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This essay offers a discussion and contextualisation of a series of letters exchanged between Jordi Cat and Paul Feyerabend from 1989 to 1994. These letters provide insights into Feyerabend’s later thought on a variety of themes including quantum holism, the disunity of science, the development of logical empiricism, and science activism. In doing so, we provide some original analysis and exegesis of Feyerabend’s evolving views on scientific methodology and quantum mechanics by focusing on Feyerabend’s changing attitudes towards Bohm, Bohr, and his eventual colleague Hans Primas and his later sympathies with the algebraic approach. We also highlight Feyerabend’s role in the growth of the Disunity of Science movement and how he connected disunity to practical considerations in the philosophy of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author examines how social roles give individuals reasons to act. It discusses philosopher Bernard Williams' analysis of Owen Wingrave who hates everything about military life, the ethical significance of xiao or familial deference in Confucian ethical life, and the trust to individuals who share similar experiences in social relationships to offer advice specific to social roles.

According to Act Consequentialism, an act is right if and only if its outcome is not worse than the outcome of any alternative to that act. This view, however, leads to deontic paradoxes if the alternatives to an act are all other acts that can be done in the situation. A typical response is to only apply this rightness criterion to maximally specific acts and to take the alternatives to a maximally specific act to be the other maximally specific acts that can be done in the situation. (This view can then be supplanted by a separate account for the rightness of acts that are not maximally specific.) This paper defends a rival view, Binary Act Consequentialism, where, for any voluntary act, that act is right if and only if its outcome is not worse than the outcome of not doing that act. Binary Act Consequentialism, which dates back to Jeremy Bentham, has few supporters. A number of seemingly powerful objections have been considered fatal. In this paper, I rebut these objections and put forward a positive argument for the view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Rainer Forst, a critical theory of power must break with the tendency of political theorists to conceive of power in opposition to normativity. Appropriately, Forst proposes a noumenal definition according to which power is normative: It works through recognition of reasons and is thereby open to critical assessment. In this discussion note, I first clarify the normativity of power in Forst's noumenal theory by means of Donald Davidson's theory of action and then explain how theory of action leads to a different understanding of force and violence from Forst's noumenal theory. In doing this, I find reason to endorse a non-normative definition of power on the lines proposed by Robert Dahl and endorsed by most authors in analytical political theory. This definition nevertheless remains faithful to Forst's methodological guideline that a theory of power must keep in view the relations between power and normativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question "what connection is there between our answer to the question of what we are, and the question, what our actions are?" Suppose that actions are reflexive changes of agents. On that supposition, there would be a direct connection between the answers to those two questions. An action of mine will be a reflexive change of me, and what I am will fix the nature of those changes. I hold that supposition to be true and consider reasons in favor of believing it. However, the paper is not primarily aimed at defense of that thesis. It rather concerned with exploring what consequences accepting it has for the competing notions of what we are, given what we ordinarily think actions are, and bringing to light a tension between thinking of actions as reflexive changes of agents in this way, and a kind of causal understanding of actions that is prevalent. What emerges is that we should shift where we start our theorizing: we cannot assume that action theory primarily involves the task of characterizing the relation between an agent and changes caused, rather than a characterization of a particular kind of relation between the agent and herself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent's sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there is a mismatch between attempt and result; in bad luck the external world thwarts goal-achievement within the agent's sphere of competence, in good luck the external world assists goal-achievement beyond the agent's sphere of competence. Fateful events are those where, more passively, the agent finds the external world achieving or frustrating their goals. Fortune concerns the contraction and expansion of the agent's sphere of competence. Eight reasons are given for accepting the account; its theoretical virtues and various things it explains. Lastly, three objections are answered; that the tychic properties relate to well-being rather than agency, that there are alternative theories of fortune available in the contemporary literature, that the account draws arbitrary distinctions between synonyms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action, by