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Right from the beginning of the history of architecture, humanity's search for enclosure has always, in some respect, been in thrall to various guises of technology and the machine. Los Angeles architect Wes Jones has always been fascinated with technological forms, articulations and the philosophy of the machine. In a wide‐ranging article, he describes some of the key ideas that have influenced him and his work over the years, illustrated with some of the work from his two practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main problem in making sense of Mitsein as an aspect of Dasein in Being and Time concerns the sense in which individual Dasein is an ‘I’, given that it can be either an ‘anyone-self’ or an ‘authentic self’. Though it is clear that the anyone-self relates directly to das Man, the relation of the authentic self to others is debatable. In this paper, I reexamine the relations between self and others by making sense of the referent of each mode of selfhood, with special attention to the problem of explaining the relations between the two. The problem, I claim, can be solved by bringing into relief a certain conception of mereology (theory of parthood relations) that underlies Heidegger’s arguments. As I will demonstrate, Heidegger uses a mereological terminology that appropriates Husserl’s logic of parts and wholes from the Logical Investigations. In view of this, I suggest understanding individual Dasein, both qua anyone-self and qua authentic self, as a moment, i.e. a dependent part of an open-ended whole. The apparent gap between anyone-self and authentic self can be better understood as a shift of focus between two different aspects of being the same type of dependent part of a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In my paper, I give an analytical commentary on Vasily Sesemann’s review of Martin Heidegger's treatise Being and Time (1927) published in the journal entitled The Way in 1928. The aim of this commentary is to evaluate the adequacy of Sesemann’s perception of Heidegger’s thought and the acceptability of his review for today’s reception of the Heideggerian ontological project. In my text, I state that Sesemann accurately fixes the transcendent essence of Heidegger’s ontological investigation, its basic theme and the main stages of its explication. In this regard, the Sesemann’s evaluation of the project of fundamental ontology in Heidegger is much closer to the very idea of this project in comparison to the evaluations of it given by both Edmund Husserl and Nicolai Hartmann. Sesemann also offered several successful or - at least - original translations of Heideggerian terms into Russian. Since he understands the incompleteness of the project, the results of which were presented in the initial divisions of Being and Time, Sesemann remains very far from being able to provide a final judgement about it. And yet, he points out the key achievements of Heidegger: the special significance of the differentiation of the ways of being of Dasein and the inner-worldly entities, emphasis of care-structure, which allows to grasp Dasein in its integrity and systemic essence of Heidegger’s work. I also acknowledge that although the interpretation proposed by Sesemann contains some weaknesses, f.i., the interpretation of Dasein as being-awareness and the neo-Kantian understanding of the systematic essence of the ontology of Heidegger, the review written by Vasily Sesemann is highly keen and may be valid for reception of Heideggerian philosophy up to nowadays.

The problem of 'transcendence'/'transcendental'/ 'transcendent' runs throughout Heidegger's Being and Time , and it is central to many of its core concerns. The confusion about the different meanings of using the same words in the history of philosophy from Kant to Heidegger causes not only problems in understanding but also problems in the translation of the philosophical classics, especially in a non-Indo-European language such as Chinese. Through examination of Kant's conception of the 'transcendental' and a critical textual analysis of Heidegger's reinterpretation of 'transcendence' as a temporal ecstatic Dasein's existence, this essay attempts to show that the problem of transcendence, along with the debates over the Chinese translation of the relevant terms, is not merely a problem in a traditional theory of knowledge or epistemology. Rather, it belongs primarily and essentially to fundamental ontology and thus to Heidegger's question of Being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the European thinkers’ purity of consciousness is studied from the standpoint of the later M. Heidegger (in polemic with F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan). The article shows that Heidegger, having embarked upon the searching for new thinking, chooses the European thinking origins and, starting from the “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)”, he already refuses to distinguish between being and time, that is, he is looking for a third principle (thinking) for their joint grip. We believe it is no longer the being that follows from the understanding of time, but being and time from the understanding of thinking (and even thinking of