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Questions and analyses centered on race have become more prominent in philosophy. By employing a ‘critical philosophy of race’, thinkers become enabled to address how race and racism continue to operate in subtle and unintended ways, including within concepts, theories, principles, practices, and methodologies otherwise purported to be race-neutral. Yet, North American sports philosophy provides few examples of work that grapples with race, racism, or theories of race. In this essay, I ask why and conclude that the shortage of discussions that include explicit references to race or ethnicity in North American sport philosophy is due to the dominance and normalization of white epistemologies – white ways of experiencing, seeing, and knowing the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive scientist studies it. That is, selection for action pulls empirical and folk‐psychology together. Accordingly, philosophers who take seriously either source have reason to work with selection for action as their starting conception of attention. This conception provides a way to bridge empirical and philosophical concerns where attention is central. The theoretical advantages of selection for action have been obscured by the common opinion that it is easily refuted. I defend the position against many of the published objections and then deploy it to provide a foundation for the intuitive, but inchoate, idea of attention being gradable, something of which there can be more or less. An analysis of the gradability of attention is then applied to consider recent work on the harms due to a surplus of attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short interview explores the influence of Evald Ilyenkov's work on contemporary philosopher, art theorist, and writer Keti Chukhrov. The interview focuses on Evald Ilyenkov's contributions to Soviet culture, dialectics, and epistemology. She reflects on the distinct intellectual milieu of Soviet thinkers like Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, Davidov, and Lifshitz, who established connections between Marx and the broader world culture. The interview also addresses Žižek's interpretation of Ilyenkov's cosmology, emphasizing the ethical dimension of Ilyenkov's communist spirit. Furthermore, Chukhrov touches on Ilyenkov's critique of cybernetics and its relevance in contemporary discussions about AI and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers have been attracted to a restricted version of the principle of indifference in the case of self‐locating belief. Roughly speaking, this principle states that, within any given possible world, one should be indifferent between different hypotheses concerning who one is within that possible world, so long as those hypotheses are compatible with one's evidence. My first goal is to defend a more precise version of this principle. After responding to several existing criticisms of such a principle, I argue that existing formulations of the principle are crucially ambiguous, and I go on to defend a particular disambiguation of the principle. According to the disambiguation I defend, how we should apply this restricted principle of indifference sensitively depends on our background metaphysical beliefs. My second goal is to apply this disambiguated principle to classical skeptical problems in epistemology. In particular, I argue that Eternalism threatens to lead us to external world skepticism, and Modal Realism threatens to lead us to inductive skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of alienation has been used to capture a specific kind of social ill or malady, and one that philosophers have argued is distinctive of life in modern society. I argue that there is a properly epistemic form of alienation present in modern society that arises due to a conflict between the dynamics of group knowledge and traditional requirements on the intellectual virtue of individuals. As group-based knowledge becomes increasingly widespread in modern society, the conflict with virtue becomes more pervasive, and the virtuous become alienated from fundamental epistemic goods. The aim of this paper is to examine this conflict and to highlight that the ‘social turn’ in epistemology is not free from costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense , humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Buddhist system of two truths provides a descriptive framework with criteria for what counts as real in contrast to what does not. This paper looks at the relationship between these two truths in the works of two seventh-century Indian philosophers, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti, and draws implications for comparison and contrast with modern scientific understandings of the world. It highlights important features of Dharmakīrti's epistemology that aim to circumvent cultural conventions in a way that resonates with scientific representations of knowledge. It also contrasts this approach with one inspired by Candrakīrti in order to argue for the place of ethics and persons in a hybrid Buddhist–scientific picture of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines an epistemological thread that runs through Michael W. Clune's A Defense of Judgment. The first half raises worries about Humean judgment, ultimately doubting whether it can vindicate all it has been asked to. The