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The modeling of uncertain information is an open problem in ontology research and is a theoretical obstacle to creating a truly semantic web. Currently, ontologies often do not model uncertainty, so stochastic subject matter must either be normalized or rejected entirely. Because uncertainty is omnipresent in the real world, knowledge engineers are often faced with the dilemma of performing prohibitively labor-intensive research or running the risk of rejecting correct information and accepting incorrect information. It would be preferable if ontologies could explicitly model real-world uncertainty and incorporate it into reasoning. We present an ontology framework which is based on a seamless synthesis of description logic and probabilistic semantics. This synthesis is powered by a link between ontology assertions and random variables that allows for automated construction of a probability distribution suitable for inferencing. Furthermore, our approach defines how to represent stochastic, uncertain, or incomplete subject matter. Additionally, this paper describes how to fuse multiple conflicting ontologies into a single knowledge base that can be reasoned with using the methods of both description logic and probabilistic inferencing. This is accomplished by using probabilistic semantics to resolve conflicts between assertions, eliminating the need to delete potentially valid knowledge and perform consistency checks. In our framework, emergent inferences can be made from a fused ontology that were not present in any of the individual ontologies, producing novel insights in a given domain., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright: © 2024 Santos et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.)

Medical report generation can be treated as a process of doctors' observing, understanding, and describing images from different perspectives. Following this process, this paper innovatively proposes a Transformer-based Semantic Query learning paradigm (TranSQ). Briefly, this paradigm is to learn an intention embedding set and make a semantic query to the visual features, generate intent-compliant sentence candidates, and form a coherent report. We apply a bipartite matching mechanism during training to realize the dynamic correspondence between the intention embeddings and the sentences to induct medical concepts into the observation intentions. Experimental results on two major radiology reporting datasets (i.e., IU X-ray and MIMIC-CXR) demonstrate that our model outperforms state-of-the-art models regarding generation effectiveness and clinical efficacy. In addition, comprehensive ablation experiments fully validate the TranSQ model's innovation and interpretation. The code is available at https://github.com/zjukongming/TranSQ., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest We declare that we have no financial and personal relationships with other people or organizations that can inappropriately influence our work, there is no professional or other personal interest of any nature or kind in any product, service, and/or company that could be construed as influencing the position presented in or the review of the manuscript., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

We introduce a new logic, called Temporal Cohort Logic (TCL), for cohort specification and discovery in clinical and population health research. TCL is created to fill a conceptual gap in formalizing temporal reasoning in biomedicine, in a similar role that temporal logics play for computer science and its applications. We provide formal syntax and semantics for TCL and illustrate the various logical constructs using examples related to human health. Relationships and distinctions with existing temporal logical frameworks are discussed. Applications in electronic health record (EHR) and in neurophysiological data resource are provided. Our approach differs from existing temporal logics, in that we explicitly capture Allen's interval algebra as modal operators in a language of temporal logic (rather than addressing it in the semantic structure). This has two major implications. First, it provides a formal logical framework for reasoning about time in biomedicine, allowing general (i.e., higher-levels of abstraction) investigation into the properties of this approach (such as proof systems, completeness, expressiveness, and decidability) independent of a specific query language or a database system. Second, it puts our approach in the context of logical developments in computer science, allowing potential translation of existing results into the setting of TCL and its variants or subsystems so as to illuminate opportunities and computational challenges involved in temporal reasoning for biomedicine., (©2022 AMIA - All rights reserved.)

According to logical theories of meaning, a meaning of an expression can be formalized and encoded in truth conditions. Vagueness of the language and individual differences between people are a challenge to incorporate into the meaning representations. In this paper, we propose a new approach to study truth-conditional representations of vague concepts. For a case study, we selected two natural language quantifiers most and more than half. We conducted two online experiments, each with 90 native English speakers. In the first experiment, we tested between-subjects variability in meaning representations. In the second experiment, we tested the stability of meaning representations over time by testing the same group of participants in two experimental sessions. In both experiments, participants performed the verification task. They verified a sentence with a quantifier (e.g., "Most of the gleerbs are feezda.") based on the numerical information provided in the second sentence, (e.g., "60% of the gleerbs are feezda"). To investigate between-subject and within-subject differences in meaning representations, we proposed an extended version of the Diffusion Decision Model with two parameters capturing truth conditions and vagueness. We fit the model to responses and reaction times data. In the first experiment, we found substantial between-subject differences in representations of most as reflected by the variability in the truth conditions. Moreover, we found that the verification of most is proportion-dependent as reflected in the reaction time effect and model parameter. In the second experiment, we showed that quantifier representations are stable over time as reflected in stable model parameters across two experimental sessions. These findings challenge semantic theories that assume the truth-conditional equivalence of most and more than half and contribute to the representational theory of vague concepts. The current study presents a promising approach to study semantic representations, which can have a wide application in experimental linguistics., (© 2023 The Authors. Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Cognitive Science Society (CSS).)