being). In this new dimension of consciousness, thinking falls into the time-like phenomenology dimension, commuting with being and time. Based on the analysis of the subsequent working of Heidegger, we can conclude that thinking must go through the metaphysics path to return to its wholeness (at the origins), but already to the existential-temporal unity. Thinking, commuting with being and time, starts to bend like the light in the black hole (according to the general theory of relativity of Einstein) and split (Heidegger uses the term “the Clearing of Being”). Existential thinking is a special case of this gap. It was that new dimension of thinking that the mystics and the Eastern sages aspired to. The topos, where being is joined to time, is the ultimate (pure) thinking that has overcome ignorance or attachment to the material world. It is through this dimension we begin to understand not only what being is, but also what time is, as thinking begins to distinguish its time, it temporalizes and starts to listen to its own “breathing” or temporalization of time (Heidegger wrote about). In such dimension, thinking turns into that original topos, when all connected with being flows inherently, be it Gods, humans, or the things grasping (everyone goes the way of being). The ideas of later Heidegger suggest that thinking can appear only where the being clearly exists (and Tao in its non-manifestation). Thinking arises only in conjunction with being and a new topos (thinking of being). Thinking is the gift of the being through the clearing (interspace), the one that allows you to grasp both the being and Tao. Nevertheless, based on the later M. Heidegger, it can therefore be concluded that almost fifty years after the writing of “Being and Time”, European thinkers still have not learned to think, since what awakens true thought, what should encourage us to think, and what is associated with pure thinking, has not yet awakened. It does look as if the later Heidegger was close to the idea that time reveals not only the being but also consciousness. In the classical dimension of thinking of being beyond the boundaries, both time and the being disappear, thereby closing the path to pure thinking (to avoid the “true”).

The pandemic provokes a radical thinking of jurisprudence. Drawing on Heidegger's Being and Time, this paper puts forward an argument for primordial analysis. Human being is inescapably bound to viral infection. Juris-prudence is primordially the 'seeing' of iuris: that which binds or obligates. Prudence is the projection forward from the condition of being bound. Viral being can be seized by Dasein as a resolute response to common suffering. Dasein's resolute response enables the fundamental link to be made between Heidegger's notion of conscience and the primordial meaning of hospital. Primordial juris-prudence thus seeks the ontological articulation of a mode of public responsibility or solidarity for the burden borne by Dasein. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The controversial issue of Martin Heidegger's Nazism has posed hermeneutic challenges since well before the philosopher's death. This essay approaches the political-philosophical conflict of Heidegger's early work not through consideration of explicitly problematic statements and writings but through comparison of the structural framework of Being and Time (1927) with Thomas Mann's roughly contemporaneous theoretical accomplishment in The Magic Mountain (1924). Specifically, the essay argues for a deep affinity between the two texts' constellations of language, temporality, and death. By demonstrating the extensively documented ties between the novel's philosophical framework and Mann's politics, the essay claims that any understanding of Heidegger's work must be contextualized alongside its concrete political valences in shifting ideological paradigms of the early Weimar Republic. This analysis suggests a new mode of ethical critique of Heidegger's magnum opus that focuses more on the text's greater theoretical edifice than on the problematization of localized passages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing upon the interpretations of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time offered by the favorable commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Dostal, Harrison Hall, and Charles Taylor, this paper responds to Heidegger’s unsympathetic commentator Herman Philipse’s critical interpretation of Being and Time (Sections 12-18 of Division I) and shows the validity of Heidegger’s claim for the ontological priority of the practical world over the theoretical world. This has been done by showing that the practical world where readiness-to-hand is the norm, emerges from a self-correcting, transient originary situation where readiness-to-hand is primordial to us while we arrive at the theoretical aspect of presence-at-hand when we encounter the unreadiness-to-hand. This paper also shows that Heidegger’s text is coherent and consistent. This has been done by looking at the structure of Heidegger’s presentational strategies and by making links explicit in them. We have also looked afresh at how he defines certain pivotal elements of his practical world and their relationship with each other.