second half argues that expertise can be grounded in fully tacit knowledge, though that fact inevitably—and rightly—introduces outsider skepticism. The explicitness of that tacit knowledge is not a requirement of expertise as such, but rather a contingent feature of the requirements of academic life. But this, among other things, may be what makes literary education a worthy pursuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What remains of German Idealism? This essay sets out by proposing that in both Hegel and Schelling the answer is ultimately an ontology of remains: an unsystematic philosophy of divine abjection in which the waste of the One is exposed as its own condition of possibility. This sheds new light on Coleridge's uneasy relationship with German Idealism, especially his puzzlement over Hegel's Science of Logic and his scandalized fascination with Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. At the heart of Coleridge's disquiet is his detection in both philosophers of a form of transcendental ontology that redirects the Kantian concern with the epistemological conditions of possible knowledge into an enquiry into the ontological conditions of the subjectivization of being. The essay traces the implications of the ontologizing of transcendental idealism for Coleridge's philosophy, chief among which is the way in which an indivisible remainder or Abfall (waste, offal) of the Absolute presents an excess that refuses to be harmonized into the transcendental unity of Coleridge's Prothetic "One." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Charles Mills' essay, "White Ignorance," and his trail-blazing monograph, The Racial Contract, he developed a view of how Whiteness or anti-Black-Indigenousand-Latinx racism causes individuals to hold false beliefs or lack beliefs about racial injustice in particular and the world in general. I will defend a novel exegetical claim that Mills' view is part of a more general view regarding how racial injustice can affect a subject's epistemic standing such as whether they are justified in a belief and whether their degree of confidence in the belief is rational given their evidence. Then, in light of this novel exegetical claim, I show how this interpretation of Mills' view about how racial injustice causes ignorance relates to proper evaluation of whether justified philosophers and social scientists count as epistemologically justified in holding the views that dominate their respective scholarly literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alter (The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, GB: Oxford University Pres, 2023) argues for something surprising: despite being widely rejected by philosophers, including Frank Jackson himself, Jackson's knowledge argument succeeds. Alter's defense of Jackson's argument is not only surprising; it's also exciting: the knowledge argument, if it's sound, underscores the power of armchair philosophy, the power of pure thought to arrive at substantial conclusions about the world. In contrast, I aim to make a case for something unsurprising and unexciting: that the knowledge argument does not succeed, or, even less far-reaching, that Alter's defense of it is not persuasive. Mine is a classic file-drawer thesis, but what it has going for it is that it's true, or so I think, and hope to illustrate why you should too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book review discusses "Pragmatic Reason: Christopher Hookway and the American Philosophical Tradition," edited by Robert Talisse, Paniel Reyes Cárdenas, and Daniel Herbert. The book contains 14 essays that celebrate Christopher Hookway's work on inquiry, pragmatism, and intellectual virtues. The essays cover various topics, including Peirce's influence on Hookway's work, the Analytic/Synthetic Wars, Peirce's views on belief in science, the nature of belief in pragmatism, the affective preconditions of inquiry, creativity as an intellectual virtue, hope and trust in transcendental arguments, and Peirce's conception of truth and metaphysics. The book provides valuable insights for readers interested in these topics and offers a diverse range of perspectives. [Extracted from the article]

Traditionally, philosophers have been skeptical that the imagination can justify beliefs about the actual world. After all, how could merely imagining something give you any reason to believe that it is true? However, within the past decade or so, a lively debate has emerged over whether the imagination can justify empirical belief and, if so, how. This paper provides a critical overview of the recent literature on the epistemology of imagination and points to avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article places the question of the presence of the Averroist philosopher Siger of Brabant in Dante's Paradiso within the debate concerning Dante's relationship with Averroistic philosophy throughout his works, particularly in the Commedia. The purpose of this research is to initially query the issue of Dante's potential retraction of previously adopted Averroistic positions in the Commedia, and then to examine in greater detail the relationship between the Florentine poet and the Brabantian philosopher. United by the thematic and autobiographical thread of knowledge persecuted by power, embodied in the history of both figures, the proposed viewpoint is that Dante finds a model of intellectual