes with ‘maximum pleasure for maximum people’. If we want to understand the instruments of this maximum pleasure, utilitarianism goes with the result or the consequences of an act rather than the instruments or the good or bad ways it is achieved, so this emphasises end over means. Sarvodaya here means upliftment of all classes of society, And on a bigger scale, it refers to Universal upliftment or progress. It is originally a Upanishadic Idea of ‘Sarve Bhavantu Sukhinah:’ means all sentients being happy and at peace. The Sarvodaya term was first coined by Mahatma Gandhi After reading Ruskin Bond’s ‘unto this last’. After that, it was highlighted as Gandhian socialism. After this Gandhi used this term for his political-philosophical ideas. Later many Gandhian thinkers like Vinoba Bhave, Jai Prakash Narayan embraced “Sarvodya” as a name of Social Movement in Post Independent India. Utilitarianism and Sarvodaya both ideas are emphasising the pleasure/upliftment of humans. But according to comprehensive analysis utilitarianism has an emphasis on the happiness of Maximum numbers, whether Sarvodaya’s object is to work for every person’s happiness in the society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

« 2 + 2 = 4 is a question of language. » Bentham J., Rationale of judicial evidence, London, Hunt & Clarke, 1827, Vol. III, p. 274. « The beginning and the end are never the most interesting [...]. Only the middle is interesting. [...]. We start again from the middle. French people think too much in terms of tree: the tree of knowledge, tree points, alpha and omega, roots and summit. It is the contrary of a blade of grass. Not only grass grows in the middle of things, but it grows itself from the middle. [...] Grass has a line of flight but it has no rooting. We have grass in our head; not a tree: that is the meaning of what thinking is; what is a brain: «a certain nervous system» of grass ». [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Jeremy Bentham put forward a distinctive and original theory of representative democracy which can be helpfully analysed through his concept of the 'deputy'. A deputy, Bentham argued, evoked a specific political relationship between governors and the governed – a relationship that was functionally different to that between the people and a 'representative' or a 'delegate'. Whereas a representative was suggestive of too great a degree of governmental independence from the people and a delegate implied an excessive dependency of governors upon the governed, a deputy for Bentham best described the relationship between the rulers and the ruled that should subsist in a representative democracy. A political form based on deputies, who were to be relatively free to conduct the business of government yet simultaneously accountable to their sovereign electors, was the only way in his eyes to guarantee the promotion of utility in politics and the security of the people from being misruled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1798–1799, Bentham lent his services to Patrick Colquhoun in drafting Bills to regularize the new Thames Police Office and establish a Central Board of Police. While recognizing Colquhoun as the "author of the system," Bentham brought his own utilitarian philosophy to bear on the task, and his arguments shed light on the twin role of licensing in both providing the finance necessary for an expansion of police and in generating a flow of information for use in deterring, detecting, and apprehending criminals. The Police Gazette and the Calendar of Delinquency were to be official publications of the proposed Board of Police, which combined the promulgation of information (thus increasing public knowledge through the understanding) with the effort to mould public opinion (thus influencing the will). Dissemination of facts provided grist to the existing moral sanction's mill and facilitated cooperation between the people and the agents of penal law. In reaction to anxiety about contagion from revolutionary France, Bentham also explicitly seeks to guide and direct public opinion, thus connecting his police writings directly with the esoteric elements of indirect legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: A new species of Lamiaceae, Cyanocephalus glocimarii, of the tribe Ocimeae subtribe Hyptidinae from the state of Tocantins, Brazil, is described, illustrated and its phylogenetic position is provided. Morphologically, this species is unusual in its indumentum of dendroid trichomes (those on the peduncle have branches ending in small gland cells). Its conservation status, as a species at present only known from the type collection, is considered. The taxonomic history of the genus Cyanocephalus is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Photo by Jr Korpa on Unsplash INTRODUCTION The moral authority of advance directives (ADs) is contingent on one of two metaphysical concepts of personhood common in the West. The first tradition originated in the ideas of David Hume and Jeremy Bentham. Hume asserts that the idea of personhood is socially fabricated and that we are nothing more than “bundles” of sensations.”[1] Bentham is famous for developing a utilitarian ethical approach predicated on Hume’s reductionist theory, a person who asserts the morally right act is the one which maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.[2] The second metaphysical tradition, which grants moral authority to ADs, stems from the work of John Locke[3] and John Stuart Mill.[4] Locke conceived of persons as beings that are “rational, concerned, continuing, and self-conscious,”[5] and Mill understood that persons act in a manner that maximizes their holistic goods, not only the sum of their experience of pleasure or pain.[6] In the 1980s, this metaphysical divergence on personhood materialized in a debate between Ronald Dworkin, whose reasoning parallels that of Locke and Mill, and Rebecca Dresser, who employs an approach that comports with that of Hume and Bentham. The debate focused on the real case of an incompetent patient named Margo who developed early-onset Alzheimer’s and, despite her condition, “or maybe somehow because of it,”[7] led a remarkably cheerful life. She no longer identified with the provision in her AD to forgo any life-sustaining medical treatment after she could no longer recognize her loved ones. When she contracted pneumonia, an ethical dilemma emerged as her prior preferences recorded when she was competent conflicted with her contemporary preferences regarding her end-of-life care. Dworkin argues that Margo’s precedent autonomy, i.e., her past ability to govern her future self through a directive and the corresponding obligation of her current self to follow the directive, has moral authority over her current treatment, but Dresser objects, asserting that because Margo is now a “new person”[8] the AD is no longer relevant.