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Im Oktober hatte der damalige Verfassungsschutzpräsident Thomas Haldenwang angekündigt, dass in 2024 mit einer verfassungsschutzrechtlichen Neubewertung der AfD und der Veröffentlichung der entsprechenden Einstufung zu rechnen sei. Jetzt ist jedoch zu vernehmen, dass das Bundesamt zwar zu einer Neubewertung gekommen sei, die Öffentlichkeit aber nun erst nach der Bundestagswahl über das Ergebnis informieren wolle. Dies überzeugt nicht.

Nach den jüngsten Ereignissen um die konstituierende Sitzung des Thüringer Landtags nimmt die Debatte um ein Verbot der Partei „Alternative für Deutschland“ (AfD) erneut Fahrt auf. Dass die Antragstellung nun unter Umständen allein durch den Bundestag erfolgen soll, ist deshalb von besonderer Bedeutung, weil sie in eine komplizierte verfassungsprozessuale Problemlage führt. Denn „falsch gestellt“ könnte die alsbald im Bundestag zu erwartende Vorlage das gesamte Parteiverbotsverfahren gleich zu Beginn konterkarieren.

This study analyses the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the European far right by examining the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party and the Swedish Sverigedemokraterna (SD). The political and geopolitical choices of the AfD and SD are contextualized in the political history of the two parties, in the influences that thinkers such as Steve Bannon and Aleksandr Dugin have on the European right, and in the context of geopolitical change taking place at the international level. A dichotomous reality of the European far right emerges with opposing political and geopolitical visions. On the one hand, the Westernist and Atlanticist extreme right, which is based on white supremacism and the West's indispensability to place itself at the helm of the world order, whose army is identified with NATO, on the other hand, an anti-American, Eurasianist, pro-Russian extreme right and that sees in the end of the American unipolar order an opportunity. Two components of the European far right that are irreconcilable and that focus attention on the inappropriateness of looking at the movements and parties of the European far right as if they were a single 'black thing'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Der Begriff des Volkes ist zentral für unser Grundgesetz – und ist es auch seit jeher für rechte Parteien und Bewegungen. Auch die Funktionär*innen, Mitglieder und Anhänger*innen der „Alternative für Deutschland“ (AfD) beziehen sich immer wieder positiv auf den Begriff des Volkes und legen nahe, dass es ein „eigentliches“, über die Gemeinschaft aller Staatsangehörigen hinaus gehendes Volk gebe, das es zu erhalten gelte. Das Grundgesetz zieht dem Volksbegriff allerdings Grenzen.

Die Urteile des Oberverwaltungsgerichts Münster vom 13. Mai sind ein Meilenstein in der aktuellen Debatte über den Umgang mit der AfD und wurden häufig als Vorbedingung für ein Parteiverbotsverfahren gesehen. Über die antirassistische Seite der Debatte liest man allerdings wenig. Zum Schutz von Personen, die von Rassismus betroffen sind, scheint ein Verbotsverfahren bei entsprechender Beweislage damit mehr als geboten.

Das Erstarken autoritär-populistischer Kräfte in Deutschland hat eine Debatte um eine verfassungsrechtliche Absicherung des Bundes-, aber auch der Landesverfassungsgerichte ausgelöst. Ein neuralgischer Punkt ist die Richterwahl, insbesondere das Zweidrittelmehrheitserfordernis und dessen Kehrseite, die Sperrminorität. Um nicht zu versteifen, sind die Gesetzgeber daher aufgefordert, sich Gedanken zu machen, wie sich das Blockaderisiko verringern lässt, ohne den Pluralismusschutz aufzugeben. Eine Lösung könnte sein, ein Vorschlagsrecht des Verfassungsgerichts mit einem abgesenkten Mehrheitserfordernis im Parlament zu kombinieren.

Die Debatte um Parteiverbote scheint festgefahren. Auf der einen Seite stehen jene, die Parteiverbote grundsätzlich ablehnen. Auf der anderen Seite stehen jene, die dringend ein Parteiverbot fordern, möglicherweise verbunden mit einem Verfahren auf Grundrechtsverwirkung gegen einzelne Politiker. Sinnvoll erörtern lässt sich die Frage der Parteiverbote aber letztlich nur im Kontext mit anderen Strategien und Mechanismen.

„Fascism a World Movement“ – so lautet die Eingangspassage in Karl Loewensteins Text zur wehrhaften Demokratie. 1937 unter dem Titel „Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights“ in zwei Teilen im American Political Science Review erschienen, arbeitet Loewenstein hier die Bedrohung des rechtsextremen „Kriegs gegen die Demokratie“ heraus und fordert die Demokratinnen und Demokraten aller Länder dazu auf, „den Erfordernissen der Stunde gerecht zu werden und alles dafür zu tun, um die Demokratie zu retten“. Wie aktuell diese Diagnose, wie groß die Gefahr durch die rechtsextreme Weltbewegung ist, zeigen nicht nur die Entwicklungen im US-amerikanischen Vorwahlkampf und im polnischen Nachwahlkampf, sondern auch im deutschen Dauerwahlkampf.