honesty and freedom in Siger's thought, ready to question even the authority of Aristotle, a model that Dante admires, places in Paradise, and upon which he structures his poema sacro. In conclusion, this work suggests a reading of some paradigmatic and antithetical pairs in the Commedia, linked by common principles yet opposite destinies, including Dante himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public reason views hold that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. A growing number of philosophers argue that this reasonable acceptability principle (RAP) can be justified by appealing to the value of civic friendship. They claim that a valuable form of political community can only be achieved among the citizens of pluralistic societies if they refrain from appealing to controversial ideals and values when justifying the exercise of political power to one another. This paper argues against such accounts. In order to justify RAP, one must explain and defend a conception of reasonableness. Civic friendship is unfit to perform this task, rendering it unable to ground public reason alone. Meanwhile, pluralist views that combine civic friendship with other considerations in order to specify RAP either fail or make civic friendship a spare wheel in the argument for public reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay revisits one of the most acclaimed paintings of Rembrandt van Rijn's later years, Aristotle with the Bust of Homer (1654; The Metropolitan Museum of Art). The painter's approach to the subject of this work owes much to visual precedents and to the reception of Aristotle among early modern men of letters, including within the intellectual circles of seventeenth-century Holland. The unusual appearance of the philosopher, which has often led to conflicting interpretations, becomes much clearer when considered against the long-standing perception of his cultural "otherness." The stance and gesture of this Aristotle not only affirm his identity but point to key aspects of his epistemology, focusing on the role of touch as the first step toward knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the interconnections between Hume's thought as a philosopher, a historian and an economist, illustrated with respect to his thought on history, development and happiness. It is argued that differences in the interpretation of Hume have an epistemological origin, reflecting either a closed-system approach or some kind of open-system approach. These differences are explored in relation to Hume's own epistemology, historiography, theory of economic development and theory of happiness. Patterns are identified in Hume's thought which support a particular, open-system, interpretation of his contributions in each area in terms of interdependent processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his recently published 1975–76 seminar on Life Death (§3), Jacques Derrida offers a severe critique of French epistemologists and philosophers of life. On Derrida's view, they do not seem to be concerned with the question of the metaphoricity of metaphor but, rather, by taking the epistemological cut between (inadequate) metaphors and (adequate) concepts for granted, they explain the scientific process as a movement of critical rectification of metaphors by concepts. Moreover, they do not engage with Nietzsche seriously. Here I build on this last point to examine the project of accounting for the very condition of the scientific process that Derrida puts forward in 'White Mythology' (1971) and Life Death. My reading hypothesis is that this project rests on Derrida's original interpretation of Nietzsche's Darwinian-type genesis of thinking, according to which selective reproduction consists in the metaphoricity of metaphor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, I support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced choice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much – needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Educators, philosophers, and commentators in the popular media often assume that students and adult citizens alike should engage in dialogue regarding ethical, social, and political issues, particularly with people who hold different views. Debates about the value of such dialogue tend to focus on the political implications of these exchanges and neglect the ontological and epistemological assumptions that could make sense of why people should talk their way to greater understanding. This focus on the political implications of dialogue also obscures conceptions of personhood that could call into question the relationship between dialogue and understanding. Drawing on conceptual resources available in the work of Charles Taylor, this article argues that ethical insight may best be cultivated when dialogue is interdependent with a quieting of the linguistic, conceptual mind. Taylor insists that articulation is indispensable to moral orientation. However for Taylor, rather than merely identifying or entirely constructing the good, language "grants access" to the good. This suggests that language is a vehicle for sources that exist outside of articulation. Education meant to cultivate students' capacity for judgment in discussions of ethical, social, and political issues might then be enhanced through practices that reserve space for that which lies outside of language. In particular, educators