Children often display non-adult-like behaviors when reasoning with quantifiers and logical connectives in natural language. A classic example of this is the symmetrical interpretation of universally quantified statements like "Every girl is riding an elephant", which children often reject as false when they are used to describe a scene with, e.g., three girls each riding an elephant and a fourth elephant without a rider. We present evidence that children's understanding of these sentences is not attributable to syntactic, semantic, or general processing limitations. Instead, in two experiments, we argue that children's behavior stems primarily from difficulty in correctly identifying the speaker's intended "question under discussion", and that when this question is made contextually unambiguous, children's judgments are almost completely adultlike., (Copyright © 2022. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

While most research on scalar implicature has focused on the lexical scale "some" vs "all," here we investigated an understudied scale formed by two syntactic constructions: categorizations (e.g., "Wilma is a nurse") and comparisons ("Wilma is like a nurse"). An experimental study by Rubio-Fernandez et al. (2017) showed high rates of logical responses to superordinate comparisons, even though they are underinformative when interpreted pragmatically (e.g., "A robin is like a bird" implies that a robin is not a bird). Based on recent studies on enrichment priming, we predicted that including "some" and "all" statements (which typically elicit high rates of pragmatic responses) in sentence verification and sentence evaluation tasks would introduce an informativity bias, increasing pragmatic responses to superordinate comparisons. The results of three Web-based experiments supported our predictions, showing that different scalar expressions not only give rise to different rates of scalar implicatures, but can also affect the degree to which an experimental task elicits pragmatic reasoning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Background: The ontology authoring step in ontology development involves having to make choices about what subject domain knowledge to include. This may concern sorting out ontological differences and making choices between conflicting axioms due to limitations in the logic or the subject domain semantics. Examples are dealing with different foundational ontologies in ontology alignment and OWL 2 DL's transitive object property versus a qualified cardinality constraint. Such conflicts have to be resolved somehow. However, only isolated and fragmented guidance for doing so is available, which therefore results in ad hoc decision-making that may not be the best choice or forgotten about later., Results: This work aims to address this by taking steps towards a framework to deal with the various types of modeling conflicts through meaning negotiation and conflict resolution in a systematic way. It proposes an initial library of common conflicts, a conflict set, typical steps toward resolution, and the software availability and requirements needed for it. The approach was evaluated with an actual case of domain knowledge usage in the context of epizootic disease outbreak, being avian influenza, and running examples with COVID-19 ontologies., Conclusions: The evaluation demonstrated the potential and feasibility of a conflict resolution framework for ontologies., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Growing evidence supports the dual-strategy model, which suggests that reasoners have access to both a statistical and a counterexample reasoning strategy. In this paper, we explore further the processes underlying strategy use. We report three studies, the aim of which was to clarify the relation between this model and two forms of everyday reasoning. One of the most robust effects found with conditional reasoning with meaningful premises is the effect of alternative antecedents on the endorsement of AC and DA inferences. In a first study, we presented participants with conditional reasoning problems having more or fewer accessible alternatives as well as our dual-strategy diagnostic questionnaire. As hypothesized, results showed that strategy use had an independent effect on the inferences made with the AC and DA forms, over and above the effect of the number of antecedents, but was not related to responding to the MP and the MT forms. In a second study, we found that this relation extended to reasoning from an incompatibility statement. Finally, a third study showed that this relationship did not hold with probabilistic rather than logical response instructions, suggesting that the way reasoners transform a probabilistic evaluation into a dichotomous judgment is a key determinant of strategy use.

During acquisition, children must learn both the meanings of words and how to interpret them in context. For example, children must learn the logical semantics of the scalar quantifier some and its pragmatically enriched meaning: 'some but not all'. Some studies have shown that 'scalar implicature' - that some implies 'some but not all' - poses a challenge even to nine-year-olds, while others find success by age three. We asked whether reports of children's successes might be due to the computation of exclusion inferences (like contrast or mutual exclusivity) rather than scalar implicatures. We found that young children (N = 214; ages 4;0-7;11) sometimes compute symmetrical exclusion inferences rather than asymmetric scalar inferences. These data suggest that a stronger burden of evidence is required in studies of implicature; before concluding that children compute implicatures, researchers should first show that children exhibit sensitivity to asymmetric entailment in the task.

The discrepancy between syntax and semantics is a painstaking issue that hinders a better comprehension of the underlying neuronal processes in the human brain. In order to tackle the issue, we at first describe a striking correlation between Wittgenstein's Tractatus, that assesses the syntactic relationships between language and world, and Perlovsky's joint language-cognitive computational model, that assesses the semantic relationships between emotions and "knowledge instinct". Once established a correlation between a purely logical approach to the language and computable psychological activities, we aim to find the neural correlates of syntax and semantics in the human brain. Starting from topological arguments, we suggest that the semantic properties of a proposition are processed in higher brain's functional dimensions than the syntactic ones. In a fully reversible process, the syntactic elements embedded in Broca's area project into multiple scattered semantic cortical zones. The presence of higher functional dimensions gives rise to the increase in informational content that takes place in semantic expressions. Therefore, diverse features of human language and cognitive world can be assessed in terms of both the logic armor described by the Tractatus, and the neurocomputational techniques at hand. One of our motivations is to build a neuro-computational framework able to provide a feasible explanation for brain's semantic processing, in preparation for novel computers with nodes built into higher dimensions., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Previous developmental studies have revealed variation in children's ability to compute scalar inferences. While children have been shown to struggle with standard scalar inferences (e.g., with scalar quantifiers like "some") (Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, & Meroni, 2001; Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003), there is also a growing handful of inferences that children have been reported to derive quite readily (Barner & Bachrach, 2010; Hochstein, Bale, Fox, & Barner, 2016; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Singh, Wexler, Astle-Rahim, Kamawar, & Fox, 2016; Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 2015; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain, 2016; Tieu et al., 2017). One recent approach, which we refer to as the Alternatives-based approach, attributes the variability in children's performance to limitations in how children engage with the alternative sentences that are required to compute the relevant inferences. Specifically, if the alternative sentences can be generated by simplifying the assertion, rather than by lexically replacing one scalar term with another, children should be better able to compute the inference. In this paper, we investigated this prediction by assessing how children and adults interpret sentences that embed disjunction under a universal quantifier, such as "Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly". For adults, such sentences typically give rise to the distributive inference that some elephant caught a big butterfly and some elephant caught a small butterfly (Crnič, Chemla, & Fox, 2015; Fox, 2007; Gazdar, 1979). Another possible interpretation, though not one typically accessed by adults, is the conjunctive inference that every elephant caught a big butterfly and a small butterfly (Singh, Wexler, Astle-Rahim, Kamawar, & Fox, 2016). Crucially, for our purposes, it has been argued that both of these inferences can be derived using alternatives that are generated by deleting parts of the asserted sentence, rather than through lexical replacement, making these sentences an ideal test case for evaluating the predictions of the Alternatives-based approach. The findings of our experimental study reveal that children are indeed able to successfully compute this class of inferences, providing support for the Alternatives-based approach as a viable explanation of children's variable success in computing scalar inferences., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