The breaking of speech taboos by populist radical right (PRR) parties and the resulting talk scandals have received considerable attention, with provocative statements being seen as playing a central role in generating media attention and in shifting the boundaries of what is sayable. In Germany, breaches of taboos by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) have caused public outrage, with some claiming that the AfD follows a deliberate provocation strategy. This study examines the reactions to the AfD's breaches of taboos as they play out in mainstream media. Focusing on reactions to five of the AfD's most controversial statements, the study analyses 340 articles from the daily quality newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt. The analysis zooms in on identifying (1) reactions to the taboo-breaking statements and how the boundaries of the respective taboos are being negotiated by the AfD and its critics, and (2) reflexive discourse on the role of breaches of taboos in the AfD's political strategy and on the role of the media in responding to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

„Wir müssen endlich im großen Stil abschieben“. Diese Aussage, wirkmächtig platziert auf dem Spiegel-Cover vom 21. Oktober 2023, stammt nicht von einem oder einer derjenigen Politiker:innen, von denen es unmittelbar zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Obwohl Forderungen nach Abschiebungen im „großen Stil“ eigentlich eine klare politische Heimat am rechten Rand haben, stammt sie von einem Sozialdemokraten, Olaf Scholz. Für viele Beobachter:innen aus den Rechts- und Sozialwissenschaften kommt dieses Spiegel-Cover dennoch nicht überraschend, sondern fügt sich nahtlos ein in die Chronologie des Rechtsrucks der deutschen Politik und Gesellschaft.

This article studies the response by public sphere institutions in democratic societies to far-right parties, focusing specifically on public broadcasting organizations in Germany and Sweden. With the upsurge of far-right parties these types of institutions are faced with difficult decisions on how to balance norms of inclusivity, impartiality and pluralism while also safeguarding substantive norms related to the protection of equal human dignity and non-discrimination. Public sphere institutions, and public broadcasting in particular, are of key importance for well-functioning democracies. They are also settings where democratic dilemmas appear that have received less attention in the existing literature on democracy's protection. We develop our contribution through a comparative study of the response by public broadcasting organizations to the far-right in Germany and Sweden. Results point to continuing difficulties in navigating dilemmas related to the response to these parties, especially as they are becoming an increasingly normalized part of the political landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of European Integration / Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Björn Höcke gilt als Kopf der radikalrechten Strömung innerhalb der Alternative für Deutschland und steht als Hardliner seiner Partei in engem Kontakt zur neurechten Szene. In der politmedialen Öffentlichkeit Deutschlands ist er mit provokanten Äußerungen aufgefallen, die nach einer adäquaten Analysemethode verlangen, die nicht nur den offenkundigen Inhalt thematisiert, sondern auch politische Narrative sowie Denk- und Argumentationsmuster freilegt. Der Beitrag wirbt daher für einen innovativen interdisziplinären Zugang und entwickelt eine diskursanalytische Perspektive auf das strategische Framing Björn Höckes. Die Untersuchung befasst sich mit seinem im Jahr 2018 erschienenen autobiografischen Werk Nie zweimal in denselben Fluss sowie einigen politischen Reden und orientiert sich nah an der Gegenwart und den politischen Perspektiven der zeitgenössischen Neuen Rechten. So kann dieser interdisziplinäre Zugang aus Frame- und Diskursanalyse die sprachlichen Muster in Höckes fremdenfeindlichen, rechtsextremen und sozialdarwinistischen Perspektivierungen substanziell aufschlüsseln, sie sowohl im sprachlichen, politischen und historischen Kontext ihres Werdens markieren und damit ein mehrdimensionales diskursives Feld des gegenwärtigen Rechtsextremismus sichtbar machen.