contrast, seems incomplete if it does not consider this. Are there two free will problems, one normative and one metaphysical? If so, they share such terms as ‘could’ and ‘could not’, and thoughtful non‐philosophers question their own normative assumptions once they understand the metaphysical problem determinism poses for the philosophy of action. This paper distinguishes metaphysical from action‐theoretic elements of the free will problem but also connects the metaphysical issues with normative questions about responsibility; it critically appraises some major metaphysical arguments concerning free action; and—to the extent possible in a single paper—it provides a positive account of free action neutral toward determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The disappearing agent problem is an argument in the metaphysics of agency. Proponents of the agent-causal approach argue that the rival event-causal approach fails to account for the fact that an agent is active. This paper examines an analogy between this disappearing agent problem and the exclusion problem in the metaphysics of mind. I develop the analogy between these two problems and survey existing solutions. I suggest that some solutions that have received significant attention in response to the exclusion problem have seen considerably less attention in response to the disappearing agent problem. For example, one solution to the exclusion problem is to reject the exclusion assumption. Analogously, one solution to the disappearing agent problem could be to deny the claim that the agent-causal approach and the event-causal approach are mutually exclusive. Similarly, proportionality theories of causation, a solution to the exclusion problem, can be transferred to the disappearing agent problem. After establishing the plausibility of the analogy between the two problems, I examine how this latter solution in particular can be transferred from the one problem to the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna's views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of 'empty intentionality'. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental representation of that thing, and (3) a direct relation to the essence of that thing. Empty intentionality does not involve the first element. Moreover, depending on the nature of the non-existent we are thinking about, the third element may not be involved either. Thus, the necessary element of being in an intentional state towards something is to be related to a mental representation of that thing. The nature of this representation may vary depending on the nature of the non-existent towards which our thought is directed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to relate the emerging field of community psychology with the philosophical thoughts of Wonhyo, a prominent figure in Korean Buddhism, from the aspect of their common orientation, to explore the development of both Buddhist philosophy and psychological research. The integration of modern psychology and Buddhist theory has only recently begun. In community psychology, there is a continuous need for the complementation of theory and case studies, and within Buddhism, there is a need to academically and popularly expand the advantages of Buddhist teachings. Furthermore, this research is believed to significantly contribute to the theory and practice of community problem-solving, which modern society demands. The characteristics of community psychology that differ from previous psychological research are twofold. First, it conducts a balanced examination of individuals and structures, moving away from the individual-centric focus of traditional psychology. Second, it emphasizes practice beyond theory, diverging from the theory-heavy focus of prior studies. Wonhyo's philosophy is particularly well-suited to these characteristics. In the discussion, the theoretical contributions of Buddhism to community psychology are examined, based on Wonhyo's philosophy, with a focus on the two main features mentioned above. This includes discussions on Buddhist introspection and the pursuit of enlightenment, grounded in a Mahāyāna perspective of the interdependent nature of the One Dharma world and the Bodhisattva path. The study further explores Wonhyo's philosophy and practical examples pertinent to community psychology. Specifically, this examination focuses on the community's psychological characteristics and practical examples demonstrated in Wonhyo's concepts of 'One Mind', 'Harmonizing Disputes (Hwajaeng)', and 'Non-hindrance', categorizing them into individual and community aspects. Through this research, it is confirmed that the personal cultivation and community contributions of Buddhism are vividly present in Wonhyo's theory and deeds. Particularly, Wonhyo's philosophy and actions, embodying the benefits of humanistic and relational Buddhism, are expected to contribute significantly to the problem-solving of modern society and the academic advancement in community psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the notion of the “sphere of action” (sphaera activitatis) as developed by a group of seventeenth-century Jesuit intellectuals: Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, and Compton. The problem inherited from fourteenth-century natural philosophers was to describe natural action which is spatially limited and decreases with distance