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National identity is the cognition of citizens regarding to which political community they belong, and the tendency to accept the political, cultural and ethnic values of the state. Previous studies have found that national identity is heterogeneous at the subnational levels. Why do people hold different degrees of nationalism and patriotism in the subnational units? In this paper, we offer a political economic explanation of national identity, which links the state capacity with political attitudes. We employ a nationalism-patriotism framework to decompose the concept of national identity, then use the supervised learning approach to measure nationalism and patriotism based on a massive number of Weibo posts dating from 2011 to 2017. Automated text analysis shows that the state capacity plays an important role preventing the national identity from being weakened by globalization and the diversity of social information. Specifically, with the progress of China's globalization, multiculturalism and various information have crossed the national boundaries, which undermines China's national identity. In order to maintain this identity, the Chinese government utilizes its redistribution capacity to reinforce both nationalism and patriotism, and also its information capacity to strengthen nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union and China resurveyed their border in order to restart their long-stalemated border negotiations. These negotiations resulted in only a partial border settlement: the agreement was signed in 1991. By the end of 1989, nationalities openly expressing their wish to secede from the Soviet Union caused the Soviet government to slow down the negotiation process, and Moscow insisted on setting aside the most contentious sections. China's nationalities issue had the opposite effect on Zhongnanhai: Chinese leaders wished to settle the entire Sino-Soviet border as quickly as possible. However, once the collapse of the Soviet Union became imminent, the Chinese saw advantages of delaying the negotiations on the disputed sections of the border. They calculated that would allow for China to negotiate with weaker, newly independent countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, against the backdrop of multiple anti-Japanese protests in China, the rise of Chinese nationalism has been much debated. By taking the 2010 and 2012 Sino–Japanese crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a case study, the article applies discourse analysis to media articles and interviews to ascertain the Chinese government's propaganda toolbox in shaping the nationalist discourse, as well as to substantiate the defining features of anti-Japanese nationalism. The findings reveal a combination of strategies and techniques that the propaganda apparatus uses, such as the creation of an 'us-versus-them' dichotomy, galvanised inclusiveness, censorship, and 'card-stacking' to mould nationalism. The article substantiates empirically both top-down and bottom-up strains of nationalism, and their interaction through the four key themes of sovereignty, history, mistrust and reactivity. It finds that Japan bridges these strands of Chinese nationalism, but in its absence alternative views of nationalism are articulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1949, ethnic minority nationalism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has consistently concerned the People's Republic of China. Most previous studies on nationalism in XUAR focused on organised visible nationalist movements and ignored everyday life, particularly regarding interactions between the government and citizens or between the majority and the minority. This study investigates daily practices of ethnic minority nationalism in XUAR within the framework of everyday nationalism. It explores daily life in Altay City to determine how members of ethnic minority groups produce and maintain their sense of ethnic identity in this context. The article found that members of ethnic minority groups are engaged in a struggle to retain their sense of ethnic identity by resisting state nationalism and expressing antagonism towards Han Chinese in their everyday lives. This study reveals a covert nationalist movement involving almost everyone in XUAR. Ethnic nationalism is central to XUAR society and will continue to shape its social relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of nationalism in China in recent decades has grown in part out of a state-sponsored patriotic education project centered on the production of narratives involving the century-long history of China's subjection to foreign imperialism. In the northeast, the regional history of Russian and Japanese colonialism during the first half of the twentieth century has provided abundant materials for this collective commemoration of China's anti-imperialist struggles. A network of commemorative projects undertaken at local, regional, and national levels of the PRC state since the 1980s, including oral histories, monuments, museums, gazetteers, and party histories, has reframed the history of the northeast borderland in terms that legitimize post-Mao nationalist and market reform ideology. This study brings attention to another dimension of these commemorative projects, the translation and republication of Chinese and Japanese historical accounts originally produced in northern Manchuria during the 1920s and 1930s. I argue that the diverse representations of the borderland's history that are included in these accounts, while originally embedded in the colonial institutional contexts of Manchuria, acquired new significance in post-Mao reimaginings of the region's place in defining nationalism and negotiating Sino-Russian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese idol fans have been identified among the main forces in cyber nationalist activisms in recent years, acting as the nationalist fans protecting the state as an idol in response to external political shocks. Their skills in acknowledging, involving, and even reinventing the image of the state and national pride in cyber nationalist activisms do not emerge in a vacuum. This article examines how idol fans involve and reinvent the nationalist discourse in their everyday fan activities – idol promotion. We focus on the pandemic in 2020 as it provides a specific social and political context that allows us to understand better the interaction between idol fans and the state in their mundane fan activities. We construct our analysis under the computational grounded theory framework with over 6 million fan posts collected from Weibo and 11 in-depth interviews with active idol fans. Our findings show that when engaging in pandemic-related discussion, idol