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Chinese diplomacy in the past decades was known for its blandness and the use of long, verbose statements. In recent years, the international community has witnessed the emergence of a new form of Chinese diplomacy. This article provides an interpretation of the "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy" in the geo-historical context of the Chinese Dream, which is advocated by President Xi Jinping of China and considers the psychological domains that produce a new national subject. Focusing on the emotional energy of pride articulated in the so-called 'wolf warriors' are known for their 'aggressive, proactive and high-profile' tactics, those constitute the most essential emotional element in the formation of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Those wolf warrior diplomats, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, have started to use social media platforms to respond aggressively to US slander against China. This article elucidates the emotional politics of pride by comparing the Chinese foreign policies in the eras of Deng Xiaoping, and I conclude that the emerging national subjectivity is a psychic transformation and reinvention of previous nationalist fantasies in the new context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over parts of the East China Sea has been discursively constructed as a threat to regional security by Indian commentators. The Indian government meanwhile has not released an official assessment of the Chinese ADIZ. Unofficial commentators extrapolate the threat into a possible Chinese ADIZ over the disputed border with India. This article examines how the Indian security community interprets and discursively constructs the ADIZ threat. Threat, identity and recommendations for response are constructed, drawing from national identity's contested concepts and ideational elements present within the Sino-Indian security equation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with two theoretical dilemmas concerning Chinese and Taiwanese identities in Taiwan: their vague classification and the unclear dynamics of change. By using grounded theory to analyse 110 in-depth interviews, the research identifies three crucial themes behind individuals' conceptualisations and interactions with the two identities: (1) ethical narrative, (2) cultural hierarchy, and (3) political ideology. Further theoretical comparisons generate a new epistemic framework which understands identity as a discourse of value: identity in its essence is merely a generic idea; only when associated with other discourses of value can an identity acquire full functions such as arousing people's sentiments and mobilising them to take actions. The theory suggests that Chinese and Taiwanese identities should be regarded as unique generic concepts attached with distinctive values. People seek identity change upon becoming aware that the original identity can no longer represent the values they have dearly cherished and followed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, we are witnessing a surge of nationalism throughout an ostensibly globalized world. In this article, we focus on the "narrative battle" over COVID-19 that has escalated between two competing major powers – China and the US. Guided by a cultural sociological approach, we reveal the meaning-making processes behind the narrative battle through in-depth, hermeneutical reconstruction of the "reactive performance" of each country, as articulated in political speeches and mass media. We point out that, in the Chinese narrative, the country emerges from a "century of humiliation," becoming a major world power that will no longer be subject to the "bullying" of the West. In the US narrative, even though Trump initially highlights the country's "very good" relationship with China, as the storyline unfolds, China is blamed for the global pandemic, assuming again the role of a dangerous actor on the world stage. Our research shows that the current reactive communicative mechanism is not only unsustainable, but also dangerous in times of crisis. We suggest that recognition of the narrative battle and acknowledgement of its performative function in the public sphere is the first step toward mutual understanding and meaningful dialogue between these two world powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By conducting discourse analysis on quotidian expressions of nationalism of Chinese netizens and analyzing their "Liking" behavior, this article tries to inductively explore during the COVID-19 pandemic what and how Chinese netizens say about nationalism. This article finds that during the pandemic, Chinese netizens show a confident and rational but confrontational and xenophobic posture in their quotidian discourses. They value reasoning and deliberation in their expressions of nationalist discourses. In the quotidian discourses, they maintain a confident tone when comparing China's performance with other countries during the pandemic, but show vigilance and even hostile sentiments toward external provocations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Chen Ziying, an American-trained Chinese biologist and his prewar efforts to bring his Woods Hole experience from the United States to China between 1930 and 1936. I argue that the Marine Biological Laboratory (MBL) appears as a prominent American scientific institution in the twentieth century among visiting Chinese students and scholars who were drawn to the American approach of building world-class seaside laboratories to facilitate marine biological study while cultivating a collaborative culture via songs of biology. Chen was one of the leading US-trained Chinese scientists who aspired to the international trend of developing coastal biology in the early twentieth century and was determined to modernize China's discipline-building of biology with the construction of marine research facilities similar to the MBL. I show that Chen's efforts of bringing the MBL practice to China took place at a time when science in China was overshadowed by the impulse of nationalism. Despite the nationalistic rhetoric, Chen was able to establish a Chinese connection with Woods Hole by introducing the MBL cultural practices of songs with biological significance. Lyrics from popular biological songs such as "It's a Long Way from Amphioxus" and "Songs of Amoy" reflect not just Darwinian themes but also a transnational connection between American and Chinese biologists in Republican-era China––a period in modern Chinese history that is often characterized by soaring sentiments of nationalism. This paper sets out to reconsider the interplay of scientific nationalism and scientific internationalism in shaping marine science in modern China, as well as to reflect