Martin Heidegger's existential account of care in Being and Time (2010) provides us with an opportunity to reimagine what the proper theoretical grounding of an ethic of care might be. Heidegger's account of care serves to deconstruct the two primary foundations that an ethic of care is often based upon. Namely, that we are inevitably interdependent upon one another and/or possess an innate disposition to care for fellow humans in need. Heidegger's account reveals that both positions are founded upon an ontic (meaning factual existence), as opposed to an ontological (which refers to the nature of being), understanding of care. The distinctions between an ontic and ontological understanding of care are significant. Yet, I maintain that they are not completely incompatible. Both Heidegger and care ethicists contend that our existence with others is understood through a relational ontology. Furthermore, there are certain ontological structures from Heidegger which resonate with an ethic of care. Two key existential structures are leaping-ahead and being-guilty. These existential structures are latent in care ethics, and by explicitly revealing them I reinforce the connection between Heidegger's account and care theory. Lastly, I develop the theoretical foundations of care ethics by proposing an existential ethic of care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the European thinkers' purity of consciousness is studied from the standpoint of the later M. Heidegger (in polemic with F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan). The article shows that Heidegger, having embarked upon the searching for new thinking, chooses the European thinking origins and, starting from the "Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)", he already refuses to distinguish between being and time, that is, he is looking for a third principle (thinking) for their joint grip. We believe it is no longer the being that follows from the understanding of time, but being and time from the understanding of thinking (and even thinking of being). In this new dimension of consciousness, thinking falls into the time-like phenomenology dimension, commuting with being and time. Based on the analysis of the subsequent working of Heidegger, we can conclude that thinking must go through the metaphysics path to return to its wholeness (at the origins), but already to the existential-temporal unity. Thinking, commuting with being and time, starts to bend like the light in the black hole (according to the general theory of relativity of Einstein) and split (Heidegger uses the term "the Clearing of Being"). Existential thinking is a special case of this gap. It was that new dimension of thinking that the mystics and the Eastern sages aspired to. The topos, where being is joined to time, is the ultimate (pure) thinking that has overcome ignorance or attachment to the material world. It is through this dimension we begin to understand not only what being is, but also what time is, as thinking begins to distinguish its time, it temporalizes and starts to listen to its own "breathing" or temporalization of time (Heidegger wrote about). In such dimension, thinking turns into that original topos, when all connected with being flows inherently, be it Gods, humans, or the things grasping (everyone goes the way of being). The ideas of later Heidegger suggest that thinking can appear only where the being clearly exists (and Tao in its non-manifestation). Thinking arises only in conjunction with being and a new topos (thinking of being). Thinking is the gift of the being through the clearing (interspace), the one that allows you to grasp both the being and Tao. Nevertheless, based on the later M. Heidegger, it can therefore be concluded that almost fifty years after the writing of "Being and Time", European thinkers still have not learned to think, since what awakens true thought, what should encourage us to think, and what is associated with pure thinking, has not yet awakened. It does look as if the later Heidegger was close to the idea that time reveals not only the being but also consciousness. In the classical dimension of thinking of being beyond the boundaries, both time and the being disappear, thereby closing the path to pure thinking (to avoid the "true"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In section 48 of Being and Time , Heidegger quotes from chapter XX of Der Ackermann aus Böhmen , a late medieval prose poem written in Early New High German, circa 1400: "As soon as a man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die." In this paper, I provide the context for the quotation. I also suggest that Heidegger's interest in Der Ackermann cannot be explained solely in terms of his believing the poem was the source of the quotation on page 245 of Being and Time. I offer a justification for this claim by showing that Heidegger's discussion of death in Being and Time employs three important images: "debt," "inheritance," and "ripeness" – all of which can be found in chapter XX Der Ackermann. I show these "borrowings" to be at once a reference to the context of the Christian/humanist heritage to which they belong and a part of the newly evolving Daseinsanalytik. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to find out that education significantly influences the way people live in the world: with today's education, humans and robots have become blurred. Therefore, it is necessary to change the curriculum and education, architecture which are the main problems Heidegger's views used as a reference in this study. The solution offered to apply the future curriculum, namely STEAM, to the education system and its architecmral forms by creating creative spaces and creating architecture that exudes human existence in them with metaphorical architecture. In this study, the current incidence of CO VID-19 is taken as the context of the times humans are in, so it is necessary to make a school design responsive to Covid-19. The method applied: 1) Applying the concept of 'being' in Heidegger's philosophy; 2) Creating a creative space; 3) Creating a strategy when the Covid-19 incident in Heidegger's philosophy of 'time'. Architects need to think about the people who feel the existence of buildings in terms of form and function. The findings; how to create creative spaces to help the learning process in schools so that children can be motivated by their creativity by referring to Heidegger's views on 'being and time'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing upon the interpretations of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time offered by the favorable commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Dostal, Harrison Hall, and Charles