A current main issue on conditionals is whether the meaning of general conditionals (e.g., If a card is red, then it is round) is deterministic (exceptionless) or probabilistic (exception-tolerating). In order to resolve the issue, two experiments examined the influence of conditional contexts (with vs. without frequency information of truth table cases) on the reading of general conditionals. Experiment 1 examined the direct reading of general conditionals in the possibility judgment task. Experiment 2 examined the indirect reading of general conditionals in the truth judgment task. It was found that both the direct and indirect reading of general conditionals exhibited the duality: the predominant deterministic semantic reading of conditionals without frequency information, and the predominant probabilistic pragmatic reading of conditionals with frequency information. The context of general conditionals determined the predominant reading of general conditionals. There were obvious individual differences in reading general conditionals with frequency information. The meaning of general conditionals is relative, depending on conditional contexts. The reading of general conditionals is flexible and complex so that no simple deterministic and probabilistic accounts are able to explain it. The present findings are beyond the extant deterministic and probabilistic accounts of conditionals.

In the biomedical domain, there exist a number of common data models (CDM) that have experienced wide uptake. However, none of these has emerged as the common model. Recently, the demand for integrating and analyzing increasingly large data sets in clinical and translational research has led to numerous efforts to harmonize existing CDMs and integrate data curated based on those models. These efforts raise the question of how to appropriately represent the semantics of data, and, furthermore, they highlight the fact that quite often different groups have greatly different definitions of 'semantics'. The question of how to formally assure that mappings between CDMs are correct is often overlooked. The answer to these challenges lies in using axiomatically-rich ontologies that allow verifying that terms refer to the same set of entities using automatic inference. This verification is only possible by building ontologies that represent the content of the scientific disciplines in accordance with the reality of the domain of the disciplines. Organizing and managing the development of numerous orthogonal domain-specific ontologies would benefit from using an Architecture Reference Model, that helps keeping the relationships consistent within each domain and ensure that appropriate inter-domain relationships are defined. This paper will explore how a strong logical representation of the scientific domain does not only foster harmonization of CDMs, but also informs and facilitates the transition from data over information to knowledge.

The goal of this paper is to test the main predictions of the semantic hypothesis about the directional effect in double conditionals (such as, 'A only if B/only if C, B') with a construction task. The semantic hypothesis claims that directional effect can be explained by the inherent directionality of the relation between the relatum and the target object of the premises. According to this hypothesis, a directional effect should occur if only one of the end-terms of the premises takes the role of relatum: a) if the end-term that plays the role of relatum is in the first premise, a forward directional effect is predicted (from A to C); and b) if the end-term that plays the role of relatum is in the second premise, a backward directional effect is predicted (from C to A). On the other hand, it claims that there should be no directional effect when both end-terms take the role of relatum or when neither of the end-terms plays the role of relatum. Three experiments confirmed the main predictions of the semantic hypothesis in a construction task., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Reasoning with inconsistencies is an important issue for Semantic Web as imperfect information is unavoidable in real applications. For this, different paraconsistent approaches, due to their capacity to draw as nontrivial conclusions by tolerating inconsistencies, have been proposed to reason with inconsistent description logic knowledge bases. However, existing paraconsistent approaches are often criticized for being too skeptical. To this end, this paper presents a non-monotonic paraconsistent version of description logic reasoning, called minimally inconsistent reasoning, where inconsistencies tolerated in the reasoning are minimized so that more reasonable conclusions can be inferred. Some desirable properties are studied, which shows that the new semantics inherits advantages of both non-monotonic reasoning and paraconsistent reasoning. A complete and sound tableau-based algorithm, called multi-valued tableaux, is developed to capture the minimally inconsistent reasoning. In fact, the tableaux algorithm is designed, as a framework for multi-valued DL, to allow for different underlying paraconsistent semantics, with the mere difference in the clash conditions. Finally, the complexity of minimally inconsistent description logic reasoning is shown on the same level as the (classical) description logic reasoning.

Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B (e.g., from If it rained, Alicia got wet and It rained to Alicia got wet). Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise (e.g., If she forgot her umbrella, Alicia got wet) can lower participants' rate of agreement-an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative conditional as a context-sensitive strict conditional: true if and only if its consequent is true in each of a contextually determined set of situations in which its antecedent is true. Pragmatically, the theory claims that context changes in response to new assertions, including new conditional premises. Thus, the conclusion of a modus ponens argument may no longer be accepted in the changed context. Psychologically, the theory describes people as capable of reasoning about broad classes of possible situations, ordered by typicality, without having to reason about individual possible worlds. The theory accounts for the main suppression phenomena, and it generates some novel predictions that new experiments confirm., (Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)

A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants were not asked to reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical brightness (Experiments 2-3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were judged to be more likable and brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing-sentence believability and facial expression-had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. The authors conclude that sensitivity to logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and outside of awareness. They discuss the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make reference to the literature on discourse comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

A central topic in the logic of science concerns the proper semantic analysis of theoretical sentences, that is sentences containing theoretical terms. In this paper, we present a novel choice-semantical account of theoretical truth based on the epsilon-term definition of theoretical terms. Specifically, we develop two ways of specifying the truth conditions of theoretical statements in a choice functional semantics, each giving rise to a corresponding logic of such statements. In order to investigate the inferential strength of these logical systems, we provide a translation of each truth definition into a modal definition of theoretical truth. Based on this, we show that the stronger notion of choice-semantical truth captures more adequately our informal semantic understanding of scientific statements., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Quantifier words like each, every, all and three are among the most abstract words in language. Unlike nouns, verbs and adjectives, the meanings of quantifiers are not related to a referent out in the world. Rather, quantifiers specify what relationships hold between the sets of entities, events and properties denoted by other words. When two quantifiers are in the same clause, they create a systematic ambiguity. "Every kid climbed a tree" could mean that there was only one tree, climbed by all, or many different trees, one per climbing kid. In the present study, participants chose a picture to indicate their preferred reading of different ambiguous sentences - those containing every, as well as the other three quantifiers. In Experiment 1, we found large systematic differences in preference, depending on the quantifier word. In Experiment 2, we then manipulated the choice of a particular reading of one sentence, and tested how this affected participants' reading preference on a subsequent target sentence. We found a priming effect for all quantifiers, but only when the prime and target sentences contained the same quantifier. For example, all-a sentences prime other all-a sentences, while each-a primes each-a, but sentences with each do not prime sentences with all or vice versa. In Experiment 3, we ask whether the lack of priming across quantifiers could be due to the two sentences sharing one fewer word. We find that changing the verb between the prime and target sentence does not reduce the priming effect. In Experiment 4, we discover one case where there is priming across quantifiers - when one number (e.g. three) is in the prime, and a different one (e.g. four) is in the target. We discuss how these findings relate to linguistic theories of quantifier meaning and what they tell us about the division of labor between conceptual content and combinatorial semantics, as well as the mental representations of quantification and of the abstract logical structure of language., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Directionality effect in deductive reasoning is a very well-known phenomenon that shows that the percentage of forward or backward inferences that participants make depends on the conditional form used. A new extension of the semantic hypothesis (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000) is presented to explain the directionality effect in double conditionals with different directionality. This hypothesis claims that the directional effect depends on which term plays the role of relatum. It also makes several novel claims which have been confirmed in three experiments: Experiments 1 and 2 showed there were more forward than backward inferences when the end-term that played the role of relatum was in the first premise, experiment 1: t (45) = 2.73, p < .01, experiment 2: t (38) = 12.06, p < .05, but there were more backward than forward inferences when the end-term that played the role of relatum was in the second premise, experiment 1: t (45) = 2.84, p < .01, experiment 2: t (38) = 2.21, p < .04. Experiment 3 showed that there was no directional effect when both end-terms played the role of relatum, t (34) = 1.39, p = .17, or when both middle-terms (or neither of the end-terms) played the role of relatum, t (34) = .78, p = .44. These experiments confirmed the predictions of the new extension of the semantic hypothesis.

We sketch four applications of Marr's levels-of-analysis methodology to the relations between logic and experimental data in the cognitive neuroscience of language and reasoning. The first part of the paper illustrates the explanatory power of computational level theories based on logic. We show that a Bayesian treatment of the suppression task in reasoning with conditionals is ruled out by EEG data, supporting instead an analysis based on defeasible logic. Further, we describe how results from an EEG study on temporal prepositions can be reanalyzed using formal semantics, addressing a potential confound. The second part of the article demonstrates the predictive power of logical theories drawing on EEG data on processing progressive constructions and on behavioral data on conditional reasoning in people with autism. Logical theories can constrain processing hypotheses all the way down to neurophysiology, and conversely neuroscience data can guide the selection of alternative computational level models of cognition., (Copyright © 2014 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)

Background: We report the results of two experiments that examine the mental representations underlying the comprehension and reasoning stages of negative exceptive conditionals requiring the subjunctive ('B a menos que A' and 'B a no ser que A' = 'B unless A') and the indicative mood ('B excepto si A' and 'B salvo si A' = 'B except if A')., Method: A truth table task was employed to infer the mental representation that people have in mind when they reason with negative exceptive conditionals., Results: Both experiments showed that participants selected the possibility 'B & not-A' more frequently than the possibility 'not-B & A' when the conditional required the indicative mood, but they selected the possibilities 'B & not-A' and 'not-B & A' equally frequently when the conditional required the subjunctive mood., Conclusions: Exceptive conditionals in the subjunctive mood lead people to think in terms of dual possibilities, whereas the indicative mood leads people to consider just one possibility.