on the meanings of value-laden terms such as "nationalism" and "foreignness" and their conceptual impacts on writing the historiography of biology in twentieth-century China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that in order to understand how national identity and political activism are linked, it is necessary to replace the old dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism with a new one that distinguishes between a constructive and a "blind" identity. Hong Kong provides an illustrative case for the problems of having the former while also needing to promote the latter. While the local government seeks to promote active citizenry, it has since 1997 become part of an illiberal nation-state that seeks unconditional support. The 2014 Umbrella Movement was driven by and has shaped the students' constructive Hong Kong identity because it raised the desire to actively participate as members of the local political community while it reduced interest in the Chinese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the history of China from 1600-1949. By using a psychohistorical approach to understand the deep humiliation enacted upon the Chinese at the hands of primarily the British and the Japanese, we understand how the Chinese Communist Party was so successful in establishing their Cultural Revolution. As a cultural anthropologist, I examine my time in Suzhou, China in October 2019, during the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party and question the Chinese sense of national identity and how they will collectively define themselves going forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia-China relations have been relatively stable over the last decade. However, soon after the outbreak of COVID-19, Australia took an increasingly assertive stance toward China, one that is arguably even more assertive than those of its Western allies. What prompted Australia to adopt a tougher policy against China? This article argues that COVID-19 has brought significant uncertainty to the international system and, hence, to Australia's external environment, which has affected the country's decision-making, accelerating the formation of a hardline policy toward China. A contributing factor behind this policy is Australia's quest for ontological security, which, in the context of COVID-19, has triggered a rise in anti-China sentiment. Meanwhile, this strategy backfired when it encountered China's own nationalism, which exacerbated the widening political chasm, dragging the two countries into an unprecedented diplomatic confrontation. The core of ontological security lies in maintaining the stability of the identity needed for the formation of consistent policy. The uncertainties created by the COVID-19 pandemic have changed the familiar external environment and challenged Australia's ability to interpret this new environment and adjust to it, which has triggered ontological insecurity. By analyzing Australia's identity as a middle power in the context of changing regional security and its commitment to certain values, the article shows how COVID-19 has accelerated Australia's quest for ontological security, which has changed the country's China policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2018, 43 leading International Relations scholars in the United States signed a public statement in support of an urgent call to preserve the current international order, triggering heated scholarly debates. The idealized form of the liberal international order was criticized by many scholars for its chronic problems, including the contradictions between proclaimed liberal values and illiberal behaviors, the inability to reform its institutional pillars to accommodate the diverse group of emerging powers, and the tensions between the defenders of this order and its challengers. These problems became fully exposed under the external shock caused by the coronavirus pandemic. As the coronavirus spreads globally and disrupts the world's political, economic, and social fabric, several forces that have gained momentum and strength during the last decade are now converging as a formidable force that may reconfigure the post-pandemic international order. This paper addresses three significant challenges to the foundations of the current liberal order: (1) the entrenchment of authoritarianism, characterized by authoritarian resilience, autocratization, and the consolidation of competing authoritarian political-economic models; (2) the exacerbation of nationalism enabled by nationalist and populist politicians; and (3) the intensified competition among major powers. China has played mixed roles in the process of reconfiguring the current order. It challenges the mythologized liberal international order and exposes the contradictions in the dominant Western model, while promoting an alternative hybrid political-economic model. The shock brought by the pandemic has provided ample opportunities for China to extend its networks and expand international space for its model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By employing discourse-historical approach and corpus linguistics, this paper examines media reports to analyze the Chinese official discourse in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. The results demonstrate that a paradox of globalism and nationalism has been simultaneously reflected when reporting the global pandemic. Based on a polarizing discursive construction of positive "self" and negative "others," on many occasions, the globalist and nationalist arguments have been closely intertwined and complement each other to reinforce the legitimacy of the ruling party at home and the international reputation of China under the leadership of the ruling party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spring 2018 China, indignant popular nationalists demanded that the "spiritually Japanese" activities of a fringe group of young Chinese who figure themselves as Japanese be proscribed. The National People's Congress quickly complied, passing legislation that made it illegal to "beautify the war of invasion." Exploring how and why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) responded to the demands of popular nationalists, we suggest that authoritarian representation occurs in China even beyond the bounds of everyday apolitical issues like education and healthcare. Indeed, because the CCP relies upon a nationalist claim to legitimate rule, authoritarian legislators may respond to the public on politically sensitive issues like nationalism as well. Journalists and lawyers, furthermore, can play a vital mediating role between elites and masses, facilitating the transmission of the information and expertise needed for authoritarian responsiveness. Implications for our understanding of Chinese