fans actively borrowed official discourse on nationalism and strategically responded to key political and social events in their idol promotion activities. The idol images they built are not only positive but also nationalist. Therefore, they play not only the commercial logic commonly seen in the Japanese and Korean K-pop/idol culture but also the political logic propagated by the state in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 1990s, China has experienced an explosion of popular interest in English language study. This nationwide "English fever" reflects how, with the global spread of neoliberal doctrines that were gradually adopted by Chinese governments, English was naturalized as the language of competitiveness and entrepreneurialism. While there is a growing body of literature examining the English‐learning craze as a facet of the transnational neoliberalization processes, this anthropological study focuses on the frictions generated in the encounter of English, conceived as a neoliberal technology of the self, with the Chinese nation‐state. It examines the understudied phenomenon of Crazy English, a language‐teaching enterprise that received unprecedented state patronage among such edu‐businesses in the decade of 1998–2008. Conceptualizing Crazy English as a self‐cultivation method provides insights into how English study in turn‐of‐the‐century China embodied tensions between key values that characterized the state's project of desirable citizenship: entrepreneurialism and patriotism. Through the idealization and promotion of the new exemplary model of the "wolf entrepreneur," Chinese state agents, edu‐entrepreneurs, and citizen‐learners sought to reconcile their desires to simultaneously participate in neoliberal globalization and protect their cultural identities and national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a rise in Chinese public diplomacy efforts in the Philippines, Filipino perceptions of China have mainly remained negative during the Duterte period. This article examines why and how China's public diplomacy efforts have primarily failed despite President Duterte's pro-China position. It draws on constructivist approaches to demonstrate how national identity mediates the impact of Chinese influence. In particular, Chinese incursions in the West Philippine Sea, and an influx of China-based offshore gaming businesses in the country, have elicited a strong nationalist response from Filipinos, perpetuating perceptions of China as untrustworthy and threatening. Evidence is drawn to determine correlation between an increase in Chinese public diplomacy and a decrease in public trust towards China. This is followed by process-tracing how national identity dampens any positive effect Chinese public diplomacy may have on Philippine attitudes towards China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Finnish national identities because they expressed the shared experiences of newly established Finnish communities, and they were crucial in constructing a new nation. It also explores created images of the Finnish and Finland, as well as community construction in Republican China, especially after Finland gained independence in 1917. Another aim is to examine those Finnish political, cultural and economic activities that supported their identity construction in China. The specific emphasis will be on analysing the largest and sometimes cross‐functioning Finnish groups in China: the governmental officials and the commercial community. By using qualitative methods, namely, discourse analysis and historical analysis, this study shows how the Finnish community created alternative, sometimes imaginative and frequently anti‐imperialist national identities in the new Republican China. Indeed, by signing the Treaty Principles of Reciprocity and Equal Treatment, it was agreed that Finland and China 'shall enjoy same rights, privileges, favours, immunities and exemptions which [might] be accorded to similar foreign agents in accordance with the principles of international law'. This article argues that Finnish aspirations were positively regarded by many Chinese, and they respected this quite unique national connection with Finland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally perceived as a country of emigration, China has in recent years become an increasingly popular subject for immigration and diaspora studies, with an immigrant population that has been growing quietly and steadily since the 1990s. However, media representations of immigrants in China have not garnered much attention. This article provides a critical assessment of how immigrants and immigrant experience are portrayed on Chinese television, using the example of Foreigner in China (2013–19), the first-ever program on a national platform to tackle this topic. It argues that, while the program paints a rather insightful and entertaining picture of contemporary immigrant life in China, its representation of immigrants is restricted by not only the internal contradiction of the Xi administration's globalist discourse, but also the exclusive, ethnocentric conception of Chinese nationhood, which remains the norm in a more heterogenous and globally conscious Chinese society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do information and communication technologies (ICTs), which seemingly bring people to a boundless world, contribute to the reproduction of the imagined community of a nation? Challenging the conventional approach that sees ICTs as merely the channel through which nationalism or activism is expressed or mobilised, this article draws on anthropological and historical studies of technology to develop a conceptual mapping of the important factors that configure specific nation-bounded, ICT-centric socio-technical imaginaries. Taking as the entry point technological nationalism in the context of the Sino-American trade war in recent years and based on long-term fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta region, this ethnographic study explores how ICTs have become the lens through which educated professionals imagine China’s transition from sweat-shop modernity toward techno-modernity. This sociotechnical imaginary is shaped by larger forces including the state discourse, political economy, material culture, and the platformised lifestyle, and mediated through work experience and consumer choices. Nationalism driven by this ICT-centric imaginary is subjected to state manipulation for the reproduction of political legitimacy. This study sheds light on larger conceptual questions on how ordinary citizens experience and make sense of ICTs and how such meaning-making processes sustain, challenge and reconfigure political processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the bestselling 