[9] In this essay, I argue that precedent autonomy morally authorizes ADs when dementia renders patients medically incompetent because it respects their dignity as persons, not merely pleasure-seeking creatures. The Case: Margo, ‘the Happy Alzheimer’s Patient’ In Margo’s Logo, Dr. Andrew Firlik describes the life of an Alzheimer’s patient he visited frequently while interning in gerontology.[10] Because she developed the disease at a relatively young age, Margo had virtually no physiological problems and lived a “carefree” life consisting of flipping through mystery novels and painting the same image every day during art class.[11] Firlik describes her life almost romantically, commenting that “there is something graceful about the degeneration her mind is undergoing, leaving her carefree, always cheerful.”[12] He does not mention Margo’s early stages of dementia which were perhaps characterized by confusion, anxiety, and existential fear, as is often the case with diseases that erode mental capacity.[13] Still, arguably in her current state Margo is happy and therefore should be given non-invasive treatments, like oral antibiotics, to extend her life if she contracts pneumonia. The argument to adhere to her previous wishes against such life-prolonging treatments may seem cruel. However, Dworkin argues that to ignore her AD would compromise her autonomy and dignity and constitute the greater cruelty. Dworkin contra Dresser Dworkin uses the framework of experiential and critical interests to defend the moral authority of precedent autonomy. Experiential interests roughly parallel Bentham’s conception of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, whereas critical interests are focused on the actions that lend “genuine meaning and coherence to our lives.”[14] Critical interests comport with Locke’s valuing rationality and with Mills’ appreciation of the big picture taken holistically. Dworkin’s conception of personhood emphasizes our pursuit of critical interests over and above our pursuit of experiential interests, indicating that there is a moral superiority to critical interests. For example, parents willingly give up sleep to sustain the critical interest of raising children and athletes endure pain to improve their odds of victory. The pursuit of critical interests lends genuine meaning to our lives. In contrast, a life characterized by the constant pursuit of experiential interests is often meaningless. Dworkin’s dichotomy of interests grounds his view of precedent autonomy because the critical interests encoded in ADs represent the “whole person”[15] - all the relationships, values, and narrative richness of personhood before the onset of late-stage dementia. If we ignore the AD, we disregard the autonomy of Margo’s “whole person” in favor of her immediate preferences. Dworkin’s view of autonomy argues that we should honor Margo’s precedent autonomy even if we believe it conflicts with her best interest because persons have the right to act “out of a distinctive sense of their own character”[16] in writing the narrative of their life. Ignoring her AD would be "an unacceptable form of moral paternalism”[17] because it effectively authors a conclusion to the story of Margo’s life that she explicitly wished to avoid, ignoring the strongest living articulation of her autonomy. Dworkin further argues the moral authority of Margo’s precedent autonomy through the principle of beneficence, the ethical obligation to promote the patient’s welfare.[18] It would be cruel to subject Margo to a chapter of life that she did not want to lead, a life that conflicts with her critical interests, even if she no longer remembers those interests. Thus, to genuinely act in the best interest of the patient, the doctor must adhere to her competent conception of what is best for her “whole person”, not merely her current experiential interests. Dresser argues that when patients with incurable dementia lead enjoyable lives, we should ignore their previous wishes. She raises an epistemic and a moral objection to Dworkin’s argument in favor of precedent autonomy. Her epistemic argument points out that when she wrote the AD, Margo did not know what quality her life would have with dementia, therefore carrying out a preference based on such limited information would not respect autonomy.[19] This argument fails to recognize that individuals make decisions all the time without knowledge of the outcome, so to disregard Margo’s AD because she did not know whether her experiential interests would be fulfilled is unjustifiably paternalistic. Furthermore, Dresser implicitly asserts that if Margo were to know the quality of her life with dementia in advance, she would not have authored the same AD. However, this removes the possibility of Margo autonomously prioritizing her critical interests regardless of the experiential outcomes. Margo likely did know that people can (and often do) lead enjoyable lives with dementia yet she still chose to word the AD to not prolong life once her critical interests could not be satisfied. Dresser’s moral argument against precedent autonomy contends that because Margo can no longer recognize her previous preferences, she is a metaphysically distinct person, and that the AD is therefore not applicable. Dresser claims that the “drastic psychological alteration that has occurred” to Margo has “produce[d] a new person.”[20] This metaphysical assertion carries significant moral weight. If we consider Margo the Alzheimer’s patient to be a distinct individual from the woman who wrote the AD, then executing an AD is akin to sentencing an innocent person to death. However, Dresser’s claim is predicated on the flawed assertion that dramatic psychological changes over time produce an entirely new individual. Children, for example, undergo substantial psychological changes from infancy to adolescence, yet we regard them as continuous individuals.