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Witnessing the pro-Western shifts in the post-Soviet countries, Russia has failed to develop policies that would attract the former Soviet satellites without keeping them in its sphere of influence via hard-power. On the other hand, Western values, political influence and institutions have penetrated Eurasian countries causing Russia's relative decline. This structural dynamic not only entraps Russia in a zero-sum game with the West but also triggers Russian threat perceptions on the unit level. Russian strategic culture emphasizes anxieties about loss of sovereignty or power shifts in the Russian regime that could mean the end of the current establishment, border security, and great power status resurrection. A combination of these threat perceptions and structural shifts manifests in the Thucydides Trap, an ancient dilemma behind the preventive war, in the post-Soviet space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes historical monuments as instruments of Russia's attempts to impose its aesthetic hegemony in the post-Communist world. Drawing on case studies from the Czech Republic and Estonia, it argues that this hegemony is precarious and vulnerable due to inability to deal with the inherent ambiguity and complexity of historical events and figures. The Russian approach regards historical truth in absolute terms and is underpinned by a zero-sum game understanding of historical narratives. It does not tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives on history and has no appreciation for postmodernist deconstruction of historical symbols. This conflicts with a more diverse, reflexive and inclusive politics of memory as an intrinsic element of cityscapes of Prague and Tallinn where some of the controversial monuments connected with the Soviet occupation have been removed. Russia's reaction to these changes reveals an inherently vulnerable nature of its aesthetic hegemony which is deeply dependent on recognition of the absolute nature of its historical truth that the monuments are supposed to embody. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an abundance of perspectives and interpretations about the practices and actions of the Russian Federation on states and individuals, especially at the information level. However, in some respects, Western perspectives tend to simplify Russian actions and categorise them as zero-sum games. In this respect, the paper tries to interpret the actions of the Russian Federation, especially at the informational level, by defining key concepts, as well as to provide a perspective on how Russian military theorists use the notion of "hostile actions" in the context of designing peacetime operations. Moreover, the complexity of the Russian military theoretical background is highlighted, with brief comparisons between the theoretical forms of some concepts from the Soviet period and the present. The paper also reviews some conceptions of the hybrid form of Russian action, attempts to synthesise certain views of Russian military theorists and, based on Russian strategic culture, to show the levels of action in the context of a series of operations. Finally, the paper proposes an orientation model that addresses a holistic perspective on how the subversive and informational actions of the Russian Federation can influence the policy and security of a state targeting the individual, society and the political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dissatisfied with their relative standing in the world, China and Russia are challenging the US-dominated liberal order. Could US accommodation of their status concerns reduce conflict? The psychological rationale for status accommodation is rooted in the insights of social identity theory (SIT), which argues that persistent status denial leads lower-status groups to "lash out." Steven Ward (2017) objects that political scientists have misinterpreted SIT. In his view, impermeable group boundaries only affect individuals and do not lead to intergroup conflict. Ward's narrow critique overlooks the larger meaning and significance of SIT, which is about how frustration and anger over status barriers and unfair treatment motivate lower-status groups to challenge the status quo. Social competition is positional and zero-sum. Given the insights of SIT, Ward's recommendation that the United States demonstrate to China and Russia the futility of status competition is likely to provoke a backlash and increase the risk of military conflict. Instead, SIT implies a continuing process of status accommodation and efforts to maintain the legitimacy and stability of US leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]