In two experiments we investigate conditional reasoning using event-related potentials (ERPs). Our goal was to examine the time course of inference making in two conditional forms, one logically valid (Modus Ponens, MP) and one logically invalid (Affirming the Consequent, AC). We focus particularly on the involvement of semantically-based inferential processes potentially marked by modulations of the N400. We also compared reasoning about emotional and neutral contents with separate sets of stimuli of differing linguistic complexity across the two experiments. Both MP and AC modulated the N400 component, suggesting the involvement of a semantically-based inferential mechanism common across different logical forms, content types, and linguistic features of the problems. Emotion did not have an effect on early components, and did not interact with components related to inference making. There was a main effect of emotion in the 800-1050 ms time window, consistent with an effect on sustained attention. The results suggest that conditional reasoning is not a purely formal process but that it importantly implicates semantic processing, and that the effect of emotion on reasoning does not primarily operate through a modulation of early automatic stages of information processing., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In their target article, Wang and Busemeyer (2013) discuss question order effects in terms of incompatible projectors on a Hilbert space. In a similar vein, Blutner recently presented an orthoalgebraic query language essentially relying on dynamic update semantics. Here, I shall comment on some interesting analogies between the different variants of dynamic semantics and generalized quantum theory to illustrate other kinds of order effects in human cognition, such as belief revision, the resolution of anaphors, and default reasoning that result from the crucial non-commutativity of mental operations upon the belief state of a cognitive agent., (Copyright © 2013 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)

Characterizing the neural substrate of reasoning has been investigated with regularity over the last 10 years or so while relying on measures that come primarily from positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging. To some extent, these techniques—as well as those from electroencephalography—have shown that time course is equally worthwhile for revealing the way reasoning processes work in the brain. In this work, we employ magnetoencephalography while investigating Modus Ponens (If P then Q; P//Therefore, Q) in order to simultaneously derive time course and the source of this fundamental logical inference. The present results show that conditional reasoning involves several successive cognitive processes, each of which engages a distinct cerebral network over the course of inference making, and as soon as a conditional sentence is processed.

Logical grammatical structures comprehension is the ability to understand the relations between objects, actions, and qualities in spoken and written sentences. The Logical Grammatical Structures Test (LGST) was especially devised to assess these abilities in children and adolescents. In the present study the LGST was administered to 405 healthy Dutch children and adolescents. The aims of the present study were (i) to evaluate the psychometric properties of the LGST (using an Item Response Theory framework), and (ii) to establish demographically corrected normative data. The results showed that there was a strong curvilinear relationship between age and LGST performance, i.e., the relative improvement in ability level was much more pronounced for younger children (aged below 14 years) than for older children (aged above 14 years). Level of parental education was positively associated with the LGST performance. Normative data that took the relevant demographic variables into account were established, and it was shown that the LGST had sound psychometric properties.

In two experiments, we established a new phenomenon in reasoning from disjunctions of the grammatical form either A or else B, where A and B are clauses. When individuals have to assess whether pairs of assertions can be true at the same time, they tend to focus on the truth of each clause of an exclusive disjunction (and ignore the concurrent falsity of the other clause). Hence, they succumb to illusions of consistency and of inconsistency with pairs consisting of a disjunction and a conjunction (Experiment 1), and with simpler problems consisting of pairs of disjunctions, such as eIther there is a pie or else there is a cake and Either there isn't a pie or else there is a cake (Experiment 2), that appear to be consistent with one another, but in fact are not. These results corroborate the theory that reasoning depends on envisaging models of possibilities.

In this paper we question the theoretical tenability of Hertwig, Benz, and Krauss's (2008) (HBK) argument that responses commonly taken as manifestations of the conjunction fallacy should be instead considered as reflecting "reasonable pragmatic and semantic inferences" because the meaning of and does not always coincide with that of the logical operator ∧. We also question the relevance of the experimental evidence that HBK provide in support of their argument as well as their account of the pertinent literature. Finally, we report two novel experiments in which we employed HBK's procedure to control for the interpretation of and. The results obtained overtly contradict HBK's data and claims. We conclude with a discussion on the alleged feebleness of the conjunction fallacy, and suggest directions that future research on this topic might pursue., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Under the assumption of the principle of cooperation (Grice, 1989), a statement such as "some eels are fish" is thought to be false since it contains less information than is considered sufficient. However, the statement is logically sound since the meaning of "some" is compatible with "all". Currently, the primary interpretation of such underinformative statements remains subject to debate. According to Levinson (2000), the pragmatic "some but not all" interpretation is the default interpretation, while others (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995) argue that this pragmatic interpretation only comes to the fore when relevant within the context and is thus considered secondary to the logical "some and perhaps all" interpretation. In this study, three factors that may influence the answer pattern are studied: task load, working memory capacity, and repetition of the statements. In Experiment 1, we used a secondary task paradigm to manipulate the cognitive load under which a number of underinformative statements had to be judged. We observed that for participants with a rather limited working memory span it is harder to reach a pragmatic interpretation under cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the repetition of the statements. We observed that with a higher number of filler statements, participants produced fewer consistent answer patterns. This study provides further evidence against the automaticity of the pragmatic interpretation: It shows that the pragmatic interpretation requires more cognitive effort than the logical interpretation and that increasing the number of filler statements inhibits the development of a response strategy.

We report the results of an experiment investigating conditional inferences from conditional assertions such as 'Juan won't go to León unless Nuria goes to Madrid' and 'Either Nuria goes to Madrid or Juan won't go to León'. This experiment addresses Dancygier's claims about the semantics of 'unless' by examining inferential endorsements of 'not-A unless B' and 'Either B or not-A' in the canonical order, presenting the categorical premise after the conditional assertions, and in the inverse order, presenting the categorical premise before the conditional assertions. The results of the experiment confirm that the representation of 'unless' includes two possibilities, although as Dancygier holds one of the possibilities may not be complete. The implications of the results are discussed in the context of the strategic nature of conditional reasoning and recent convergent theories of linguistic processing.

