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This article examines the emergence of Austria-Hungary from the perspective of uneven and combined development (UCD), which unifies social and geopolitical modes of explanation. It argues that UCD can explain the 'paradoxical' role of Hungary, a relatively backward society that was at the forefront of the 1848 revolutions and the political reorganisation of the Austrian Empire in 1867. However, it maintains that potentials of UCD have not been realised even in recent UCD interpretations of the Monarchy due to declinist assumptions. The article argues that the international management of UCD via the Concert of Europe inflated Austrian power, but could not prevent sociopolitical change, laying the ground work for its later deflation. The Austrian Empire also faced the challenge of revolutionary Hungary. The article demonstrates that its intersocietally generated peculiarities resulted in the gentry initiating the transition to capitalism to counter the geopolitical threat of industrialising Austria and arrest its social decline. Despite defeating Hungary and introducing capitalist social relations, the strength of Austrian dynasticism prevented the emergence of a hegemonic bloc and political stabilisation. It was this political weakness rather than economic backwardness that might better explain its expulsion from Germany in 1866. The article then turns to a comparison of the political economies of Prussia/Germany and Austria-Hungary and questions the overemphasis on Austro-Hungarian backwardness. By offering a new interpretation of Austria-Hungary, the article contributes to a rethinking of nineteenth century international relations and the long-term causes of World War 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concert of Europe was a system that was built for the purpose of maintaining the status quo between the European states and the means by which the system rested were constructed during the course of the Congress of Vienna. The Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance (later Quintet) not only enabled Europe's Great Powers to cooperate in building and maintaining order, but also succeeded in creating common values that would keep cooperation alive. While the liberal and nationalist ideas brought by the French Revolution and spread by Napoleon's campaigns were alive both in European societies and on the political map drawn by Napoleon in 1815, the victorious major powers were aware that the peace was to be established both by the suppression of these ideas and by reformation of the map. For this reason, the absolutist values and structure before the French Revolution formed the reference points that would form the basis of the new peace. This article aims to analyze the peace on which the so-called European Harmony is based, within the framework of international relations literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conflicting combination of Old and New Diplomacy imparted to the Versailles treaty, through numerous compromises, a flexibility which tends to be overlooked and which was meant also to gain time in face of quite rabid Allied public opinion in 1919. Many provisions could be modified (reparations for instance), many delays could be shortened (as the occupation of the Rhineland). The treaty could be implemented harshly, as in 1921-1923,1 or more leniently, as after Locarno (1925).2 It was one of the few great international treaties which contained the means for its revision. It is not true that all the disasters of the 1930s were implied by the treaties, even if their legacy was much more short-lived and less successful than that of the Vienna Congress.

Modern political thinkers have ushered in the theoretical concepts of modern alliances and collective security/defense. Before these political theories were turned into modern organizations, many radical changes had to take place in how international relations were perceived in Europe and the world. These dynamic changes started at the end of the Thirty Years War, with the signing of the Westphalia treaties in 1648, and came to fruition with the forming of the League of Nations in 1920. This article explores this 272 year historical process including its impact on the population of the Baltic Sea countries.

The article provides a critical analysis of the interpretations of the Concert of Europe by British and American historians of the XXth century. The interest in the study of this phenomenon is rooted in its relation to the problems of the maintenance of international order and stability. It is not only academic, being partly determined by the fact that throughout the XX century first Britain and then the USA was at the top of the world hierarchy, and accordingly played a leading role in the construction and maintenance of the European order. Current international environment, the experience of the two World Wars of the XXth century determined the angle from which the phenomenon of the Concert of Europe was studied. Whereas in the second half of the 1910s - early 1920s historians pointed to the deficiencies of the international system of the preceding century (and in particular, the institution of the Concert of Europe), the students of the Vienna system working after the Second World War regarded the period of 1815-1914 as relatively stable, compared to the short interwar interlude. The Concert of Europe was named as one of the factors contributing to stability and peace. Certain logic can be discerned in the development of the historiography of the problem, which to some degree reflected the evolution of ideas about international relations management. At the same time, the differences in the interpretations of the Concert of Europe derive from the fact that this very concept in the XIXth century was not fixed and static. Great Powers' readiness to cooperation did not mean that there were no conflicts of interests. They struggled for leadership within the Concert and sought to impart to it their own interpretation.