could cultivate students' capacity to produce reasons through dialogue not in isolation but in relationship to students' receptivity to non-verbal insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The acquaintance with significant philosophical doctrines emerging in the West has been a systematic process in the leading Russian-language philosophical journals, collections of articles, monographs and translations. Practically all the most important Western philosophical doctrines have been subjected to scrutiny by Russian philosophers. One of the most vivid Neo-Kantian projects of the early twentieth century, Emil Lask's Logic of Philosophy, has not gone unnoticed either. Reaction to Lask's works were far from being homogeneous. His project received several different evaluations, including the critical ones. The project was criticized for the unsolved ontological potential of philosophy, the dogmatic immobility of logic of philosophy, inconsistency of material–form relation, etc. The article considers the first reviews and critical assessments of Lask's works in Russia as well as the texts of Russian religious philosophers and Russian Neo-Kantians which contain constructive criticism. The range of reviews allows us to reconstruct the reception of Lask's ideas in Russia and provides a significant supplement to the overall picture of the reception of Neo-Kantianism in Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Locke's theory of quantity and its connection to his broader philosophical framework, emphasizing its historical roots in Aristotle's approach to quantity. Topics include Locke's treatment of quantity principles, the quantity-quality distinction, and their relevance to discussions on infinity and demonstrative knowledge.

Recently, various philosophers have argued that we can obtain knowledge via the imagination. In particular, it has been suggested that we can come to know concrete, empirical matters of everyday significance by appropriately imagining relevant scenarios. Arguments for this thesis come in two main varieties: black box reliability arguments and constraints‐based arguments. We suggest that both strategies are unsuccessful. Against black‐box arguments, we point to evidence from empirical psychology, question a central case‐study, and raise concerns about a (claimed) evolutionary rationale for the imagination's reliability. Against the constraints‐based account, we argue that to the extent that it works, this does not give rise to knowledge that is distinctively from the imagination. We conclude by suggesting that the imagination's role in raising possibilities, traditionally seen as part of the context of discovery, can in fact play a role in justification, including as a bulwark against certain sorts of skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the theory of rationality as 'openness to criticism' solved the problem of 'rational belief in reason'? This is the main question the present article intends to address. I respond to this question by arguing that the justified true belief account of knowledge has prevented Karl Popper's critical and William Bartley's pan-critical rationalism from solving the problem of rational belief in reason. To elaborate this response, the article presents its arguments in three stages: First, it argues that the idea of objective knowledge as justified true belief leads to the equation of objective knowledge with justification. Hence, if we base the theory of critical rationalism, as openness to criticism, upon such a conception of knowledge, our theory of rationality involves in infinite regress of proofs. Second, it argues that Popper describes critical rationalism as an 'irrational attitude' of openness to criticism because the rationalist cannot justify his belief in reason by argument or experience. Thus, since Popper assumes that 'a belief in reason' must be justified in order to be 'rational' he cannot lead to a solution for the problem of rational belief in reason. Third, it argues that, like Popper's critical rationalism, Bartley's pan-critical rationalism originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge, however, not because Bartley defines critical rationalism as irrational faith in reason, but because his theory does not tell us how an 'open' belief in reason is to be refuted logically. The reason for this failure is that Bartley uses Popper's epistemology of science to define the conception of criticism. While Popper and Bartley are recognized as the non-justificationist philosophers of science and rationality, this article tries to reveal that the idea of objective knowledge as justified true belief has prevented them from showing how 'a rational belief in reason' can be defended by argument. The article also briefly shows the consequence of this study for a notable change in the logical foundations of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is, among philosophers involved in the debate concerning the nature and epistemology of understanding, a general recognition that this state has a grasping component that accounts for some of its distinctive features. This article defends the view that this component of understanding consists of a knowledge of how to use a particular explanation to account for a given phenomenon. How a subject acquires this knowledge is examined and the result of this examination is shown to highlight the particular contribution of