Taylor, this paper responds to Heidegger's unsympathetic commentator Herman Philipse's critical interpretation of Being and Time (Sections 12-18 of Division I) and shows the validity of Heidegger's claim for the ontological priority of the practical world over the theoretical world. This has been done by showing that the practical world where readiness-to-hand is the norm, emerges from a selfcorrecting, transient originary situation where readiness-to-hand is primordial to us while we arrive at the theoretical aspect of presence-at-hand when we encounter the unreadiness-to-hand. This paper also shows that Heidegger's text is coherent and consistent. This has been done by looking at the structure of Heidegger's presentational strategies and by making links explicit in them. We have also looked afresh at how he defines certain pivotal elements of his practical world and their relationship with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even highly regarded translators cannot escape the common suspicion that philosophical ideas are not communicable in foreign languages – a suspicion that plagues philosophical translation. Translators effectively counter this distrust of translation when they explicitly claim to have collaborated with the author. This paper focuses on the Italian translation of Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) (first published in 1927; Heidegger 1986a), titled Essere e tempo (Heidegger 2006, trans. Marini), whose translator, Alfredo Marini, took particularly interesting measures to legitimate his work. This case is especially intriguing because Pietro Chiodi's earlier translation (Heidegger 1953, 1976, 2005) is still popular in Italy despite Chiodi's own complaints that the German text is untranslatable. The widespread acceptance of the earlier Italian translation presents a considerable problem of legitimation for Marini, who counters Chiodi's views by arguing for the translatability of the text and supports his argument through a rhetorically constructed scene of collaborative translation. I begin this paper by retracing Marini's strategy for presenting Essere e tempo (Heidegger 2006, trans. Marini) as a 'translaboration' (a collaborative translation), before addressing concerns that collaborative translation could hinder the translator's creativity. I show that Marini's translation achieves its most creative, and at times eccentric, effects through his close collaboration with the (deceased) philosopher, Martin Heidegger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sarah Deyong, an associate professor and director of the architecture programme at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, maps the complex relationships contemporary theorists and practitioners have with concepts of 'form', which can be traced back to previous avantgardes. She uses the work and publications of architectural collective WAI Think Tank as a microcosm of this complex discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heidegger scholarship has done an admirable job accounting for Luther's influence on key Heideggerian concepts such as his method of destruction and anxiety. Yet given Heidegger's statements concerning Luther's immense personal and philosophical importance, it is likely that Luther's influence extends further and deeper than might first appear. I argue that this influence also manifests in Heidegger's concept of authentic existence. In particular, I argue that Luther's understanding of Christian freedom and servitude form ontic material from which Heidegger draws to come to his general ontological understanding of Dasein's freedom as power over its existence and servitude to its communal involvements. As Luther understands the freedom of a Christian, everything comes to aid the Christian in salvation, much like Dasein gains power over its existential possibilities in coming to authenticity. Yet this newly created freedom also creates additional ontological or existential connections with one's community. The consequence of such connections is the addition of new responsibilities, or form of servitude, to one's community wherein one aids others in coming to faith or authenticity, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question, what measures to address the shortage of transplantable organs are ethically permissible? requires careful attention because, apart from its impact on medical practice, the stance we espouse here reflects our interpretations of human freedom and mortality. To raise the number of available organs, on utilitarian grounds, bioethicists and medical professionals increasingly support mandatory procurement. This view is at odds with the Catechism of the Catholic Church (2003, p. 2296), according to which '[o]rgan donation after death is a noble and meritorious act' but ethically impermissible absent consent. Those who concur with this position, but would oppose conscription on independent philosophical grounds, have not yet found a voice in the Western tradition comparable in strength to the utilitarian basis of the policy's support, for Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, too, lend themselves to a requirement that we make our organs available to others when they can no longer serve ourselves. One finds an ethical wedge against conscription in an unexpected philosophical locale: the 'fundamental ontology' of Heidegger's Being and Time, where pertinent individual choices arc protectively over what happens post mortem. Heidegger's perspective on this issue thus meshes, not with other philosophical voices, but with Catholic doctrine—a surprising convergence of atheistic and theistic approaches to our flourishing whose ground I address in the article's conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I am not concerned with whether Heidegger’s philosophy is a "secularisation" of primitive Christianity buried beneath the excrescence of a dead medieval Scholasticism and the "ontotheological constitution of its metaphysics". Nor I am concerned with seeking out the theological roots of Heidegger’s philosophy even though he and others may claim that his philosophy is rabidly a-theistic. To repeat, this paper is not interested in intellectual history and or a genealogical reconstruction of Heidegger’s true intentions and the contradictions that are displayed in his published works and what that could mean for the relation between theology and the philosophy of religion. We have to tread a path, making it new, as opposed to discovering a new path that has yet to be taken. Creation is harder than discovery; the former is active and intentional, albeit obscure, and the latter is passive, even accidental, albeit something that can be more readily followed.

