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International audience; La " liberté de conscience " associée à celle de " sujet " jugeant et agissant de sa propre autorité est donc une notion de type " moderne ", liée mais distincte de la conscience-âme des Pères de l'Eglise et inscrite dans la transformation du rapport entre le religieux et le politique. Cristallisée sous la plume de Luther (Gewissensfreiheit) et de Calvin (conscience), elle est ciselée par Pierre Bayle sous la forme d'un respect dû à la conscience. Etroitement liée à l'idée de " liberté religieuse ", l'expression est progressivement sécularisée dans l'espace des langues européennes (conscience, Gewissen, consciousness) où se pensent la reconfiguration des Etats et, conjointement, des rapports inédits entre l'homme et l'Etat (Locke, Condillac, Wolff, Kant). La terminologie connaît une unification relative au début du XIXe siècle, moment à partir duquel ses éléments fondamentaux sont diffusés en milieu de langue arabe majoritairement musulman. Les magistères religieux, qu'ils soient catholiques, orthodoxes, musulmans et, pour partie, juifs et protestants, entravent le mouvement au nom d'une règle commune : l'erreur ne peut pas avoir de droits face à la vérité, or ce qui est appelé " conscience " est susceptible de se tromper.

There was an age when people had the right to criticise the entourage of the prophet, when religious controversy was carried out with a great freedom of tone, and when Islamic scholars glorified atheism. Today, all the many debates relating to Islam present one single dilemma: the abandonment of faith or fundamentalism. In this article, a linguist and a historian relate how the two " givens " of Islam – the integrity of Mohammed's entourage and the inimitability of the Koran – gradually became established over time. To them, Islam should be reconciled with the science of texts and freedom of thought., Il y eut une époque où l’on avait le droit de critiquer l’entourage du Prophète, où les controverses religieuses se faisaient avec une grande liberté de ton, où des érudits musulmans glorifiaient l’athéisme. Aujourd’hui, nombre de débats relatifs à l’islam présentent leur problématique sous la forme d’une unique alternative : l’abandon de la foi ou l’expression intégraliste. Dans cet article, un linguiste et un historien rappellent que deux principes tenus aujourd’hui pour acquis – l’impeccabilité de l’entourage de Muhammad et l’inimitabilité du Coran – se sont établis progressivement. Il s’agit, en d’autres termes, de réconcilier l’Islam, la science des textes et le libre examen.

International audience; For thirty years, Hezbollah has played a pivotal role in Lebanese and global politics. That visibility has invited Hezbollah's lionization and vilification by outside observers, and at the same time has prevented a clear-eyed view of Hezbollah's place in the history of the Middle East and its future course of action. Now part of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah nevertheless remains in tension with both the transnational Shiite community and a religiously diverse Lebanon. Calling for an Islamic regime would risk losing critical allies at home, but at the same time Hezbollah's leaders cannot say that a liberal regime is the solution for the future. Consequently, they use the ambiguous expression "civil but believer state." What happens when an organization founded as a voice of "revolution" and then "resistance" occupies a position of power, yet witnesses the collapse of its close ally, Syria? How will Hezbollah's voice evolve as the party struggles to reconcile its regional obligations with its religious beliefs? The authors' analyses of these key questions--buttressed by their clear English translations of foundational documents, including Hezbollah's open letter of 1985 and its 2009 charter, and an in-depth glossary of key theological and political terms used by the party's leaders--make Hezbollah an invaluable resource for all readers interested in the future of this volatile force.

For thirty years, Hezbollah has played a pivotal role in Lebanese and global politics. That visibility has invited Hezbollah's lionization and vilification by outside observers, and at the same time has prevented a clear-eyed view of Hezbollah's place in the history of the Middle East and its future course of action. Now part of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah nevertheless remains in tension with both the transnational Shiite community and a religiously diverse Lebanon. Calling for an Islamic regime would risk losing critical allies at home, but at the same time Hezbollah's leaders cannot say that a liberal regime is the solution for the future. Consequently, they use the ambiguous expression "civil but believer state." What happens when an organization founded as a voice of "revolution" and then "resistance" occupies a position of power, yet witnesses the collapse of its close ally, Syria? How will Hezbollah's voice evolve as the party struggles to reconcile its regional obligations with its religious beliefs? The authors' analyses of these key questions--buttressed by their clear English translations of foundational documents, including Hezbollah's open letter of 1985 and its 2009 charter, and an in-depth glossary of key theological and political terms used by the party's leaders--make Hezbollah an invaluable resource for all readers interested in the future of this volatile force.

The focus of this intervention about " religious freedom " and " freedom of conscience " is the way followed by the catholic and the sunni traditions to answer to a modern challenge : is individual liberty an upper principle than common truth ? Both included the higher number of believers in one God, and through the public authorities both have in the past established collectiv regulations in accordance to the lecture of their sacred texts and a Weltansschaung in which everyone could not be separate from the faith. Despite game of memories and shared convictions, the historian must say that one stable type has never been founded : each time, the system has been fragilized or destructed from the inner. The unprecedented fact is, for two centuries, that an alternativ has been proclamed face to the " Catholic State " or " Islamic State " and we will see the consequences. What about the others ? Actually the byzantin type (as the other eastern Churches) is no longer activ despite some greek temptations in the 1960's and the return of the orthodox visibility in Russia since the beginning of the 1990's. The jewish type, in Israël, is based on a tension between citizenship and nationality which open to practice inequality. The shi'as type shows two figures : on one side a liberal one in which a new religions (babism and bahaïsm for instance) could appear and growth ; on the other side, since the islamic revolution, the religious discrimination -even against the sunnis

International audience; The focus of this intervention about " religious freedom " and " freedom of conscience " is the way followed by the catholic and the sunni traditions to answer to a modern challenge : is individual liberty an upper principle than common truth ? Both included the higher number of believers in one God, and through the public authorities both have in the past established collectiv regulations in accordance to the lecture of their sacred texts and a Weltansschaung in which everyone could not be separate from the faith. Despite game of memories and shared convictions, the historian must say that one stable type has never been founded : each time, the system has been fragilized or destructed from the inner. The unprecedented fact is, for two centuries, that an alternativ has been proclamed face to the " Catholic State " or " Islamic State " and we will see the consequences. What about the others ? Actually the byzantin type (as the other eastern Churches) is no longer activ despite some greek temptations in the 1960's and the return of the orthodox visibility in Russia since the beginning of the 1990's. The jewish type, in Israël, is based on a tension between citizenship and nationality which open to practice inequality. The shi'as type shows two figures : on one side a liberal one in which a new religions (babism and bahaïsm for instance) could appear and growth ; on the other side, since the islamic revolution, the religious discrimination -even against the sunnis

International audience