The article provides a critical analysis of the interpretations of the Concert of Europe by British and American historians of the XXth century. The interest in the study of this phenomenon is rooted in its relation to the problems of the maintenance of international order and stability. It is not only academic, being partly determined by the fact that throughout the XX century first Britain and then the USA was at the top of the world hierarchy, and accordingly played a leading role in the construction and maintenance of the European order. Current international environment, the experience of the two World Wars of the XXth century determined the angle from which the phenomenon of the Concert of Europe was studied. Whereas in the second half of the 1910s - early 1920s historians pointed to the deficiencies of the international system of the preceding century (and in particular, the institution of the Concert of Europe), the students of the Vienna system working after the Second World War regarded the period of 1815-1914 as relatively stable, compared to the short interwar interlude. The Concert of Europe was named as one of the factors contributing to stability and peace. Certain logic can be discerned in the development of the historiography of the problem, which to some degree reflected the evolution of ideas about international relations management. At the same time, the differences in the interpretations of the Concert of Europe derive from the fact that this very concept in the XIXth century was not fixed and static. Great Powers' readiness to cooperation did not mean that there were no conflicts of interests. They struggled for leadership within the Concert and sought to impart to it their own interpretation.

This article investigates British policy fluctuations regarding the Cretan Question from 1893 to 1913 by examining Great Britain’s participation in the European Concert, as well as its plans to achieve an economic foothold in Crete. Running parallel, these two factors expose the critical factors determining British policy through an analysis of the development of British international relations in the Levant and the fulfilment of the City’s investment plans in Crete. Moreover, the examination of British policy regarding the Cretan issue helps explain why and to what degree London shifted from a soft to a hard-line exercise of power towards the key aspects of the Cretan problem. The article closes by suggesting that Britain’s main priority was to avoid diplomatic isolation over the Eastern Question, while maintaining closer relations with Russia, and re-entering the arena of the Eastern Question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interplay between international society and world society during the Greek War of Independence. It argues that the Philhellenist movement represented a European world society, which politically engaged with European international society in an effort to influence the latter's policies pertaining to the Greek case. As a result, a tension between the two emerged. The independence of Greece constituted a major illustration of the European Concert in action. However, European world society played a major role in the final outcome. Not only did European world society provided the means to the Greeks to pursue their cause but, most importantly, kept the hope of independence alive even at times when the Greek revolt appeared to be dead. Moreover, European world society served as an additional factor in the calculations of European powers, thereby exercising considerable influence over the decisions and actions of the governments of the European powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A causal explanation provides information about the causal history of whatever is being explained. However, most causal histories extend back almost infinitely and can be described in almost infinite detail. Causal explanations therefore involve choices about which elements of causal histories to pick out. These choices are pragmatic: they reflect our explanatory interests. When adjudicating between competing causal explanations, we must therefore consider not only questions of epistemic adequacy (whether or not we have good grounds for identifying certain factors as causes), but also questions of pragmatic adequacy (whether or not the aspects of the causal history picked out are salient to our explanatory interests). Recognising that causal explanations differ pragmatically as well as epistemically is crucial for identifying what is at stake in competing explanations of the relative peacefulness of the nineteenth-century Concert system. It is also crucial for understanding how explanations of past events can inform policy prescription. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a case in which Swiss law did not define sufficient safeguards against arbitrary interference. It asserts the secret surveillance of activities of social-insurance claimant by private investigators recruited by her insurance company is not lawful, violating Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It adds that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) considers that the private insurance company is a public authority.