1898 novel The Yellow Danger , a so-called Chinese invasion fantasy that inspired Sax Rohmer's infamous Fu Manchu series. Where analysis of The Yellow Danger has tended to underplay its religious dimension, I argue that its depiction of the Yellow Peril constitutes a prototype of what I call "sanctified Sinophobia," religiously motivated hostility toward China that now fuels contemporary Christian nationalism. Both as a characterological emblem of racial personality and as an eschatological force of nature, the Yellow Terror represents an ineffable Satanic malevolence, defying European Christians' existing categories of evil. Tracing these two variants of sanctified Sinophobia in Shiel's novel, I then examine how the text's logics of ethnoreligious purity continue to structure the prayers, benedictions, and oracles of so-called China Virus discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature played an important role in the construction of a modern nation-state in late Qing China, when fiction as a literary genre was endowed with strong political and ideological agendas. In fin-de-siècle China, the emergence of political novels through translation from the West, as an important subgenre of "new fiction", was essentially a response to the nation's severe national crisis engendered by colonial threat. Against this backdrop, the practical value of literary translation was strikingly emphasized, as progressive Chinese intellectuals took the translation of western-derived political novels as a vehicle of intellectual enlightenment and political engagement, appealing to constitutionalism, nationalism and patriotism. In this context, translators deliberately put political priority over linguistic faithfulness or aesthetic value, turning the process of literary translation into "transcreation", to propagate their ideals for sociopolitical reforms. Thus, as an important instrument for constructing the nationalist imagination, the translation of political novels served as a fictional prescription for national emancipation in late Qing China, manifesting both a process of cultural (re)construction and an important facet of East–West interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trump's earlier statements about China and the US losing out on trade primed his supporters for the "China virus" narratives that epitomized Trump's references to the COVID-19 pandemic. Keywords: Trump; China; victimhood; nationalism EN Trump China victimhood nationalism 882 889 8 10/04/22 20221001 NES 221001 This paper analyses the deployment of victimhood nationalism towards China by Donald Trump during his two presidential campaigns and presidency. [Extracted from the article]

This document is a review of two separate books. The first book, "Always Faithful," is praised for its comprehensive and diverse perspective on the evacuation of Kabul and the US war in Afghanistan. The reviewer recommends it to anyone interested in these topics or war in general. The second book, "Plato Goes to China: The Greek Classics and Chinese Nationalism," focuses on the fate of ancient Greek classics in China and the regime's campaign to discredit them. The reviewer acknowledges the political and intellectual repression in China but highlights the resilience of the Chinese people and the continued commitment to universal values. [Extracted from the article]

Changes in relative power between the rising and dominant state have been consistently recognized as a key contributor to international conflicts, as they can lead to convergence within both societies in threat perceptions of each other. In the case of China, a dominant view assumes that China's increased power leads to wide social support for nationalism, which unifies the Chinese threat perceptions of key rivals such as the US and Japan. Based on a large-scaled survey among China's elite youth, this study examines the relationship between their perception of China's power asymmetry and threat with respect to the US and Japan. The findings show that the dominant view has clearly overlooked the divergent voices within the youth, and they also challenge the common assumption that China's growing power has fostered a generation of youth with unanimous support for more assertive Chinese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since China has formally joined the WHO-backed global COVID-19 vaccine initiative known as COVAX, there is a presumed notion that China's vaccine diplomacy will make a significant contribution to the international public good and thus uplift Beijing's role as the rule-maker of international order. To scrutinize this, the paper asks if China succeeded in proliferating its weaponized vaccine policy to obtain maximum diplomatic gains and soft power projection to intensify its international image, geopolitical power, and domestic politico legitimacy. The authors argue that despite its vaccine diplomacy demonstrated the robust governance capacity and responsibility to be a great power. Yet, Beijing's geopolitical influence and international image are significantly overrated and not enough to play a more prominent role in the global power fulcrum/equilibrium. On the contrary, China enjoys a leading position on the domestic political front. Its successful portrayal of China's vaccine provision in the global market and remarkable configuration to leverage a deep-rooted nationalism has fundamentally provided China with a powerful rationale to divert its public's attention from Beijing's earlier inadequate handling of the outbreak. The evaluation of the paper reveals that China's vaccine diplomacy's influence in promoting international image and geopolitics is limited but has successfully stabilized its domestic political environment and enhanced its domestic legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the field of international relations, it has long been believed that nationalism generates adverse foreign policy preferences. This article revisits this long-standing assumption by investigating how stimulating nationalistic sentiments shapes mass foreign policy preferences in two contexts, namely when celebrating national achievements and greatness with a focus on the national Self and when invoking negative historical memories in relation to a salient Other. Using a survey experiment conducted in China, which capitalized on visual stimuli drawn from real-world sources to stoke respondents' nationalistic sentiments, this article shows that not all rises of nationalism are the same. Adverse foreign policy preferences, such as a preference for a hawkish approach, an uncompromising attitude, and a dislike for the status quo, emerge when nationalistic sentiments are stoked by invoking negative historical memories but not by celebrating general national achievements