nationalism, authoritarian responsiveness and state legitimation in China today are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Militaries are sustained by public money that is diverted away from other domestic ends. How the public react to the "guns-versus-butter" trade-off is thus an important question in understanding the microfoundations of Chinese military power. However, there are few studies on public attitudes towards military spending in China, whose rising power has been a grave concern to many policymakers around the world. We fielded a national online survey to investigate the nature of public support for military spending in China. We find that Chinese citizens support military spending in the abstract, but their support diminishes when considered alongside other domestic spending priorities. We also find that public support for military spending coexists surprisingly with anti-war sentiments and a significant strain of isolationism. In addition, while the conventional wisdom suggests that nationalism moves a state towards bellicosity and war, we find that Chinese citizens with a stronger sense of national pride report stronger anti-war sentiments than other citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, the Chinese party-state has attempted to teach its youth how to think and speak about the nation through a "patriotic education" campaign waged in schools, the media and on public sites. The reception of these messages by youth of different social backgrounds remains a disputed issue, however. Drawing on a multi-sited field study conducted among rural and urban Han Chinese youth attending different types of schools, this article explores the effects of the patriotic education campaign on youth conceptions of the nation by examining the rhetoric high-school students employ when asked to reflect upon their nation. The study reveals that a majority of youth statements conform to the language and contents of the patriotic education campaign; however, there are significant differences in the discursive stances of urban youth and rural youth and of those attending academic and non-academic, vocational schools. These findings call into question the party-state's current vision of China as a "unified" national collectivity. They highlight the existence of variances in the sense of collective belonging and national identity of Chinese youth, while underscoring the importance of social positioning and perceived life chances in producing these variances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role do nationally celebrated holidays play for groups that are not considered—or do not consider themselves—to be part of the majority nation of a state? What function do holidays specific to minority group cultures serve under regimes that discriminate against those groups? This article explores holidays as a forum for contestation for the national identity proposals promulgated by the state in repressive regimes. We argue that national holidays are meaningful sites of identity contestation for four reasons: the role of holidays in heightening identity salience, the malleability of identity narratives, the relative lack of institutional barriers to acts of celebration, and the significance of refusing to participate in celebrations. We collected the data through interviews and participant observation of the Hui in China and the Kurds in Turkey. We employ ethnographic observation and intertextual analysis to compare these identity narratives. We find that the Hui legitimize their group's existence by co-opting the traditional Spring Festival, or by outwardly insisting they are not celebrating while still engaging in festivities. In contrast, Turkey's Kurds resist the government's co-optation of the spring celebration of Newroz as a Turkish national holiday. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the discursive construction of newsworthiness between Chinese and international media in their English-language news reporting about the Chinese tennis player, Li Na. Adopting corpus linguistic methods, discursive news values analysis framework (DNVA) and a modified network of social actor representation, this paper examines news values through key words, naming strategies and evaluative lexis in four news outlets from China, Britain, Australia and the United States. Li Na's Eliteness is enhanced through constructions of Superlativeness, Positivity, Impact and Unexpectedness in all news outlets. However, the international media highlight individualism and Li Na's rebelliousness in the face of systemic change in Chinese sporting culture, while Chinese media emphasizes collectivism and nationalism and Li Na's responsibility towards the nation. The corpus-assisted discourse analysis reveals the ideological forces that are at play in positioning her in relation to the roles and responsibilities she faces as she negotiates competing sports systems in China. • Sports news reporting about famous athletes deserves the attention of discourse analysis. • Hidden ideologies are revealed through discursive news values analysis. • A corpus-based comparative analysis is conducted on hard news reporting about Li Na, an elite Chinese athlete. • A revised social actor network is presented, based on the analysis of naming strategies in news reporting on Li Na. • Ideological forces work to position Li Na in relation to China's competing sports systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to common undeclared pedagogical assumptions in translation skill classes that 'faithfulness' to the source text is the highest good guiding translation exercises, I draw from Begriffsgeschichte to demonstrate how translations which have found a place in history often achieve their authority not by being 'the most faithful' to the source texts, but by successfully dominating and displacing alternatives. Intrigued by Koselleck's close attention to the ideologization and politicization of language, I transform his Begriffsgeschichte into a tool for examining the history of translation as driven by the will to power rather than truthfulness to the source text. Using as examples the Chinese renditions of two Western terms in the early twentieth century, I demonstrate how the translations which became standardized gained dominance by engaging the Chinese people's will to empowerment when the country came under constant existential threats of subjugation by colonial powers. Thus channelling Koselleck via Nietzsche, new horizons are opened up for translation studies. The article concludes with a comparison between this and other approaches to translation, highlighting the distinctive contributions made possible by this Nietzschean-informed Begriffsgeschichte method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the politics of the U.S.