Background: Ontologies are widely used to represent knowledge in biomedicine. Systematic approaches for detecting errors and disagreements are needed for large ontologies with hundreds or thousands of terms and semantic relationships. A recent approach of defining terms using logical definitions is now increasingly being adopted as a method for quality control as well as for facilitating interoperability and data integration., Results: We show how automated reasoning over logical definitions of ontology terms can be used to improve ontology structure. We provide the Java software package GULO (Getting an Understanding of LOgical definitions), which allows fast and easy evaluation for any kind of logically decomposed ontology by generating a composite OWL ontology from appropriate subsets of the referenced ontologies and comparing the inferred relationships with the relationships asserted in the target ontology. As a case study we show how to use GULO to evaluate the logical definitions that have been developed for the Mammalian Phenotype Ontology (MPO)., Conclusions: Logical definitions of terms from biomedical ontologies represent an important resource for error and disagreement detection. GULO gives ontology curators a fast and simple tool for validation of their work.

Thesauri that are "ontologized" into OWL-DL semantics are highly amenable to modeling errors resulting from falsely interpreting existential restrictions. We investigated the OWL-DL representation of the NCI Thesaurus (NCIT) in order to assess the correctness of existential restrictions. A random sample of 354 axioms using the someValuesFrom operator was taken. According to a rating performed by two domain experts, roughly half of these examples, and in consequence more than 76,000 axioms in the OWL-DL version, make incorrect assertions if interpreted according to description logics semantics. These axioms therefore constitute a huge source for unintended models, rendering most logic-based reasoning unreliable. After identifying typical error patterns we discuss some possible improvements. Our recommendation is to either amend the problematic axioms in the OWL-DL formalization or to consider some less strict representational format.

Individuals in different contexts are referred to as "heroes" for seemingly different reasons. To better understand how and why people use this term, three studies were conducted. Approaching the question deductively, individuals defined the term "hero" and responses were coded according to existing definitions. Then, a definition of hero was sought inductively by examining the specific reasons participants cited in choosing their heroes. A third study further examined individuals' descriptions of their heroes in light of their own self views. The findings across these studies extend our understanding of the term hero and suggest that the use of the term is based both on the specific features of any heroic figure, as well as on the self views of the person identifying the hero.

A constellation of joint probability estimates is semantically coherent when the quantitative relationship among estimates of P(A), P(B), P(A and B), and P(A or B) is consistent with the relationship among the sets described in the problem statement. The possible probability estimates can form an extremely large number of permutations. However, this entire problem space can be reduced to six theoretically meaningful patterns: logically fallacious (conjunction or disjunction fallacies), identical sets (e.g., water and H(2)O), mutually exclusive sets (e.g., horses and zebras), subsets (e.g., robins and birds), overlapping sets (e.g., accountants and musicians), and inconsistent overlapping sets. Determining which of these patterns describes any set of probability estimates has been automated using Excel spreadsheet formulae. Researchers may use the semantic coherence technique to examine the consequences of differently worded problems, individual differences, or experimental manipulations. The spreadsheet described above can be downloaded as a supplement from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.

Two experiments are reported in which the representational distinctiveness of terms within categorical syllogisms was manipulated in order to examine the assumption of mental models theory that abstract, spatially based representations underpin deduction. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated conclusion validity for syllogisms containing either phonologically distinctive terms (e.g., harks, paps, and fids) or phonologically nondistinctive terms (e.g., fuds, fods, and feds). Logical performance was enhanced with the distinctive contents, suggesting that the phonological properties of syllogism terms can play an important role in deduction. In Experiment 2, participants received either the phonological materials from Experiment 1 or syllogisms involving distinctive or nondistinctive visual contents. Logical inference was again enhanced for the distinctive contents, whether phonological or visual in nature. Our findings suggest a broad involvement of multimodal information in syllogistic reasoning and question the assumed primacy of abstract, spatially organized representations in deduction, as is claimed by mental models theorists.

The mental model theory of reasoning postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities in which the premises of an inference hold and that these models represent what is true but not what is false. An unexpected consequence of this assumption is that certain premises should yield systematically invalid inferences. This prediction is unique among current theories of reasoning, because no alternative theory, whether based on formal rules of inference or on probabilistic considerations, predicts these illusory inferences. We report three studies of novel illusory inferences that depend on embedded disjunctions-for example, premises of this sort: A or else (B or else C). The theory distinguishes between those embedded disjunctions that should yield illusions and those that should not. In Experiment 1, we corroborated this distinction. In Experiment 2, we extended the illusory inferences to a more stringently controlled set of problems. In Experiment 3, we established a novel method for reducing illusions by calling for participants to make auxiliary inferences.

Theory predicts a close structural relation of formal languages with natural languages. Both share the aspect of an underlying grammar which either generates (hierarchically) structured expressions or allows us to decide whether a sentence is syntactically correct or not. The advantage of rule-based communication is commonly believed to be its efficiency and effectiveness. A particularly important class of formal languages are those underlying the mathematical syntax. Here we provide brain-imaging evidence that the syntactic processing of abstract mathematical formulae, written in a first order language, is, indeed efficient and effective as a rule-based generation and decision process. However, it is remarkable, that the neural network involved, consisting of intraparietal and prefrontal regions, only involves Broca's area in a surprisingly selective way. This seems to imply that despite structural analogies of common and current formal languages, at the neural level, mathematics and natural language are processed differently, in principal.

