84 results on '"AGENCY costs"'
Search Results
2. Non-controlling large shareholders and dynamic capital structure adjustment in China.
- Author
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Liao, Jia, Zhan, Yun, Yuan, Yu, and Xu, Ailing
- Subjects
- *
CAPITAL structure , *AGENCY costs , *GOVERNMENT business enterprises , *STOCKHOLDERS , *SPEED - Abstract
Using the sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2020, this study examines the impact of non-controlling large shareholders (NCLSs) on corporate capital structure adjustment. The results show that NCLSs significantly increase the dynamic capital structure adjustment speed and reduce capital structure deviation. NCLSs have an asymmetric influence on capital structure adjustment speed for different deviation directions, i.e. compared to the speed of upward adjustment after a downward deviation of the capital structure, the effect of NCLSs on the speed of downward adjustment of the capital structure after an upward deviation is stronger. Whether in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), NCLSs significantly increase the dynamic capital structure adjustment speed. However, compared with SOEs, NCLSs in NSOEs have a more significant positive impact on the dynamic capital structure adjustment speed. The mechanism analysis suggests that reducing agency costs and mitigating financing constraints serve as the important channels through which NCLSs influence the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. This paper not only enriches and improves the theoretical basis of dynamic capital structure adjustment, but also helps to deepen the understanding of dynamic capital structure adjustment of Chinese listed firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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3. Do foreign institutional shareholders affect international debt contracting? Evidence from Yankee bond covenants.
- Author
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Brockman, Paul, Drobetz, Wolfgang, El Ghoul, Sadok, Guedhami, Omrane, and Zheng, Ying
- Subjects
EXTERNAL debts ,AGENCY costs ,INVESTORS ,OPPORTUNISM (Psychology) ,BOND market ,STOCKHOLDERS ,BOND prices - Abstract
Copyright of Journal of International Business Studies is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
- Published
- 2024
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4. Global Board Reforms and the Pricing of IPOs.
- Author
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Chen, Yangyang, Goyal, Abhinav, and Zolotoy, Leon
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BOARDS of directors ,GOING public (Securities) ,REFORMS ,PRICES of securities ,STOCKHOLDERS ,FINANCIAL statements ,PRICING ,AGENCY costs - Abstract
We document that global board reforms are associated with a significant reduction in the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). The effect is amplified for IPOs with greater agency problems and mitigated for IPOs certified by reputable intermediaries, IPOs with greater disclosure specificity, and IPOs in countries with better shareholder protection and stringent financial reporting regulations. Furthermore, global board reforms have led to an improvement in the long-term market performance, proceeds, and subscription level of IPOs and have enhanced board independence in the issuing firms. Our findings suggest that global board reforms have strengthened board oversight in the issuing firms, leading to less underpriced IPOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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5. Linkage Between Brand Value and Firm Performance: An Empirical Examination Using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
- Author
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Bhaskaran, Rajesh Kumar, Sujit, Koyilathumpaday Sukumaran, and Waheed, Kareem Abdul
- Subjects
- *
ORGANIZATIONAL performance , *BRAND equity , *FUZZY sets , *STOCK exchanges , *STOCKHOLDERS , *AGENCY costs - Abstract
This study is designed with the data of Interbrand for ranking top 100 global brands. In this study, the linkage between brand values and financial performance was estimated using different performance measures that include both stock market and operating performance using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) technique. The study investigates the effect of brand value on profitability and shareholder. It is observed that the firms that have superior operating performance result in greater brand valuation. Performance of firms measured through profitability is found to be a significant factor in brand valuation. Brand valuation is also found to be significant determinant of profitability. Thus, higher brand quality improves the likelihood of repurchases and in turn improved cash flows. Firms with high agency conflicts tend to have lower brand value. Higher market valuation positively impacts brand valuation in the context of lower leverage and agency costs. The linkage of brand value to firm performance is the justification for marketer's investments toward branding initiatives as a mechanism that creates value. This study is the first of its kind to examine the impact of agency costs on brand value using fsQCA technique to understand valuation impact of brands. To measure the effect of branding and marketing initiatives of the firms on financial performance, this study integrated both econometric and financial modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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6. Agency Conflicts around the World.
- Author
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Morellec, Erwan, Nikolov, Boris, and Schürhoff, Norman
- Subjects
AGENCY theory ,CONFLICT theory ,STOCKHOLDERS ,FOREIGN investments ,DECISION making in investments ,CORPORATE governance ,AGENCY costs ,STOCK ownership - Abstract
We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs. Received April 19, 2016; editorial decision November 18, 2017 by Received April 19, 2016; editorial decision November 18, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
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7. Joint board management meetings and earnings management.
- Author
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Agustia, Dian, Harymawan, Iman, Nasih, Mohammad, and Nowland, John
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EARNINGS management ,CORPORATE meetings ,SENIOR leadership teams ,STOCKHOLDERS ,BOARDS of directors ,AGENCY costs ,AUDITORS ,ACCOUNTING - Abstract
Purpose: Joint board management meetings bring boards of directors and top management teams together to share information and discuss company matters. The authors investigate whether these joint meetings are associated with higher agency costs or information sharing benefits in the context of firm earnings management. Design/methodology/approach: Using publicly disclosed data on the frequency of joint board management meetings in Indonesian firms, the authors examine the relationship between joint board management meetings and earnings management during 2010–2017. Findings: The authors find that more joint board management meetings are associated with lower earnings management. This is consistent with joint board management meetings providing net information sharing benefits. Additional testing indicates that the results are the strongest when firms hold more joint board management meetings than regular board meetings. Originality/value: The findings suggest that in addition to holding regular board and audit committee meetings, formal meetings between boards of directors and top management teams are beneficial to shareholders by restricting opportunistic accounting choices by firm management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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8. Optimal Short-Termism.
- Author
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Hackbarth, Dirk, Rivera, Alejandro, and Wong, Tak-Yuen
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AGENCY costs ,INCENTIVE (Psychology) ,STOCKHOLDERS ,PATIENCE ,DEFAULT (Finance) - Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic contracting (multitasking) model of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, and shareholders choose optimal debt and default policies. Excessive short-termism ex post is optimal for shareholders because debt has an asymmetric effect: shareholders receive all gains from short-term effort but share gains from long-term effort. We find that grim growth prospects and shareholder impatience imply higher optimal levels of short-termism. Also, an incentive cost effect and a real option effect create nontrivial patterns for the endogenous default threshold. Finally, we quantify agency costs of excessive short-termism, which underscore the economic significance of our results. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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9. Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation.