the grasping component of understanding to the distinctive features of this state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There could be various comparative studies between Kant and Kierkegaard on fields like human knowledge, ethics, faith, art, etc. This paper aims to compare the two philosopher's epistemology through their writings. The main common ground of Kant's and Kierkegaard's epistemology is their belief in the idea of a "fissure" between theory and practice, which constitutes the core of their contemplations on human knowledge. This article shows that Kant's theory of knowledge paved the way for Kierkegaard to describe his notions of the "fissure" between being and thought. Thus, it will be shown that Kant and Kierkegaard have been led to believe in the finitude of human beings in knowledge by this split. Then, it will be demonstrated that Kierkegaard, following Kant, distinguishes "being" from "essence" and "actuality" from "ideality". Finally, we argue that Kant's critique of the traditional proofs of God's existence anticipates Kierkegaard's conflict with natural theology and his idea that traditional demonstrations are useless for a believer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What degree of justification should be required of epistemological cognition, the kind of cognition by which epistemological problems are to be solved? I consider the question by examining Husserl's view of the matter. Challenging the current consensus, I argue that he is committed to the infallibility of epistemological cognition. I first present what he takes to be the leading problem of epistemology, which he designates as the 'problem of transcendence' or the problem of how 'transcendent cognition' is possible. I then give an account of what I call his Non-Transcendence Constraint, on which the problem cannot be solved by means of cognitions of the kind whose possibility it concerns, and so cannot be solved by means of transcendent cognition. Pointing out that he provides four specifications of the problem, I go on to argue that on the most fundamental of these it concerns the general possibility of fallible cognition. By the Non-Transcendence Constraint, however, this entails that the problem of transcendence cannot be solved by means of fallible cognition. I conclude that central aspects of Husserl's metaepistemology commit him to the infallibility of epistemological cognition, at least as far as solving the supposedly leading problem of epistemology is concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to one prominent critique of mainstream epistemology, discoveries about what it takes to know or justifiedly believe that p can't provide the right kind of intellectual guidance. As Mark Webb puts it, "the kinds of principles that are developed in this tradition are of no use in helping people in their ordinary epistemic practices." In this paper I defend a certain form of traditional epistemology against this "regulative" critique. Traditional epistemology can provide—and, indeed, can be essential for—intellectual guidance. The reason is that, in many cases, how you should proceed intellectually depends on what you already know or justifiedly believe: how you should treat counterevidence to your beliefs, for example, can depend on whether those beliefs count as knowledge. Therefore, to get guidance on how to proceed intellectually, it will often be essential to be able to figure out what you know or justifiedly believe. And to do that it will often be helpful to try to figure out what it takes to count as knowledge or justified belief in the first place. To do this is precisely to engage in mainstream epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I discuss Gaston Bachelard's criticism of Henri Bergson's employment of intuition as the specific method of philosophy, and as a reliable means of acquiring knowledge. I locate Bachelard's criticism within the reception of Bergsonian intuition by rationalist philosophers who subscribed to the Third Republic's ethos. I argue that the reasons of Bachelard's rejection of Bergsonian intuition were not only epistemological, but also ethical and pedagogical. His view of knowledge as mediated, social, and historical, cannot be separated from his conceptions of society, education, and the human being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Matthew J. Brown considers Feyerabend and expertise, and Sarah M. Roe considers what Feyerabend's position on modern citizen science initiatives might have been. Interpreting Feyerabend: critical essays. How to tame your Feyerabend: Karim Bschir and Jamie Shaw (eds.);. [Extracted from the article]