Two studies examined the hypothesis that accepting false premises as true in order to make the modus ponens (MP) inference requires inhibition of contradictory knowledge. Study 1 presented both MP and affirmation of the consequent (AC) inferences using either false, but plausible premises or completely unbelievable premises, with standard logical constructions using either an evaluation or a production paradigm. The rate of acceptance of the MP inferences was significantly greater with unbelievable premises than with plausible premises, in both evaluation and production, while no such effect was observed with the AC inferences. Study 2 used a computer-generated presentation allowing for measures of response times. Participants who tended to accept the MP inference with unbelievable premises took longer to do so with plausible premises than with unbelievable premises. Participants who tended to reject the MP inference showed an opposite pattern. In both studies, the observed effects were not shown for the AC inferences. The overall pattern of results was consistent with the hypothesis that inhibition is a key component of logical reasoning with false premises.

According to the conjunction rule, the probability of A and B cannot exceed the probability of either single event. This rule reads and in terms of the logical operator wedge, interpreting A and B as an intersection of two events. As linguists have long argued, in natural language "and" can convey a wide range of relationships between conjuncts such as temporal order ("I went to the store and bought some whisky"), causal relationships ("Smile and the world smiles with you"), and can indicate a collection of sets rather than their intersection (as in "He invited friends and colleagues to the party"). When "and" is used in word problems researching the conjunction fallacy, the conjunction rule, which assumes the logical operator wedge, therefore cannot be mechanically invoked as a norm. Across several studies, we used different methods of probing people's understanding of and-conjunctions, and found evidence that many of those respondents who violated the conjunction rule in their probability or frequency judgments inferred a meaning of and that differs from the logical operator wedge. We argue that these findings have implications for whether judgments involving ambiguous and-conjunctions that violate the conjunction rule should be considered manifestations of fallacious reasoning or of reasonable pragmatic and semantic inferences.

Previous research (e.g., S. A. Gelman & E. M. Markman, 1986; A. Gopnik & D. M. Sobel, 2000) suggests that children can use category labels to make inductive inferences about nonobvious causal properties of objects. However, such inductive generalizations can fail to predict objects' causal properties when (a) the property being projected varies within the category, (b) the category is arbitrary (e.g., things smaller than a bread box), or (c) the property being projected is due to an exogenous intervention rather than intrinsic to the object kind. In 4 studies, the authors showed that preschoolers (M = 48 months; range = 42-57 months) were sensitive to these constraints on induction and selectively engaged in exploration when evidence about objects' causal properties conflicted with inductive generalizations from the objects' kind to their causal powers. This suggests that the exploratory actions children generate in free play could support causal learning.

Four experiments investigated 4-year-olds' understanding of adjective-noun compositionality and their sensitivity to statistics when interpreting scalar adjectives. In Experiments 1 and 2, children selected tall and short items from 9 novel objects called pimwits (1-9 in. in height) or from this array plus 4 taller or shorter distractor objects of the same kind. Changing the height distributions of the sets shifted children's tall and short judgments. However, when distractors differed in name and surface features from targets, in Experiment 3, judgments did not shift. In Experiment 4, dissimilar distractors did affect judgments when they received the same name as targets. It is concluded that 4-year-olds deploy a compositional semantics that is sensitive to statistics and mediated by linguistic labels.

We distinguish between grasping gestures associated with using an object for its intended purpose (functional) and those used to pick up an object (volumetric) and we develop a novel experimental framework to show that both kinds of knowledge are automatically evoked by objects and by words denoting those objects. Cued gestures were carried out in the context of depicted objects or visual words. On incongruent trials, the cued gesture was not compatible with gestures typically associated with the contextual item. On congruent trials, the gesture was compatible with the item's functional or volumetric gesture. For both gesture types, response latency was longer for incongruent trials indicating that objects and words elicited both functional and volumetric manipulation knowledge. Additional evidence, however, clearly supports a distinction between these two kinds of gestural knowledge. Under certain task conditions, functional gestures can be evoked without the associated activation of volumetric gestures. We discuss the implication of these results for theories of action evoked by objects and words, and for interpretation of functional imaging results.

A series of experiments investigated what determines people's degree of belief in conditionals and their readiness to draw inferences from them. Information on the frequency of exceptions to conditional rules was contrasted with information about the number of different disabling conditions causing these exceptions. Experiments 1 and 2, using conditionals with arbitrary contents, revealed a strong effect of frequency information and no effect of disabling information. Experiment 3 established that, in the absence of frequency information, the disabling condition information used in Experiments 1 and 2 affected belief in the conditionals and inference acceptance, as has been found in many previous studies (Byrne, 1989; DeNeys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2003b). Experiment 4 extended the results of Experiments 1 and 2 to everyday conditionals. The results show that belief in a conditional, and the confidence in inferences subsequently drawn from it, both depend on the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. This probability is estimated from the relative frequency of exceptions regardless of what causes them.