This paper examines Martin Heidegger’s own interpretation of Being and Time in the Black Notebooks. The opening part addresses Heidegger’s singular notions of “thinking” and “questioning” which suggest a critically reflective stance, but involve an initiatory call to surrender to the hidden powers of Beyng. The second part addresses Heidegger’s lament in the Black Notebooks that Being and Time has not produced a “great enemy”, and his critique of the initial existentialist or “anthropological” receptions of his magnum opus. The third part looks at how Heidegger’s thought moves beyond Being and Time, in light of the central role the thinker assigns to the German people in repeating the first “inception” of preSocratic thought, in order to overcome the legacies of Roman universalism, and what Heidegger as early as 1932 was calling “Jewish Christianity”. The final part addresses Heidegger’s conception of “the history of Beyng” as it is developed in the Black Notebooks of the early 1940s, from out of the account of “temporality” in Being and Time: a “history” in which Heidegger’s postulation of a need for the “annihilation“ (Vernichtung)” of the essential enemy of the Volk become the lens through which Heidegger can read the Shoah as the “the peak of self-destruction in history”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen (reckoning), Machenschaft (machination), and Geviert (fourfold), several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” (1949) and “The Question concerning Technology” (1954). Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cassirer is important in 20th Century philosophy for the attention he gives to the fundamental relationship between myth and language. For Cassirer, myth is a non-subjective form of discourse wherein the origin of language coincides with both the human-divine encounter and the event of being itself. In this article, I trace the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger on the nature of the magical (or “primitive”) sign, which is at the heart of mythical discourse. While Heidegger initially argues that this form of sign is structurally impossible on the basis of his accounts of signs and language in Being and Time, he later comes to recognize that he had not properly accounted for its possibility within his phenomenological deduction. I conclude by describing how Heidegger’s notion of poetry eventually comes into alignment with the way Cassirer describes the function of myth and the magical sign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the critique of Being and Time formulated by Levinas in Totality and Infinite, a critique centered on Heidegger’s omission of two fundamental forms of being in the world: enjoyment and inhabiting. This omission is symptomatic: as a critique of modernity, Being and Time internalizes and ontologizes the prevalence of the equipmentality that characterizes our era far more than scientific objectivism does. Thus, a certain type of pragmatism would constitute the keystone of Being and Time as a whole: the acknowledgment by Heidegger of this “contamination” would explain, at least partially, his transition to the “history of being”.

The task of this paper is to propose an answer to these relatedquestions. It amounts to an attempt to work through conceptually step by step Heidegger’s so called “overcoming of metaphysics”. It is true of course that the locution, “the overcoming of metaphysics”, does not appear in Being and Time. The discourse of the overcoming of metaphysics is held by Heidegger’s commentators to belong to a period post-dating the early work, after the so called Kehre. I shall stubbornly evade this knotty issue of Heidegger interpretation here. For my purposes it suffices merely if our understanding ofBeing and Time, its content, intent and consequence, can be deepened or expanded if it is read in the light of the task of overcoming metaphysics—or at least in the light of that task as it is to be conceived in the context I shall present here. What is to be understood by the phrase “the overcoming of metaphysics”?