- Author
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GAYLE, GEORGE‐LEVI, LI, CHEN, and MILLER, ROBERT A.
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UNITED States. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ,EXECUTIVE compensation ,CHIEF executive officers ,CONTRACTS ,AGENCY costs ,STOCKHOLDERS ,CONSUMER goods ,CONFLICT of interests - Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden information and hidden actions. It finds that SOX: (1) reduced the conflict of interest between shareholders and their CEOs, mainly by reducing shareholder loss from CEOs deviating from their goal of expected value maximization; (2) increased the cost of agency, or the risk premium CEOs are paid to align their interests with those of shareholders; (3) increased administrative costs in the primary sector (which includes utilities and energy) but the effect in the other two broadly defined sectors, services and consumer goods, was more nuanced; and (4) had no effect on the attitude of CEOs toward risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2022
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10. Correlation between distribution of cash dividends from capital reserves, ultimate controlling shareholders and corporate governance.
- Author
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Liu, Yen-Yu, Lee, Pin-Sheng, and Yang, Chih-Hao
- Subjects
CORPORATE governance ,DIVIDEND policy ,STOCKHOLDERS ,STOCKHOLDERS equity ,DIVIDENDS ,AGENCY costs ,LEAST squares ,ACCOUNTING policies - Abstract
Purpose: This study aims to discuss whether a new accounting policy can help enterprises withstand operating risks and whether corporate governance can play a supervisory role. Taiwan took the lead worldwide in allowing companies to distribute cash dividends from capital reserves. Compared with traditional cash dividends distributed from retained earnings, this move was aimed at maintaining the stability of cash dividends and helping listed companies address the risks of temporary downturns. However, the distribution of cash dividends from capital reserves may violate the principle of capital maintenance and damage creditors' equity. The authors sought to examine whether corporate governance could play a supervisory role. Design/methodology/approach: The present study targeted Taiwanese listed companies and cited data from the Taiwan Economic Journal. The study period was from 2011–2019. The authors tested the hypotheses using the least square method. Findings: The results showed that ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies can maximize their own interests through ownership arrangements, whereas corporate governance cannot play a supervisory role nor protect creditors' equity. The findings provide insight on whether, in the development process of corporate governance, appropriate measures are taken to protect creditors' equity in addition to shareholders' equity, or achieve a good coordination of interests among all stakeholders. Originality/value: The ultimate controlling shareholders or directors of a listed company would seek to maximize their own interests, and transfer the operating risks to creditors through the arrangement of dividend policy, thus harming creditors' equity. However, independent directors cannot play a supervisory role. The authors inferred that corporate governance standards previously focused on the shareholder level or alleviation of the agency problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders but ignored creditors' equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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11. How Do Managers and Shareholders Respond to Taxation? An Analysis of the Introduction of the UK Real Estate Investment Trust Legislation.
- Author
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Holland, Kevin, Lindop, Sarah, and Abdul Wahab, Nor Shaipah
- Subjects
REAL estate investment trusts ,STOCKHOLDERS ,TAXATION ,FISCAL policy ,TAX laws - Abstract
Corporate finance decisions, measurement of accounting profits, and market valuations are invariably made within the framework of a taxation system(s). Previous research indicates both ambiguity over the influence of taxation on managers' behaviour and limitations in the ability of shareholders to process tax information. The establishment of the UK's Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) regime in 2006 allowed quoted companies to opt out of company level taxation. We examine managers' and shareholders' responses, that is, their ability to process information. When compared with shareholders, managers demonstrated a greater knowledge of the legislation, and of its applicability. For example, managers appeared to pre‐empt the effects of the legislation. Our findings have implications for tax policy makers and taxpayers, acting as a warning of the potential downside of increased cooperation when trying to make more appropriately formed legislation. Further, managers appeared to be willing to trade off the interests of shareholders for their own personal gain, which is surprising given the visibility of the REIT conversion process and illustrates the limitations of shareholder control over managers' behaviour. We find shareholders were able to accurately assess the general effects of the legislation but were unable to identify specific companies likely to benefit. Without any increase in shareholder sophistication, concerns exist over the effectiveness of shareholders in acting as monitors of managers' decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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12. AGAINST CORPORATE ACTIVISM: EXAMINING THE USE OF CORPORATE SPEECH TO PROMOTE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.
- Author
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BUNTING, W. C.
- Subjects
SOCIAL responsibility of business ,CORPORATE finance ,CORPORATE speech ,STOCKHOLDERS ,GOVERNMENT corporations - Abstract
This Article offers a novel typography of expenditures on corporate social responsibility, highlighting that such spending often requires a public business corporation to engage in corporate speech. When this speech pertains to social or political issues unrelated to the company's business, this Article argues that such expenditures are generally not in the best interests of the firm's stockholders and terms this spending "corporate activism." Corporate activism is described as the product of agency costs and ideological conflict that derive from an expansion of corporate speech rights under the First Amendment. To protect shareholders from corporate activism, courts have relied upon various disciplining mechanisms that are often not up to the task. This Article offers a different solution, placing the responsibility squarely upon the board of directors of public corporations to limit "expressive" expenditures on corporate social responsibility that do not directly advance the best interests of a company's shareholders. As a tentative policy proposal, this Article suggests that the Securities and Exchange Commission encourage public companies that trade on U.S. stock exchanges to have a "Communications Committee" responsible for the oversight of all forms of corporate speech. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
13. Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games.
- Author
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Zhang, Lipai
- Subjects
FINANCIAL institutions ,REAL estate business ,STOCKHOLDERS ,AGENCY costs ,SUSTAINABILITY - Abstract
The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders' controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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14. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence from Index Thresholds.
- Author
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Crane, Alan D., Michenaud, Sébastien, and Weston, James P.
- Subjects
INSTITUTIONAL ownership (Stocks) ,DIVIDENDS ,DISCONTINUITY (Philosophy) ,STOCKHOLDERS ,ORGANIZATIONAL behavior ,AGENCY costs - Abstract
We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around Russell index thresholds. Our estimates indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in institutional ownership causes a $7 million (8%) increase in dividends. We also find differences in shareholder proposals and voting patterns that suggest that even nonactivist institutions play an important role in monitoring firm behavior. The effect of institutional ownership on dividends is stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
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15. An impact of the first and second-largest shareholders on a catering effect: evidence from Poland.