[21]Ultimately, we must consider persons rather than pleasure-seeking subjects to be the locus of autonomous decision making, therefore moral authority is granted to precedent autonomy in cases like Margo’s. Locke’s emphasis on rationality also supports following the AD. Personal identity, in Locke’s view, is meaningfully linked to persistence over time and the ability to rationally self-reflect – abilities which Margo presently lacks. He writes in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “a thinking intelligent Being, … has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.”[22] From this diachronic view of identity, Locke characterizes persons as agents. Margo, in contrast, no longer has these abilities and has lost her sense of personhood and agency. It is only through our ability to self-reflect and project our values onto the current situation that we can be said to be persons. Dresser makes an erroneous metaphysical assertion in saying that the late-stage Alzheimer’s patient is a new person due to “substantial memory loss and other psychological changes.” It is exactly these changes which rob late-stage Alzheimer’s patients of their personhood. Utilitarianism and Advance Directives The two founding figures of Utilitarian ethics, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, agreed that the ‘right’ action is the one which maximizes utility in a given situation, but they disagreed on what sorts of consequences constitute utility. Bentham focused merely on the quantity of pleasures, asserting that the right action would result in the most favorable balance between pleasure and pain.[23] Pursuant to this hedonistic calculus which disregards the quality of pleasure, the right action is to ignore Margo’s AD by providing the life-saving treatment. This would be the most ethical choice according to Bentham because it produces a greater sum of pleasure than her death, regardless of her prior critical interests. Hume’s view of experiences also overvalues pleasure as opposed to cognition. When applied to Margo, who essentially experiences a bundle of sensations without the ability to rationally appreciate them, Hume’s viewpoint would negate the AD vis a vis Bentham’s calculus. Yet, Margo’s AD concerned ranking the characteristics of life that would justify prolonging it which included experiences like remembering one’s narrative and having meaningful relationships with friends and loved ones. These values transcend the immediate sense data that Bentham factors into the utilitarian sum. The philosophies of Hume and Bentham not only impede dignity, and negate autonomy, they impose a limited, outside view on what persons value. Mill criticized Bentham’s approach to utilitarianism because it was indiscriminate in its valuation of different pleasures, implicitly leading to the conclusion that distinctly human pleasures “of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination and of the moral sentiments” are no more valuable than animal pleasures “of mere sensation.”[24] In Mill’s view this degrades the moral status of humans. If our pleasures are no different, then Bentham suggests that our moral status is equivalent to that of animals, which is clearly problematic. In an example of the flaws of utilitarian applications, in a purely quantitative utilitarian calculus, the life of an immortal oyster is more desirable after a certain amount of time than the life of the jovial and accomplished composer, Joseph Hayden.[25] If given the choice, I suspect an overwhelming majority of people would prefer to live as a human being that feels pain over an animal that feels only simple pleasures. Even though human life is often characterized by stress, uncertainty, and vulnerability, the profound heights of the human condition justify life according to Mill’s philosophy. Mill’s utilitarianism focused on the quality rather than the quantity of pleasures, and thus he would argue that following Margo’s AD will result in the outcome with the greatest utility because she is no longer capable of pursuing higher pleasures.[26] Her current existence is characterized only by experiential pleasures, which according to Mill, is not a life worth living.[27] CONCLUSION A consequence of the reductionist view of personhood endorsed by Hume, Bentham, and Dresser is an erroneous moral equivalence between animals and humans and a disregard for human dignity. Dworkin’s framework of critical interests and Mill’s version of Utilitarian ethics support the moral authority of precedent autonomy by defending the narrative quality of life, the important pursuit of higher pleasures, and a dignified characterization of humanity. [1] Hume, D. & P. H. Nidditch (ed.). (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hume posits a distinct ontology of self: “each of us is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions that follow each other enormously quickly and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (Hume, 1978, p.131) [2] Bentham, J. (1789, 1907). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [3] Locke, J. (1948). An essay concerning human understanding, 1690. [4] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [5] Rich, B. A. (1997). Prospective autonomy and critical interests: A narrative defense of the moral authority of advance directives. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 6(2), 138-147. Chicago [6] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [7] Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [8] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [9] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [10] Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [11]Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [12]Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [13] Menzel, P. T., & Steinbock, B. (2013). Advance Directives, Dementia, and Physician‐Assisted Death. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 41(2), 484-500. [14] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [15] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [16] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [17] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [18] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [19] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [20] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [21] Rich, B. A. (1997). Prospective autonomy and critical interests: A narrative defense of the moral authority of advance directives. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 6(2), 138-147. Chicago [22] Locke, J. (1948). An essay concerning human understanding, 1690. [23] Bentham, J. (1789, 1907). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [24] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [26] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [27] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Autonomous machines are moving rapidly from science fiction to science fact. The defining feature of this technology is that it can operate independently of human control. Consequently, society must consider how ‘decisions’ are to be made by autonomous machines. The matter is particularly acute in circumstances where harm is inevitable no matter what course of action is taken. This dilemma has been identified in the context of autonomous vehicles driving under the regulation of domestic law and, there, governments seem to be moving towards a utilitarian solution to inevitable harm. This leads one to question whether utilitarianism should be transposed into the context of autonomous weapons which might soon operate on the battlefield under the gaze of humanitarian law. The argument here is that it should because humanitarian law includes the core principle of ‘proportionality’, which is fundamentally a utilitarian concept – requiring that any gain derived from an attack outweighs the harm caused. However, while human soldiers are always able to come to a view on proportionality, albeit subjective, there is much doubt over how an autonomous weapon might determine what is proportionate. There is a very large gap between our embryonic understanding of utilitarianism in relation to autonomous vehicles manoeuvring around a city on one hand; and what would be required for armed robots patrolling a battlespace on the other. Bridging this gap is fraught with difficulty but perhaps the best starting point is to take Bentham’s expression of utilitarian mechanics and build upon them. With conscious effort and, ideally, collaboration, states could use the process of applying his classic theory to this very modern problem to raise the standard of protection offered to those caught up in conflict.

Michael Quinn's article reveals that Jeremy Bentham strongly endorsed the suggestions of Patrick Colquhoun, a London magistrate, for reducing the myriad of tempting opportunities for crime in large cities like London. However, it was Colquhoun's other, positivist ideas about training the poor to resist these temptations that helped determine crime policy for the next 150 years. This positivist agenda has recently been criticized by environmental criminologists and crime scientists, who have revived Colquhoun's ideas about reducing opportunities for crime and who have advanced the security hypothesis as the explanation for the international drop in crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1810s, Jeremy Bentham wrote a set of texts entitled Not Paul, But Jesus, arguing against the religious authority of St. Paul, and the principle of asceticism he propagated. This paper argues that Bentham's critique of the principle of asceticism was not only or primarily a religious one, but a political one. Bentham objected to the principle of asceticism because it could be used to provide practical and ideological support for tyranny. The principle of asceticism, as a principle which repudiated common pleasures, provided a 'cloak' for tyranny, in giving rulers a reason to establish laws which penetrated further into the everyday activities of men and women (than would have been justified under the principle of utility), and so enabled them to increase their power over their subjects. The principle of asceticism also enabled rulers to create the conditions of fear and social isolation, which encouraged obedience to their laws. The Not Paul texts and related writings can be read as an extended argument against the principle of asceticism as a political principle, and as a defence of common pleasures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este artigo pretende apresentar a partir de Sandel as teses fundamentais do utilitarismo de Bentham destacando seus aspectos vantajosos e seus déficits do ponto de vista moral. O aspecto deficitário do utilitarismo benthamiano diz respeito à violação do indivíduo à medida em que lhe é demandado o sacrifício em prol do bem-estar da maioria; além disso, há também o problema da uniformização dos valores e dos prazeres. No que concerne aos êxitos do utilitarismo sugere-se o descentramento do racionalismo a partir do binômio prazer e dor e, com isso, a ampliação da proteção ética e legal de animais não-racionais, porém sencientes.

O objetivo desse artigo é compreender a diferença entre amoralidade dos sistemas filosóficos de Bentham e John Stuart Mill,bem como provar que há mais espaço para a elaboração de regrasmorais no utilitarismo de Mill, quando comparado ao utilitarismode Bentham. Contudo, para que se entenda como a moral nosistema de Bentham distingue-se da moral no sistema de Mill, énecessário ter uma clara noção da natureza humana dos indivíduosde ambos os autores e dos respectivos princípios de utilidade quederivam destas distintas noções de natureza humana, pois oconceito de moralidade de cada autor decorre das respectivas ideiasde natureza humana e do princípio de utilidade de tais autores.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo formular comparação entre as concepções de ética e direito dos autores Bentham e Kant. A posição assumida neste artigo ressalta que tanto para Kant quanto para Bentham o direito se baseia nos mesmos princípios que fundamentam a ética. No caso de Kant, é o imperativo categórico que fundamenta a ética e o direito e, no caso de Bentham, é o princípio de utilidade. Embora ambos os autores possuam apenas um princípio para fundamentar a ética e o direito, há inúmeras diferenças entre ambos os campos do pensamento, bem como entre as teorias, que se pretende apresentar neste artigo. Entre elas estão a origem epistemológica dos princípios e o que cada um deles prescreve.