at a regular rate. To capture natural patterns, scholastic philosophers introduced various forms of regularity or “uniformity,” the relevant type for the present context being “uniform difformity.” While the scholastic tradition also defined more sophisticated forms of regularity, these were not part of the discussion in the analyzed corpus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental stewardship is a term describing both the philosophy and the actions required to protect, restore, and sustainably use natural resources for the future benefit of the environment and society. In this paper, we review the environmental science literature to map the types of practical actions that are identified as 'environmental stewardship' using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines for scoping reviews. We specifically mapped: 1) the type of actions and outcomes targeting the natural environment that have been categorized as environmental stewardship, 2) the main actors, and the underlying factors influencing their environmental stewardship actions, and 3) the methods used to mobilize environmental stewardship actions once these factors are known. From the 77 selected articles, we found the term environmental stewardship encompassed a multitude of different actions, undertaken by a range of actors and addressing an array of issues that impact biodiversity on the land and in the water. These stewardship actions were conducted on both privately-owned and publicly managed lands and waterways, and across rural and urban landscapes. Despite many studies identifying characteristics and underlying behavioral factors that predicted actors' participation in stewardship actions, there were few studies formally evaluating interventions to increase stewardship. Our review highlighted the term environmental stewardship is not embraced by all and is viewed by some as being inconsistent with aspects of indigenous worldviews. A better understanding of the concept of environmental stewardship and continued practical research into its practice is fundamental to empowering people to demand and enact environmental stewardship as well as for evaluating the success of their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This conceptual paper presents the analytical theory of agency (ATA), an overlooked philosophical approach to the concept of action, to develop its theoretical basis in routines research in which the constructs of action and agency play crucial roles. It expounds, in the framework of ATA, the ideas of the spectrum of intentionality, kinds of action, and collective agency, which help advance the rigor of action-theoretical concepts in routines research as well as reveal the rationale of the microfoundational approach to routine actions. To uncover the developmental potential of ATA, the article discusses the most crucial conceptual challenges for routines research; it also briefly examines the limitations and future work related to using ATA in the management field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The implementation of Video Assistant Referees (VARs) in 2018 has had a significant impact on the multi-billion-dollar soccer industry. As the most popular and watched sport globally, soccer's financial stakes are high, with clubs, leagues, broadcasters, sponsors, and fans heavily invested in the game. The ongoing debate surrounding the VAR system brings to light the intricate balance between preserving the authenticity of football (soccer) and harnessing technology to improve accuracy. It is crucial to strike the right equilibrium in order to uphold football's metaphorical power and sustain the timeless joy it has brought to fans throughout generations. In this context, Immanuel Kant's philosophy can offer valuable insights into the utilization of VARs in soccer. According to Kantian ethics, using VARs can be justified if it serves to enhance fairness and accuracy, aligning with the moral duties of referees. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the potential dehumanizing effects and the necessity of preserving the value of human judgment in the game. Therefore, this paper aims to explore in-depth the intricate dynamics that arise when technology is integrated into traditional practices, emphasizing the significance of critical reflection on the implications of such advancements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studii de Ştiintă şi Cultură is the property of Studii de Stiinta si Cultura and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Risk‐targeted spectra for seismic design have been proposed in earthquake engineering literature to harmonize seismic reliability for different structures designed at different sites. Such a proposal has been motivated by the fact that designing for uniform seismic hazard across building sites has been shown to generally lead to non‐uniform seismic risk. This note uses a case study implementation of the risk‐targeted design actions philosophy for seven Italian sites, to showcase two noteworthy practical issues with this otherwise appealing approach. First, at lower‐to‐moderate‐hazard sites, which may be the majority in a country, design against gravity loads and detailing according to minimum code requirements, can result in higher‐than‐anticipated overstrength, not commensurate with the adopted level of seismic design loads, thus deviating from the target reliability. This leaves