and greatness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An influential body of scholarship argues that authoritarian regimes design "hard" propaganda that is intentionally heavy-handed in order to signal regime power. In this study, by contrast, we link the power of propaganda to the emotional power of "soft" propaganda such as television dramas and viral social media content. We conduct a series of experiments in which we expose over 6800 respondents in China to real propaganda videos drawn from television dramas, state-backed social media accounts, and state-run newscasts, each containing nationalist messages favored by the Chinese Communist Party. In contrast to theories that propaganda is unpersuasive, we show that propaganda effectively manipulates anger as well as anti-foreign sentiment and behavior, with heightened anti-foreign attitudes persisting up to a week. However, we also find that nationalist propaganda has no effect on perceptions of Chinese government performance or on self-reported willingness to protest against the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the origins of nationalism? In this article, we trace the origins of an important early twentieth-century nationalist movement to Christian missionary activity. A growing literature credits missionaries with spreading schooling and democracy. Yet missionary activity often led to a political backlash and to antiforeign, nationalist mobilization. Drawing on evidence from China, we show how missionary activity sparked nationalist mobilization in the early 1900s. We gather new data on early nationalist secret societies, missionary activity, and antimissionary violence. Qualitative and quantitative evidence shows how missionaries threatened the political power of local elites, who responded by mobilizing violent antiforeign protests and participating in nationalist political societies. The findings challenge the idea that Christian missionaries influenced long-run political development primarily because they spread schooling and literacy. Instead, we show that missionaries also sparked early nationalist mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government is fond of invoking the 'hurt feelings of 1.4 billion Chinese citizens' to protest foreign actions and policies. However, this rhetoric might be nothing more than propaganda and attempts to leverage nationalist sentiment. How much do citizens in China actually care about issues completely unrelated to their daily livelihoods? To answer this, the study employs a representative survey to investigate the extent to which rhetoric about 'hurt feelings' is consistent with public opinion on four contemporary socio-political disputes involving the NBA, Marriott International, Mercedes-Benz and the city of Prague. Across the scenarios, we found that the Chinese government did not exaggerate the displeasure of audiences—citizens are aware of the cases, were indeed upset by them and advocated for retaliatory measures that were surprisingly more forceful than those adopted in reality. These emotions were largely driven by nationalistic sentiment rather than personal experiences or encounters, suggesting the success of state propaganda in steering the public opinion toward outcomes favourable to the state. These findings support recent studies highlighting the peculiar case of rising nationalism in China, and have important implications for the impact of public opinion on Chinese policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central government and local governments in China constitute "laboratory nationalism", which is different from "laboratory federalism". As a planner, the central government first organizes small-scale policy trials, then imitates the successful policies on a larger scale. To illustrate the process, we take the gradual regional opening as a typical case, then develop a two-stage "trial-extension" game model incorporating the central government and two local governments. Laboratory nationalism's domination depends on actions of the central government at two stages: (1) offering proper incentives to the eligible district at the beginning; (2) in the end unifying local policies to the one which has proven to be successful. We demonstrate that under certain conditions, laboratory nationalism can improve on decentralized outcome. • Centralization of social decision-making is a common trend. • China's policy innovation is organized like Laboratory Nationalism, different from Laboratory Federalism. • China usually adopts small-scale experiments before expanding the scope. • The central government designs policy innovation rules for local ones, and the pros and cons are mixed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transitioning into the post-revolutionary era, China in the 1980s saw a variety of uncertainties. State policies, popular sentiments, and individual psychologies were all in constant fluctuation. Despite these uncertainties, efforts to understand the past and a strong desire for a prosperous future characterized the general spirit, widely reflected in the increasingly active and diversified cultural life of the Chinese people. In 1983, Chinese Central Television (CCTV) held a Spring Festival Gala that was broadcast live nationwide for the first time. As one of the first cultural milestones of the New Era, the gala painted a joyful and harmonious picture of the country amidst various complexities and ambiguities. Studying the organization and content of the 1983 gala, this paper argues that the gala responded to the ongoing historical transition by replacing the previously dominant revolutionary discourse, which stressed class struggle, extreme collectivism, and politicization of daily life, with a nationalist discourse, which aspired for China's integration into a highly modernized world as a prosperous world power. Such replacement was demonstrated in the gala's depiction of the relationship between individuals and the state, memories of revolution, and new connections between traditions and the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over a hundred thousand US servicemen were stationed in post–World War II China, resulting in the largest grassroots interactions in Sino-US history. Reexamining this unprecedented encounter in the context of American global military empire, this article investigates the sociocultural tensions caused by GIs' sexual relations with Chinese women between 1945 and 1949. While conservatives maligned "Jeep girls" out of racial and sexual anxieties, liberals and self-identified Jeep girls invoked the language of modernity and patriotism. However, in the wake of the Peking Rape incident in 1946, the once diverse debate quickly ended as nationwide protests raged against American imperialism. In contrast