Being and Time’s emphasis on practical activities has attracted much attention as an approach to meaning not modelled exclusively on language. However, understanding this emphasis is made more difficult by Heidegger’s notion ofRede(‘Articulacy’ or ‘Discourse’), which he routinely characterizes as both language-like and basic to all disclosure. This paper assesses whether this notion can be both interpreted coherently and reconciled with Heidegger’s emphasis on intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. It begins by identifying two functions of Articulacy – the demonstrative and articulatory – and a potential source of incoherence in Heidegger’s analysis. Having reviewed some standard approaches to Heideggerian Articulacy, I show how Heidegger’s discussion of predicative judgements (‘Statements’) implies that language can be linked with different kinds of content. This allows Heidegger’s analysis to be read coherently, provided Articulacy is understood as having distinct purposive and predicative modes. The final section shows how this reading preserves a close connection between Articulacy and language while accommodating intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper first applies Heidegger's notion of in/authenticity to Orestes in Aeschylus' The Eumenides. The examination of authenticity is the departure point after which the question of freedom in this tragedy can be addressed mainly with Heidegger's Being and Time in view. It then discusses a possible interpretation of the Greek god Apollo which frees and yet entangles Orestes in his course of decisions, which is also a harbinger of a new historical era in which the mythos for the historical Dasein brings it to the destiny of people. Heidegger's understanding of tragedy brings the fate of historical man to the destiny of its people; therefore, in this reading of Aeschylus' The Eumenides the individual-as in early Heidegger-transforms into a historical gestalt which is meaningful only with a look into the possibilities of future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy, which does not begin again, always unfolds against the background of the ongoing philosophical tradition, which it needs to interpret. I argue that Heidegger's theories, like all philosophical theories, can neither be reduced to, nor separated from, the historical context. In that sense they are like all other philosophical views, perhaps in theory ahistorical but in practice historical, hence always bound up with and inseparable from their historical moment. If, as I believe, Heidegger's theories led him in part toward National Socialism, there is no alternative, if philosophy is to survive in a meaningful sense, to rejecting those aspects of his position, which must now be considered as simply and wholly dead, in favor of other aspects of Heidegger's thinking that, if they are still living, can possibly be saved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Trawny, Heidegger's Black Notebooks show that he turned away from any National Socialism in 1938 and that his thinking could be "contaminated" by National Socialism and anti-Semitism only between 1931 and 1944/1945. However, in this paper it is argued that already in Being and Time (1927) Heidegger had made a case for National Socialism; that he discovered in 1938 the "true" National Socialism, and that Trawny's main criterion regarding Heidegger's anti-Semitism is false. Heidegger's case is compared with Max Scheler, who, because of Hitler, turned from the right to the centre. In addition, alternatives to Trawny's detailed interpretations of three of Heidegger's anti-Semitic remarks are offered, it is shown that Trawny misconstrues and downplays not only Heidegger's National Socialism, but also his anti-Semitism, and the anti-Semitic aspects of Heidegger's history of Being are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a paper entitled "Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?" (Philosophy Today 59[3] [2015]), Thomas Sheehan accuses Faye of committing many blunders in Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. In this paper, I address what is according to Sheehan himself the most important part of his paper, namely his charges against Faye's interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time. I show that they are all wholly unfounded. All the aspects of Being and Time that Sheehan addresses speak not only not against Faye but rather even for Faye. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Martin Heidegger's phenomenology provides methodological guidance for qualitative researchers seeking to explicate the lived experience of study participants. However, most phenomenological researchers apply his philosophy loosely. This is not surprising because Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy is challenging and the influence of his philosophy in shaping the conduct of interpretive phenomenological research is broadly debated. This article presents an exploration of Dasein, a key tenet of Martin Heidegger's interpretive phenomenology and explicates its usefulness for phenomenological research. From this perspective, we present guidance for researchers planning to utilize Heidegger's philosophy underpinning their research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay revisits the question of inheritance, legacy and handing-down ( das Erbe) as it is developed in Heidegger's Being and Time. A careful reading especially of paragraphs 6 and 72-74 allows us to consider whether Heidegger's notion of inheritance might not be far more resistant to modes of premature closure-such as its apparent exclusion of das Erbe from the workings of Destruktion-than readers often have perceived it to be. In a second step, the discussion of Heidegger's inheritance opens onto some of Derrida's fundamental reflections on the mortgage of inheritance, in which Heidegger is never far away, even when his work is not the ostensibly primary topic of analysis. If Derrida suggests that certain difficulties 'never disappear from Heidegger's discourse' and that they 'bring the consequences of a serious mortgage to weigh upon the whole of his thought', the legacies of this Heideggerean inheritance call for perpetual reappraisal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a list of corrigenda to the English translation of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (German original: Sein und Zeit, 1927, 8th edition 1957) by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (1962). The list includes 186 entries: most are corrections of outright mistakes in expressing