only higher‐hazard sites with real margins for homogenization of reliability, which raises the bar. Second, risk‐targeted spectrum approaches typically require some a‐priori assumptions for structural fragility at low‐performance objectives, corresponding to alleged high damage. These assumptions, among others, carry an implicit adoption of shaking intensity measures with which to express fragility, whose lack of sufficiency and efficiency may in turn reduce the level of homogenization of risk that can be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout his career, Michael Bratman has developed a detailed model of individual 'planning agency', and, more recently, models of joint action and aspects of social life that he argues such planning agency helps support. How might we empirically investigate whether these models capture what is going on in actual human lives? In this article, we critically engage with this broad question by focusing on what Bratman calls the 'core capacity thesis', which is at the center of his most recent discussions of how his work in the philosophy of action hangs together. In his own words, the core capacity thesis claims that 'our capacity for planning agency plays basic roles in multiple, interrelated systems of human, mind‐shaped practical organization, individual and social'. We explore how one might go about testing this thesis, focusing on Bratman's particular way of defending this thesis using the idea of 'nested Cummins functions'. In so doing, we hope to contribute to a broader discussion about what the relationship is (or, perhaps more importantly, should be) between the kind of philosophy of action Bratman does and empirical work in fields such as psychology, cognitive science, and biology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti‐individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our capacity for planning agency is a core capacity that underlies interrelated forms of mind‐shaped practical organization: cross‐temporal organization of individual agency, shared agency, social rules, and rule‐guided organized institutions. A function of our capacity for planning agency is the support of these forms of practical organization. I highlight Peter Godfrey‐Smith's contrast between the 'Wright function' of something as 'the effect it has which explains why it is there' and 'Cummins functions' that 'are capacities or effects of components of systems, which are salient in the explanation of capacities of the larger system'. Drawing on Paul Grice's strategy of 'creature construction', I articulate a sequence of nested constructions: from temporally extended planning agency to shared agency to shared policies to social rules to rule‐guided organized institutions. We see our capacity for planning agency as part of an explanation of how we achieve such practical organization, and as having nested Cummins functions of supporting those forms of organization. This sheds light on related ideas in H.L.A. Hart's theory of law, a challenge from J. David Velleman, the centrality of such forms of organization to the philosophy of action, and the moral and political significance of our capacity for planning agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I defend a novel way of working out the Balancing View of Ought, that is, the view that whether one ought to take some action depends on nothing but the balance of the reasons for the action and those against it or for its alternatives. I show that the Balancing View needs to be complemented by certain principles of reason transmission, at least one of which might seem rather surprising. The result is an attractive theoretical package that allows for compelling explanations of noteworthy normative phenomena, including ones that the Balancing View has been claimed to be at odds with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a novel solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem that afflicts Fitting-Attitude analyses of value. I argue that we can distinguish reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind by being clear about what our reasons are for. In Wrong Kind of Reason cases, our reason to have a certain affective attitude is a reason for an action , and it is this category-mistake that is the source of the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: Aesthetics; agency; games; phenomenal experience; C. Thi Nguyen EN Aesthetics agency games phenomenal experience C. Thi Nguyen 380 391 12 12/22/21 20211101 NES 211101 In his fascinating new book I Games: Agency as Art i , C. Thi Nguyen claims that games construct and frame forms of human agency in a way that gives rise to a genuine I aesthetics i of agency. Three extensions of Nguyen's view I'll argue that the aesthetics of agency can incorporate three elements Nguyen left out: emotions of agency, patterns of attention, and affordances. Like Dewey, Nguyen begins with a refreshingly expansive understanding of those experiences that can have (or confer on their objects) genuine aesthetic value.[2] What Dewey left out, according to Nguyen, is the role of a I player i in a game. This is a tall order, but Nguyen does constrain his task: 'I don't mean to imply that aesthetic experiences are essential to art, nor to claim that games' sole purpose is to provide aesthetic experiences', he writes. [Extracted from the article]