This article presents a theory of intuitive skill in terms of three constitutive elements: getting things right intuitively, not getting things wrong intuitively, and sceptical ability. The theory draws on work from a range of psychological approaches to intuition and expertise in various domains, including arts, business, science, and sport. It provides a general framework that will help to further integrate research on these topics, for example building bridges between practical and theoretical domains or between such apparently conflicting methodologies as a heuristics and biases approach on the one hand and one based on naturalistic decision-making on the other. In addition, the theory provides a clearer and more precise account of relevant concepts, which will help to inspire new directions for future research. Intuitive skill is defined as a high level of intuitive ability, that is, the ability to make good use of intuition; specifically, a high level of ability at either getting things right intuitively, not getting things wrong intuitively, or sceptical ability, where the latter is the ability to detect instances of getting things wrong intuitively so as to avoid forming incorrect intuitive judgements, which may itself be partly intuitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to argue that there is no unproblematic way of delineating perceptual beliefs from non‐perceptual beliefs. The concept of perceptual belief is one of the central concepts not only of philosophy of perception but also of epistemology in a broad foundationalist tradition. Philosophers of perception talk about perceptual belief as the interface between perception and cognition and foundationalist epistemologists understand perceptual justification as a relation between perceptual states and perceptual beliefs. I consider three ways of cashing out the difference between perceptual and non‐perceptual beliefs (semantic, justificatory, and etiological) and argue that none of them works. Finally, I explore the possibility of understanding perceptual justification without relying on the concept of perceptual beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much depends on questions of belonging and home. If one must, by definition, belong to a single home community to do theology, then the use of the term "theology" in both comparative theology and Theology Without Walls is equivocal. Transreligious theologians refuse to stipulate that theology must be done for a theologian's home community. But the term "theology" might be understood in another sense—the existentially invested quest for religious truth that does not require a primary religious home. With this understanding, theology is existentially serious and committed reflection, whereas truth-seeking that entails no existential commitment (with or without a home) might go by another label, such as "philosophy of religion." After all, the philosopher of religion may well be agnostic or atheist. But two further sets of distinctions must follow: 1) the distinction between a) transformative truth accessed through the specific therapeutic regimes of a particular home tradition and b) public truth that requires no transformation but only publicly defensible epistemological warrants; and 2) the means of arriving at a) transformative truth on the one side and b) publicly available truth claims on the other. What I know by way of experience (anubhava) or a scriptural revelation (śruti) is particular to how my tradition accesses transformative truth. When I seek to publicly defend the content of that experience or scripture, I must engage all comers by means of knowing and disputation that are acceptable to all and do not depend on belonging to or accepting the internal norms of a home tradition. Avoiding muddled debates between comparative theology and TWW requires keeping these distinctions in view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When contemporary philosophers discuss the nature of knowledge, or conduct debates that the nature of knowledge is relevant to, they typically treat all knowledge as propositional. However, recent introductory epistemology texts and encyclopedia entries often mention three kinds of knowledge: (i) propositional knowledge, (ii) abilities knowledge, and (iii) knowledge of things/by acquaintance. This incongruity is striking for a number of reasons, one of which is that what kinds of knowledge there are is relevant to various debates in philosophy. In this paper I focus on this point as it relates to the third kind of knowledge mentioned above – knowledge of things. I start by supposing that we have knowledge of things, and then I show how this supposition reshapes various debates in philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The way in which individualised child agency is already 'given' ontologically in digital play research profoundly affects epistemology: how data is produced, analysed and interpreted. Co-created as part of a large-scale international study is a photograph 'of' South African six-year-old Zuko playing with Lego bricks. The agential realist diffractive reading of the photo as phenomenon traces transdisciplinary what is already at play materially and discursively in its specificity. Benefitting from recent work by feminist philosopher and quantum physicist Karen Barad and other agential realists, this article foregrounds the distinct contribution agential realism can make in children's geographies. Moving away from either zooming in objects, or subjects when analysing data disrupts the adult-human gaze and brings into focus the apparatuses that measure and the relational spacetime entanglements objects are always already part of. Doing justice to the complexity of reality reconfigures digital play and agency as intra-actively relational – essential for reimagining more equitable futures in resource-constrained environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been suggested that philosophers should adopt a methodology largely inspired by mathematics and that the "mathematical" virtues of rigor, clarity, and precision are also fundamental philosophical virtues. In reply, this paper argues that some excellent