with previous studies highlighting how Communist propaganda led to new anti-American sentiments, this research, by uncovering the complexities of Chinese women's experiences and their stories—which have been muffled or filtered through patriarchal agendas—foregrounds the key role of gendered nationalism in Sino-US relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The purpose of this research is to explore whether the location of a citizen's residence is an important source of explanation for nationalistic attitudes in China. Methods: Using data from a nationwide representative survey of Chinese adults and a multidimensional approach to nationalism, analyses include bivariate correlation and multiple regression. Results: Significant support is found for 12 of 16 hypotheses linking "location variables" to specific types of nationalistic attitudes, even when modeling with a substantial set of controls. The hypothesis‐supporting evidence touches on three of the four dimensions of nationalism covered here. Conclusion: In regard to the development of nationalistic attitudes in China, location matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan continue to partly live in the shadow of World War II (WWII) with recurrent expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China periodically ebbing bilateral relations. How does the Chinese government manage anti-Japan public manifestations of nationalism and what factors explain it? The government has to walk a fine line by managing the nationalism it has bred without undermining its own rule and considering elite divisions, heightened public nationalism, and the developments in its external environment. Six case studies from the Hu-Wen era provide a comprehensive understanding of what pertains to Chinese nationalism, the means used to express it, and more importantly the way the government chose to tackle them. While nationalism can be a mean of garnering legitimacy and exercising pressure on Japan to bend to its wishes, the Chinese government is embarked on the sinuous task of preventing an escalation beyond its control at both the domestic and international levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study discusses the socialisation experiences of young Chinese from two different education backgrounds and media environment. Through a survey on the attitudes of students from Macau and mainland China towards nationalism‐related news events using a survey, this study has revealed that their education social background and media‐use patterns have a greater impact on students' attitudes towards political events (military parade and Occupy Central) than cultural events (Tu Youyou's Nobel Prize and championship of women's volleyball team), and the differences of their attitudes vary depending on the events in question. Moreover, mainland students are more nationalistic and supportive of the official mainland media's discourse on sovereignty issues, but more sceptical of its sources on events of conflicts between Chinese ethnicities. The findings of this study have revealed how wider media exposure impacts the attitudes of individuals; additionally, it responds to the debates on whether people are more inclined to recognise their existing common identities or influenced by the political regimes constructed by the elites; most importantly, it tests the socialising experiences of nationalism among young Chinese from different educational and media backgrounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how affective narratives of the COVID-19 pandemic on Chinese social media reinforce and challenge established scripts of national identity, political legitimacy, and international geopolitical imaginary. Taking theoretical insights from the scholarship on trauma, disaster nationalism, and politics of emotions, I structure the analysis of social media posts from state media and private accounts around three emotional registers: grief as a crucial site of control and contestation during the initial stage of the outbreak; gandong (being moved in a positive way) associated with stories of heroic sacrifices, national unity, and mundane 'heart-warming' moments; and enmity in narratives of power struggles and ideological competition between China and 'the West', especially the United States. While state media has sought to transform the crisis into resources for strengthening national belonging and regime legitimacy through a digital reworking of the long-standing repertoire of disaster nationalism, alternative articulations of grief, rage, and vernacular memory that refuse to be incorporated into the 'correct collective memory' of a nationalised tragedy have persisted in digital space. Furthermore, the article explicates the ways in which popular narratives affectively reinscribe dominant ideas about the (inter)national community: such as the historical imagination of a continuous nationhood rising from disasters and humiliation, positive energy, and a dichotomous view of the international order characterised by Western hegemony and Chinese victimhood. The geopolitical narratives of the pandemic build on and exacerbate binary oppositions between China and 'the West' in the global imaginary, which are co-constructed through discursive practices on both sides in mutually reinforcing ways. The lens of emotion allows us to attend to the resonances and dissonances between official and popular narrativisations of the disaster without assuming a one-way determinate relationship between the two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of effeminate male images known as "little fresh meat" (xiao xian rou), or, more insultingly, "sissy pants" (niangpao) in film, TV, and advertisement has come in for heavy criticism in China. A number of "sissy" actors have even been blacklisted by the state media. Yet, despite this masculinist backlash, effeminate-looking stars and the aesthetic they embody are enjoying increasing popularity among high school students and other young people in urban China. The article situates the prevalence of male effeminacy and "sissyphobia"—the fear or hatred of effeminate men—in a wider social, cultural, and political background and adopts a culturally saturated and historically specific approach to queer masculinities in the Chinese context. By critical readings of recent TV/Web dramas featuring this type of male images, the article explores the disjuncture between urban youth culture and official attitudes and what the tension between them tells us about gender roles and subjectivity in contemporary China. And by discourse analysis of the debates in the media triggered by the images, the study examines how the effeminate male body is given affective interpretations and significances that are different from those in a Western context, and