7 results on '"AGENCY costs"'
Search Results
2. Does debt structure heterogeneity reduce the cost of capital?
- Author
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Augusto Eça, João Paulo and Albanez, Tatiana
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CAPITAL costs , *BUSINESS enterprises , *STOCKHOLDER wealth , *VALUE (Economics) , *COST structure , *ENTERPRISE value , *HETEROGENEITY , *AGENCY costs , *CAPITAL structure - Abstract
This paper seeks to investigate the relationship between the level of debt structure heterogeneity and the cost of debt of publicly and privately held Brazilian companies in the period from 2020 to 2019. Debt structure heterogeneity is a relatively recent topic in the financial literature related to capital structure. As far as is known, the direct relationship between debt heterogeneity and the cost of debt has not yet been addressed in previous studies in the national and international literature. Research that broadens the knowledge regarding factors that attenuate the cost of debt is pertinent, especially in a context such as that of Brazil, in which high funding cost spreads end up compromising the economic viability of many projects and, consequently, the capacity for companies to generate value. The research results have impacts over the financial decision-making process, given the association identified between heterogeneity and debt cost, leading to reflections on the definition of a company's capital structure. Thus, it is closely related with firm value, whose maximization is the object of interest of managers and shareholders. Panel data regression models were estimated in which the dependent variable is represented by the cost of debt and the explanatory variables are represented by the heterogeneity level of companies' debt structure, which in turn is represented by two different proxies, aiming to give greater robustness to the results. The results are original and highlight the role of the debt structure in reducing the cost of debt. It is verified that the greater the debt heterogeneity, the lower companies' cost of debt. This relationship is even more intense for companies that are more susceptible to high agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Hedging Policies to Reduce Agency Costs in Brazil.
- Author
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Magnani, Vinícius Medeiros, Ambrozini, Marcelo Augusto, Antonio, Rafael Moreira, and Gatsios, Rafael Confetti
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HEDGING (Finance) ,AGENCY costs ,FINANCIAL policy ,ECONOMIC uncertainty ,PANEL analysis ,AGENCY theory - Abstract
Given the recent Brazilian economic scenario, characterized by political uncertainties and economic instabilities, it is essential for companies to engage in hedging as part of their financial policy in order to prevent their results from being affected by market frictions. In this context, the present study aimed to verify the impact of hedging on the agency costs of Brazilian companies. The methodology used was that of panel data contemplating a manually collected database of 154 companies between 2010 and 2017 (all companies that use derivatives for hedging). The results obtained agree with the literature on hedging and agency costs, indicating that the greater the use of hedging, the lower the agency costs faced by shareholders, expanding on the discussions involving developed markets. This relationship shows that by using hedging in a company's financial policy, managers can minimize the impacts of market frictions and reduce the residual losses of shareholders in relation to what would otherwise occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. The relation between the property structure and the leveraged debt cost via debenture issues in Brazil.
- Author
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Konraht, Jonatan Marlon, Consoni, Silvia, and Wagner da Fonseca, Marcos
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CAPITAL costs ,BONDS (Finance) ,PRICES of securities ,INTEREST rates ,PROPERTY - Abstract
Objective: This research aimed to identify the relation between the percentage of direct participation in the property (control) and the leveraged debt cost via debenture issues in Brazil. Method: The cost of debt (spread of interest rate of debenture issues) was regressed with the property structure (direct property concentration, direct control concentration and excessive control), using linear and quadratic regressions for the period from 2011 to 2018. Results: The results found suggest that, among the analyzed property/control structure characteristics, only the concentration of direct control is relevant for the debenture holders when pricing the securities. Contributions: The research contributes to the literature by evidencing that the relation between control concentration and spread is quadratic. Hence, to a certain extent, the increase in the control concentration is reflected in an increased cost of debt; nevertheless, when this concentration becomes very high, the creditors interpret it as something beneficial, reducing the cost of debt. These results suggest that the positive and negative effects deriving from the control concentration are present in the debt leverage; nevertheless, the benefits only tend to appear when the control concentration becomes high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
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5. Regional consortia and transaction costs for sanitation services in Brazil.