The paper examines the changing nature of publicity in the courts, tracing three distinct but interconnected phases of publicity using Jeremy Bentham's theory of open justice and publicity as a framework. The first phase is press coverage, with the news media chronicling the justice system for the general population, most recently including televised court proceedings. The second is the appointment of Courts Information Officers, occurring as early as the 1930s and growing in impact since the 1990s, established to facilitate the relationship between courts and the news media. The third and final phase is the Internet, including social media, resulting in changes to news media models and driving contemporary practices of court-generated media. The paper concludes that, while media and communication practices have changed radically since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the concept of publicity has shifted, Bentham's approach to open justice remains salient for twenty-first-century courts' communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay defends deliberative democracy by reviving a largely forgotten idea of corruption, which I call "cognitive corruption"—the distortion of judgment. I analyze different versions of this idea in the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bentham, and Mill. Historical analysis also helps me rethink orthodox notions of corruption in two ways: I define corruption in terms of public duty rather than public office, and I argue that corruption can be both by and for political parties. In deliberative democracy, citizens can take off their party hats and may be more influenced by the force of the better argument than in party democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing enthusiasm for transparency in public affairs. Discourses idealising the value of transparency are part of the rhetoric of advocates of ‘good governance’. However, there is little discussion of the justifications for transparency. The view that transparency underpins legitimacy is similar to that of the advocates for ‘publicity’ in the initial era of representative government, when transparency (or publicity) became a crucial issue in political debates. This article identifies the intellectual roots of claims for transparency through a retrospective examination of the initial pleas in its favour. It concentrates on Jeremy Bentham, who provided an extended inventory of reasons for publicity. We examine Bentham’s major arguments and how they are currently analysed. We conclude that the virtuous effects of transparency are today qualified by criticisms in scholarly work which emphasise the possible costs and perverse effects of the search for transparency or demonstrate that it may fail to deliver the expected benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, instead of postulating a theory of action, we should think of a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational paradigm in philosophy towards a co-actional one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jeremy Bentham and the Tiddlywinks Player Rules, That Is About That Not Every Liberal Is Liberal Jeremy Bentham is one of the most important Anglo‑Saxon political thinkers, jurists, social reformers and founders of utilitarianism. He also deserves a prominent position in the history of democratic ideas. Bentham not only perceived popular rule as a vehicle for the materialisation of his vision of utilitarian society, but he also gave us a detailed picture of the basic institutions of that form of democracy. In this article the Author suggests that Benthamiam political concept is not liberal but radical and also rooted in continental radical philosophy of French Enlightenment. By rejecting classical liberal ideas such as natural rights, law of nature, social contract and limited government he opened the door for the democratic tyranny of mediocrity justified by the victory of equality over liberty.

Tomando como punto de referencia central la disputa entre los diarios El Constitucional de Popayán y El Constitucional de Cundinamarca (1835-1836), el presente artículo intenta comprender las dificultades de la recepción neogranadina de las doctrinas utilitaristas de Jeremías Bentham. La principal de ellas residiría en la inconmensurabilidad entre los presupuestos lógicos sustancialistas subyacentes en los receptores —no importa si partidarios o impugnadores del utilitarismo—, y la lógica funcionalista que presuponen los planteamientos de Bentham. Los conceptos de substancia y de función se explican recurriendo a un reconocido trabajo de Ernst Cassirer. En su conjunto, las élites criollas, forzadas heterónomamente a la Independencia, estarían básicamente satisfechas con la lógica sustancialista. Solo en virtud de las exigencias derivadas del intercambio con unos interlocutores europeos nuevos, parte de ellas se habría interesado en aprender los códigos utilitaristas, no obstante sin ahondar hasta sus supuestos lógicos funcionalistas.