philosophy lacks these virtues and that too much emphasis on the mathematical virtues excludes potentially valuable forms of philosophical discourse and makes the profession less diverse than it should be. Unduly restrictive conceptions of philosophical argumentation should be avoided. On a contributory conception, philosophy should try to make a positive contribution to human emancipation where possible. The paper argues that it is possible and desirable for epistemology to contribute in this way and that the mathematical virtues are less significant in this context than the emancipatory virtues of what one might call "liberation philosophy." These include irony, reflectiveness, imagination, contrarianism, and worldliness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the philosophical theory of Feng Qi, an important modern Chinese philosopher, who is practically unknown in the West. I argue that his theory of knowledge is not limited to epistemology in the strict and narrow sense, but also refers to ontological and metaphysical issues. The paper shows how Feng Qi integrated ontological and ethical suppositions into the framework of what he called 'expanded epistemology'. In this way, he offers an innovative solution to several problems, linked to the dichotomous relations of substance and phenomena. The article analyses and interprets his theoretical system in order to highlight that it represents an important contribution to comparative epistemology and its underlying methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. But why do they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the "Common-Sense Tradition" contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the "Dynamic Argument" (or the "starting-point argument"), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but which will be strengthened with the help of Gilbert Harman's epistemology of belief revision). Second, G.E. Moore's "greater certainty argument" (interpreted along the lines of Soames' and Pollock's construal). This combined strategy, I will argue, is the strong core of Common-Sense Philosophy, and relies on extremely modest and widely held assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to explore the philosophy of Ṣadruddin Shirazi known as Mullā Ṣadrā. He promoted ontology, founded a new epistemology, and explored the primacy of Being. He gave important philosophical doctrines and an understanding of Muslim philosophy and thought development. The study aims to explore his departure from the tradition of the primacy of essence to the primacy of Being; the dynamic characteristics of Being, and his views on characteristics of transcendent knowledge. The study uses the content analysis methodology to critically analyze Ṣadrā’s philosophy of primacy of Being and its impact on the development of Islamic philosophy. The study concluded that Ṣadrā strongly argues against Illuminationist Philosopher, al-Suhrawardy for taking existence as merely a logical notion and secondary intelligible. For him, Existence is his sole reality, and he firmly rejects any role of essence in the external reality. He played an important role to resolve the metaphysical and logical difficulties of the philosophy of his time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Describing the abstract of the Soul in the words of rational and logical philosophers is the expression of ancient philosophy and the implementation of a new ontological view. Psychology, or inner epistemology, is constructed with a deep look at the spiritual aspects of the soul. The world of dreams has always been of special importance in the view of philosophers, as the manifestation of human thoughts and the soul outside the body. Psychology, especially from the contemporary view in the field of science, has a different perspective on understanding the inner dimensions of man. On the one hand, empirical psychiatry considers the dream of the unseen world to be connected with the bodily interactions of the brain, and on the other, the philosophical attitude of rationalists and imaginative philosophers signifies a different category. The essence of a dream can be explored and researched. The importance of the subject emerges when it deals with the type of dreams that are constructed in the human mind. The main issue is the development of dreams that a person goes through in the dream world and gives it carnal aspects. Is it a dream to depict everything that is seen in the material world? Is it possible to see nonsensations in the dream world? This article, which is written in an analyticaldescriptive manner in addition to field research in the field of psychology, has been documented in addition to a questionnaire. The positive hopeful result is that the dream is nothing but the manifestation of external sensations in the dream world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relation-theories—theories on the metaphysical status of relations—have for some time stood at the center of disputes between realism and idealism. To such disputes, this paper contributes insights from an understudied premodern source, the Sambandhasiddhi (Proof of Relation). Its author Utpaladeva (c. 925–975 C.E.) is the Śaiva philosopher of India best known as an innovator in the Pratyabhijñā (Doctrine of Recognition) school of Kashmiri Śaivism. This lesser-known late text shows Utpaladeva deploying an even more explicitly Bhartṛharian