- Author
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PIELOCH-BABIARZ, ALEKSANDRA
- Subjects
STOCKHOLDERS ,CATERING services ,AGENCY costs ,DIVIDENDS ,EMINENT domain ,DIVIDEND policy - Abstract
Motivation: Dividend pay-out is a frequently undertaken research issue. However, there is no study on the impact of concentrated ownership on adjustment of dividend amount to investor sentiment for pay-outs. The paper contribute to the literature by filling the research gap regarding the catering effect in the context of principal-principal agency conflict and type II agency costs, monitoring hypothesis and expropriation hypothesis. Aim: The aim of the article is to investigate an impact of the first and second-largest shareholders on an adjustment of dividend pay-outs to investor sentiment for dividends. To achieve the aim, two hypotheses have been formulated, i.e. H1: if the first-largest shareholder is a strategic investor, a catering effect weakens; H2: an existence of significant second-largest shareholder moderates the extent to which companies cater to investor sentiment for dividends. Results: There are three main finding: 1) the number of shares held by the first-largest shareholder is lower in dividend payers, while the number of shares held by the second-largest shareholder is lower in dividend non-payers; 2) listed companies from electromechanical industry sector cater to investor sentiment for dividends; 3) both research hypotheses have not been satisfied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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16. Does International Financial Reporting Standard 8 improve the firms' information environment?
- Author
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Lenormand, Gaëlle and Touchais, Lionel
- Subjects
INTERNATIONAL Financial Reporting Standards ,INVESTOR protection ,STOCKHOLDERS ,FINANCIAL analysts ,ACCOUNTING standards ,AGENCY costs - Abstract
Purpose: This article analyzes the effect of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 on the informational content of segment data. It aims to assess the change in quality of the financial analysts' and the shareholders' information environment due to the new segment reporting standard to verify the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) expectations and the conclusions of its post-implementation review. Design/methodology/approach: Based on a sample of 250 companies listed on Euronext Paris in France, a country with poor legal protection for shareholders, over a nine-year period, the authors test whether the new standard makes the financial analysts' forecasts more accurate and reduces the implied cost of equity capital. Findings: The findings show that IFRS 8 partially improves the informational content of segment data, partially supporting the outcome of IASB. The management approach may have forced some firms to change their segmentation to provide a more economic view of the business. The poor legal protection for shareholders in France may explain this result. Research limitations/implications: Due to proprietary and agency costs, firms may withhold segment information whatever the standard used. Practical implications: This study contributes to the ongoing debate about IFRS 8 and may interest financial statement users and the international standard-setter for such a criticized standard. Originality/value: The results contribute to the segment reporting literature by addressing the partial improvement of information environment under the managerial approach in a country with lower investor protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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17. POWER TO THE PRINCIPALS! AN EXPERIMENTAL LOOK AT SHAREHOLDER SAY-ON-PAY VOTING.
- Author
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KRAUSE, RYAN, WHITLER, KIMBERLY A., and SEMADENI, MATTHEW
- Subjects
STOCKHOLDERS ,PUBLIC companies ,CHIEF executive officers ,EXECUTIVE compensation ,VOTING research ,AGENCY theory ,ORGANIZATIONAL performance ,LOSS aversion ,PAY for performance ,PROSPECT theory ,STOCKHOLDER wealth ,AGENCY costs ,EXPERIMENTAL design - Abstract
With recent legislation mandating that publicly traded corporations submit their CEOs' compensation for a nonbinding shareholder vote, a systematic understanding of shareholder preferences has never been so important. In spite of this, relatively little is known about what impacts shareholders' preferences and, subsequently, their ultimate voting behavior. We integrate two theories to help frame the question and to help predict shareholder behavior. Per agency theory, shareholders, as principals, will disapprove of high CEO rewards and poor firm performance, symmetrically assessing gains and losses. Per prospect theory, shareholders will be loss averse, responding much more strongly to being in a loss position than to being in a gain or neutral position. We combine these theories' predictions in two lab experiments in which we simulate a shareholder "say-on-pay" vote, hypothesizing that shareholders will be concerned with agency costs, but only when they are in a loss position. The results of these simulated votes suggest that shareholders do value "pay for performance," in keeping with agency theory. However, shareholders exhibit this focus on agency-normative prescriptions asymmetrically, showing loss aversion in keeping with prospect theory. This finding has significant implications for both theory and practice as shareholder votes become a regular and high-profile occurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
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18. The Law and Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions
- Author
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Korsmo, Charles R.
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
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19. Value of Cash Holdings and Accounting Conservatism* Value of Cash Holdings and Accounting Conservatism.
- Author
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Louis, Henock, Sun, Amy X., and Urcan, Oktay
- Subjects
CASH flow ,CORPORATE accounting ,NET present value ,AGENCY costs ,VALUATION of corporations ,STOCKHOLDERS - Abstract
The article refers to accounting research and considers the idea that conservatism in corporate accounting can reduce the value destruction associated with cash holdings. The discussion focuses on the reduction of incentives to take on negative net present value (NPV) projects, the role of accounting practices in mitgating agency costs, and the direct benefit to shareholders that accounting conservatism provides. The article concludes that accounting conservatism increases the value of a corporation's cash holdings and it also increases the efficient use of cash holdings.
- Published
- 2012
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20. How Internal Control Protects Shareholders' Welfare: Evidence from Tax Avoidance in China.
- Author
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Chang, Hsihui, Dai, Xin, He, Yurun, and Wang, Maolin
- Subjects
INTERNAL auditing ,TAX evasion ,STOCKHOLDERS ,CORPORATE welfare ,AGENCY costs ,CORPORATE tax accounting - Abstract
This paper investigates how effective internal control protects shareholders' welfare in the context of corporate tax avoidance. Prior literature documents a positive association between internal control weakness and low tax avoidance. In this paper, we re-examine this association and complement prior research by finding that the direction of the association between internal control and tax avoidance depends on the level of tax avoidance. Specifically, for firms with low (high) levels of tax avoidance, internal control quality is positively (negatively) associated with tax avoidance. In additional analyses, we further explore how internal control mitigates agency costs for state-owned enterprises and tunneling activities. We show that for state-owned enterprises, which have lower incentives to avoid tax, effective internal control prevents managers from paying more taxes to cater to the controlling shareholders' interests. We also find that the association between tax avoidance and tunneling is reduced by effective internal control systems. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
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21. Do Corporate Governance Ratings Change Investor Expectations? Evidence from Announcements by Institutional Shareholder Services.