In general, two theories or school of thoughts had been prevailed in modern moral philosophies until recently. Ethical school of thought of "task-oriented", in which the emphasis is on the nature of the action. At first, this school of thought was considered by Immanuel Kant. Accordingly, doing or will to do every action should be such that become a universal moral law. In contrast, another ethical school of thought known as "utilitarianism ethics" was introduced by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Here, we give priority to those moral actions that can bring the greatest happiness for most people. In three or four recent decades, coinciding with the linguistic and cognitive turn, which has become known as the transition from positivism to post-positivism, another challenge has been raised in discussing philosophy of ethics by Richard Rorty which is related to his claim regarding the requirements of the current multiple world. This claim can make a new relation between morality and human rights. Hence, the main hypothesis of this paper is to clarify the point that Rorty has raised his claim by combining the theory of pragmatism and postmodern Ethics. To prove this hypothesis, this article has been set in two sections, in the first section in order to become familiar with Rorty's creed-breaker thought, the foundations of the philosophy of ethics is discussed. In the second section and under the discussion of ethics based on the rights of human, some of its characteristics will be analyzed. This article has been prepared by a descriptive method through the content analysis of various works of Rorty. Theoretical support for this article is a critical-normative approach. به طور کلی در فلسفه‌های اخلاق مدرن تا این اواخر دو نگره یا مکتب حاکم بوده است. مکتب اخلاق «وظیفه‌گرا»که در آن بر ماهیت کنش تأکید می‌شود. این مکتب ابتدا از سوی ایمانوئل کانت مورد توجه قرار گرفت. بر این اساس، انجام یا خواست هر عمل باید به گونه‌ای باشد که به یک قانون اخلاقی جهانشمول تبدیل شود. در مقابل مکتب اخلاقی دیگری از سوی جرمی بنتهام و جان استوارت میل با عنوان«اخلاق فایده‌گرا» مطرح شد. در اینجا ما آن کنش‌های اخلاقی را در اولویت قرار می‌دهیم که بتواند بیشترین خوشبختی را برای بیشترین مردم به همراه آورد. سه چهار دهة اخیر و همزمان با چرخش زبانی و معرفتی که تحت عنوان گذار از اثبات‌گرایی به فرااثبات‌گرایی مشهور شده، چالش دیگری در بحث فلسفة اخلاق از جانب ریچارد رورتی، مطرح شده که به ادعای وی مبتنی بر استلزامات جهان متکثر کنونی است. این دعوی می‌تواند نسبت جدیدی میان اخلاق و حقوق بشر ایجاد کند. از این رو مفروضة اصلی مقالة حاضر این است که رورتی این ادعا را با ترکیب نظریة پراگماتیسم و اصل رخدادی بودن معرفت و اخلاق پسامدرن مطرح کرده است. به منظور اثبات فرضیه، مقاله در دو بخش تنظیم شده است؛ در بخش نخست به منظور آشنایی با اندیشة آیین‌شکن رورتی، بنیادهای فلسفة اخلاق به بحث گذاشته می‌شود. در بخش دوم و ذیل بحث اخلاق مبتنی بر حقوق انسانی، برخی ویژگی‌های آن مورد واکاوی قرار خواهد گرفت. .مقالة حاضر به روش توصیفی و با تحلیل محتوایی آثار مختلف رورتی به نگارش در آمده است. پشتوانة نظری مقاله رهیافت انتقادی - هنجاری است.

Schumpeter’s highly influential theory of democracy, developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, is less a market-based theory of party competition than it is a theory of strong leadership, modeled after generalship. As such, it is a weak foundation for rebuilding a democratic theory of party politics. Moreover, Schumpeter’s demolition of the “Classical Doctrine of Democracy” knocks down a straw-man theory: a hybrid of Bentham’s utilitarianism and Rousseau’s communitarianism that few contemporary theorists of democracy would be willing to defend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Jeremy Bentham’s treatment of taste in his essays on sexuality, in the context of the historical development of the idea of taste as a singular practice with a broadly social character. My analysis of Bentham’s comments on taste in these essays also engages with Bentham’s criticisms of David Hume’s writing on social standards of taste. Bentham’s essays on sexuality enable us to understand why he condemns Hume’s critical, and avowedly unprejudiced, analysis of good and bad tastes, with as much vehemence as he does the anti-democratic attitudes of ‘aristocratical’ taste. In his essays on sexuality, Bentham defines taste as a disposition to derive pleasure, which assumes meaning in a social context where human beings transact with one another to secure and increase their enjoyment. By this definition, judgements on good and bad tastes are aspects of an anti-social practice that exerts a negative influence on what Bentham calls ‘an uncontrolled choice’ that links pleasure to utility. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The purpose of this article is to present an argument supporting the view that the ideology driving the notion of New Public Management (NPM) is not a new or recent aspect of public sector financial reform. Rather, back in the early nineteenth century, significant public discussions were exploring the pros and cons of various financial reforms based on this ideology. The research approach taken in this study is based on a semi-fictitious conversation created between key early nineteenth century public commentators, Sir Henry Parnell and Sir Samuel Bentham. The conversation is constructed through a reflection of the key themes and perspectives presented in Sir Henry Parnell’s pamphlet ‘On financial reform’, first edition published in 1830, and Sir Samuel Bentham’s 1830 letter in response titled ‘Financial reform scrutinized’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a contribution to both rural theory and a geography of rural disability, this paper tackles the idea of the ‘rural panopticon’. Inspired by empirical research on mental ill-health in the Scottish Highlands, the authors specify certain workings of the rural panopticon, stressing interconnections between visibility, observation, surveillance, chatter and interiorised senses of self-disciplining (particularly for those with fragile mental health). There are suggestions that Bentham regarded his institutional brain-child, the Panopticon, as most logically and properly an urban phenomena, even calling it ‘Panopticon Town’, but there is a supplementary argument that identifies a rural vision – of a virtuous, self-regulating farming community – present in the margins of his Panopticon thinking. Through the figure of the ‘glass palace’ in the countryside, emphasising the pervasive watching, judging and censuring of conduct, a further link is made from Bentham's Panopticon to the rural panopticon. The paper explores this link both textually and though the Highlands case study, concluding by examining Foucault's dual attention to both Bentham's Panopticon and a rural colony for delinquent boys, Mettray, as twin exemplars of ‘panopticism’ in the disciplining of troublesome and troubled populations (those with disabilities included). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on unveiling the underlying conceptions required to elaborate a concept such as indirect legislation, and on possible methods of distinguishing it from direct legislation. Three elements will be put to the test to analyse whether they could be used as distinguishing criteria. Firstly, indirect legislation – like contemporary forms of indirect means to influence behaviours, such as the famous nudges of Thaler and Sunstein – relies heavily on an accurate and complete account of human nature. However, so does direct legislation. Having human psychology as a foundation for legislation leads to several epistemic and evidential issues. Secondly, temporality seems initially to be a likely candidate for the sought for criterion: direct legislation, through punishment, applies after the offence, whereas indirect legislation applies before the offence, precisely in order to prevent it. However, I will show that this understanding needs to be revised. Thirdly, the solution to the difficulty might lie in resolving the issue of what is really the target of influence: what is it that indirect means attempt to modify. At the end of this paper, I will show that the difficulties faced both by Bentham and by contemporary nudge theory seem to imply that a complete re-evaluation of indirect means to influence behaviour is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The goal of this paper is to locate indirect legislation within Bentham’s art of legislation, and to distinguish it, as far as possible, from direct legislation. Along the way, some parallels are drawn between indirect legislation on the one hand, and the Nudge theory of Thaler and Sunstein on the other. It will be argued that many expedients categorized by Bentham as indirect legislation are simultaneously exercises of direct legislation. Another set of indirect expedients act on knowledge, and involve efforts to eliminate asymmetries of information between potential offender and potential victim by providing official standards and disseminating a plethora of factual information. Other forms of indirect legislation threaten the coherence of Bentham’s theory of law, firstly by regarding all government actions as exercises in legislation, and secondly by turning the formers of public opinion into legislators. Insofar as some forms of indirect legislation operate by sleight of hand, they conflict with Bentham’s commitment to transparency in the exercise of public power, reflecting a tension between reality and appearance which runs through his thought. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper critically analyses current depictions of prevention and tries to offer a new theoretical reflection on the concept by reconstructing it on the basis of Jeremy Bentham’s writings on indirect legislation. It is my aim not only to explore Bentham’s concept of indirect legislation as an outstanding example of enlightened social/public policy, but also to show to what extent his thoughts might be a fruitful contribution to a necessary reconceptualization of current conceptions of prevention, which are heavily criticized by many scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Bentham's thought cannot be reduced to the usual oppositions between ‘natural freedom’ and government interference. For Bentham, freedom in a political society is determined by the existence of a legal system that creates obligations for some people and rights for others. The government's task does not directly consist in respecting a sacred natural right, but aims at producing the ‘arrangements’ that are to direct the interests of the greatest number towards beneficial goals for the community as a whole. The legislator is to know, form and guide the individual interests. For this purpose, he has to summon public opinion in order to control individual action. On this point, we should reiterate, contrary to what Michel Foucault contended, that the main form of power in modern society is not exerted by a central state, but by each individual on others. That is the meaning of a very important idea in Bentham's theory, which appears in his writings on indirect legislation under the metaphor of the ‘invisible chain’. The habit of watching and judging others in the permanent Public Opinion Tribunal is the best way to learn self-discipline. Bentham's ideal is the self-government of individuals by the calculation of pleasures and pains. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The debates over Sunstein and Thaler’sNudgeoppose libertarianism and paternalism, or defend the authors’ proposed manipulation of individuals’ ‘choice architectures’ as a consistent system of libertarian paternalism. My essay looks beyond the terms of this debate and revisits Bentham’s ‘Indirect Legislation’ in order to excavate the issues raised by the deployment of technologies of behavioural economics in schemes of government. On the one hand, nudging is nothing other than a mild and carefully considered mode of indirect legislation, and the authors are right to join Bentham in pointing out that the landscape they seek to improve is always with us; we are always already governed and governing others, and we might as well govern and be governed better than we do/are. On the other hand, nudge-like innovations reveal the extent to which Bentham’s insights have been captured by a disciplinary orientation that removes its subjects from political space. Put differently, the issue with this kind of government is not that it interferes with our liberty so much as that it presumes our lack of political orientation and efficacy. Bentham’s liberal subjects inhabit a public and even republican space that Sunstein and Thaler’s neo-liberal subjects have long since abandoned. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Utilitarianism has been one of the biggest streams in ethics since a long time ago. Prior to Mill’s activity as its spokesman (Mill 1833, 1838, 1861), it is said that Jeremy Bentham initially set forth the doctrine. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship of these three thinkers, Hume, Bentham, and Mill, in the context of utilitarianism. Through discussion, we shall figure out how and why utilitarianism is trustworthy.