This article considers what the nineteenth century can tell us about the nature of great power management under conditions of ambiguity in relation to the holders of great power status. It charts the development of an institutionalised role for the great powers as managers of international society but with a specific focus on the mutual recognition, and conferral, of status. Such a focus highlights the changing, and sometimes competing, perceptions of not only which states should be thought of as great powers, but also therefore whether the power structure of international society remained multipolar or shifted towards bipolarity or even unipolarity. The article argues that a ‘golden age’ of great power management existed during a period in which perceptions of great power status were in fact more fluid than the standard literature accounts for. This means that predictions surrounding the imminent demise of the social institution of great power management under an increasingly ambiguous interstate order today may well be misplaced. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The debate on the reform of the Security Council can be conceptualised as the most recent episode in the evolution of World Governing Councils (WGCs), that is, the highest-level intergovernmental bodies charged with regulating the international use of violence. Building on a historical comparison of key formative and transformative moments – 1815, 1919, 1945, and post-Cold War – we argue that the modern evolution of WGCs is characterised by increasing inclusiveness. More specifically, we show that the number of participants involved in deliberations has constantly risen; that legitimating principles have gradually tilted in favour of ‘input legitimacy’; that the constitutive rules and procedures have steadily gained in transparency; and that the WGCs themselves have comprised an expanding membership with a decreasing number of veto points. At the theoretical level, these converging trends can be explained by the existence of a ‘ratchet effect’ whereby new norms and practices of inclusion accumulate over time. However concrete and long lasting, the democratic gains registered in the process must be cast in terms of historically specific politics and struggles rather than in terms of lofty ideals promoted by altruistic norm entrepreneurs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses world politics, with a particular focus on attitudes towards and reactions against U.S. power. According to the author, the world is emerging from a unique period of Unipolar Concert, characterized by widespread acceptance of U.S. power and international leadership. Details on increasing counterbalancing and revisionism against U.S. power from countries such as Russia and China are presented. It is suggested that the U.S. must modify its grand strategy in order to adapt to the changing international order. Other topics include the 19th-century political era known as the Concert of Europe, the Cold War, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Concert of Powers has emerged as an attractive modality in global governance. As an emerging power, China must seriously take this template into account. This article seeks to analyze the incentives, possibilities, and uncertainties for China to participate in Concert with reference to China's history memory on Concert, China's intellectual endeavors, as well as China's evolving foreign preferences. It concludes that China is generally qualified and capable of being a key participant in Concert of Powers with increasing willingness. Yet, China's involvement depends on 1) if Concert template can overcome its own deficiencies; 2) if Concert have competitive advantages compared with other governance alternatives for China; and 3) if China can keep its momentum on both willingness and capacity in power transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the fall of 1918, after over four years of war, the cohesion of Austria-Hungary collapsed. In the aftermath of the Great War, Burgenland (Western Hungary) was part of a pattern of complex territorial issues, though it was actually the smallest disputed territory between Hungary and her successor states. The region became a disputed land after the Allied Supreme Council recommended the transfer of most of it to Austria. The internal crisis in Budapest, the Habsburg restoration attempts and the activities of many militia on the ground led to an extremely dangerous situation. Diplomatic and direct military involvement of the Powers eventually resolved the issue with an agreement providing for a plebiscite on the fate of Sopron and the other smaller towns of the region. At least until 1921 Western Hungary represented an element of destabilization in Europe, while its partition was a significant event in the evolution of relations between the two new states of Hungary and Austria, and a testing ground for European diplomacy. The purpose of this article is to highlight the role of Italy in these complex events and to elucidate the contribution of its military in the formulation of clearer political strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A speech given by naval historian N. A. M. Rodger on the pitfalls of historical analogy, or using history to predict future events, at the International Seapower Symposium on October 20, 2011, is presented. Historical events discussed by Rodger include the Concert of Europe following the Napoleonic Wars and 19th-century British trade. He believes that a comparison of the early 21st century and the 19th century is apt and demonstrates the possibility for a large war.

The article examines the role and political influence of European diplomats in determining foreign policy in the context of the Concert of Europe and the relations of the European great powers to the Ottoman Empire. The author focuses on the institutionalized consultations of the Austrian, British, and German ambassadors in Istanbul, Turkey, in the context of the Greco-Turkish conflict about the island of Crete, Greece, in 1896. In addition, the public finances of and Western economic interests and neo-imperialism in the Ottoman Empire are discussed.

The quest for perpetual peace is a modern phenomenon, associated with a progressive view of history which emerged only in the Enlightenment. In addition, boredom – a feeling of ennui associated with a loss of the ability to act – is a fundamental mood of the modern age. Modern societies are thus, simultaneously, becoming more peaceful and their inhabitants are becoming more bored. As a means of overcoming our boredom, we are increasingly fascinated by violence, and war is glorified as a means of restoring our ability to act. Empirical illustrations of this thesis are drawn from World War I and from the Bush administration's ‘global War on Terror’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article based on Russian, Dutch, German, English, and Latin sources, Kees Boterbloem shows how the Dutch Embassy led by Koenraad van Klenk that visited Muscovy in 1675 and 1676 unfolded to the satisfaction of both the Russian hosts and their Dutch guests. This was in large measure the result of van Klenk's expert knowledge about Muscovy and his sober assessment of the foreign policy priorities of Tsars Aleksei and Fyodor as well as his own country's government. Meanwhile, the evidence regarding the embassy and its historical context are testimony to of a sudden intensified Muscovite interest in Europe and European interest in Muscovy. It suggests that Muscovy was no longer an "Orientalized" or "barbaric" outsider and had entered the Concert of Europe a generation before historians propose that Peter the Great "opened Russia's window to the West." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]