- Author
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Guest, Paul M and Nerino, Marco
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CORPORATE governance ,CORPORATE ratings ,STOCKHOLDERS ,AGENCY costs ,INVESTORS - Abstract
This paper examines empirically the announcement effect of commercial corporate governance ratings on share returns. Rating downgrades by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) are associated with negative returns of –1.14% over a 3-day announcement window. The returns are highly correlated with the proprietary analysis of ISS and are decreasing in agency costs, consistent with ratings providing independent information on underlying corporate governance quality. We thus show that the influence and impact of ISS extends beyond proxy recommendations and subsequent voting outcomes. Our findings contrast with the insignificant price impact of Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2010) , whose analysis we replicate and successfully reconcile to ours by pooling upgrades and downgrades together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
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22. Shareholder rights.
- Author
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Armour, John
- Subjects
STOCKHOLDERS ,CHARITIES ,SOCIAL & economic rights ,MARKET pricing ,SELF-control - Abstract
'Shareholder rights' are the legal entitlements of shareholders vis-à-vis companies in which they invest. A large body of research has sought to investigate how shareholder rights foster accountability of controllers. The concern has been that without accountability, managers and dominant shareholders will use their power to further their own interests at the expense of outside investors. A contrasting concern is that strengthening shareholder rights may come at the expense of other parties, which may also lead to misallocation of corporate resources. A recently-emerging body of research suggests that the relationship between shareholder rights and social welfare is not monotonic, but rather inverse-U-shaped. We argue that the calibration and impact of shareholder rights depends crucially on the institutional channel(s) through which they are implemented—voting, litigation, and/or market pricing. In particular, the market pricing channel intensifies the effects of shareholder rights in ways that can be excessive. This can harm not only other constituencies but also shareholders, as it can promote short-termism and systemic externalities. These problems are less pronounced for shareholder rights implemented through the voting channel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
23. Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century: Complicating Corporate Governance Beyond Agency Costs.
- Author
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Pargendler, Mariana
- Subjects
STOCKHOLDERS ,CORPORATE governance ,CORPORATION law ,NATIONALISM ,AGENCY costs - Abstract
The article focuses on the implication of controlling shareholders on corporate governance. Topics mentioned include good law jurisdictions, nonpecuniary private benefits of control, the different types of controlling shareholders, the role of nationalism in the development of corporate law and governance, and the efficiency of corporate governance in reducing agency costs
- Published
- 2020
24. The Law and Practice of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis of China and the United States.
- Author
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Hui Huang, Robin and Thomas, Randall S.
- Subjects
- *
PRACTICE of law , *STOCKHOLDERS , *CHINESE people , *AGENCY costs , *COMPARATIVE studies , *CORPORATE governance - Abstract
Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the relevant documents of the company in which they hold an interest, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry and reduce the agency costs inherent in the corporate structure. While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate governance face different sets of agency cost problems, this Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an important role in both China and the United States. On the books, while shareholder inspection rights in both countries are broadly similar, there are some important differences on issues such as the proper purpose requirement. The empirical analysis of this Article further sheds light on how inspection rights operate on the ground. A good number of inspection cases are filed in both China and in Delaware. These cases are resolved by the courts relatively quickly. While inspection rights in both countries are frequently used as a presuit discovery device, the types of subsequent litigation that can be filed in each country are quite different. Efforts are made to explain, and draw implications from, the similarities and differences on shareholder inspection rights between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
25. Do shareholder protection and creditor rights have distinct effects on the association between debt maturity and ownership structure?
- Author
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Martins, Henrique Castro, Schiehll, Eduardo, and Terra, Paulo Renato Soares
- Subjects
DEBTOR & creditor ,CORPORATE debt ,DEBT ,STOCKHOLDERS ,MATURITY (Finance) - Abstract
This study examines the effects of the firm's ownership concentration and its institutional environment on corporate debt maturity choices. As ownership concentration and debt maturity are alternative governance mechanisms, we theorize and investigate whether their association is influenced by country‐level governance factors that enhance outside monitoring by minority shareholders and debtholders. Our investigation is based on a dataset of 50,599 firm‐year observations from 38 countries. We use a propensity‐score matching approach and find that the effect of ownership concentration on debt maturity is conditional to country‐level governance attributes. Ownership concentration has a negative effect on debt maturity in countries where both shareholder protection and creditor rights are weak. Ownership concentration, however, tends to lengthen debt maturity as protection increases, and this positive effect on the length of debt maturity is stronger in countries enhancing protection towards debtholders (instead of shareholders). We also explore other characteristics of ownership structure, such as the identity and presence of controlling shareholders. These results corroborate the view that entrenched shareholders may use debt maturity opportunistically. Our study provides new insights into the interplay between firm‐ and country‐level governance mechanisms and a deeper understanding of cross‐country differences in the association between ownership structure and debt financing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
26. Does CEO inside debt compensation benefit both shareholders and debtholders?
- Author
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Borah, Nilakshi, James, Hui Liang, and Park, Jung Chul
- Subjects
AGENCY costs ,CAPITAL costs ,DEBT ,STOCKHOLDERS ,DIVIDEND policy - Abstract
We examine whether the proportion of CEO inside debt holdings (pension and deferred compensation) to stock holdings benefit both shareholders and debtholders by relating CEO inside debt to a firm's dividend payout policies. Based on the positive association of CEO inside debt and the propensity and the size of the dividend payout, we find that firms paying their CEOs with large inside debt present the lower cost of debt and default risk, and these benefits transfer to better firm performance and valuation. Moreover, we find that CEO inside debt is related to superior firm performance only in dividend-paying firms. Dividends tend to increase when firms with high agency costs of equity use inside debt. We conclude that dividends serve as a channel through which CEO inside debt compensation mitigates both agency costs of debt and agency costs of equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
27. Multiple directorships and the value of cash holdings.
- Author
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Chou, Ting-Kai and Feng, Hsuan-Ling
- Subjects
CAPITAL investments ,DIVIDENDS ,AGENCY costs ,STOCKHOLDERS ,MARKET value - Abstract
This study examines the impact of multiple directorships on the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. We find that the marginal value of cash increases with multiple directorships. Furthermore, the positive relationship between cash value and multiple directorships is more pronounced for firms with higher managerial agency problems. Additional analyses suggest that multi-board directors limit a firm's holdings of excess cash, and especially directors having current industry affiliations have better ability to perform their monitoring function. Firms with multi-board directors make better cash acquisitions. Multiple directorships improve subsequent operating performance associated with capital expenditures and R&D investments. When firms have limited investment opportunities, multiple directorships result in more dividend payouts of cash. Collectively, our results suggest that multiple directorships are associated with a more efficient use of cash, thereby providing direct benefits to shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. Managerial Opportunism during Corporate Litigation.