This article examines how the German radical-right populist party the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) and its politicians have engaged with the public memory of the East German past via Twitter and how this has impacted the use of social media as a tool of political commemoration in Germany. The article analyses the mnemonic wars over 'anniversary tweets' related to four events: the East German Uprising (1953); the construction (1961) and fall (1989) of the Berlin Wall; and German reunification (1990). The article surveys when and how Twitter became a platform for these events' political commemoration and the role of the Alternative für Deutschland therein. It also outlines the mnemonic discourses that the Alternative für Deutschland has deployed on Twitter around these events' anniversaries and explores the sorts of digital contestation and transnationalization evident at these times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of architectural heritage in the discourse and practice of the populist far right is examined, referring to examples in Germany and focusing on the Alternative für Deutschland. The findings reveal that the Alternative für Deutschland appropriates historic buildings and sites in a number of ways, including visual and oral rhetoric and embodied performance, and instrumentalizes them to specific ends. Built heritage in particular serves to naturalize and therefore to legitimize and authorize populist positions by anchoring them not only in time but also at places, thus reinforcing populism's exclusionary logic along territorial lines – including those describing the space of 'European civilization'. This implies challenges for heritage professionals and institutions, as actors such as the Alternative für Deutschland attempt to map the notion of a national or a civilizational 'Heartland' onto existing heritage objects and sites or else engage in 'making' heritage in the urban environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Athenaeum: Polskie Studia Politologiczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The 2017 entry of the AfD in the Bundestag is one of the most important event in the history of the federal Republic. The far-right party has changed the way debates are led on numerous subjects including European issues. We analyse how the Brexit debates have shaped AfD's Euroscepticism and how other parties have reacted to this rhetoric. We investigate how Brexit is mobilized in the Bundestag as a political issue. The case of the AfD is particularly relevant since this far-right party was originally established in 2013 and based its foundations on a critique of the EU construction and particularly its monetary policy. However, the party has evolved into a populist, anti-migrant, sovereignist party while maintaining its Eurosceptic arguments. The AfD is the main opposition force in the Bundestag and has regularly managed to influence the media agenda and political debates on various topics, including Europe. Specific attention will be given to the debates in the plenary to underline how the Bundestag discusses this issue in a chaotic atmosphere. This article relies on the analysis of parliamentary debates and political programmes of the parties in the Bundestag from September 2017 to September 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of the right-wing populist and eurosceptic party, Alternative für Deutschland, in Germany, represents a significant shake up of the country's pro-EU consensus. Spatial models of partisan behaviour predict that mainstream parties are likely to react to eurosceptic challenges by veering towards a more critical European position. A comparison of the politicisation of European integration in party programmes between the 2017 federal elections and those held previously shows that the reverse is true. In the face of a eurosceptic challenger, mainstream parties have adopted an adversarial rather than accommodating response, becoming more pro-European and increasingly vocal in their support for the EU. I argue that the europhile fight-back of mainstream parties is likely driven by increases in europhilia amongst mainstream parties' supporters who move to rally around the EU when the polity is under attack from a eurosceptic threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia is the property of Historical Association of South Africa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the role played by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a German right-wing political party, in the politics of memory in and of Dresden. Based on ethnographic fieldwork among AfD members and observation of the party's organization, the article demonstrates that the performative acts of local AfD members bear crucial significance in explaining the party's attempts to challenge the mainstream memory discourse that is linked to the centrality of the Holocaust. I argue that party members not only draw upon established discursive narratives of Germany's victimhood, but also find ways to skillfully adapt their messages in their efforts to achieve legitimacy. Their performative contestations have enabled the AfD to be both a beneficiary and an instigator of the shifting boundaries of what is considered admissible in Germany's official culture of memorialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the Alternative für Deutschland's (AfD) racist, nationalist, and far-right discursive strategies in the lead-up to the 2017 federal election. Rather than taking the approach that this party constitutes a "new nationalism" that is out of touch with mainstream conceptions of German nationhood, the article depicts the ways in which the recognizability of the AfD's anti-Muslim racism was predicated on mainstream civilizationist discursive repertoires and the rise of the populist-nationalist right. To do so, I compare themes presented by legal experts and mainstream politicians in favor of banning veiling in the mid-2000s to the civilizationist claims made by the AfD between 2015 and 2017. This article thus extends case analyses of contemporary right-wing nationalist and populist movements to Germany. It also emphasizes the antecedents of the "new nationalism" classification applied to such movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an analysis of how think tanks of the German New Right have sought to expand the reach of the New Right into far-right electoral politics, specifically those embodied by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. Informed by social network analysis and document analysis, the research focuses on the years between 2013 and 2017, the period that saw the foundation of the AfD, its shift to the right toward embracing nationalist-völkisch positions, and its entry into the Bundestag. The data show that only a few New Right think tanks have strongly engaged with the AfD for the purpose of changing ideology, personnel, or policy. Most of these think tanks are well-networked with other actors, such as magazines and campaign groups from the wider far right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Wide Web connects less and disconnects more. In Germany as in the United States, disconnecting factions digitize their ideologies and overnight multiply their adherents. Such forces of disruption are incessant. Appeal to constructivist theory reveals that beneath this destabilizing dynamic is awareness of contingency, the feeling of disempowerment in the face of an unpredictable and uncontrollable future. Religion has the potential for stabilizing, but religious leaders will need to reignite a faith in the future to make this happen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Soziologie is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Europe has been hit by a global financial crisis, and so has Germany. This crisis is associated, among European Union citizens, with the degree of support for European integration: those who are skeptical about the Euro and the debt crises in parts of the Eurozone tend also to be skeptical about European integration more generally. Our main question in this article is whether the pledges of political parties (as issued in their election manifestos) can add to our understanding of electoral choices in Germany. Relating German election results to the German data provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project MRG/CMP/MARPOR research tradition, our expectation is that political parties' European pledges have been irrelevant for the vote over half a century. Now that the European Union is rapidly moving in its postfunctional phase, the election of 2013 is expected to mark a turning point in that regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]