- Author
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Silvestre, Hugo Consciência, Marques, Rui Cunha, Dollery, Brian, and Correia, Aldenisio Moraes
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TRANSACTION costs , *SANITATION , *CONSORTIA , *QUALITY of service , *AGENCY costs - Abstract
Studies on public cooperation usually focus on its impact on the service costs experienced by service providers. However, engagement in public cooperation in service provision often seeks other outcomes, like service coverage (measured by the population served) rather than simply minimizing service expenditure. Moreover, public cooperation by local governments, as either 'providers' or owners, generates transaction costs arising from negotiation, monitoring, agency costs and the enforcement of cooperative agreements. However, to date, little empirical effort has been directed at determining the impact of transaction costs on service provision owners and service outcomes. This paper addresses this gap in the empirical literature by examining the relationship between cooperative agreements between Brazilian municipalities for water and wastewater provision and service coverage in the light of transaction costs. We find that transaction costs are higher for cooperative providers due primarily to low service coverage levels, especially in sewage services that demand high investment in assets with high specificity. However, lower expenditures may occur after initial up-front investment. • Public cooperation by local governments - as either 'providers' or owners - generates transaction costs. • This paper compares the total spending and service coverage through public cooperation and 'stand-alone' local councils. • Intermunicipal cooperation through Regional Consortia in Brazil has been selected for analysis. • We find that transaction costs are higher for cooperative providers due primarily to low service coverage levels. • Decreasing expenditure may occur after the initial up-front investment on asset specificity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2022
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6. Do financial constraints in an unstable emerging economy mitigate the opportunistic behavior of entrenched family owners?
- Author
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Kabbach-de-Castro, Luiz Ricardo, Kalatzis, Aquiles Elie Guimarães, and Pellicani, Aline Damasceno
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EMERGING markets , *FAMILY-owned business enterprises , *MINORITY stockholders , *CAPITAL market , *CAPITAL movements , *INFORMATION asymmetry , *AGENCY costs , *FREE cash flow - Abstract
Prior research is not conclusive whether information asymmetries or managerial discretion are the cause of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper examines the effect of family firms' governance heterogeneity on firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity in Brazil. The Brazilian economic and corporate governance context present several idiosyncratic features, including weak minority shareholder protection, an underdeveloped capital market, macro-economic uncertainties, the presence of controlling shareholders (especially families), and the excessive use of control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing us to explore in greater detail the drivers of investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with a highly entrenched family presence (divergence between corporate control and voting rights coupled with family management) than in less entrenched family firms. This result emerges primarily due to financial constraints from asymmetric information, rather than agency problems of free cash flow from abuse of managerial discretion. Our findings shed new light on the role of excessive control rights in investment decisions, allowing family managers to reallocate capital to cope with financial constraints in times of economic uncertainties. • Family entrenched firms reduce the investment-cash flow sensitivity. • Entrenched owners are stewards in times of economic uncertainty. • Underinvestment due to information asymmetries seems to prevail. • There is no evidence of private benefits of control in family entrenched firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2022
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7. What is the impact of bad governance practices in a concentrated ownership environment?
- Author
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Di Miceli da Silveira, Alexandre and Dias, Jr., Armando L.
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STOCK prices , *MASS media , *CORPORATE governance , *STOCKHOLDERS - Abstract
This article investigates the impact on share prices when news released on the specialized media indicates that the interests of controlling and minority shareholders groups diverge. Methodologically, we analyze 24 announcements of conflicts between shareholder groups in Brazil using two event study methodologies. We find strong support for our hypothesis that such news constitutes a proxy for relevant agency costs taking place, leading to a higher perception of risk and reduced share price. To our knowledge, this is the first article to estimate the impact of specific agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders in an environment characterized by concentrated ownership structures. The article is relevant for all capital markets' investors, as well as for analysts and other capital markets' agents. For policy makers and practitioners, our results provide evidence on the potential corporate value loss owing to conflicts between shareholders groups. As a result, they reinforce the argument for the adoption of good corporate governance practices, in order to avoid corporate value destruction resulting from problems between different shareholding groups. The main author is a professor at the School of Economics, Management and Accounting of University of São Paulo (FEA/USP) in Corporate Governance courses at both graduate and undergraduate level. In addition, he is Executive Coordinator of the Center for Corporate Governance Research of Fipecafi (CEG – www.ceg.org.br), Vice-President of the Brazilian Society of Finance (www.sbfin.org.br) and Senior Researcher of the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC – www.ibgc.org.br). He is author of several books and articles on corporate governance, and writes a monthly column on corporate governance issues for Capital Aberto magazine, one of the most prominent capital markets' magazines in Brazil, making him well known among the corporate governance community in Brazil and Latin America. All persons involved with capital markets, media and policy makers should take note of these results, as most have corporate environments characterized by controlling shareholders, and their relationship with minority shareholders can be a potential source of relevant value destruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
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