In this dual-task study, we applied both cross-talk logic and locus-of-slack logic to test whether participants can retrieve semantic categories in Task 2 in parallel to Task 1 bottleneck processing. Whereas cross-talk logic can detect parallel memory retrieval only in conditions of categorical overlap between tasks, the locus-of-slack approach is independent of such restrictions. As was expected, using the cross-talk logic, we found clear evidence for parallel retrieval of semantic categories when there was categorical overlap between tasks (Experiment 1). Locus-of-slack-based evidence for parallel semantic retrieval was found, however, both in conditions with (Experiment 1) and in those without (Experiment 2) categorical overlap between tasks. Crucially,however, increasing the demand for resources required to switch from Task 1 to Task 2 eliminated even the locus-of-slack-based evidence for parallel memory retrieval during the psychological refractory period (Experiment 3). Together, our results suggest that parallel retrieval is not bound to conditions of categorical overlap between tasks but, instead, is contingent upon resources needed for switching between tasks (e.g., Oriet, Tombu, & Jolicoeur, 2005).

This article sketches the Parallel Architecture, an approach to the structure of grammar that contrasts with mainstream generative grammar (MGG) in that (a) it treats phonology, syntax, and semantics as independent generative components whose structures are linked by interface rules; (b) it uses a parallel constraint-based formalism that is nondirectional; (c) it treats words and rules alike as pieces of linguistic structure stored in long-term memory. In addition to the theoretical advantages offered by the Parallel Architecture, it lends itself to a direct interpretation in processing terms, in which pieces of structure stored in long-term memory are assembled in working memory, and alternative structures are in competition. The resulting model of processing is compared both with processing models derived from MGG and with lexically driven connectionist architectures.

Background: Everyday talk is characterised by implicit information that the listener is required to infer. We introduce a method of analysis based on theories from semiotics and classical rhetoric that enables the researcher to reveal unspoken beliefs that underlie such talk., Objective: This paper aims to provide a detailed description of the process of unveiling the hidden elements of logical inference within narrative. We wish to enable other medical education researchers to utilise this method in their own field of interest., Overview: We begin by giving an overview of the concepts of the enthymeme in rhetoric and opposition in narrative analysis. We then demonstrate the steps required in order to undertake such analysis by using examples from our own data. Strengths and weaknesses of this approach, including the problem of inference, will be discussed., Conclusion: We identify a number of current domains in which the investigation of enthymemes has been fruitful. We suggest that this method might also be utilised successfully within the domain of medical education research and encourage other researchers to consider this approach.

Many studies have shown that inferential behavior is strongly affected by access to real-life information about premises. However, it is also true that both children and adults can often make logically appropriate inferences that lead to empirically unbelievable conclusions. One way of reconciling these is to suppose that logical instructions allow inhibition of information about premises that would otherwise be retrieved during reasoning. On the basis of this idea, we hypothesized that it should be easier to endorse an empirically false conclusion on the basis of clearly false premises than on the basis of relatively believable premises. Two studies are presented that support this hypothesis.

Many authors have argued that word-learning constraints help guide a word-learner's hypotheses as to the meaning of a newly heard word. One such class of constraints derives from the observation that word-learners of all ages prefer to map novel labels to novel objects in situations of referential ambiguity. In this paper I use eye-tracking to document the mental computations that support this word-learning strategy. Adults and preschoolers saw images of known and novel objects, and were asked to find the referent of known and novel labels. Experiment 1 shows that adults systematically reject a known distractor (e.g. brush) before mapping a novel label (e.g. "dax") to a novel object. This is consistent with the proposal that participants worked through a Disjunctive Syllogism (i.e. Process-of-Elimination) to motivate the mapping of the novel label to the novel object. Experiment 2 shows that processing is similar for adults performing an implicit Disjunctive Syllogism (e.g. "the winner is the dax") and an explicit Disjunctive Syllogism (e.g. "the winner is not the iron"). Experiment 3 reveals that similar processes govern preschoolers' mapping of novel labels. Taken together, these results suggest that word-learners use Disjunctive Syllogism to motivate the mapping of novel labels to novel objects.

Framing effects are said to occur when equivalent frames lead to different choices. However, the equivalence in question has been incompletely conceptualized. In a new normative analysis of framing effects, we complete the conceptualization by introducing the notion of information equivalence. Information equivalence obtains when no choice-relevant inferences can be drawn from the speaker's choice of frame. We show that, to support the normative implications traditionally attributed to framing effects, frames must be equivalent in this sense. We also present new evidence for McKenzie and Nelson's (2003) reference point hypothesis, which posits a tendency to cast descriptions in terms of what has increased relative to the reference point. This leakage of information about relative state violates information equivalence, and gives rise to a normative account of the most robust finding in the attribute framing literature - the valence-consistency of preference shifts. We argue that, more generally, valenced descriptions leak information about perceived valence. Such "implicit recommendations" may generalize the reference point explanation of the valence-consistent shift. Normative and psychological implications of the information leakage framework are discussed.

The effect of emotional content on logical reasoning is explored in three experiments. Theparticipants completed a conditional reasoning task (If p, then q) with emotional and neutral contents. In Experiment 1, existing emotional and neutral words were used. The emotional value of initially neutral words was experimentally manipulated in Experiments 1B and 2, using classical conditioning. In all experiments, participants were less likely to provide normatively correct answers when reasoning about emotional stimuli, compared with neutral stimuli. This was true for both negative (Experiments 1B and 2) and positive contents (Experiment 2). The participants' interpretations of the conditional statements were also measured (perceived sufficiency, necessity, causality, and plausibility). The results showed the expected relationship between interpretation and reasoning. However, emotion did not affect interpretation. Emotional and neutral conditional statements were interpreted similarly. The results are discussed in light of current models of emotion and reasoning.