When spontaneous expressions such as smiling or crying have been at issue in Anglophone philosophy of action, the touchstone has been Donald Davidson's belief-desire account of action. In this essay, I take a different approach. I use Elizabeth Anscombe's formal conception of intentional action to capture the distinction and unity between intentional action and spontaneous expression. Anscombe's strategy is to restrict her inquiry to the class of acts to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' has application. Applying Anscombe's strategy to an area she did not consider other than by contrast, I argue that spontaneous expressions are subject to a different but intimately related why-question. Both questions elicit non-observational knowledge. But where the question posed to intentional actions opens up a means-end order (an order of practical reasoning) this is not true of the corresponding question for spontaneous expressions. Our explanations of our own spontaneous expressions have conceptual and normative dimensions, but they do not display an inferential order. Anscombe, taking a formulation from Aquinas, describes practical knowledge as the cause of what it understands. I conclude by arguing that this formulation also holds true of our understanding of our own smiles and episodes of crying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• ACT has commitments to values not commonly associated with science. • The psychometrics of its measures undermines ACT research. • ACT contains a problematic commitment to Machiavellian values. • A commitment to open science could improve ACT research. • An avoidance of questionable research practices would improve ACT research. How good is the science in the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) program? This article examines ACT philosophy, theory, and research on five dimensions: (1) the quality of its meta-science; (2) the clarity of its constructs; (3) the psychometrics of its principal measures; (4) the adequacy of its account of values; and (5) the quality of its research. Significant problems are found in each dimension, and suggestions for improvements are offered. ACT aligns with a Machiavellianism that is problematic in accurately describing these commitments and constituting a meta-stance that permits problematic values to be embraced. Relatedly, there is evidence of a positive bias in ACT research that has been ignored methodologically and in summaries of ACT. These problems justify significant skepticism regarding any claims from the science associated with ACT. Avoiding questionable research practices, psychometrically problematic measures, and research designs that weaken valid causal inference is recommended. Finally, an increased commitment to open science, intellectual humility, and severe testing is recommended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• RFT is arguably not sufficiently well-supported and its links to ACT are tenuous. • Most studies of ACT's core process have accidentally measured Neuroticism instead. • One cannot engage in valued action without having value clarity. • ACT's underlying philosophy may negatively affect the therapeutic process. A large array of randomized controlled trials and meta-analyses have determined the efficacy of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). However, determining that ACT works does not tell us how it works. This is especially important to understand given the current emphasis on Process-Based Therapy, the promise of which is to identify manipulable causal mediators of change in psychotherapy, and how their effectiveness is moderated by individual contexts. This paper outlines four key areas of concern regarding ACT's status as a Process-Based Therapy. First, the relationship between ACT and Relational Frame Theory has been widely asserted but not yet properly substantiated. Second, most of the studies on ACT's core process of change, psychological flexibility, have used invalid measures. Third, while lots of research indicates means by which individuals can be helped to behave consistently with their values, there is virtually no research on how to help people effectively clarify their values in the first instance, or indeed, on an iterative basis. Finally, the philosophy underlying ACT permits a-moral instrumentalism, presenting several ethical challenges. We end by making several recommendations for coherent methodological, conceptual, and practical progress within ACT research and therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this capacity to intervene does not amount to agential control or action. I illustrate this with a case study of how passive breathing, a mere behavior, is misclassified by mere capacity views. I end by revisiting the central alternative to mere capacity views: causal control views. Advances in our understanding of how agents exert control over unfolding movements indicate that the nature of control is characterized by ubiquitous, small-scale causal interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the relationship between ethical actions and the reasons behind them, exploring whether actions' ethical properties are explained by the ethical properties of non-actions or by other factors. Topics include contrasting perspectives on this explanation from Kantians and Mooreans; an argument against the Deontic Primacy of Actions; and the role of judgment-sensitive attitudes in determining an agent's ethical obligations and actions.