-China blame-game regarding COVID-19's origin, particularly Chinese disinformation narratives attributing the virus's root to the United States. The blame-game is symptomatic of contradictory global imaginaries circulated within distinct geopolitical spaces. This article approaches Chinese disinformation narratives as transnational and intertextual constructs, which involve the practices of (mis)translating and referencing foreign source texts to paradoxically delegitimate the foreign, especially Western, Other; they reinforce what I call self-serving cosmopolitanism, a narcissistic and locally conditioned sense of global consciousness that is oriented towards the consolidation of self-identity and pride. It is my contention that, to combat global disinformation about COVID-19, we should foreground the politics of translation, enhance cross-cultural sensibility, and most importantly, mobilize a kind of counter-politics against the xenophobic nationalism that disinformation narratives often parasitize. Cultural scholars with comparative perspectives are well positioned to take the initiative in revealing the structural issues at play within a global context and in promoting genuine cosmopolitan openness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State policies regarding the internationalization of higher education (IHE) in China have undergone significant shifts between 1949 and 2019. This paper advances the proposition that these shifts in policies pertaining to IHE can be understood as part of a process of ongoing Chinese state formation in relation to national and global developments and does so by examining the history of IHE policy and policy changes between 1949 and 2019 to demonstrate this possibility. We consider three specific periods to make this case, including (1) the period of Marxist-Leninist socialist nationalism, patriotism and proletarian internationalism and the early engagements of IHE (1949–1976); (2) neoliberal globalization and opening-up: a return to the international stage and further IHE (1977–2002); and finally, (3) state developmentalism and the era of globally engaged higher education (HE) (2003–2019). In conclusion, the current implications of a neoliberal (capitalist) globalization are discussed in terms of real and potential implications for Chinese state formation, Chinese HE and society. The paper aims to investigate the historical underpinnings and formation of international HE in China and contribute to the significant gap in our current literature regarding IHE in China as a socio-historical phenomenon. It not only offers a detailed documentation of how policy on IHE has evolved and shifted in the context of significant changes in political and economic directions in China but also teases out influences of national concerns such as ideological and cultural considerations as well as neoliberal globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1932, with the help of the League of Nations, the Chinese government sent an educational mission consisting of five scholars to Europe, in order to investigate education in different countries as reference points for ongoing Chinese educational reform. This article argues that educators in the mission used foreign examples to support their existing educational reform proposals, and that such a situation resulted from their understanding of the function of national education and China's practical situation. In doing so, the article adopts a transntional perspective and focuses on the discussions around national educational aims and general impressions of education in European countries, with a particular emphasis on two educators of the mission – Cheng Qibao and Yang Lian. To begin with, the article introduces the educational reform background of the mission – namely, what the Kuomintang (KMT) wanted national education to contribute. In the second part, the article discusses the understanding of the two educators regarding the social function of education, and reveals that, although they admired idealised internationalism, they considered that Chinese education should still prioritise a nationalist viewpoint. In the third part, the article analyses how the two educators constructed their impressions of education in those European countries, and used these impressions to remind readers about the Chinese situation. In the final part, the article discusses the proposals the two educators put forward and analyses the potential factors that prevented their proposals from having a concrete impact on Chinese educational reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the need to develop new approaches to the problems of intercultural communication under modern conditions. The established theories were formulated in the mid-20th century in a specific historical context and for specific purposes; today they are outdated. The ongoing globalisation, changing global balance of power, increased mobility of the ever-growing masses of the world population, mainly in the spheres of tourism, education and labour migration, call for new concepts and theoretical frameworks. Cultural globalisation revived interest in national cultures, creating a desire to preserve national traditions, lifestyles, characteristic features of everyday life and even those of the worldview. This process is stimulated by the opposition between increasing globalisation and attempts to uphold national identity. Thus, most nations today find issues related to national identity increasingly important and sensitive. The clash between the two opposing vectors - cultural standardisation, on the one hand, and a kind of cultural nationalism, on the other - leads to a growing number of cross-cultural misunderstandings and conflicts. This study relies on a variety of sources, including the results of a survey of Russian and Chinese students studying at the Lomonosov Moscow State University. The discussion of the need to design new approaches to intercultural communication is illustrated by the experiences of Chinese students studying at Russian universities and Russian academics teaching Chinese students. The number of Chinese students is steadily growing, but Russian educational institutions are not prepared to handle this increased inflow. Students, in their turn, are not prepared to integrate into an alien culture. Apart from the need to develop new principles and techniques for cross-cultural studies, the paper also emphasises the importance of providing practical information and advice in various forms - the Internet, guidebooks, induction courses to help international students to adapt to the Russian education system and everyday life. Of great importance are professional advancement courses for the Russian faculty teaching students from China, which would offer them an introduction into Chinese education traditions, behaviour patterns