- Author
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HASLEM, BRUCE
- Subjects
ACTIONS & defenses (Law) ,LEGAL costs ,LEGAL settlement ,STOCKHOLDERS ,CORPORATE governance ,AGENCY costs ,SETTLEMENT costs ,BUSINESS losses ,LEGAL judgments ,INFORMATION asymmetry - Abstract
Using a large sample of litigation events involving publicly listed defendants, we document a surprising fact. The resolution of litigation through a court's decision dominates settlement of litigation from the shareholders' point of view, even when the firm loses. We develop a model using agency costs within the firm to explain why the market views settlement as a negative outcome on average and find empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. Specifically, firms with weak corporate governance settle litigation more quickly, and the market reacts more negatively to settlements involving firms with higher agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2005
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29. Large Shareholder Incentives and Auditor Choice.
- Author
-
Zhang, Shanshan, Ye, Kangtao, Cui, Yijing, and Zang, Wenjiao
- Subjects
AUDITORS ,STOCKHOLDERS ,AGENCY costs ,INVESTORS ,AUDITING - Abstract
SUMMARY: This study investigates the impact of large shareholder incentives on firms' auditor choice using a quasi-natural experiment setting provided by the split share structure reform in China. The reform converted the previously non-tradable shares held by large shareholders into tradable shares and thus enhanced the alignment of large shareholders' and outside investors' interests. We find that firms switch from large auditors to small auditors following the completion of the reform. The results are robust to the audit firm merging effect and the firm fixed effects. Further analyses reveal that the effect is more pronounced in firms with greater agency costs prior to the reform and in firms located in a weak legal environment. Taken together, these results suggest that a reduction in conflicts between large shareholders and outside investors leads to a declining demand for high-quality audits. JEL Classifications: M42; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
30. Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance.
- Author
-
Lund, Dorothy S.
- Subjects
- *
STOCKS (Finance) , *CORPORATE governance , *STOCKHOLDERS , *AGENCY costs , *TRANSACTION costs - Abstract
A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Zillow, and Snap, have issued stock that does not allow investors to vote on corporate decisions. But there is fundamental disagreement among scholars and investors about whether nonvoting stock is beneficial or harmful. Critics argue that nonvoting shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight, and therefore increase agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that nonvoting shares may provide benefits that exceed these agency costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders. This Article offers a novel perspective on this debate. It demonstrates an important and previously unrecognized benefit of nonvoting stock: that it can be used to make corporate governance more efficient. This is because nonvoting stock allows companies to divide voting power between informed shareholders who value their voting rights and uninformed, "weakly motivated" shareholders who do not. When this efficient sorting happens, a company will lower its cost of capital by reducing agency and transaction costs. Specifically, informed investors will pay more for voting stock that is not diluted by the votes of uninformed, weakly motivated investors; indeed, a company may even entice informed investors to invest by offering two classes of shares. Likewise, weakly motivated investors will gravitate toward shares that do not require them to incur the costs associated with voting, especially because nonvoting stock tends to trade at a discount relative to voting stock. In other words, the company that issues nonvoting shares for its uninformed shareholders will make itself more valuable. This insight has several implications for the law. Most importantly, this Article contends that recent proposals to restrict or deter companies from issuing nonvoting shares should be rejected. Under certain circumstances, nonvoting stock has beneficial functions, and therefore, restricting its use may impede efficient corporate structuring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
31. Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines and Debtholder Wealth.
- Author
-
Kang, Jun-Koo and Xu, Limin
- Subjects
EXECUTIVE compensation ,STOCK ownership ,COMMERCIAL loans ,SPREAD (Finance) ,AGENCY costs ,STOCKHOLDERS ,FINANCIAL statements - Abstract
We examine how the adoption of executive stock ownership guidelines affects debtholder wealth. We find that guideline adoption is associated with lower loan spreads, fewer collateral requirements, and fewer other restrictive covenants. The results are robust to using an instrumental variables approach. We further find that guideline adoption has a negative effect on bond yield spreads and that after the adoption, firms' risk-taking incentives are lower. These results suggest that guideline adoption benefits debtholders by lowering agency costs of debt. However, we also find that adoption of ownership guidelines is associated with a significant increase in stock prices, and that firms are more likely to increase financial reporting quality in the post-adoption period, indicating that guideline adoption incentivizes managers to improve firm fundamentals, benefiting both shareholders and debtholders. JEL Classifications: G21; G32; M12; M41. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
32. ENHANCED SCRUTINY ON THE BUY-SIDE.
- Author
-
Afsharipour, Afra and Laster, J. Travis
- Subjects
- *
MERGERS & acquisitions , *STOCKHOLDERS , *FIDUCIARY responsibility , *STANDARD of review (Law) , *AGENCY costs - Abstract
Empirical studies of acquisitions consistently find that public company bidders often overpay for targets, imposing significant losses on bidder shareholders. Numerous studies have connected bidder overpayment with managerial agency costs and behavioral biases that reflect management self-interest. For purposes of corporate law, these concerns implicate the behavior of fiduciaries--the officers and directors of the acquiring entity--and raise questions about whether those fiduciaries are fulfilling their duty of loyalty. To address comparable sell-side concerns, the Delaware courts developed an intermediate standard of review known as enhanced scrutiny. There has been little exploration, however, of whether the rationales for applying enhanced scrutiny to the actions of sell-side fiduciaries extend to comparable fiduciaries on the buy-side. This Article addresses this long-neglected question. Drawing upon the history of Delaware jurisprudence on enhanced scrutiny, it argues that enhanced scrutiny should extend to the decisions of buy-side fiduciaries. The Article also recognizes that, although doctrinally coherent, applying enhanced scrutiny to buy-side decisions would open the door to well-documented stockholder litigation pathologies that have undermined the effectiveness of enhanced scrutiny for sell-side decisions. To address these pathologies, the Delaware courts have recently encouraged the use of fully informed stockholder votes on the sell-side to lessen litigation risk. This Article reasons that a primary argument in favor of extending enhanced scrutiny to buy-side decisions rests not on the ability of the litigation itself to generate superior outcomes, but rather as an inducement to more frequent buy-side votes. This argument builds on recent empirical literature which finds that stockholder voting can provide an important counterbalance against the self-interest and biases that lead to bidder overpayment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
33. On Foreign Shareholdings and Agency Costs: New Evidence from China.
- Author
-
Hai, Jiang, Min, Huang, and Barth, James R.