how the nation is imagined and articulated through embodied masculinity. Through an interdisciplinary approach, the article argues that the "little fresh meat" is part of a larger story of increasing diversity of gender presentations in postsocialist China and embodies shifting masculinity in a consumer society. The rise and popularity of such "sissy" actors need to be understood in the mechanisms of star making and the entertainment industry. At the same time, the debates on the standard of masculinities sparked by these images demonstrate distinctive interplay between manhood and nationhood and deep-seated anxiety over what an effeminate younger generation will mean for China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research applies the analytical lens of 'cosmopolitan nationalism' to examine how 'non-traditional' international high schools interweave cosmopolitan and nationalistic tendencies in Shenzhen, China. In-depth interviews with parents (n = 16) and students (n = 60) explored the motivations for choosing international schooling, experiences of international schooling, whether cosmopolitan identities are emerging amongst students and, if so, with what characteristics. The findings demonstrate the utility of 'cosmopolitan nationalism' in illuminating the nature of international schooling in China and extends it by applying it to denote the identities expressed by students, who confidently project the national into the global with their expectations for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shaping of people's identities as members of the Chinese nation is crucial to China's nationalist discourse at school. What kind of image of the Chinese nation does the state intend to transmit to its new generation of citizens? Does the constitutional separation of religion and education prescribe a secular image for the collective identity of the Chinese nation? This study explores how the interpretation of religion is manufactured during the discourse of constructing the nation in Chinese school textbooks. The findings reveal that different religious traditions are assigned strikingly different roles in the national curriculum's interpretation of the Chinese nation as a construct and the distinction between China and the external world. The integration of religious narratives and the agenda of shaping the national cultural identity of Chinese students reveal the changing role of religion in contemporary Chinese society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most English studies of Chinese Christianity recognise the significance of early independent church movements led by indigenous leaders, few have looked in detail at the pioneering example of Yu Guozhen and his China Jesus Independent Church. Indeed, what motivated the early efforts of Chinese Protestants to form independent churches? As probably the first leader of independent churches to achieve national impact, Yu exhibited a clear commitment to harmonising Christianity with the Chinese state, which he deemed as the basis of guaranteeing religious rights. Though it would adopt various forms in the years to come, such synthesis of Christian nationalism has proved to be a recurring theme in the indigenisation of Chinese Christianity in the twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalism today interacts in complicated ways with advanced information and communication systems, regularly leading to unanticipated consequences. Popular online nationalism in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a case in point: In the PRC, digital nationalism has become a central feature of political discourse and decision‐making, at times powerfully shaping the state's policy efforts. This article explores a missing puzzle piece in how state‐led and popular nationalism interact in Chinese politics: the role that advanced information and communication technologies play in such processes. This is a question that is not only relevant to scholars of China but also to anyone interested in the role that digital media and communication play in the formation and spread of contemporary nationalism. How do interactions in complex sociotechnical systems affect nationalism today? To answer this question, the article analyses and traces interaction and feedback loops in Chinese digital environments during Sino‐Japanese disputes over the East China Sea. It shows how the interactions between humans, organisations and technologies create unexpected variations in outcome that resonate through China's internet and create the conditions from which digital nationalism can powerfully emerge to shape legitimation and policy‐making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a contextualised examination of whether Xi Jinping Thought, the latest rendition of Marxism-Leninism that functions as China's ideology, has made China's political system more sustainable. By scrutinising Xi's speeches and writings since he came to power in 2012, we demonstrate that his vision is premised on modifying consultative Leninism, China's post-Deng Xiaoping political framework, with strongman rule. This is intended to revitalise the Chinese Communist Party as a Leninist instrument to deliver comprehensive leadership, upgrade China's economy, Sinicise Marxism, nurture a party-centric nationalism, enhance legitimacy and claim global leadership on the world stage. In the process, he has revived the Maoist mass line to induce people to embrace national goals set by the Party, ultimately to persuade them that China's Leninist party-state is more 'democratic' and better at serving them than any other political system. We found that Xi's measures have enhanced the capacity of China's consultative Leninist state and thus the resilience of the regime in the short term. However, the substitution of collective leadership by strongman rule, and the end of predictable power transition by abolishing a term limit for himself, have undermined institutionalisation and reduced the endurance of the system in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2018 the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan elevated certain Chinese languages, Taiwanese Indigenous languages, and Taiwan Sign Language to the status of national languages, seemingly marking the latest stage in an evolution of language education policy away from the long-standing focus on Mandarin. This paper analyses this evolution by comparing approaches to language education policy in contemporary Taiwan with those in the People's Republic of China (PRC). It focuses on how notions of multiculturalism, deployed to legitimate policy, have taken on different meanings in these divergent political contexts. I argue that in both the PRC and Taiwan, multiculturalism primarily signifies symbolic recognition