and mentality. Some other ways of addressing the current issues in integrating Chinese students into the Russian world are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 22, 2021 the US, UK, Canada and the European Union imposed a coordinated series of sanctions on current and former Chinese officials, increasing pressure on China for alleged abuses in Xinjiang. China replied with its own sanctions on European officials. Indeed, very recently after this event, on June 10, 2021, China passed a new law to "counter foreign actions". It has rejected the allegations of abuse, stating that the camps are "re-education" facilities utilised to combat terrorism. According to Xinhua Net netizens expressed support for local brands after H&M and Nike came under fire in China for refusing to use Xinjiang cotton. In addition to this, 11 topics connected to Xinjiang cotton were on the trending list in China's Twitter-like social media platform Sina Weibo, each issue attracting tens of millions of views and discussions. The study tried to relate this phenomenon to the concept of nationalism by taking literature from nationalism and media/media censorship theories, which mainly serve as a source of legitimacy and instrumental strategy for the state. The study aims to analyse the highest government's management of nationalism and public opinion, during the time it faces international pressure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the sociological/philosophical theory of liberal communitarianism to analyze existing trends in global affairs. The European Union (EU) has often erred by expanding its missions without also recognizing the pull of nationalism and conducting community-building to strengthen the bonds among member nations. EU nations and countries around the world are retreating to nationalism. Rather than bringing the world together to fight a common enemy, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated these global trends. The rise of nationalism has not increased domestic cohesion, but has led to high levels of domestic polarization. International communities seem a long way off, and the world order in the near future may depend to a considerable extent on whether the United States will permit China to increase its influence in the Western Pacific, which would allow for collaboration on most other matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the social crisis of the Covid-19 epidemic and the government responses in China from a performance perspective. It argues that the epidemic outbreak in late December 2019 initiated a highly contested social drama, in which loyalty was tested, political order questioned, and ideological crisis made visible. The numerous netizens and residents drew on a wide-ranging repertoire of discourses, symbols, and narratives to heighten public spectacles of suffering and sympathy, which placed extensive blame on the lies, negligence, and censorship of the government. Nonetheless, within the short span of three months, the conflictive, cacophonous social drama was overshadowed and subsumed by a hegemonic political performance of national victory, unity, and patriotism, framed and channeled by state propaganda, censorship, ritual, and practical policies. Social protests in cyberspace continued in even more dramatic forms. But these it only constituted sporadic performances of resistance, rather than a monumental social drama that challenged the fundamental political order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores a recent tendency in the official Chinese discourse on nationalism—the government more actively employs Chinese achievements in science and technology to boost national pride and regime legitimacy. This "techno-turn" focuses on China's construction of megaprojects, its active role in international techno-economic business, and its development of cutting-edge scientific research and technologies. This transition in the official discourse on nationalism contains several rationales along material, policy, and ideological dimensions, and uses sophisticated propaganda tactics. It also faces constraints and challenges—some derived from conflicts with reality, and others derived from internal logical imbalances. The turn marks a new stage in the development of contemporary Chinese nationalism, in which official nationalism absorbs elements from popular nationalism. This ideological transition may influence both Chinese domestic and international politics—it may lead to China's more confident engagement in international affairs, but may also generate uncertainties in relations between China and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ritualized wine and tea tasting events exemplify the intensifying consumerism in contemporary China, and provide an opportunity for understanding the link between commercialized ceremonial practices and underlying individual aspirations and national ideologies. Based on an ethnographic investigation of recent formal wine and tea tasting events held in China's coastal eastern regions, this article explores how such events are embedded in discourses about both new individual lifestyle models and national cultural reconstruction. The author argues that, despite the fact that wine and tea drinking have very different cultural histories, ritualized tea and wine gatherings reflect many similar underlying social discourses. Furthermore, this article analyses some unsuccessful aspects of ritualized tastings to reveal the tension between social discourses and realities. Essentially, the article aims to show that Chinese consumption aspirations are caught in a paradox between ideals and practices, and performances and realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This address was intended to be and remains about global circulatory processes and the ways that human societies have sought to deploy, control, or regulate these processes. In this essay, I principally consider how nationalist ideologies regulate global circulatory processes. The parallel with the current COVID-19 crisis is evident, and my remarks do suggest some similarities. Although COVID-19 is not the topic I engage here, my theme alerts us to thinking methodologically about largely invisible or inconspicuous modes of circulation and their consequences, less dire but deeply transformative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nationalists were the internationally recognized government of China during the war against Japan, and Beijing's memorialization of that conflict always has been complicated by this inconvenient fact. In the early 1930s, Japan embarked on an implausibly ambitious strategic enterprise: conquering enormous amounts of Chinese territory and a vast population and incorporating them into an imperial system centered on Tokyo. [Extracted from the article]