grammatical view of reality than he had previously. He argues against his chief rival and predecessor, the Buddhist epistemologist, Dharmakīrti (c. 6th or 7th C.E.), while modifying the latter's epistemic idealism to an objective idealism. This text differs from Utpaladeva's prior works in its sustained attack on Dharmakīrti's nominalism and citation of the Buddhist's own writings. The Sambandhasiddhi accordingly offers an interesting glimpse at a sustained treatment on relations, a topic that is important to Utpaladeva's prior arguments, but that he considered perhaps not sufficiently developed, so as to warrant a separate treatment. A few brief comments are also offered on how Utpaladeva's relation-theory might fit alongside Russell's disputes with Bradley over relations, and Utpaladeva's affinity with Peircean semiosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers Spenserian allegory in light of the ontology and epistemology of the post-structuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Drawing on Deleuze's interpretation of Baruch Spinoza, I compare the characters of Spenser's poem to Deleuzean affects, differential intensities that come into being through their varying relations on a "plane of immanence."Where influential recent arguments have characterized allegorical materiality in The Faerie Queene in terms of deadness and aesthetic emptiness, I will instead emphasize the immanent vitality and generativity of matter in Spenser's poem. Entering into Deleuzean Becomings as they encounter other bodies in the differential field Spenser calls "Faerie land," the denizens of Spenser's Faerie, I will argue, produce affective significance in excess of the delimiting violence of allegorical abstraction. This excess, finally, opens the possibility for our own divergent encounters with the poem--for readings that bring Spenser into differential relation with thinkers of our own historical era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postmodern fiction and literary theory have endorsed radical skepticism about knowledge, which was partly conditioned by philosophers’ inability to provide a viable epistemology that would resolve the radical skeptical problems. Most recent developments in both fiction and theory have largely ignored the apparently still unresolved issue and have instead embraced the position of active commitment that presupposes that knowledge is in fact possible. In this text, we address this apparent oversight and present an interactivist ontology of the mind and culture that explains how we can acquire knowledge about the world, and why the postmodern radical skepticism is ungrounded. We argue that once the interactivist theory of cognition as well as ontology of the mind and culture are assumed, the skeptical problems that troubled postmodern thought become non-problems and further pursuit of epistemically evaluable theory of culture (fiction included) gains solid theoretical grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores Michel Serres's "poetic dream of another epistemology" connected to an anti-Cartesian, sensorial view of knowledge. The philosopher alludes to empirical studies from the field of cognitive neuroscience, which have demonstrated that the mind and body are interwoven as part of one integrated entity, in order to propose an alternative epistemological framework for (re-) envisioning the nature of knowledge. The philosopher's rehabilitation of our senses illustrates that our body is replete with overlapping epistemological channels that bifurcate in all directions. Serres explains how somatic encounters with the universe enable us to constitute a stable sense of self in relation to the larger world. However, he recognizes that there are a plethora of obstacles standing in the way of allowing his epistemological dream to come to fruition. In what he refers to as the Exo-Darwinian, hominescent era, the (post-) modern, urbanized lifestyle affords very little contact with the remainder of the planet. Moreover, Serres laments how climate change has already forever eradicated spaces of meaning that are indispensable as part of an epistemological quest of knowing what and who we are as planetary beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the dispute between Burge and McDowell over methodology in the philosophy of perception. Burge (2005 , 2011) has argued that the disjunctivism posited by naive perceptual realists is incompatible with the results of current perceptual science, while McDowell (2010 , 2013) defends his disjunctivism by claiming an autonomous field of enquiry for perceptual epistemology, one that does not employ the classificatory schemes of the science. Here it is argued that the crucial point at issue in the dispute is Burge's acceptance, and McDowell's rejection, of the 'Cartesian idealization' of mind as a self-contained system. Burge's case against disjunctivism rests on the assumption of a clearly demarcated boundary between mind and world, a picture of the mind that McDowell's philosophy reacts against. This boundary is required for scientific, causal explanations of perceptual processing because it is a simplifying assumption that helps present scientists with a clearly demarcated object of investigation. Concurring with McDowell, I conclude that philosophers need not carve up their objects of investigation in the same way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]