of minority and non-dominant languages, involving limited redistribution of power. The continued centrality of Mandarin reflects the powerful legacy in both the ROC and the PRC of discourses of national identity centred around Han Chineseness, despite significant differences in the deployment of multicultural rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schools worldwide have long engaged in various forms of 'war education'. In China, an extensive 'Patriotic Education' campaign and an expanded 'National Defense Education' curriculum have led to an increase in youth-oriented military programs in the 2000s. Previous work on the implementation of these programs in Chinese schools has mostly focused on urban elite youth, while overlooking the reception of these programs by non-urban, non-elite populations. The present study addresses this issue by examining youth perceptions and experiences of military training courses in urban and rural high schools. Drawing on the analysis of Chinese publications in the 2000s and on data from field interviews with students of different backgrounds, the study finds that youth military training constitutes a contentious program. Although the Chinese government promotes the program as crucial for military strengthening and the fostering of a patriotic spirit, PRC academic and media writers provide alternative rationales for the program, which at times undermine the logic of government articulations. Meanwhile, interviews with youth document divergent attitudes and even resentment towards the program, especially among city youth. This finding casts doubt on the assumption that military-training courses necessarily contribute to the increased 'militarization' of Chinese youth and education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the contemporary practice of nationalistic rhetoric in Chinese society through the singing competition franchiseThe Voice of China. By employing the concept of ideograph, the authors explore how the show successfully incorporates the Chinese Communist Party's nationalistic goal of promoting a unified and strong China to both the domestic audiences and the global Chinese community by relying on the persuasive and affective power of slogan. Specifically, the authors analyze and — two political and cultural slogans articulated in a variety of sonic representations and in contestants' performative statements. The authors argue that while popular culture products in contemporary China continue to be sites of political propaganda, they are able to apply new media-influenced rhetorical strategies to reflect popular sentiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outside of the dominant frame depicting World War II as a showdown between the Allied and Axis powers, the war also represented a critical juncture in the global battle between empire and nation. In Asia, the war allowed a "semi‐colonial" China to successfully reclaim its sovereignty from both its allies and enemies and compelled the Dutch to forfeit colonial rule in Indonesia and its prestige as a regional power. Moving beyond conventional dichotomies and great‐power bias, this paper analyses two portentous wartime controversies between China and the Netherlands, whose common goals as allies did not prevent clashes over diametrically opposed national pursuits. In exposing the conflicting nature of their respective nationalisms, these disputes elucidate the interplay of war, nationalism, and imperialism in East Asia as well as China's changing place in the emergent post‐war regional and global orders. The Dutch refusal to accept these shifting realities and underlying notions of national self‐determination presaged the traumatic trajectory of Indonesia's decolonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using an inductive framing analysis of news coverage, we examine how the most popular liberal and conservative news media in the United States and South Korea mobilize different nationalist narratives on China in responding to social, economic, and political upheavals during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. We identify three major areas of political cleavage in both Korean and U.S. media discourse on nationalist identities vis-à-vis the construction of the national or racialized "Other." This includes (1) imagined solidarity against China as an adversary; (2) political disputes over boundary-making; (3) and the construction of ethnonational belonging and exclusion. Our research underscores how intrastate and interstate shifts during periods of crisis can heighten political cleavages along racial and ethnic fault lines and complicate dominant frameworks of civic and ethnic nationalism in both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fighting the COVID‐19 pandemic requires large numbers of citizens to adopt disease‐preventive practices. We contend that national identification can mobilize and motivate people to engage in preventive behaviors to protect the collective, which in return would heighten national identification further. To test these reciprocal links, we conducted studies in two countries with diverse national tactics toward curbing the pandemic: (1) a two‐wave longitudinal survey in China (Study 1, N = 1200), where a national goal to fight COVID‐19 was clearly set, and (2) a five‐wave longitudinal survey in the United States (Study 2, N = 1001), where the national leader, President Trump, rejected the severity of COVID‐19 in its early stage. Results revealed that national identification was associated with an increase in disease‐preventive behaviors in both countries in general. However, higher national identification was associated with greater trust in Trump's administration among politically conservative American participants, which then was associated with slower adoption of preventive behaviors. The reciprocal effect of disease‐preventive behaviors on national identification was observed only in China. Overall, our findings suggest that although national identification may serve as a protective factor in curbing the pandemic, this beneficial effect was reduced in some political contexts. HighlightsPolicymakers should note that national identity serves as a protective factor in curbing the COVID‐19 pandemic. Narratives that highlight the collective agency of people would be useful in promoting disease‐preventive actions as long as they are also endorsed by national leaders.National leaders should provide clear and consistent recommendations in promoting disease‐preventive actions.Practitioners and policymakers should be aware of how the communication strategies they use would be affected by society's political contexts. Mobilizing disease‐preventive actions through a patriotic frame might not be useful when national leaders did not unambiguously promote disease prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The media have played a key role in the dissemination of an official middle-class discourse that emerged in the People's Republic of China two decades ago. The emergence and construction of a middle-class discourse in China will be analysed through news items published in Renmin Wang (People's Daily Online), the digital version of the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in order to answer the question: why does the CCP promote an official middle-class discourse in China? The findings suggest that the Party-State legitimises its authority by taking different stances based on a populist nationalism that fosters a new identity consistent with neoliberal values, which goes hand in hand with the discourse of the middle class. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well known that regime types affect international conflicts. This article explores political parties as a mechanism through which they do so. Political parties operate in fundamentally different ways in democracies vs. non-democracies, which has consequences for foreign policy. Core supporters of a party in a democracy, if they are hawkish, may be more successful at demanding hawkish behavior from their party representatives than would be their counterparts in an autocracy. The study draws on evidence from paired experiments in democratic Japan and non-democratic China to show that supporters of the ruling party in Japan punish their leaders for discouraging nationalist protests, while ruling party insiders in China are less likely to do so. Under some circumstances, then, non-democratic regimes may be better able to rein in peace-threatening displays of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beyond Chinese studies and Asian studies more broadly, Tam's book will also make important contributions to the interdisciplinary study of language in fields such as sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology. Methodologically, Tam's study rests on a "keyword" approach developed by cultural studies theorist Raymond Williams and applied in China by scholars such as Leon Rocha and Ruth Rogaski. £22.99 ISBN 978-1-108-74569-7 Gina Tam's book I Dialect and Nationalism in China, 1860-1960 i is an outstanding work that provides crucial historical insights for understanding language in contemporary China. [Extracted from the article]

This study examines the cultural representations of Chinese military-action films which re-interpret China's non-intervention policy and give China's foreign engagements rationality and legitimation. It involves two narrative strategies: (1) framing the protection of nationals abroad as the key incentive behind China's military actions; and (2) emphasizing an unquestioning commitment to sovereignty, to UN authorization, and to the consent of host countries during the intervening process.Then, it points out the propagandistic features of China's military-action films: framing the outside world as a threatening place in which individuals' survival depends on the protection of a powerful nation; cultivating collective narcissism and nationalism; and reframing China's global economic expansion through a"friendship narrative". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xi Jinping's anti-corruption drive, personnel reshuffles, and institutional overhauls seem to mark a turning point in Beijing's long-running fight against 'localism' (difangzhuyi). Yet, key questions remain about the scope and effectiveness of efforts to rein in China's subnational officials. Has the Xi administration effectively combated localism by appointing more outsiders to provincial leadership teams? Or have strengthened oversight institutions made subnational officials more responsive to the center regardless of their individual backgrounds? To address these questions, this article distinguishes between different types of localism in contemporary China and the varying personnel 'risk factors' underlying them. Comparing the makeup of provincial party standing committees under Xi Jinping's 18th CPC Central Committee (2012–2017) with those from the 15–17th CPC Central Committees under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (1997–2012), the analysis finds that Xi has accelerated personnel changes to address multiple forms of localism. At the same time, gaps in governance outcomes between local cadres and outsiders have faded since 2012 in several domains, implying that Xi-era institutional reforms have also played a role in curbing localism. Even under Xi, however, important personnel risk factors for localism have persisted and in some domains local-outsider differences in governance outcomes have actually increased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines popular nationalism and regime support in the Xi era by evaluating news comments from a major overseas Chinese website on the 2018 constitutional amendments removing presidential term limits. It finds that the event was not only contested among overseas and domestic Chinese, but also has alienated many nationalists who previously supported the regime. Even the subsequent pro-regime discourse is less focused on support for Xi or the regime, and more about distrust of the West and dissidents. However, some citizens have become less critical toward the regime out of the concern of external threats. The findings confirm the Xi Jinping effect on nationalist regime support, and show how China's international and domestic environments may activate nationalist sentiment differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Native-place associations have played an indispensable role in the global migration of ethnic Chinese. Although there has been growing attention to their political role in advancing the Chinese state's interests, few studies have looked into how they are organized and how they operate vis-à-vis the state. This article focuses on post-handover Hong Kong, where native-place associations, despite their long presence, are still growing in number and sophistication after the 1997 handover. It posits that native-place associations there are forming a "cultural nexus" through which the Chinese state fosters political mobilization in support of its interests and policies. Based on an original set of event and biographical data, it shows that native-place associations are consolidating into a massive network connected by power-seeking elites. It also demonstrates how these associations seek to renew the significance of native-place and national identities. The findings point to how native-place associations may serve as a powerful cultural space for the Chinese state to project its influence offshore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]