- Subjects
AGENCY costs ,FOREIGN investments ,STOCKHOLDERS ,INSTITUTIONAL investments ,INSTITUTIONAL investors ,GOVERNMENT business enterprises - Abstract
This article examines the impact of foreign shareholdings on agency costs of Chinese firms from 2006 to 2012. The empirical results indicate that: (1) direct foreign shareholdings, in contrast to indirect foreign shareholdings, improve asset utilization, suggesting low agency costs; (2) qualified foreign institutional investors play a significant role in firms because they are less subject to political pressure, which is consistent with lower agency costs, but this effect could be eroded by government control; and (3) foreign shareholdings reduce the cost of equity and improve firm performance. The results contribute to the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the domestic/foreign ownership structure of firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
34. The Role of Options in the Resolution of Agency Problems: A Comment.
- Author
-
FARMER, ROGER E. A. and WINTER, RALPH A.
- Subjects
OPTIONS (Finance) ,SECURITIES trading ,STOCKHOLDERS ,MATHEMATICAL proofs ,STOCK ownership ,AGENCY costs ,EXTERNALITIES ,FINANCIAL markets ,FINANCE literature ,STOCK options - Abstract
THE AIM OF THE contracting literature in economics is to explain observed contractual arrangements, or organizations, as minimizing the costs of incentive conflicts. In the agency cost literature of financial economics, the contractual arrangement at issue is the mix of securities held by inside management of a firm and outside suppliers of capital--the ownership structure of the firm, in Jensen and Meckling's [8] terminology.
This article re-examines the role of options in the resolution of agency problems. We argue, in Section I, that options cannot eliminate the agency problem of excessive perquisite consumption, contrary to Haugen and Senbet. The essential point is that unless outside financing can be provided entirely by riskless debt, then outsiders must have a residual claim on the net income of the firm in some states of the world. Outsiders therefore share in the costs of increased perquisite consumption, whatever the ownership structure of the firm. This negative externality means that excessive perquisite consumption is inevitable.
This paper analyzes the problem of efficient ownership structure under the simplest set of conditions giving rise to an agency problem. When a manager-entrepreneur cannot fully finance investment with riskless debt, the residual return to investment must be shared with security holders. The optimal ownership structure solves the problem of dividing residual return across states between the manager and the security market, subject to the constraint that sufficient capital be raised. We argue that the manager's proportionate share of residual return is greater in the high-output states because the shadow cost--through the financing constraint--of increasing this share is lower in the high-output states. This provides an efficiency explanation of call options in managerial compensation packages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 1986
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
35. Costly Contracting and Optimal Payout Constraints.
- Author
-
JOHN, KOSE and KALAY, AVNER
- Subjects
STOCKHOLDERS ,BONDHOLDERS ,CONFLICT management ,CONTRACTING out ,INDIVIDUAL investors ,AGENCY costs - Abstract
Motivated by the assumption of perfect capital markets, the firm has been traditionally viewed as a homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value. However, in an environment of costly contracting, some recent research has portrayed the firm as a collection of competing groups whose interests can conflict. This paper concentrates on the conflict between the two major groups—the stockholders and the bondholders—and derives an optimal set of contractual arrangements which minimize the costs of this conflict. In our model, these contracts will determine endogenously the optimal investment levels and the dividend policy of a levered firm. This paper presents a rigorous theoretical analysis of the form and optimality of constraints on dividend payouts to be serf-imposed by the shareholders of a levered firm in debt contracts. These optimal contracts are derived endogenously in a multi-period model which allows for divergence of interests between stockholders and bondholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1982
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
36. Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure.
- Author
-
Mehran, Hamid
- Subjects
EXECUTIVE compensation ,STOCKHOLDERS ,AGENCY costs ,AGENCY theory ,CORPORATE finance ,CAPITAL structure - Abstract
Agency theory recognizes that the interests of managers and shareholders may conflict and that, left on their own, managers may make major financial policy decisions, such as the choice of a capital structure, that are suboptimal from the shareholders' standpoint. The theory also suggests, however, that compensation contracts, managerial equity investment, and monitoring by the board of directors and major shareholders can reduce conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. This research investigates the relationship between the firm's capital structure and 1) executive incentive plans, 2) managerial equity investment, and 3) monitoring by the board of directors and major shareholders. This paper finds a positive relationship between the firm's leverage ratio and 1) percentage of executives' total compensation in incentive plans, 2) percentage of equity owned by managers, 3) percentage of investment bankers on the board of directors, and 4) percentage of equity owned by large individual investors. These findings are consistent with the predictions of agency theory, suggesting, in turn, that capital structure models that ignore agency costs are incomplete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1992
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
37. Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification.
- Author
-
Denis, David J., Denis, Diane K., and Sarin, Atulya
- Subjects
DIVERSIFICATION in industry ,AGENCY costs ,EQUITY (Law) ,EXECUTIVES' attitudes ,STOCKHOLDERS ,STOCKS (Finance) ,FINANCIAL crises ,MARKETS ,ECONOMIC competition ,LABOR turnover - Abstract
We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1997
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. The Theory of Capital Structure.
- Author
-
Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur
- Subjects
CAPITAL structure ,CORPORATE finance ,CAPITAL market ,AGENCY costs ,MARKET volatility ,INFORMATION modeling ,DEBT ,EQUITY (Law) ,FINANCIAL executives ,STOCKHOLDERS ,LIQUIDATION ,RISK aversion - Abstract
This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1991
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. Shareholder Protection and Agency Costs: An Experimental Analysis.