With the rise of the China Model, China's sharp power has infringed upon the exercise of liberal democracy in other nations. A concern for governments of the Taiwan Strait and other democratic countries is whether visits to Mainland China alter the national identity of Taiwanese youth. This research conducted a panel study of 331 Taiwanese youths who had visited Mainland China. Social contact, rational choice, and political socialization theories were introduced to establish hypotheses; a questionnaire was employed to collect panel data, and statistical regression models were utilized to test the hypotheses. Following visits to Mainland China, the number of participants perceiving themselves as only Taiwanese decreased by 4.59%; those perceiving themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese increased by 3.98%, and those perceiving themselves as Chinese increased by 0.61%. According to the mean survey results, the average change to national identity was 0.05, indicating that visiting Mainland China slightly negatively influenced participants' Taiwanese identity. Following visits to Mainland China, participants' impression of China improved, their preference for an independent Taiwan reduced, they seemed less satisfied with Taiwan's democratic government, and their personal sense of being Taiwanese was reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes China' and the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s rationale in opening what it calls a 'logistical support facility' in Djibouti as well as the missions that it is supposed to fulfil. The author also presents this base's activities since its opening on 1 August 2017 and explores the potential role that the Chinese military stationed in Djibouti could play to secure Xi Jinping's Belt and Road initiative and protect Chinese interests and nationals in Africa or the Middle East. Finally, it assesses the PLA base's relations with other militaries present in Djibouti, particularly the US, the French and the Japanese, concluding that Djibouti operates as a microcosm of a multipolar world heading towards a bipolar, though asymmetrical, world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examining emotions within the studies of mobilities, recent literature has highlighted that migration is an inherently uncertain process shaped by hopes and dreams, as well as feelings of fear and anxiety. More than an individual pursuit for economic advancement or cultural assimilation, we find that migration is also a political project that incessantly creates valuable working-class subjects; a project that often starts in vocational training school, a site generating multiple forms of mobility between learning and workspaces. In the context of China, this article explores the emotional reproduction of working-class subjects through schooling and internship experiences, students' sense of belonging to the nation-state, their aspirations and fears for the future. Developing the concept of 'emotional authoritarianism', it examines the ways in which working-class students were influenced by state-engineered nationalistic sentiments, and how it became a conflictual process of subject-making. Emotional governance is a peculiar political strategy that shapes the emotions of working-class students who are expected to serve the growth of the national economy and transnational capitalism. We discover that mixed emotions or 'emotions in conflict' are fundamental to the class reproduction of migrant agents, torn among different bodies and desires in 'learning to labour'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many historians of China, particularly those based in North America, insist that the Qing dynasty's territorial expansion was imperial and comparable to the imperial expansions of other global empires. Other historians, particularly but not only those based in the People's Republic of China, continue to resist this interpretation. They argue that dynastic expansion in the Ming and Qing periods was simply a form of nation-state building, akin to similar processes in Europe. Rather than rejecting their claims as a product of Chinese nationalism, we argue that the term "empire" should be (re)understood as a global co-production, emerging from multiple intersecting histories and scholarly debates about those histories. Doing so challenges influential definitions of empire that rely on a distinction between empires and nation-states, highlighting their dual presence in both Euro-American and Chinese pasts (and presents). This move demands a rejection of periodizations that suggest that empires ceased to exist following the period of decolonization from 1945 to the 1970s. This opens up new avenues of historical and normative inquiry to acknowledge the modern continuity between empires and nation-states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research inspects the media and public discourses surrounding the first season of the sensational Chinese reality TV rap competition, The Rap of China (iQiyi, 2017). Through the combined theoretical lenses of queer China studies and global media studies, I examine the show's framing of linguistic, geocultural, gender and sexual variations in its construction of a nationalistic imaginary alongside China's media and cultural globalization. I reveal a revised fantasy of 'authentic Chineseness' projected by the competition. I then offer a careful reading of the post-competition sexual scandal and the government's 2018 crackdown on Chinese hip-hop. I consider the official criticism and censorship of Chinese rap as the government's response to the public cultural panic over the threat to China's hetero-patriarchal-structured sexual morality. I show that a self-contradictory imaginary of a globalized, modernized and diversified 'Sinophone' community located within mainland China was created and positioned at the party-state's moral and cultural centre. In this imaginary, nonnormative cultures, identities, languages and forms of intimacy, which have often been ostracized or degraded in the linguistic, geopolitical and conjugal paradigms of mainstream Chinese culture, are enabled to negotiate a place within official culture and mass media, though often in limited and problematic ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines manifestations of "shame nationalism"—a learned emotional script prevalent in discourses of modern Chinese national identity—in Se, jie (Lust, Caution ; Ang Lee, 2007) and its reception. The essay argues that this affectively charged response to perceived national humiliation functions as a form of communal identification that performs and interprets shame as a signal of moral virtue and national devotion. Analyzing performances of shame and humiliation in the film, the article demonstrates how the emotional script for shame nationalism employs the melodramatic mode for its narrativization and dissemination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the book "Dongfang shi ri tan" or "An Eastern Decameron," by Jiao Naifang. The author explains that the book comments on the relationship between sex and identity in modern China, explores the social aspects of sexual behavior in Chinese history, and discusses how Jiao's work provides a Chinese reception of the book "Decameron," by Giovanni Boccaccio.