The paper seeks to contribute to clarifying agnotology as an 'epistemic strategy', conceived as 'epistemically damaging and hurt[ing] the production of knowledge'. My general claim is that the grammar of intentions 'embedded' in agnotological arguments is often not considered accurately. I use considerations from the philosophy of action as a theoretical framework to make more explicit what is implied in agnogenetic manoeuvres. Agnotology, as a 'theory' about epistemic states, in particular knowledge and ignorance, would be seriously incomplete without that component. The following can thus be read as a contribution to an analysis of the presuppositions of the strategic variant of Agnotology. My first claim is that the more common objections to the introduction of intentions are in no way definitive. My second, more specific, claim is that we need a room, in our conceptual toolbox, for 'anti-epistemic intentions', which play a key role in agnotological arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Collective impact cases are situations where people collectively bring about a morally significant outcome by each acting in a certain way, and yet each individual action seems to make no, or almost no difference to the outcome. Intuitively, the beneficial or harmful outcomes give individuals moral reason to act (or refrain from acting) in collective impact situations. However, if the individual action does not make a difference to the outcome, it is not clear what those moral reasons are. The problem of collective impact is the challenge of identifying such moral reasons. Julia Nefsky has presented an account of how an individual action can help without making a difference – call it the Helping Account – that claims to provide a general solution to the problem of collective impact while avoiding problems faced by previously suggested solutions. I present an internal critique of Nefsky's work. First, I argue that, based on the problems that Nefsky has raised against previously suggested solutions, three success conditions for a general solution to the problem of collective impact can be formulated: The Weightiness condition, the Generalizability condition, and the Connectedness condition. Second, I argue that the Helping Account fails to satisfy the three success conditions, thereby failing, by Nefsky's own standards, to provide a general solution to the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resultant moral luck occurs whenever aspects of an agent's moral responsibility are affected by luck pertaining to the outcomes of their actions. Many authors reject the existence of moral luck in this sense, but they do so in different ways. Michael Zimmerman argues that resultant luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. That is, it affects what agents are responsible for, but not how responsible they are. Andrew Khoury takes a more resolute approach, arguing that both the scope and the degree of moral responsibility are free from resultant luck. In this paper, I criticize both accounts and develop an alternative. I argue, first, that Khoury's approach leads to an implausibly far-reaching error-theory about moral responsibility. Second, Zimmerman's account cannot account for all the ways in which moral responsibility comes in degrees. Third, these problems can be overcome by introducing a distinction between two concepts of responsibility that both come with scope and degree. The first concept I call internal responsibility, as it applies exclusively to agent-internal factors. The second concept I call external responsibility, as it applies to (partly) agent-external factors such as actions and their outcomes. Given this distinction, we can avoid the problems of Khoury's as well as Zimmerman's accounts while preserving the central intuition behind the rejection of resultant moral luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shared intentionality is a specific form of shared agency where a group can be understood to have an intention. It has been conjectured that humans are better equipped for collaboration than other animals because humans but not other great apes share intentions. However, exporting shared intentionality from a debate about the ontology of mental state attributions like intentions to groups does not seamlessly lend itself to evolutionary science. To explore and de-center the implicit assumptions of Western conceptions of cooperation, I look at Zhuangzi’s philosophy of (in)action. This philosophy treats the actions of individuals as always a form of co-action alongside other agencies to whom one must adapt. Thinking of collaboration as a product of skillful co-action, not shared intention, sidesteps asking about cooperation in “kinds” or levels. Instead, it directs attention to the know-how and behavioral flexibility needed to make our constant coordination adaptive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a program of action for the philosophy of regulatory science, based on a general theory of social epistemology. Two candidates are considered. The first one, offered by Alvin Goldman, is not fit for our purposes because it is focused on a veritism incompatible with non‐epistemic aims of regulatory science. The second, championed by Steve Fuller, sociologically investigates the existing means of producing knowledge, to modify them with the goal of obtaining democratic aims through action on a legislative meta‐level. The program has been built upon this procedure, instantiated by the identification, characterization, and modification of epistemic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the received view, philosophy of action took a justified turn towards causalism because anti‐causalists failed the causalist challenge about efficacious reasons. This paper contests that view by examining the ways in which Georg Henrik von Wright responded to causalism in his later philosophy. First, von Wright attacked the subjectivism of causalism by arguing for an objectivist view that construes reasons not as subjective mental states but as external facts of the agent's situation. Second, von Wright fundamentally disagreed with the view of philosophical inquiry that underpinned causalism. For von Wright, the task of philosophy was conceptual: to explicate what one is looking for when one is looking for the real reasons for action. In contrast, for causalists the task was ontological: to determine what kind of item in the world the real reason for action is. Examining von Wright's account contributes to contemporary assessments of the metaphilosophical dimension of the reasons/causes debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is carried out in the sphere of the anthropological field of culture, focusing on the artistic and political practices of actionism as a special manifestation of individual's subjectivity. The philosophy of action and intersubjectivism allow us to consider a person as a singular agent living in a performative space of interaction. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyze various types of actionist practices and the subsequent logical justification of the performative paradigm in modern philosophy, the new concept of the body and the phenomenon of agency characteristic of it. Also, the purpose is a comparative analysis of actionist and judicial practices in terms of their forms, means and goals. The question of the attribution and conceptuality of body in legal proceedings is investigated, the performative nature of law-asevent is substantiated. In the course of the work, the authors turn to the theory of criminal procedure law in the aspect of performative actionism as a tactic for the implementation of right. In this study, the concept of intersubjectivism of legal bodies in the metamodern paradigm is further developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What mental states are required for an agent to know-how to perform an action? This question fuels one of the hottest debates in the current literature on philosophy of action. Answering this question means facing what we call here The Challenge of Format Dualism, which consists in establishing which is the format of the mental representations involved in practical knowledge and, in case they are given in more than one format, explaining how these different formats can interlock. This challenge has generated two parallel debates: the debate between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism on the one hand, and the debate on the Interface Problem on the other. While the former is about whether practical knowledge can be considered a species of propositional knowledge, the latter investigates how motoric and propositional states can be related. Here we offer a unified account capable of explicitly analyzing those two problems within the same philosophical framework. Our account suggests a new way for solving the Interface Problem that paves the way for addressing the debate between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are there things that we must never do, no matter how untypical the circumstances and "unorthodox" our deontic ideas might be? In this essay I try to make evident that acts I call "pure sadist acts" satisfy this description. I discuss several examples of such acts and alert to their being not always easy to distinguish from certain others. Norms prohibiting such acts I call "true", and I suggest that other, less suggestive, norms might also be (derivatively) true, if the pertinent acts stand in certain relations with the former ones. I incorporate some ideas from Hume, as well as from elementary model theory, to make mine clearer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the features that distinguish acting jointly from acting in parallel but merely individually. Topics discussed include states of the agent and their explanatory relation to acting jointly, competing attempts to characterise a single phenomenon, and mechanistically neutral strategy for characterising acting jointly.

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Noncognitivism about normative judgment is the view that normative judgment is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit. Noncognitivism about intention (also called the "distinctive practical attitude" theory) is the view that intention is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit. While these theories are alike in several ways, they have rarely been discussed in concert. This paper studies the relation between these two theories, focusing on the question of whether noncognitivism about intention faces an analogue of the well-known Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivism about normative judgment. I argue that whether it faces the Frege-Geach problem depends on how it treats the distinction between what Anscombe called expressions of intention and personal predictions. I show that there is substantial pressure to treat that distinction as semantic, and that a variant of the Frege-Geach problem arises for versions of noncognitivism about intention that go this route. Yet some philosophers of action may be willing to resist this pressure, and I develop a pragmatic account of the distinction that would allow such philosophers to avoid the Frege-Geach problem altogether. I argue that this pragmatic account has significant independent appeal. Notably, it provides a way for noncognitivists about intention to undercut the force of a recent argument for cognitivism due to Berislav Marušić and John Schwenkler. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beyond revealing unconscious pathological identifications and traits—including their past usefulness but current toxicity—what techniques in our psychoanalytic practice can lead to change? Radically different from mainstream philosophical views advocating that such undesirable self-aspects should not be endorsed as Self, psychoanalysts hold that these negative traits must instead be understood as part of one's Self. But then what? Investigating concepts from classical conditioning, neuroscience, the philosophy of mind and action, and psychoanalytic practice itself, this article will suggest a preliminary account of the mechanism of action of psychoanalytic work after insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges the widespread assumption that terrorist ideology was invented in the mid-nineteenth century by figures such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin. Instead, the article argues, the foundations of terrorism were laid at the end of the eighteenth century by the Enlightenment philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte and his disciples, who in turn exerted a strong influence on later radical thinkers. In showing how the intellectual reverberations of the French Revolution gave rise to anarchist ideology as well as actual acts of terrorism in Germany, the article traces the link between the state terror of the French Revolution and the emergence of insurgent terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]