- Author
-
LaRiviere, Jacob, McMahon, Matthew, and Neilson, William
- Subjects
STOCKHOLDERS ,INVESTOR relations (Corporations) ,AGENCY costs ,DIVIDENDS ,LEGAL status of stockholders - Abstract
Two competing principal--agent models explain why firms pay dividends. The substitute model proposes that corporate insiders pay dividends to signal and build trust with outside shareholders who lack legal protection. The outcome model, in contrast, surmises that when shareholders have legal protection, they demand dividends from insiders to prevent them from expropriating corporate funds. Either way, dividends represent an agency cost paid to align the interests of shareholders and insiders. Expropriations by insiders and reduced investment by shareholders are also agency costs, but they are diffi- cult to identify with archival data. Using a laboratory experiment, we identify the impact of strengthened shareholder protection on all three types of agency costs. Dividend payout ratios are five times larger with stronger investor protection, insider expropriation ratios are twice as high, and outsider investment falls by 45%. Thus, we find evidence that strengthening shareholder protection introduces previously unidentified agency costs into the insider--investor relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
40. The Myth of the Optimal Capital Structure and the Dogma of Creditor Protection.
- Author
-
Granato, Michelangelo
- Subjects
- *
DEBTOR & creditor , *CAPITAL structure , *CORPORATE finance , *CORPORATION law , *STOCKHOLDERS - Abstract
This paper aims to reassess the dogma of creditor protection in light of the corporate finance principles and theories. To this end, I set forth two methodological premises to reach a substantive conclusion on the optimal creditor protection strategies. First, I draw a double-layered taxonomy of classes of creditors; second, I underscore the importance of legal systems and the statutory allocation of powers and authority on creditor-sensitive corporate decisions. The corporate finance literature shows that (1) debt matters for the firm's value maximization and governance and (2) the optimal capital structure is influenced by various determinants. Creditor protection and debt governance serve as determinants of financial behaviour. Legal strategies can positively or negatively determine the cost of capital. Against this framework, I argue that ex ante corporate law techniques of creditor protection hamper firms' financing maximization, whereas ex ante contractual arrangements bolster optimal capital supply. Ex post creditor protection is applicable only to distressed firms and has positive effects on capital structure when it involves directors, whereas it is rather cumbersome and unjustified when it impinges upon stockholders. Alternative, non-corporate law techniques may efficiently outperform strategies based on unlimited shareholder liability. I conclude that, while creditor protection techniques are a function of the interplay between legal environment and the specific features of each class of creditors, the case against ex ante corporate law, and toward ex ante contractual strategies, is substantial. Corporate finance forces should drive the legal design and assessment of this function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. Free Cash Flow, Agency Cost and Dividend Policy of Sharia-Compliant and Non-Sharia-Compliant firms.
- Author
-
GUIZANI, MONCEF
- Subjects
FREE cash flow ,STOCK exchanges ,DIVIDENDS ,STOCKHOLDERS - Abstract
The objective of this study is to examine how sharia-compliance mitigates the agency cost of free cash flow by using dividend policy in the context of firms listed on Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) country stock exchanges. The study applies a panel regression to a data set composed of 1242 observations from 207 companies during the period 2009-2014. The results show that sharia-compliant firms not only have higher payout ratios but also have higher likelihood to pay dividends. Moreover, consistent with avoidance of the free cash flow problem, the results reveal that the dividend payments of sharia-compliant companies respond more strongly to free cash flow than do the dividend payments of non-sharia-compliant companies. Likewise, Sharia-compliant companies are likely to pay out more of their free cash flow than non-sharia-compliant companies, which can prevent managers from misusing the resources in ways that may not maximize shareholder wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
42. IMPACT OF A COMPANY'S DIVIDEND POLICY ON THE LIQUIDITY OF SHARES LISTED ON THE WARSAW STOCK EXCHANGE.
- Author
-
GNIADKOWSKA-SZYMAŃSKA, AGATA
- Subjects
DIVIDEND policy ,LIQUIDITY (Economics) ,AGENCY costs ,ENDOGENEITY (Econometrics) ,STOCKHOLDERS - Abstract
This study investigates the informational effect of stock liquidity on dividend payouts. Using a sample of Polish listed companies during 2000 - 2012, I do not find a relation between stock liquidity and dividend payouts. This result is robust to the use of alternative measures of liquidity, and holds after we control for endogeneity concerns. In accord with my hypothesis that stock liquidity provides information and increases insiders' incentive to pay out dividends, I do not find that the relation between stock liquidity and dividend payouts is more pronounced when the information environment is opaque, and when conflict between controlling shareholders and minority investors is severe. The aim of this study is to show the dependencies occurring between dividend policy and the liquidity of shares of a company. The basic thesis of this study is that decisions on dividend payments positively affect the liquidity of the shares of a company. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
43. Disproportional Control Rights and the Governance Role of Debt.
- Author
-
Dey, Aiyesha, Nikolaev, Valeri, and Wang, Xue
- Subjects
DEBT ,STOCKHOLDERS ,CAPITAL market ,AGENCY costs ,FINANCIAL market reaction - Abstract
We examine the governance role of debt in the context of U.S.-based dual class ownership structures. We hypothesize that the use of debt alleviates the conflict between shareholder classes by balancing the power of controlling insiders. We document that dual class firms have higher leverage and a greater propensity to issue private debt; they also more frequently use cash sweeps and performance-based covenants. Dual class firms with greater agency conflicts and a greater need to access the capital market appear to rely more extensively on debt. These findings are consistent with controlling insiders bonding against the agency costs associated with dual class ownership. The governance role of debt is further corroborated by the valuation effect of debt for dual class companies. Private debt issuances trigger greater positive market reactions to the inferior dual class stock in relation to both the superior dual class stock and a matched sample of single class firms. Further, leverage attenuates the previously documented adverse effect of dual class status on Tobin's q. Taken together, our analyses suggest that dual class firms use debt as a complementary governance mechanism. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
44. Do corporate bond recovery rates monitored by corporate governance mechanisms?
- Author
-
Mili, Mehdi and Abid, Sami
- Subjects
CORPORATE bonds ,CORPORATE governance ,RATES ,BUSINESS enterprises ,AGENCY costs ,BONDHOLDERS ,STOCKHOLDERS - Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and firms’ bond recovery rates (RRs). The authors hypothesize that governance features impact RRs by controlling agency costs that result from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders. The authors also test the relationship between CG and RRs during the last crisis. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use a generalized method of moments regression model to test the relationship between CG and firms’ bond RRs. The authors employ a direct measure of recoveries rates from Moody’s ultimate recovery database covering the period from 2003 to 2012. Both firm-level CG and country-level variables are used to examine the determinants of corporate bonds RRs. Findings – The results support a significant impact of CG mechanisms on bond RRs mainly during crisis period. The authors find that firms operating with CEO-Duality decrease their bond RRs during financial crisis. This implies wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders and provides one explanation why some firms operate with weak governance. Originality/value – This paper provides the first direct evidence that corporate bond RRs are directly related to CG mechanisms. The authors combine firm-level CG and country-level variables to examine the determinants of corporate bonds RRs. Earlier studies focussed on financial firm-level data and macro-economic variables. The authors also test the impact of board composition and ownership structure on bond recoveries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
45. CEO Pay Complexity.
- Author
-
Sigler, Kevin and Sigler, Jake
- Subjects
CHIEF executive officers ,EXECUTIVE compensation ,STOCKHOLDERS ,ORGANIZATIONAL goals ,WAGES ,STOCK exchanges ,PENSIONS - Abstract
The components of chief executive officer (CEO) pay are numerous and complex. Top managers are hired to work in the shareholders’ interests, which are to maximize the wealth of the owners. But CEOs are human and are concerned in maximizing their own utility of wealth. This desire may run counter to the shareholders’ interests, resulting in agency costs. It appears that the complex manner in which a CEO is paid is designed to provide an incentive to the top manager to carry out the goals of stockholders and reduce agency problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. Can coase govern the Green Bay Packers?