This paper presents a study of a strong desert dust episode over the Iberian Peninsula, and its effect on the spectral ultraviolet (UV) irradiance in Granada, Spain. Remote sensing measurements, forecast models, and synoptic analysis are used to identify a Saharan desert dust outbreak that affected the Iberian Peninsula starting 20 July 2009. Additionally, a Bentham DMc150 spectroradiometer is employed to obtain global, direct and diffuse spectral UV irradiances every 15 minutes in Granada. The desert dust caused a large attenuation of the direct UV irradiance (up to 55%), while the diffuse UV irradiance increased up to 40% at 400 nm. The UVSPEC/LibRadtran radiative transfer model is used to study the spectral dependence of the experimental UV irradiance ratios (ratios of spectral irradiance for the day with the highest aerosol load to that measured in days with low–moderate load). The spectral increase or decrease of the UV direct irradiance ratios depends on a new parameter: a threshold wavelength. The spectral dependence of the UV diffuse irradiance ratio can be explained because under the influence of the intense dust outbreak, the Mie scattering by aerosols at shorter wavelengths is stronger than the Rayleigh scattering by gases. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the aerosol absorption properties shows a substantial attenuation of UV spectral irradiance with a weak spectral dependence.

The paper highlights clashes between different conceptions of right, law and justice crystalizing in the French Declaration of Human and Civic Rights from 1789 and the criticisms it aroused. Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) and Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762) are discussed as important predecessors. The philosophical conceptions of law, justice and right stated by Hobbes and Rousseau and in the Declaration will be discussed in connection with two seminal criticisms. By excluding women from politics, Olympe de Gouge objected, the Declaration contradicted the universal understanding of human rights. Jeremy Bentham protested against the Declaration’s core idea of inalienable human rights.

El presente texto cuestiona el utilitarismo de Jeremy Bentham como fundamento de la teoría marginalista walrasiana. La problemática se aborda a través de un análisis comparativo del pensamiento de Jeremy Bentham y de Leon Walras en tres áreas centrales: sus visiones de la sociedad y el objetivo social, sus aproximaciones teóricas y metodológicas en relación directa con sus respectivas teorías de la sociedad, y el lugar del principio de utilidad en el marco de las teorías generales de sociedad. El escrito contribuye a un debate vigente sobre los fundamentos filosóficos de la teoría de la elección racional y a deshomogenizar el pensamiento de los padres del marginalismo.

Jeremy Bentham is best known as the founding father of utilitarianism, a moral philosophy that values ‘happiness’ more than all other goals in life. According to this creed, policies should be directed at ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. Besides formulating this general principle, Bentham wrote about several specific topics including the death penalty, which he passionately opposed. He did so, however, without applying his own utilitarian method. In this article the relationship between death penalty and happiness is studied empirically. Average happiness of citizens is compared in states with and without death penalty. Comparisons are made across 127 nation states in the early 2000s and among 47 federal states within the US over the years 1970-2000. The results show that Bentham, from the perspective of his own ethical philosophy, was too negative about the death penalty. It hardly undermines the happiness of nation states and it does not undermine the happiness of American states at all. If one opposes the death penalty, it should be done for non-utilititarian reasons.

Propaganda and surveillance are pervasive in contemporary society. Extensive literatures have developed around each. George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four is an important point of reference in both literatures. Orwell takes both propaganda and surveillance to extreme limits: total surveillance and total propaganda. Writing them large he brings important aspects of each into sharp relief, which is why his novel has the iconic status that it does for theorists in both literatures. However Nineteen Eighty-Four is of interest not just for its potential contribution to theorizing about propaganda or about surveillance. Propaganda and surveillance in the novel are not just accidentally related but essentially linked. I show how they work not just individually but in tandem in Orwell’s text, playing complementary roles in an absurd project of total social control directed not just at behaviour but also thought. Relating propaganda and surveillance in a sustained and systematic reading of the novel reveals it to be an even richer resource for theorizing about either surveillance or propaganda than it is when read, as it typically is, with an emphasis on one or the other. Additionally, from a literary perspective this reading opens up what I believe is a fresh perspective on the novel and makes it more inviting for a thoughtful and rewarding reread.