Nationalism is a prominent theme in China's cultural productions. While many studies research nationalistic representations of wars, revolutions and nation-building processes in Chinese socialist cinema and dramas, this article focuses on a marginal media form: political animations. It examines the patriotic discourses in popular Chinese animated series Year Hare Affair and presents three main findings. First, that the series characters represent personified/animalized nation states, reflecting the animator's perceptions of 'self' and 'other' (and 'friends' or 'enemies'), which are highly consistent with the Chinese authority's stance and policy in foreign affairs. Second, that the animation's key theme of 'dreams of being a powerful nation' explicitly demonstrates nationalist and developmental connotations, showing confirmation and resonation of Xi's China Dream initiative. Third, that the animation also moderately deviates from the mainstream representations and offers re-interpretations of the official patriotic narratives with regard to China's performance in international affairs. The analyses conclude a negotiation dynamic between the (half-) independent political animation and the state's hegemony in China's transformative political communication space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main focus of this article is the Haiphong shipping boycotts of 1907 and 1909–10, which were conflicts over freight rates on rice which arose between several Chinese rice hongs in Haiphong (Hải Phòng), the main port in northeastern French Indochina, and three European tramp shipping companies. When these companies set up a joint agreement in 1907 unilaterally increasing the freight rates for shipping rice to Hong Kong, the affected merchants felt unfairly treated and boycotted the companies' ships. Furthermore, in 1909, they formed a rival charter syndicate and set up a steamship company chartering the vessels of other companies to apply additional pressure on the firms to return to the previous rate. Although the Chinese suffered direct financial losses due to their insufficient expertise in this business, they were successful in achieving a considerable decrease in the freight rate on rice, which shows that boycotting, even when costly, proved to be an effective means to push for reductions and better arrangements with shipping companies. In contrast to a similar incident in the same trade—the shipping boycott of 1895–96 when the French government intervened with the Chinese government on behalf of a French shipping company—the later boycotts did not provoke the intervention of Western powers. This case suggests that growing anti-imperialism and nationalism in China, expressed in public discourses on shipping rights recovery and in the use of economic instead of political means, had an impact on the boycotts. Economic, not imperial, power determined the outcome of this struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This spotlight article reflects on President Xi Jinping's handling of the COVID‐19 epidemic and evaluates its specificities by making a brief incursion into the history of Chinese official responses to epidemics. This analysis shows that Xi Jinping's response to the COVID‐19 epidemic differs from official responses to the 2003 SARS epidemic and the cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic of 1966–1967, and is used to assert his legitimacy on both the local and the international stage. By sharing data, even if it was not as accurate as claimed, Xi Jinping has presented himself as a trustworthy international partner, leading a country that is at the forefront of scientific research, capable of vigorously implementing epidemic preparedness measures, and destined to become a major player in global health. On the Chinese stage, he showed that the central government has regained control over local public health organizations and that public health is once again a key government priority. As part of his response, Xi Jinping also honored gods of the Chinese pantheon, in a seeming contradiction with communism and science. I argue that, by combining the most advanced technology with a religious heritage, Xi Jinping is skillfully creating an image of himself not only as powerful and modern, but also as a leader undeniably rooted in Chinese tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author puts forth an analytical framework called party-state realism for understanding how policy makers in the People's Republic of China approach foreign policy. It has four defining characteristics. In order of importance, they are: putting the interests of the Communist Party at the core of China's national interest calculation; and on this basis adopting an instrumentalist approach; adopting a party-centric nationalism; and adhering to a neoclassical realist assessment of the country's place in the international system and its relative material power in advancing national interest. In this conception, the putting of the Chinese Communist Party's interest at the core of national interest is a constant, not a variable, factor. This does not mean the changing international context and relative national power are irrelevant, just that they take secondary importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese Christians in the 1920s faced pressure from a new republic that demanded the loyalty of its citizens despite lacking a proper knowledge of the meaning of the term. Progressive Christians associated with the YMCA soon launched the Citizenship Education Movement in 1924 as they tried to combine Christian virtue with China's broader national demands. While their association of modern citizenship with virtue cultivation was not new, these Christians did attempt something unique, which was to define a good citizen as a world citizen, whose belief in God meant one is loyal ultimately to certain universal values instead of the nation-state. As the Movement continued, the relationship between one's devotion to these higher values and that to the Chinese nation-state remained a complex and often competitive one. Although the Movement ended largely with the end of its visionary, Yu Rizhang, its momentum was harnessed by the Nationalist Party in the New Life Movement. The latter, however, omitted the language of God and universal values at the same time as it injected the nation-state, and the Party in particular, as the sole receiver of loyalty and granter of privilege. Thus the decade-long history of the YMCA's Citizenship Education Movement testifies to the association between one's religious devotion and an internationalist understanding of citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few studies on the legacies of the Chinese Civil War have examined its effects on state consolidation in the borderland area between China and mainland South-East Asia. This paper empirically examines the impact of the intrusion of the defeated Kuomingtang (KMT) into the borderland area between China, Burma and Thailand. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the presence of the US-supported KMT across its Yunnan border increased the new communist government's threat perceptions. In response, Beijing used a carrot-and-stick approach towards consolidating its control by co-opting local elites while ruthlessly eliminating any opposition deemed to be in collusion with the KMT. In the case of Burma, the KMT presence posed a significant challenge to Burmese national territorial integrity and effectively led to the fragmentation of the Burmese Shan State. Finally, in Thailand, Bangkok collaborated with the Americans in support of the KMT to solidify its alliance relations. Later, Thailand used the KMT as a buffer force for its own border defence purposes against a perceived communist infiltration from the north. This paper contextualizes the spill-over effects of the Chinese Civil War in terms of the literature on how external threats can potentially facilitate state consolidation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This response to Ashish Rajadhyaksha's essay reflects on the following themes: state promises made and broken, comparing India and China, and science fiction as national redemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on Hong Kong's history have viewed the 1967 riots as a watershed in the formation of Hong Kong identity in the 1960s and 1970s. However, by considering MacLehose's social policies as the main contribution to Hong Kong identity formation and defining China as 'the Other' in that process, the prevailing view overlooks the multifaceted nature of Hong Kong identity formation and the continuity of Hong Kong's historical development between the mid-1960s and the 1970s. This article questions that view by investigating the Cultural Revolution discourse in three rarely examined yet representative Hong Kong youth and student journals: Undergrad (Xueyuan), Chinese University Student Press (Zhongda xuesheng bao), and Pan Ku (Pangu). Through examining the three publications' interpretations of the Cultural Revolution during nationalist moments and movements in Hong Kong—the 1967 riots, the Chinese Language movement, the Defending the Diaoyu Islands movement, and the 'Learning about China, Caring about Society' campaign—the article discusses the ways in which the Cultural Revolution profoundly affected educated youth and students by contributing to the mutual development of their national and local identities at the intersection of political, ideological, cultural, and geographical perspectives. By documenting the local practices of the Cultural Revolution and the concept of 'serving the people,' the article demonstrates that Chinese nationalism, along with Maoism and the Cultural Revolution, played an important role in the formation of Hong Kong identity in the colonial setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait is heating up, as Mainland Chinese netizens, generals, and politicians increasingly talk about 'forceful' rather than 'peaceful' reunification. While Xi Jinping and Chinese nationalists desperately desire Taiwan's reunification, Trump's isolationist "America First" rhetoric has only encouraged reckless Chinese thinking about forcing reunification, and the Taiwanese remain largely passive, unable to confront an overwhelming threat. Wishful thinking in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington is increasing the odds of miscalculation. The 2020 presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, furthermore, bode ill for peace in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2016, the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump's electoral victory once again brought xenophobic nationalism into the world spotlight. Surprisingly, in the United Kingdom and the United States, a dramatic increase in wealth inequality impelled the working poor to cling more tightly to nationalism. In recent times, China has also witnessed this correlation of resurgent nationalist aspirations and an increasing gap between rich and poor. In light of these international developments, the primary objective of this study is to explore how China's increasing inequality is influencing Chinese nationalism. The question of whether the Chinese youth who agonize over the trend of wealth inequality has paradoxically grown more attached to Chinese nationalism is also intriguing. Based on structural equation modeling, the estimated results show that, conversely, the increase in economic inequality in China has led to a decline in Chinese nationalism. In particular, disaffected Chinese youth with higher education who suffer from increasing economic disparity have been reluctant to embrace nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular nationalism remains strong in China. What drives this strong nationalistic sentiment? This is the key question this study attempts to answer. The authors are particularly interested in the connection between domestic politics and outward nationalist feelings among Chinese urban residents, specifically the relationship between democratic orientation and regime support on the one hand and nationalist feelings on the other. Descriptive findings from random survey data on Chinese urban residents in 34 Chinese cities reveal that democracy-oriented Chinese urbanites tend to show stronger nationalistic feelings. A large volume of literature on the relationship between democratic value and nationalistic sentiments, however, generally suggests that people with more liberal democratic values tend to be less nationalistic. How should one, then, reconcile and explain this seemingly contradictory relationship in China? Upon further research, the study finds that system support is a confounding factor affecting Chinese urban residents' nationalistic sentiments. People with more nationalistic feelings tend to be those who show less support for the current system in China. Popular political discontent with the Chinese domestic system may very well have a spill-over effect on Chinese people's nationalist feelings toward the outside world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]