- Author
-
Jia-Yuh Chen and Khadka, Manish
- Subjects
CORPORATE governance ,STOCKHOLDERS ,STOCK prices ,CORPORATE directors - Abstract
Purpose -- The agency problem inherent in governing public corporations predicts a management not acting in shareholders' best interest. The purpose of this paper is to use the Green Bay Packers' unique ownership structure as a case study to show that a disperse shareholder base does not necessarily lead to failures in corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach -- The Packers have been run by a great management team since 1992. The authors argue that the new management has become the de facto owners of the Packers organization and dealt away the agency costs as a result. This argument is in line with the Coase Theorem. Findings -- The ownership of the Packers is a property. As would be argued with the Coase Theorem, if the property right is well defined, who controls the property, under certain circumstances, is irrelevant in regard of maximizing ownership value. Research limitations/implications -- With only one sample point, the authors, however, cannot rule out the randomness of the Packers' stellar performance and also the possibility that the new management acts in the best interest of Packers shareholders because they have well-designed employment contracts. Originality/value -- Nevertheless, the findings offer a new perspective to the corporate governance literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. Dividends and family governance practices in private family firms.
- Author
-
Michiels, Anneleen, Voordeckers, Wim, Lybaert, Nadine, and Steijvers, Tensie
- Subjects
DIVIDENDS ,PRIVATE companies ,FAMILY-owned business enterprises ,STOCKHOLDERS ,ECONOMIC policy ,AGENCY costs - Abstract
Intra-familial principal-principal conflict are a relevant agency problem in privately held family firms. These conflicts of interest commonly occur between active and passive family shareholders, and require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article empirically examines whether or not firms use dividends as instruments to cope with conflicts of interest between active and passive family shareholders and how family governance practices moderate this relationship. The results show that the existence of an intra-familial conflict of interest results in a higher propensity to pay dividends and that the use of family governance practices strengthens this relationship. Additionally, the findings suggest that using family governance practices leads to a more efficient dividend policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
48. MONITOR AND CONTROL IN COMPANIES: AN AGENCY THEORY APPROACH.
- Author
-
CĂRĂUŞU, Dumitru-Nicuşor
- Subjects
- *
STOCKHOLDERS , *AGENCY theory , *AGENCY costs - Abstract
The aim of this paper is to survey what are the potential benefits and drawbacks of the most common mechanisms a shareholder can use to monitor and control a manager according to the agency theory. Despite the wide array of policies and instruments shareholders have at their disposal, all the mechanisms exhibits inherit flaws which limit their applicability. From the powerful boards to the ownership structure, management compensation plans, capital structure and market for corporate control, all are able to some degree to mitigate the conflict between shareholders and managers but raise others dilemmas regarding applicability and effectiveness, inquiring additional consideration. Ultimately there isn't a single solution for every environment but rather a specific mix according to the specific environment of each company, so policy makers need to take into consideration all the characteristics of the firm and only after issue recommendations, norms and laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
49. The demand for auditor services in wholly family-owned private firms: the moderating role of generation.
- Author
-
Corten, Maarten, Steijvers, Tensie, and Lybaert, Nadine
- Subjects
AUDITORS ,AGENCY costs ,STOCKHOLDERS ,ABILITY grouping (Education) ,FAMILY-owned business enterprises - Abstract
Former audit demand studies generally consider wholly family-owned private firms as a homogeneous group of firms that incur minimal agency costs. Family firm literature, however, argues that these firms might incur significant agency costs as well and we therefore examine audit demand in this particular type of firm. As we examine private family firms from the USA, which have no audit requirement, we broaden the concept of audit demand to the demand for auditor services, which encompasses audits, reviews and compilations. Consistent with former audit demand studies, we hypothesise a negative association between management ownership and the demand for auditor services, but only for first-generation private family firms. We hypothesise that this relation turns positive for subsequent generation private family firms due to entrenching behaviour caused by weakened altruistic feelings between the family shareholders. Our results support this hypothesis, but only regarding the demand for reviews and compilations. Therefore, our findings suggest that reviews and compilations seem to be sufficient and more cost-effective in this specific context to mitigate shareholder–manager agency costs compared to more expensive audits. Moreover, results suggest that the level of shareholder–debtholder agency costs do seem to be a driver for the demand for audits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
50. Governance Quality in a 'Comply or Explain' Governance Disclosure Regime.
- Author
-
Luo, Yan and Salterio, Steven E.
- Subjects
CORPORATE governance ,RESEARCH ,ENTERPRISE value ,AGENCY costs ,STOCKHOLDERS ,STOCKHOLDERS equity - Abstract
Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue Do firms take advantage of the flexibility of the 'comply or explain' corporate governance disclosure regime to adopt governance practices that are best suited to their needs and value-added to the firms as predicted by economic theories of the firm? Using the Canadian 'comply or explain' corporate governance disclosure regime, we construct a board score measure based on the Canadian code's 47 'best practices.' We employ a unique approach by positing that the 'explain' disclosures indicate higher agency costs of best practice adoption or indicate the ability of the firm to improve its governance practices relative to 'best practices' in light of firm specific circumstances. Research Findings/Insights We find that our measure is strongly and positively associated with higher firm value and weakly and positively associated with better operational performance. Further, our measure is more strongly associated with both than best practice adoption measures. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our unique measure of governance quality reveals differences in governance efficiency and effectiveness that are consistent with the theorized advantages of 'comply or explain' governance disclosure regimes. Further, our results suggest that firms in a 'comply or explain' regime are not employing, on average, the discretion permitted by such a regime to avoid improvements to their corporate governance practices. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our results support the proposition that the flexibility of a 'comply or explain' governance regime provides tangible financial benefits to shareholders in terms of higher firm value and returns on shareholders' equity investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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