the sense of Heidegger's text, and twenty-two entries are marked as representing Heidegger's own revisions to the work as found in the latest German edition (2006). Explanatory comments accompany many of the entries. The corrigenda are offered as a service to scholars of Heidegger's magnum opus who work within the discipline of philosophy and also to humanistic psychologists who follow the tradition of continental philosophy in their work as practioners and researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Heidegger’s concept “Authenticity” can be used to provide a justification for the doctrine of precedent beyond traditional predictability and equality arguments. This justification is based on an attitude towards existence itself rather than prescriptive claims about judging. The article demonstrates that a Heideggerian description of adjudication can allay the fears of writers such as Hobbes and Holmes that adherence to precedent might impede reason or justice. It further suggests that precedent presents judges with a rare opportunity to develop their own sense of reason or justice in adjudication. Particular emphasis is placed on efforts by adjudication to capture the nature of real entities. For illustrative purposes, use is made of the concept of a “lease” in the English case Ashburn Anstalt v. Arnold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Th e aim of the article is to reconstruct the possible contents of the Second Half of Being and time. Author begins with presentation of the hermeneutical logic of philosophical concept formation, it is formal indication; then describes the announcements of the Th ird Division in Being and Time. Finally, the original Heidegger's concept of philosophy is recalled to stress the meaning of the third division of Part One of Being and Time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent efforts to analyze notions of subjectivity draw on the notions of autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory from the literature in psychology and cognitive science, and on theories of time consciousness and subjectivity from phenomenology. In doing so, leading interpreters have relied primarily on Husserl's theories of time consciousness. This paper outlines the significantly different approach grounded in Heidegger's analysis of the temporality and historicality of the self. Heidegger's framework proves to be fruitful for an analysis of autonoetic conciousness, and challenges several fundamental presumptions of dominant psychological models of episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of a priori does not belong to Heidegger's favourite or most familiar concepts. Unlike concepts such as, e.g., Sein, physis, ousia, idea, aletheia, etc., it is not given detailed discussions in his works. When it occurs -- mostly in the 1920s -- it has the usual meaning it has come to obtain in early modern philosophy ever since Kant. A characteristic occurrence of the term crops up in his main work: "'A-priorism' is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself." ("Der »Apriorismus« ist die Methode jeder wissenschaftlichen Philosophie, die sich selbst versteht" (Sein und Zeit, p. 50 = Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, p. 490, note x). To claim that this concept does not rank in Heidegger's innermost vocabulary is, however, not to claim that he totally ignored or overlooked it. On the contrary: Heidegger was well aware that this concept is closely related to two of his most central concepts or themes: those of time and -- through it -- to Being. -- The paper proposes to explore these dimensions in subsequent steps. First it is shown that, in his critical confrontation of Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger appreciated very much Husserl's efforts to reconstruct "the original sense of a priori" by disengaging it from the subject. Heidegger takes up and radicalizes Husserl's effort to de-subjectivate this concept in claiming that a priori is a designation of being. Towards the end of the 1927 lecture course (=GA 24) Heidegger comes to expand on the theme more in detail. He says that the original sense of a priori in terms of "earlier" contains a clear reference to time; it is, therefore, a temporal determination. He claims that earlier than any possible "earlier" is time or temporality. This makes it possible to speak meaningfully about something such as "earlier" at all. Time may, accordingly, be called to be the "earliest" of everything that may come "earlier" -- it is, indeed, the a priori of all possible a prioris, preceding these and making them possible. On the other hand, preceding all beings is being as such. Being is "earlier" than beings. From this perspective, Being is the absolute a priori. A priori is then both a temporal and an ontological concept. Time, however, understood in terms of its relation to being, is not to be accounted for by and in terms of the common concept of time in the sense of intratemporality. Philosophy as an a priori science is both an ontological and a temporal science, and that is what Heidegger's main thesis according to which Being and Time belong together comes down to. -- In subsequent parts of the paper a possible objection is examined at some length, namely, whether it is not a misunderstanding, on Heidegger's part, to claim that "earlier" is always and in any case a "temporal" determination, whether, in other words, one could not -- and indeed, should not -- rather make a distinction between "temporal" and "logical" sequence or succession. This objection is countered with reference to the fact that, in order to reasonably formulate the dichotomy temporal--logical, one must tacitly presuppose a restricted, that is, non-Heideggerian concept of time. A final dilemma emerges with regard to whether and to what extent Heidegger's assumption of his radically new concept of time can legitimately be linked to (or opposed to) traditional concepts of time -- a dilemma pretty much the same as the ones regarding whether and to what extent his radically new concepts, e.g., of history and being, can be linked to, and derived from, a critical confrontation (=destruction) of the philosophical tradition. This dilemma is claimed to pertain to the linguistic dimension of philosophy (that is, of how, with what conceptuality a philosopher addresses or names his subject matter), and it seems hardly able to be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time, shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic illness, especially in children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]